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Abstract
The existing research regarding political assassinations largely focuses on 
characteristics of assassins, for example, by identifying typologies (e.g. Clarke,
1990), and is limited by small sample sizes, restricted geographic locations and 
confounded research designs. The current research examines 400 incidents of 
political assassination, occurring between 1990 and 2008, worldwide. Data are 
collected from UK broadsheet newspapers (via LexisNexis) and the Mickolus series 
of books (Mickolus, Sander & Murdock, 1989; Mickolus, 1993; Mickolus and 
Simmons, 1997; Mickolus and Simmons, 2002), which provide accounts of 
transnational terrorism. This data is coded on a series of variables, describing aspects 
of the assassin (e.g. identity, weapon choice, presence at the scene, number of 
assassins and roles), and aspects of the victim (e.g. age, geographical region in which 
they are killed, location and timing in which they are targeted, their previous 
experiences of threats and assassination attempts, whether they have a bodyguard or 
not). Three models are explored. First, the Situational Vulnerability of targets of 
assassination is considered, incorporating the Accessibility of the target, and the 
Victim’s Prepai'edness (i.e. previous threats, previous attempts, and presence of 
bodyguard). Second, the Specificity of the attack is explored in terms of the collateral 
victims of assassinations (injuries and deaths), in relation to the type of perpetrator, 
the location of the attack, and the geographical region in which the attack occurred. 
Finally, the research models the Method of attack used by assassins, in terms of 
weapon Complexity, and the Proximity between victim and offender at the time of 
the attack. Interactions were found between Accessibility and Complexity,
Proximity, and Specificity; Victim Preparedness and Complexity and Specificity; 
and Complexity and Proximity. The results are considered in relation to the literature 
and the implications and futui'e directions for research are discussed.
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PART ONE: 
DEFINING ASSASSINATIONS
1. Introduction to the thesis
Political assassinations first became the subject of research in the early 1960s, when 
studies began to emerge fi om tlie US, perhaps in response to tlie tln eat of presidential 
assassination. The existing body of research has focused largely on the assassin, 
creating profiles and typologies of political assassins. For example, Rothstein (1964, 
1966) defined ‘Presidential Assassination Syndrome’, arguing that there are a 
collection of behaviours which create a desire in individuals to attack or tlireaten the 
President. Subsequently, Clarke (1990) argued for a 4-part typology of assassins, 
with differentiation according to seven criteria identified by Clarke, More recent 
research has attempted to ‘claiify’ the body of evidence, with the Exceptional Case 
Study Project (ECSP, Fein and Vosskeuil, 1998) debunking existing myths about 
political assassins, and highlighting aspects of research which appear to be more 
reliable. Outside of the US, European research has concentrated more on attacks on 
the British Royal Family, and politicians in general. Perhaps largely due to 
definitional differences, the findings of Eui opean research contrast with those of the 
US, where a liigher presence of mental illness is noted in assassins and threateners in 
Europe.
This thesis moves away fiom these attempts to profile the assassin, and instead 
examines the observable behavioui's of the assassin, and those of the victim in terms 
of then vulnerability at the time of their death. In addition, the current research is not 
restricted to one geogiapliical region (i.e. the US, or Europe) and instead will gather 
data on attacks occuning worldwide. The research will analyse observable features 
of political assassination with the intention of developing models tliat account for 
vai'iations in the victims’ accessibility and preparedness for an assassination, and the 
way that the assassinations ai e carried out in terms of the specificity of the attack, 
and the method used. Together, these models will combine to enhance understanding 
of political assassinations, the circumstances in which they occur, and the way that 
they are caiiied out.
The thesis is formed of two parts. Part 1 will address the issue of defining political 
assassinations, both as a phenomenon in its own right, and also in light of homicide
and terrorism. Chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion of the existing definitions of 
political assassination. Through a careful analysis of the literature, the key concepts 
wliich are included in the defhiitions are identified, along with the ways in which 
tliese are combined by different authors to create definitions. In addition, the way the 
individual concepts aie defined is examined. As political assassination is, at its most 
basic, a form of homicide, the literature on a number of homicide sub-types and their 
definitions is also considered. Again, these are analysed to identify the concepts 
used, and the way in wliich these concepts aie defined. Finally, chapter 2 reviews the 
terrorism literature, in order to establish whether this could be used to inform future 
political assassination research. This includes a discussion of the debate surrounding 
whether political assassination is a form of terrorism. As part of this, definitions of 
terrorism were examined, and the underlying concepts identified.
Chapter 3 provides the first in a series of empirical studies, examining how well real- 
life political assassination incidents meet the definitions of political assassination set 
out by the literature. Using concepts identified m chapter 2, accounts of political 
assassinations are content analysed, and Partial Order Scalogram Analysis is then 
used to ‘scale’ political assassination incidents. This enables identification of how 
well the definition concepts account for variation in political assassination incidents.
Similarly, chapter 4 uses the concepts undeiiymg homicide to content analyse a 
sample of political assassinations and homicides. Multidimensional Scalogiam 
Analysis (MSA) is then used to understand the similarity between political 
assassinations and other types of homicides. MSA also enables identification of the 
way they are differentiated fiom each other by the definitions identified in chapter 2.
The final empirical analysis in this series is found in chapter 5, and this considers 
whether assassination incidents meet the definition of terrorism set out by the 
literature. Again, the concepts identified as underlying terrorism definitions are used 
to content analyse accounts of both political assassination and terrorist attacks. MSA 
is again used, in order to establish how political assassinations and terrorism differ 
on the basis of these concepts, if at all. Due to the debate sunounding the inclusion 
of political assassinations as a form of tenorism, these results ai e of particular
importance, as, if political assassinations are found to be similai* to other forms of 
teiTorism, the terrorism literature can then be used to inform subsequent political 
assassination research.
Pait 1 is concluded in chapter 6, with a discussion of the findings from the series of 
emphical analyses, and an explanation of how this thesis will define the term 
‘political assassmation’.
Pait 2 of the thesis moves away from definitional issues, examining the existing 
research on political assassinations and conducting emphical analysis of a sample of 
400 political assassination incidents canied out in the last 18 years. Chapter 7 
provides a review of the existing literatui e in the political assassination field. This 
begins with pre-1998 US-based research, which focuses on creating profiles and 
typologies of offenders. The next part of chapter 7 provides a discussion of post- 
1998 US-based reseaich, which is less focused on typology or profile creation, and 
instead examines the behaviours observed in political assassination incidents. 
Finally, chapter 7 provides a discussion of European-based political assassination 
research. This research tends to take a broader sample of political assassination 
incidents, with less focus on heads of state, and more on politicians in general, and 
also included incidents targeted at members of the Royal Families.
Chapter 8 discusses theoretical perspectives which can be applied to the 
understanding of political assassinations. Theories of homicide, rational choice 
theory, situational crime prevention, routine activity theory, and script theory aie 
discussed, offering various viewpoints from which to understand political 
assassinations.
Chapter 9 provides an overview of the methodology used in the thesis. This begins 
with an overview of the methods used in previous political assassination research, 
and an explanation of the aims of the thesis. The methodology to be used in this 
thesis is presented, along with a discussion of the existing databases in this area, and 
the database created and used for the cun ent research. Finally, an explanation of the
content analysis technique is presented, along with an explanation of the coding 
scheme which is used to content analyse the data.
Chapter 10 provides an overview of the sample, in temis of place and time 
demographics, the characteristics of the victim and the assassin, and aspects of the 
attack. Demogi aphic aspects of the immediate victims ai e presented, along with the 
number of collateral victims, and the previous experiences of the tar get (e.g. threats, 
or previous attempts). The identity of the assassin is discussed, with a focus on the 
teiTorist groups and governments who have committed assassinations in this sample. 
Finally, tlie data relating to the weapon used, and the location and timing of the 
political assassinations is presented.
Chapter 11 provides an empirical analysis of the Situational Vulnerability of political 
assassination victims. This examines the accessibility of victims at the time of the 
attack, in terms of their location and the timing of the attack, and also then 
preparedness for an attack, by looking at whether they have received threats prior to 
their death, whether they survived previous attempts, and whether they were 
protected by a bodyguai d at the time of the attack. The resulting models enable the 
creation of scales of Accessibility and Victim Preparedness, enabling the scoring of 
individual assassination incidents.
Chapter 12 continues the empirical analysis, with an examination of the level of 
specificity seen in political assassinations in terms of the numbers of victims (both 
injmed and deceased) other than the target. The specificity is examined in light of the 
type of assassin, the location and timing of the attack, and the geographical region in 
which the attack took place. The Specificity of assassinations is then compared to the 
scales of Accessibility and Preparedness.
Chapter 13 is the final empirical analysis chapter, looking at the methods of political 
assassination used by assassins, in terms of the complexity of the weapons used, and 
the level of proximity between the target and the victim at the time of the attack. 
Again, these aie modelled, and scales of Complexity and Proximity created. The
chapter ends with a comparison of Complexity and Proximity, along with 
Accessibility and Prepaiedness, and Specificity.
Finally, chapter 15 offers a discussion of the thesis as a whole. The findings, and the 
models, aie compaied to the existing research and the theoretical perspectives 
discussed in chapters 7 and 8, offering insight into how they relate to the existing 
literature. The limitations of the research are presented, along with suggestions for 
future research, and the potential implications and applications of the findings are 
discussed.
2. Defining Assassinations
2.1 DEFINITIONS AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT
The definition of variables and concepts is an essential aspect of the theory 
construction which takes place in research; researchers must define what they are 
lookhig for, before the research begins (Eysenck, 1998), Thus, the puipose of this 
chapter is to examine the phenomenon of political assassinations, and to unpick the 
inter-related concepts which comprise the definition of these acts, in order to provide 
better understanding of the cuirent research domain.
Definition of variables (or concepts) is a fimdamental stage of theory construction, 
and in defining the conceptual elements one is beginning the theory constr uction 
which underlies research. Research goes beyond the simple observation of facts or 
behaviour s. It requires interpretation of those observations, to understand both their 
meaning, and the relationships between them. Via this theory creation, the way that 
researchers look at the facts available is altered, allowing “scientists to search in a 
more directed way” (Brysbaert and Rastle, 2009, p. 295). A theory is “a system of 
logically interrelated, specifically non-contradictory, statements, ideas, and concepts 
relating to an ar ea of reality, formulated in such a way that testable hypotheses can 
be derived from them” (De Groot, 1966, p.40). Thus, a theory can be considered as a 
series of assertions, which are designed to organise and explain observations, and to 
predict firture behaviour (Breakwell and Rose, 2006). A theory shows the 
relationships between behaviours imder examination, and gives the researcher an 
idea of what can be expected in unknown conditions (Bem and de Jong, 2006). The 
theory created serves as a guide which allows scientists to establish those 
observations that should be given credence, and those that should not. This act of 
theory construction has three main stages: first a detailed, methodical statement of 
what it is the researcher is looking at is created. Second, tire different aspects of the 
phenomena are allocated to categories, based on the commonalities they share, which 
mean that they can be treated as similar' concepts. Once this categorisation is 
completed, the tliird stage is to link the categories and establish how they relate to
one another. It is not until the different categories are related to one another that 
theory construction begins (Breakwell and Rose, 2006).
Breakwell and Rose (2006) state that all researchers are guided by theory, be it 
implicit or explicit, with any examination of the relationship between concepts 
having “the attributes of a theory” (Breakwell and Rose, 2006, p.4). In the natural 
sciences, there was previously a belief that the world, and natur e, was designed 
according to strict mathematical laws. These mathematical laws, and subsequent 
theories, were used to provide a formal structure for theories in the natural sciences. 
The formal structures of these theories should enable scientists to make quantifiable 
predictions, based on deductions fi om the principles of the theories. Bem and de 
Jong (2006) explain how Hull attempted to do the same with human behaviour. Hull 
believed that as psychology is a natural science, and as natur e is underpinned by a 
“mathematical and mechanical system” (Bem and de Jong, 2006, p. 11), it should 
therefore be possible to create a single, deductive theory of human behaviour which 
is based on the system/laws which underlie nature. From this, Hull believed, it 
should be possible to make predictions and create theories about human behaviour 
based on deductions fiom “clearly stated principles” (Bem and de Jong, 2006, p.ll). 
However, as Leahey (2001) states, Hull’s supposition was unsuccessfirl. There is no 
single, unified comprehensive system which underlies either natur e, or human 
behaviour. Scientific theories are susceptible to change and can and have been 
‘proved wrong’. Therefore, more informal methods are often more appropriate for 
use in psychology, i.e. by not using structured theories, but instead usmg implicit 
theories to guide the research.
In general, psychologists rely on more informal methods of deriving predictions firom 
theory (Bem and de Jong, 2006), i.e. they often avoid research which is designed 
solely for theory construction, preferring to conduct research which is intended to 
describe a phenomenon (e.g. the behaviours present in political assassination) rather 
than being explicitly designed to create a theory of that phenomenon (Breakwell and 
Rose, 2006). Others prefer to conduct ‘applied’ research, which is designed for use in 
real-world applications and decision making (e.g. how best to protect potential 
targets of assassination), disregarding any theory construction that may arise from
this (e.g. a theory of why and where targets are attacked) (Breakwell and Rose,
2006). In these cases, researchers tend not to acknowledge the theory underlying the 
research, but are nevertheless guided by implicit theory. Such researchers, who are 
not intending to build a theory in their research, should make a clear statement of the 
assumptions Üiey make about their resear ch. Failing to acknowledge the implicit 
theories guiding or underlying the research has disadvantages for the researcher. 
Implicit theories may lead the researcher to focus on some concepts more than 
others. That is, by not openly acknowledging the theory underlying the research, 
researchers may be guided by their own biases, either consciously or unconsciously. 
However, if the researcher is explicit about the underlymg theory of their work, 
weaknesses can be identified and acknowledged. Tins clarity ensures others have the 
oppoitunity to evaluate the work, in light of all of the facts, and thus establish 
whether the research is/has been influenced by an underlying theoiy (Breakwell and 
Rose, 2006). An additional benefit of acknowledging underlying theories is that the 
way theories aie defined, and the language used to do this, can offer new insights and 
ways to understand the phenomenon under examination (Breakwell and Rose, 2006). 
It is essential to understand the theoretical imderpinnings of research, and a key 
element of this is to clearly define the concepts which comprise the phenomenon.
Key authors in this field include Popper and Kuhn. Popper introduced the 
hypothetico-deductive model of reasoning (see Figure 2.1), which bases scientific 
thinking on observations and inductive thought, along with educated guesswork. 
From these initial concepts, a theory is developed to explain the phenomenon (in this 
case political assassinations). Here, deductive reasoning makes a contribution, the 
theory is assessed for accuiacy using hypotheses based on deductive reasoning. The 
predictions made in conjunction with the hypotheses aie then falsified, offering a 
new set of observational data which the reseaicher can then use for further research 
(Brysbaert and Rastle, 2009).
Similarly, Kuhn argued that theory should be prioritised over obseivations, »
highlighting the relationship between the language used by the researcher and the 
dependence of the obseivations and theoretical concepts on this language (Brysbaert
Observations
Theory
development
Theory
assessment
Hypothesis 
development & 
prediction making
Figure 2.1. Stages of theory consù'uction 1
and Rastle, 2009). As with Popper, and as shown in Figure 2.2, Kuhn saw science as 
starting with a collection of observations, facts and models, which are used to explain 
low level phenomena. From there, researchers must identify the guiding framework 
or theory, to understand the relationships between the individual concepts, and to 
enable researchers to identify appropriate methodologies. This is known as a 
paradigm: “a set of common views of what die discipline is about and how problems 
must be investigated” (Brysbaert and Rastle, 2009, p.311). Once the paradigm is 
established, ‘real’ science can begin, including falsification of the proposed theory.
Observations 
of conceptsFalsification □ = ; >
Understanding of Explanation
relationships of low-level
between concepts phenomena
Identification of 
theoretical 
framework
Figure 2.2. Stages of theory consti uction 2
10
Thus, the puipose of this chapter is to perform the first stages of theory construction. 
The phenomenon under examination is that of political assassination, and the aim is 
to understand what components have been used to define these acts in previous 
research, along with new insights that can be brought from related fields of study.
In areas such as forensic psychology and terrorism research, where the focus is on 
real world actions, there is another layer of complexity to the issue of definition. 
Johnson (1992) higlilights the need for accurate definitions in real-life, as well as in 
the research arena, and this is particularly true in an area such as political 
assassinations. Here definitions aie also used to classify the legality of vaiious 
crimes, amid the sometimes bluiTed boundaries between criminal action, terrorism, 
and warfare (Wilson and Lemanski, 2010). Early research in terrorism struggled to 
find common definitions of the phenomenon, with no commonly accepted definitions 
being in use across different countries and different agencies. The same has held true 
for assassinations and it is essential that there is a clear definition of what is an 
assassination, to avoid the “abusive inteipretation” of the law by state actors 
(Johnson, 1992).
Tliis chapter provides a discussion of the research areas, and the theories within 
these, that may be used to identify the concepts which comprise political 
assassinations, in order that the phenomenon can be better understood. Two areas 
which, it is suggested, may offer an underpinning to this area are that of homicide, 
and terrorism. These will be discussed in detail, by identifying the ways in which 
they are defined and the concepts which are used to do this.
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS
The first step in understanding how to define political assassinations is to examine 
the ways in which others have defined them. Table 2.1 contains 13 definitions of 
political assassination, drawn from different fields, including the law (e.g. The 
Hague, 1907) and academia (e.g. Kirkham, Levy and Grotty, 1971). However, it is 
unclear how the authors created most of these definitions, as most give
11
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no explanation as to how they defined the phenomenon of political assassination, and 
how the concepts included in their definitions of political assassination ar e selected 
(this can be seen in, for example Khatchadomian, 1974, Pape, 2002, and Ben- 
Yehuda, 2005). As discussed in section 2.1, it is important to clearly define the 
phenomenon that is being studied (i.e. political assassination), and the concepts 
which make up that phenomenon. However, one paper, by Kasher and Yadlm (2005) 
clear ly explains the way in which their definition of political assassination was 
created. They examined other discussions of and papers on assassinations, and found 
that ten features ar e commonly present in other definitions of political assassination:
1. “Killing a person;
2. Killing a political leader;
3. Killing a non-combatant;
4. Killing selectively;
5. Killing intentionally;
6. Killing in a premeditated maimer;
7. Killing for political (including religious) purposes
8. Killing unexpectedly;
9. Killing by a person not in uniform;
10. Killing in a secret and clandestine manner.” (Kasher and Yadlin, 2005, p.43). 
However, they found that these ar e just things that commonly happen in . 
assassinations, rather than being necessary components of an assassination. Through 
their examination of definitions, they decided what featur es (i.e. individual concepts) 
an act should contain to be classified as an assassination. Thus they use a definition 
which includes a prominent person, an act which is selective and intentional, for 
political (including religious) purposes. However, aside from Kasher and Yadlin 
(2005) there is no evidence of how other definitions have been created. This thesis 
will follow the example of Kasher and Yadlin (2005), and will examine this, and 
other, definitions of political assassinations to imderstand the concepts which are 
included in the literature definitions, as presented in Table 2.1.
These definitions are content analysed, and four concepts were repeatedly found in 
the political assassination definitions:
• Legality
14
• Victim Identity
• Perpetrator Identity
• Motive
These concepts underpin the definitions presented in Table 2.1, and Table 2.2 shows 
how each definition is made up of various combinations of the concepts.
Table 2.2
Features o f Assassination Definitions
Definition Victim Offender Motive Legality
Ben-Yehuda (2005) X
Zengel (1991) X
Pape (2002) X
Kirkham, Levy and Crotty 
(1970)
Khatchadomian (1974)
Crotty (1971)
Kasher and Yadlin (2005)
Fein, Yossekuil and 
Holden (1995)
X
Pickard (2001) i/'
O’Brien (1998)
Havens, Leiden & Schmitt 
(1970)
X
The Hague (1907)
Fein and Yossekuil (1998)
The definitions vary in the number of concepts addressed by the definitions, i.e. 
some address all three of the concepts in defining the phenomenon of assassination, 
while others address fewer. However, none of the definitions address all four 
concepts. There are a multitude of ways in wliich these concepts combine to form 
definitions of political assassination (see Figme 2.3).
15
Victim + Offender OffenderVictim
(e.g. Pickard, 2001)(e.g. Fein, Vossekuil & 
Holden, 1995)
(Pape,
2002)
Victim+Motive
Offender + Legality(e.g. Khatchadourian, 1974)
LegalityMotive Motive+Legality
(e.g. Ben-Yehuda, 2005)
Figure 2.3. Concepts present in definitions of political assassination
For example Pape (2002) addresses three of the foui", omitting the legality of political 
assassinations, while Kirkham et al. (1970) also addresses three concepts, but in this 
case it is the identity of the offender which is not considered. The use of these 
concepts as a way to define the phenomenon of assassination offers an hnportant 
advantage. These definitions come fiom different contexts (i.e. law, academia) but 
nevertheless they are still based on the same set of concepts. For example, O’Brien 
(1998) has fi amed the act of political assassination as a method of killing used by 
state actors against their opponents, rather than as a method used by non-state actors 
targeting politicians, or prominent figur es. As such, he has taken an entirely different 
viewpoint from many other definitions, but nevertheless has incorporated the
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concepts of the identity of the target, and the motive. Zengel (1991) also 
conceptualises political assassination differently to other researchers, using a 
definition di awn from an analysis of the law surrounding use of political 
assassination as a tactic of a state actor. He also incorporates aspects of the legality 
of the act, and the identity of the victim and the motive. Thus although both of these 
definitions are rather more focused on the legality of such attacks, and view them as 
a possible tactic of state authorities, they nevertheless use the same concepts as 
others in their definitions.
Although these four' main concepts underpin the definitions used to describe the 
phenomenon of political assassination, the concepts themselves are not always 
defined in the same ways across different definitions. Even where definitions address 
the same concepts, the concepts themselves vary in the way in which they are 
defined. First, although the majority of definitions do go some way to defining the 
variable of ‘victim’, not all do (e.g. Ben-Yehuda, 2005), leaving this particular 
concept undefined, and therefore not contr ibuting to an understanding of the 
phenomena. At the very detailed end of the specti*um is the definition proposed by 
Fein and Vossekuil (1998). In this instance, a lot of attention is afforded to the 
potential target’s identity, including botli political targets, such as presidents, 
senators and governors, and non-political targets, such as chief executives of 
companies and celebrities. The remaining definitions are rather less detailed.
Kirkham et al. (1970) do address the identity of political assassination targets, and 
similarly to Fein and Vossekuil do not restrict tliis to political individuals. They are 
however, both less detailed and narrower in thefr definition, citing potential targets as 
any prominent public figure. Thus there is far less detail, which offers more scope for 
inclusion, but also offers less guidance as to who may be a target (i.e. how is 
‘prominent’ or ‘public’ intended to be defined). Others do not prescribe the 
profession of the target, or require that they are a political figure, but do state that 
they must be a ‘prominent’ figme (Pape, 2002, Kasher and Yadlin, 2005, Fein, 
Vossekuil and Holden, 1995). Pape (2002) does however specify that the targets of 
political assassination are very specifically selected and taigeted by die offender. 
Definitions which have even broader definitions of target identity include 
Khatchadourian (1974) and Crotty (1971), with both including private individuals as
17
potential political assassination targets, removing other definitions’ requirement that 
the target be a prominent or public person. Finally, some definitions do not make any 
specification regarding target identity, with Ben-Yehuda (2005) and O’Brien (1998) 
offering no detail on tai get identity. Thus, there aie a wide range of potential political 
assassination targets to be considered, ranging from private citizens, to the most 
famous politicians and celebrities.
Second, the identity of the assassin is a concept included in some definitions of 
political assassination, although this is afforded a lower level of detail than that of the 
target. The majority of definitions identified here do not include any details regarding 
the assassin. Crotty (1971) specifies those individuals who should not be included in 
the concept of assassin, rather than those who should, arguing that individuals who 
are suffering from mental illness are incapable of committing an assassination. 
Pickard (2001) proposes a relatively nairow concept of assassin, suggesting that 
assassinations can only be peipetrated by an “official agent of a nation”, such as a 
member of the military or the intelligence services. Iviansky (1971) suggests that the 
identity of the peipetiator be that of a Tone wolf, while Ben-Yehuda (2005) 
suggests that anyone can be the perpetrator of a political assassination. Thus, 
compared to the attention given to the identity of the victim of a political 
assassination, there is relatively little on the conceptualisation of the perpetrator of 
the assassination. However, here it may be possible to draw on the terrorism 
literature, where it has been suggested that it is the act which is the important 
concept, rather than the identity of the terr orist (or assassin) (e.g. Schmid, 1992) (see 
section 2.4).
The third concept, the motivation for an assassination, is given more attention. In 
terms of motivations behind political assassmations, the majority of definitions in 
Table 2.2 (perhaps obviously) state that the motivation for a political assassination is 
political. However, the concept of ‘political motivation’ is not defined and is still 
rather vague. However, while there may be no explicit explanation as to what 
political means in this context, it appears to mean that the perpetrator is motivated by 
their desire to make a political statement, to remove a political opponent, or to 
further their own political ends. Other definitions also include religious motivations
18
alongside the political (Kasher and Yadlin, 2005), with these functioning in the same 
way, i.e the offender is motivated by their desire to make a religious statement, to 
further their own religion, or because of their religious beliefs. Crotty (1971) is more 
specific, suggesting that the motive for political assassination is the desire for 
political gain. In addition to describing motivation as a conceptual element of 
political assassinations, there is also discussion of where motivation discounts an act 
from being a political assassination. Khatchadourian (1974) states that malice against 
the victhn is not sufficient motivation for a case to be defined as a political 
assassination. Pape (2002) supports this, saying that the motivation must be for 
political purposes rather than private reasons. However, some state that a political 
assassination need not be politically motivated. Kirkham et al. (1970) also include 
the potential for political impact as a motivator of perpetrators of assassinations. 
Although this is not acknowledged by all definitions, Kirkham et al. (1970) do state 
that a political motivation is only one of thiee components which are required in a 
political assassinations, i.e. it is not required. For example, a murder of a politician 
by a person motivated by mental illness rather than politics, would count as a 
political assassination because of the resulting political impact (e.g. in forcing an 
election to fill the deceased’s seat).
The fourth and final concept is the legality of an assassination. Both Kirkham et al. 
(1970) and Pape (2002) classify a political assassination as a muider, while Ben- 
Yehuda (2005) also quantifies a political assassination as an illegal killing. Havens et 
al, (1970) state that political assassinations are ‘extralegal’. Thus there is a clear 
statement in a number of definitions that political assassinations aie a sub-type of 
murder. In fact, Khkham et al. (1970) define it as a murder (and therefore illegal, see
2.3 for a discussion of mui der and homicide) with any one of thi ee aspects, as shown 
in Figure 2.4.
Taking political assassinations as the phenomena under investigation, each of the 
concepts wliich are a part of the political assassination must be clearly defined. This 
presents a weakness of the definitions, as identified in Table 2.2, as this selection of 
definitions show little consistency in the concepts they define as part of political 
assassinations, and the way in which they are defined.
19
In addition to the varying definition of the individual concepts, there is also variation 
in the ways the concepts overlap. As Figure 2.3 shows, it is in the overlap between 
the concepts that the definitions fall, with examples given where they exist.
Political
motiveProminent political figure
(Potential for) 
Political Impact
Figure 2.4, Combinations of features of political assassinations
Even within individual definitions, there may be multiple ‘types’ of assassination. 
For example, in Kirkham et al.’s (1970) definition there are seven potential types of 
political assassination: cases where just one of the three concepts is present, cases 
with two of the concepts present, or cases where all three concepts are present. This 
suggests that there may be different ‘levels’ of assassination, depending on whether 
one aspect, two aspects, or three aspects are present. Thus, even within political 
assassinations there may be sub-types, with Scholes and Wilson (2008) arguing that 
political assassinations fall along a continuum, with differing degrees of ‘typicality’ 
between that and homicide.
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As this section has shown, definitions of political assassination are comprised of 
valions combinations of concepts, which themselves are differently defined by 
authors. Thus, there appears to be little agreement on how the phenomena of political 
assassination should be defined. As Eysenck (1998) states, when looking at 
phenomena it is important to use common definitions in research. None of the 
definitions presented here provide a sufficiently detailed description of what 
comprises a political assassination, therefore it is suggested that a new definition be 
established. Based on the information in section 2.1 it is first necessary to look at 
theories which may underlie the phenomena of political assassinations. As some of 
the existing definitions have shown, at their most basic, political assassinations are a 
form of homicide, or attempted homicide, in that they are a form of violence where 
(at least) one person’s life is taken by (at least) one other person. Therefore, it makes 
sense to refer to the literature on homicide and its subtypes, to guide the research into 
political assassinations.
2.3 HOMICIDE AND POLITICAL ASSASSINATION
Homicide is “the killing of a human being, whether the killing is lawful or unlawful” 
(Brookman, 2005, p.5). Like all categories of crime, homicide is largely socially 
constructed, with different sub-types constructed to describe the universe of unlawful 
homicide (Brookman, 2005). Even across countries, the law differs on what 
homicide is or is not. In defining homicide, the only easy aspect is establishing 
whether an individual (or group of individuals) has killed another person. From then 
on, the circumstances and public and media reaction to homicide vary hugely 
(Brookman, 2005).
The term homicide is broad, encompassing a number of different incident types. At 
the broadest level it includes the unlawful acts of murder and manslaughter. Muider, 
according to the Crown Prosecution Service (England and Wales), is committed 
where a sane individual, has unlawfully killed another (living) person (i.e. not self- 
defence or an otherwise justified killing), with the intention of killing them, or 
causing grievous bodily harm (The Crown Prosecution Service, 2011). Here then, the
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behaviours of the offender ai e accounted for, but the identity of the victim and 
offender aie not, nor is the relationship between the victim and offender, or the 
motivation (beyond the desire to kill or grievously harm). Manslaughter is a broad 
category which encompasses a wide range of acts (Brookman, 2005). Its breadth 
leads to difficulties in establishing a definition of manslaughter, and in paiticular 
clarifying where manslaughter should start and end. As the UK Law Commission 
(1996) states, manslaughter is “extremely broad and ranges in its gravity fiom the 
borders of muider right down to those of accidental death” (1996: No 237, p.l). 
Brookman (2005) offers a general definition of manslaughter, where “any unlawful 
homicide which is not classified as murder is categorised as some form of 
manslaughter” (p. 8). Thus, individual concepts such as the identity of the victim, or 
the offender, or the motivation for the attack, are not defined. Instead, manslaughter 
is defined on the basis of what it is not, rather than what it is. However, beyond these 
broad categories of unlawful homicide, as set out in law, there are many other 
subtypes of homicide, wliich divide the universe of homicides and which are defined 
in various ways. Ten sub-types of homicide have been identified fi om the literature, 
providing a range of definitions. These are content analysed, in order to identity the 
concepts which underlie homicide definitions. The purpose of this is to understand 
the concepts which are considered important in differentiating between sub-types, 
and to improve understanding of the way political assassinations are differentiated 
from otlier types of homicide. A total of six concepts were found to underlie these 
definitions:
• Motivation
• Victim Identity/Relationship to Offender
• Timing
• Geograpliic Location
• Method
• Number of victims
Table 2.3 shows the concepts which are used to define sub-types of homicide.
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As Table 2.3 shows, the sub-types of homicide can be defined by vaiying 
combinations of the underlying concepts, with combinations of between one and four 
concepts being used to describe the sub-types. One of the broadest of all the 
definitions, as it is defined by just one concept, is that of death by dangerous driving. 
This is defined by tlie method, i.e. a person driving a cai\ No other concepts ar e 
addressed by this definition. Also described by one concept is corporate homicide, 
wliich is the death of a person as a result of negligence, or deliberate decisions made 
by a corporate body. Thus this describes the relationship between the victim and the 
offender, with no reference to motivation, number of victims, geographic location, 
timing, or method. Finally, sexual homicide is also defined by one concept. Sexual 
homicide is an act which is defined as “one person killing another in the context of 
power, control, sexuality and aggressive brutality” (Burgess et al., 1986, p.252), thus 
the motivation for the attack is the underlying concept. There is no reference to 
number of victims, geographic location, timing, method, victim-offender 
relationship.
Other sub-types of homicide are defined by two of the concepts listed in Table 2.3. 
Infanticide is defined by the concepts of motivation, and victim/offender 
relationship. This is a particular form of homicide where a mother kills her biological 
child while the child is under 12 months. The motivation for this act is the mother’s 
mental illness, with the definition stating that “the balance of her [the mother] mind 
was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered fiom the effects of having 
given birth to the child, or by reason of the effects of lactation consequent upon the 
birth of the child” (Infanticide Act, 1938, p.l), and the victim-offender relationship is 
of coui'se parent-child. Also defined by two concepts is serial killing, defined by the 
timing of incidents (attacks take place over an extended time period, generally 
specified as over 30 days. Holmes and Holmes, 1998), and the number of victims 
(thiee or more victims, Ressler, Buigess and Douglas, 1988). Political assassination 
is also defined by two concepts: the motivation for the attack (the presence of a 
political motivation), and victim identity (as a political individual). Unlike many 
homicide sub-types, no detail on temporal or geograpliic characteristics are defined, 
therefore presumably this is not considered an important aspect of this type of 
homicide. Finally, nui se-serial-killing is comprised of the victim/offender
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relationship, and the method used to commit the homicide. These are incidents where 
nurses kill their patients (victim-offender relationship) without consent from the 
patient (Field and Pearson, 2010), using methods such as lethal injections, 
suffocation, or long term abuse. This definition does not incorporate the concept of 
motivation, but it does go some way to identifying the victim/offender relationship.
Mass killings and spree killings are both comprised of the same thr ee concepts 
(timing, geographic location, number of victims), although they differ in the way the 
concepts themselves are defined. Incidents classified as mass killings are expected to 
include four or more victims (Ressler et al., 1988), in the same temporal period, and 
in similar geographical locations (Brookman, 2005). Spree killings are defined as 
incidents with two or more victims (Ressler et al., 1988), who are usually killed in 
different geographical locations, and over an extended temporal period (Brookman, 
2005) (suggested by Holmes and Holmes, 1998, to be up to 30 days long). Looking 
at these two subtypes, it is clear that these are largely defined in terms of the number 
of victims, the geographic location and timing, with little attention afforded to the 
victim-offender relationship or victim identity, the method used, or the motivation 
for the attack.
Finally, at the most prescriptive end of the spectrum are school/campus murders. 
Here, similar- to multiple murders, the geograpliic and temporal characteristics are 
important, as is the victhn/offender relationship, and the method. Leary et al. (2003) 
require that a school murder (and they specifically discuss shootings), must have 
occurred dur ing school hours, at a school. Incidents at a school outside of the school 
day, such as an orchestra rehearsal, would not be included. In addition, the 
perpetrator(s) must be a student(s), and the incident must result in the death or injury 
of at least one student. Where there are multiple victims it is also possible that a 
school shooting could be classified as a spree or mass murder, depending on which 
criteria the act meets.
Thus, there are numerous sub types of homicide, and it appears that political 
assassinations do indeed fall in this categor-y. Definitions of political assassination 
appear to be underpinned by thr ee of the six concepts, with no reference to
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geographic location, timing, or number of victims. However, when considering 
political assassinations in more detail these aspects may be important, therefore these 
notions will be used to explore assassinations further, for example the time and place 
of assassinations should be investigated, along with the number of victims in political 
assassination incidents. In addition to considering whether or not assassinations are a 
sub-type of homicide, it may also be that political assassinations are a sub-type of 
assassination (see Figure 2.5), in the same way that school shootings are a sub-type 
of multiple murders. By removing the ‘political’ aspect, in the concepts of 
motivation and victim identity, an assassination becomes the targeted killing of a 
specific person. This does not seem very different to a murder, although it does 
specify that the victim is selected and specifically targeted.
HOMICIDE
POLITICAL É  ASSASSINATION
Figure 2.5. Political Assassination as a sub-type of homicide
Thus the concepts included in definitions of homicide show some similarity with 
those included in definitions of political assassinations. It is plausible therefore, that 
the literature on homicide, and understanding the sub-types, may be appropriate to 
underpin research on political assassinations. In addition to assisting in
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understanding more about how homicides (including political assassinations) are 
defined, these concepts also offer a starting point for further research into the 
definition of political assassinations. These are the concepts which underlie incidents 
of homicide, and if political assassination is such a phenomenon, these are also likely 
to underlie political assassinations. For example, the geographic location refers to the 
place and time at which victims of assassination are targeted, and the method 
describes how victims are killed. As will be discussed further in Part 2 of this thesis, 
more research regarding these areas is required in order to further understanding of 
political assassinations. However, it should be noted that there is a large body of 
research examining homicide in terms of behavioural typologies, and while this is 
relevant to the thesis (and will be discussed in chapter 7), the current section is 
intended to only discuss definitions of homicide, rather than the broader behavioural 
aspects.
HOMICIDE
POLITICAL
ASSASSINATION
:e r r o r is i
Figure 2.6. Interaction between homicide, assassination, and terrorism
There may also be other areas of research which can be used to inform the current 
research. For example, political assassinations have also been considered in the
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literature on terrorism, therefore this is an area which may be worthy of further 
examination. As Figure 2.5 shows, assassinations may be a homicide sub-type, and 
political assassinations an assassination sub-type. It is possible that these are (at least 
in pait) those perpetrated by terrorist groups, as shown in Figure 2,6.
2.4 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL ASSASSINATION
As with homicide, the decision as to whether or not political assassinations are a sub- 
type of teiTorism depends on how terrorism is defined, which in itself is not simple. 
According to Schmid and Jongman (1988) there aie over 100 separate definitions of 
terrorism. Of cour se, in the intervening 22 years since publication of tins paper, this 
number is likely to have increased hugely, paiticularly in the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent proliferation of terrorism research 
(Wilson and Lemanski, 2010). Definitions of teiTorism vary hugely, with debate over 
aspects such as the identity of the victim, identity of the perpetrator, motivation, and 
the political views of the connnentator. Here then there appear to be similarities with 
political assassination research. Table 2.4 shows a sample of definitions of terrorism 
which have been dr awn from the literatur e. There are also a number of legal and 
govermnental definitions, to show the range of definitions.
A content analysis of these definitions shows that there are seven underlying 
concepts which appear to underpin tliem:
Premeditation 
Motivation 
Target Identity 
Type of violence 
Perpetrator Identity 
Intention 
Legality
These concepts of terrorism definitions ar e set out in Table 2.5, with an indication of 
which definitions incorporate which concepts. Two of the 13 definitions explicitly 
state that for an act to be classified as terrorism there should be evidence that it was
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premeditated, while fom- definitions addiess the (il)legality of terrorism, with four 
defining it as unlawful, in varying levels of detail. Other aspects of definitions which 
were more commonly addr essed in these definitions are the identity of the 
perpetr ator and the victim, the motivation for the attack, the intention of the 
perpetrator, and the presence of violence in the attack. The definitions here present a 
relative consensus on the identity of the perpetrator, with agreement that the 
per petr ators of terrorism are not just groups, but are also individuals working alone. 
State actors are included as teiTorists in some definitions (e.g. Schmid, Jongman and 
Stohl, 1988).
There is more variation amongst the definitions of tar gets of teiTorism. Underlying 
the definitions there is an apparent consensus that targets ar e noncombatants, with 
this covering civilians/the general public. Others also include off-duty military 
persomiel, unarmed military personnel, or armed military personnel in peacetime, 
governments or societies, in this group. Some suggest that both property and people 
can be the tar gets, and in this military installations ar e included, if they ar e based in a 
non-hostile country (e.g. attacks on US military bases in Europe). Different ‘types’ of 
tar get ar e identified, with suggestions that tar gets can be randomly or selectively 
targeted, meaning that the targets of terrorism are either targets of opportunity or 
representative/symbolic targets, respectively. Targets are contrasted by some with 
assassinations, as in terrorism it is ar gued that dh ect targets of violence ar e not main 
targets, i.e. there are the immediate victims and also wider targets. The targets, it is 
suggested, serwe as message generators, and are used a communication tool by the 
tenorists, to manipulate those in authority.
Similar ly to the identity of the perpetrator, the definitions clearly state that the 
motivation for terrorism is political, with some also adding social, religious or 
ideological motives to this. However, there is little in the way of explanation as to 
what a political motive looks like in practice, so although the consensus simplifies 
the area, in practical terms it is still not clear cut. Closely linked to the motivation for 
terrorism is the intention of the perpetrators. The general intention highlighted by 
definitions of terrorism is the desire to influence an audience, and more specifically 
to inspire anxiety or fear' in a target group. Descriptions of terrorist intentions
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highlight that the audience which should be affected is wider than the immediate 
victims, for example while a government may not be the direct target, the ultimate 
intention is to affect the behaviour of the government, or to intimidate or coerce them 
in order to achieve the group/individual’s political or social objectives.
The final aspect which is incorporated in the definitions of terrorism is that of 
violence. There appears to be agreement that terrorism must be either an act or threat 
of violence, which is often repeated. The violence can be targeted at individuals or 
property, critical infrastructure or key resources. Some suggest that this violence can 
be either mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping, while others explicitly state 
that teiTorism is any violence short of warfare.
Wilson and Lemanski (2010), amongst many others, highlight the pejorative nature 
of the term ‘terrorism’ and the way in which the perception of terrorism can be 
affected by the individual’s support for the terrorists’ cause, with some researchers 
preferring to use teims such as ‘war’, ‘resistance’, and ‘fi*eedom-fighting’ to describe 
terrorism. Labels such as ‘insurgents’, ‘activists’ or ‘combatants’ have been put 
forward as more appropriate ways of describing terrorism, although there is no 
consensus on this. Heskin (1984) argues that such terms are used where the general 
public have sympathy for the teiTorist cause, with people less likely to make harsh 
judgements if (a) the cause is perceived as just, and (b) if they and their firiends or 
family are unlikely to be the targets of violence. Others, for example Horgan (2005), 
have considered the relationship between teiTorism and state-sponsored violence, 
such as war, arguing that the differences are merely ‘surface dissimilarities’. War is 
an act of violence which occurs between two states, who are relatively evenly 
matched. Conversely, terrorists are less evenly matched with their opponents (the 
power-holding democracy/state/government), and their lack of resomces forces the 
terrorists to employ alternative tactics.
To avoid tliis problem of the inherent judgement in definitions of terrorism it has 
been argued that terrorism should be defined by the actions and behaviours of the 
teiTorists (Schmid, 1992). For example, a key concept in the definition of teiTorism is 
the identity of the target(s), and the intended behavioural outcome fi om attacking
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these individuals. Research tends to divide the (potential) targets of terrorism into 
three categories: first the ‘direct’ targets of terrorism. These are defined by Schmid 
(1992) as those who are physically harmed in terrorist violence, where the intended 
behavioural outcome is their death or injmy. Second, there are the ‘main’ targets, or 
the general public, who must be distinct from the direct target in order to achieve the 
aim of creating feai' in a wide audience. This is supported by Pickard’s (2001) 
argument that a specific quality of tenorism is that it typically has a wide audience. 
The intended behavioural outcome from the main target is fear' induced in the public 
by ten'orist violence. Third is the ‘authority’ target, who is the government/state that 
tire terrorists ar e challenging, with the intended behaviomal outcome of achieving 
political change (Wilson and Lemanski, 2010).
The concept of different types of victims and the interactions between these are the 
focus of many definitions of terrorism. For example, Schmid and Jongman (1988) 
ar gue that it is possible tliat the direct tar get of terrorism is a single person, for 
example a soldier or police officer. While some argue that a single individual is not a 
sufficient direct target (e.g. Schmid, 1992), Schmid and Jongman (1988) suggest that 
where a solitary direct target is a police officer or soldier and thus symbolic of a 
nation, such an attack can be categorised as efficient terrorism. Killing the symbolic 
target can weaken the opponent, and thus achieve the aim of also affecting the main 
target: the induction of fear in the general public.
It is because of these ‘requirements’ relating to the targets of terrorism that some 
ai'gue political assassinations should not be considered as a sub-type of ten orism. 
Schmid (1992) argues that political assassinations, which typically have just one 
direct target, are less likely to induce fear in the general population (or main tai'get) 
than other subtypes of terrorism. Assassinations have also been rejected as a sub-type 
of terrorism on the basis that the behavioural outcomes ar e different. Post­
assassination, the wider population/general public are likely to feel anger or sadness, 
whereas after a terrorist incident tlie public is more likely to feel fear, in particular 
that they may be the next victim (Schmid and Jongman, 1988). Schmid and Jongman 
(1988) suggest that it is possible for solo direct taigets to have an impact where the 
main taigets can relate to the direct target. However, it seems that the general public
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would find it harder to relate to a political assassination victim, rather than a soldier 
or police officer (as discussed previously). As the majority of the population are 
unlikely to be targeted by political assassinations, this fear will not come from an 
assassination.
However, there is the third tar get of terrorism, the authority tar get, where the desired 
behaviour al outcome is change of some kind. ‘Traditional’ terrorism can attempt to 
influence this change through bombing campaigns etc, but there is still a gap 
between the dhect target, the main target and the authority target. Assassinations 
offer a way to bridge this gap, as a type of terrorist violence where the dhect target 
and the influential target are one and the same. Thus in political assassinations, 
terrorist violence tar geted at the direct victim is also guaranteed to target the 
authority victim. The use of a political assassination removes the level of ‘main 
target’, and acts dhectly on the authority target. It also can ensure a behavioural 
outcome of political change (as specified by Sclimid) as this is likely to also be an 
outcome of a political assassination. There is evidence that assassinations ar e used as 
a tactic by terrorist groups, as shown by Wilson, Scholes and Brocklehmst’s (2010) 
analysis of assassinations as atactic used by ETA. In addition, Horgan (2005) has 
argued that smaller terrorist groups, who are limited in terms of their manpower and 
resour ces, are more likely to turn to assassinations, as a way to draw attention to 
themselves and their cause.
However, the motivation, methods and organisation of terrorism can change. Recent 
developments in research into terrorism have focused on the concept of a ‘new’ 
terrorism. The underlying assumption of tins model is that terrorist motivations have 
changed (Benjamin and Shnon, 2000, Benjamin and Simon, 2002, Bremer, 2001, 
Laqueur, 1999, Lesser, Hoffînan, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, 1999, Morgan, 
2004). This new tenorism is fundamentally and qualitatively different from that seen 
in the 1990s, The ‘new’ terrorism is argued to be different in three ways: the 
organisational structure, the motivations and goals, and the methods used.
The organisational structures in new terrorism tend to be ‘flatter’, decentralised, and 
international, compared to the hierarchical and ‘top-down’ structures of ‘old’
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terrorism. This flattened structure is, at least in part, derived from the assumptions 
about the underlying psychology of terrorist motivations. The new terrorist groups 
have less contact between group members than old tenorism. The members’ beliefs 
are so strong that they compensate for this lack of interaction, and help to build 
group identity, cohesion and collective behaviour*. The shared beliefs encourage 
solidarity amongst group members (Crenshaw, 2006). Thus in tliis tenorism, group 
solidarity can be insphed by “inspiration and imitation” (Crenshaw, 2006, p.53) 
rather than via a dhect instruction fr om an authority frgme. Any isolation or distrust 
that may ordinarily come fr om such remoteness are countered by adherence and 
devotion to doctrine. The increase in internationality is in part enabled by this 
decentr alised str-uctur e, but is also because of new terxorism’s desire to challenge the 
power of the US and its allies.
In the model of new tenorism, the motivation and method are inextricably linked. 
Unlike old terrorism, where the terrorists were motivated by (and reacted to) political 
situations (Crenshaw, 2006), the new tenorists are motivated by hatred and a desire 
for death and violence. A centr al belief of new terrorism is violence, with new 
terrorists being driven to violence by their hatr ed of the US and its allies (Bremer, 
2001). Laqueur (1999) has stated that the new tenorists have a mindset of “rage, 
aggression, sadism and paranoia” (Crenshaw, 2006, p.52), and the perception is that 
they enjoy killing their target(s) (Lesser et al., 1999). Jenkins is often quoted as 
saying that ten orists do not want a lot of people dead, but do want a lot of people 
watching. It is ar gued that in the new model of terrorism this statement is inverled: 
terrorists want a lot of people dead, and are imconcerned with how many people will 
be watching. These new models also tend to merge the group and the individual, with 
little attempt to distinguish between “personal aspirations and collective goals” 
(Crenshaw, 2006, p.53). As a group, the members all share the fimdamental hatred 
which imderiies new terrorism, ftuther motivating the group and fostering the 
“culture of violence” (Crenshaw, 2006, p.53) which permeates throughout new 
terrorism.
Thus, new tenorists ar e said to be driven by hatred and a desire to kill others. In 
contrast to old tenorism, where methods were selected on the basis of opportunity.
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and violence sei*ved as a means to an end, in the new tenorism, violence sei*ves as 
both a means and an end in itself. The new terrorists are ar gued to prefer to use 
suicide attacks because of the increased lethality these methods offer, and in 
addition, new terrorists are also willing to die themselves. It is also argued that new 
terrorists ar e drawn towards weapons of mass destruction (WMD) because of their 
increased lethality. However, as Crenshaw (2006) points out, the attacks of 9/11 are 
seen as the pinnacle of new terrorism, but in these attacks, WMDs were not used. 
Instead, traditional weapons (explosives) were used in innovative ways (via hijacking 
planes).
Despite the changes which, it is ar gued, have been observed in modern-day 
terrorism, Crenshaw (2006) maintains drat the existing psychological research is still 
relevant. The underlying theme of new terr orism is that the change in terrorist 
motivation has led to an increased lethality, and a change of methods. However, the 
psychological research shows no evidence for this. As with ‘old’ terrorism, tenorists 
still look for support from their audience and community (Crenshaw, 2006). There is 
no conclusive evidence to show an increase in tlie lethality of terrorist attacks 
compared to the lethality of ‘old’ terrorism. Finally, the suicide terrorism said to be 
char acteristic of new terrorism is actually still relatively rar e compared to the 
incidence of other forms of terrorism, and has been used by ‘old’ terrorism (e.g. the 
Tamil Tigers). Therefore, Crenshaw (2006) argues against dismissing the knowledge 
we already have.
The issue then, in viewing assassinations as a form of terrorism, is based on the 
identity of the target(s), and the behavioural outcome of the violence. It is ar gued that 
for violence to be terrorism, multiple direct targets must be killed or wounded, 
resulting in a fearful general public and an authority target who is willing to change. 
In terms of victim numbers, in political assassinations there is typically one direct 
target, but there are often other victims caught up in the attack. Of the 275 ETA- 
perpetrated assassinations identified by Wilson et al. (2010), 60 resulted in victims 
other than the target (approximately 22%). Thus it is possible tliat political 
assassinations could fulfil this criteria for terrorism. Scholes and Wilson (2008) also
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found that it may be possible to ‘scale’ assassination incidents depending on the level 
of similarity with terrorist incidents.
Crenshaw (2006) highlights the differing target selection techniques used by new and 
old terrorism. In ‘old’ terrorism, which was discriminatory and selective, with 
carefully selected targets, the terrorists aimed to be measured in their violence, rather 
than indulging in all-out violence and lethality. The new model suggests that 
terrorists do not go thr ough any of the process of target selection, but instead kill 
wantonly (Crenshaw, 2006). However, as Wilson and Lemanski (2010) highlight, 
although the number of injuries and fatalities per terrorist incident appear to be 
increasing over time, it seems likely that in fact this is a result of the increased ease 
of manufacturing explosives, and the prevalence of suicide bombings, rather than a 
conscious decision by the terrorists.
2.5 TOWARD A SYSTEMATIC DEFINITION OF POLITICAL 
ASSASSINATIONS
This chapter began with an examination of how theories ar e constructed, identifying 
three stages; first a detailed examination of the area of research, second, the 
identification of commonalities between aspects of the phenomenon, and grouping of 
these into similar categories, and tliird, the identification of links between these 
categories to establish the relationships between them. As part of this research, three 
different areas related to political assassinations have been examined; the existing 
research on political assassinations, research on homicide, and research on terrorism. 
In each ar ea, definitions of the phenomenon have been identified, and then analysed 
to establish the commonly occurring concepts, which ar e subsequently gr ouped into 
categories. From the political assassination literature, 13 definitions were foimd, 
providing four" concept categories: the identity of the victim, the identity of the 
offender, the motivation for the attack, and the legality of the attack. From the 
homicide literature, ten sub-types were identified. These provided six concepts which 
underlie homicide definitions: the motivation, the victim identity/relationship to the 
offender, the timing, the geographic location, the method, and the number of victims.
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Finally, from the area of terrorism 13 definitions were drawn, with a content analysis 
showing that there are seven concepts underlying these definitions: the presence of 
premeditation, tire type of motivation, the type of tar get, whether violence was used, 
the identity of the perpetrator, the intention for the attack, and the legality.
Having examined the research areas, and identified the commonalities between the 
definitions, the next step is to test these categories against real data. With the 
literatur e suggesting that there are different subsets of homicide and terrorism, it is 
possible that there are also different subsets of political assassinations. Analysis of 
cases of political assassination incidents on the basis of the identified categories will 
allow identification of the relationships between concept categories found in the 
literatirr e. It will offer a way to better imderstand both the various types of political 
assassination, and the way in wliich these can be identified by the literatur e.
Similar ly, the concepts identified in definitions of homicide will be used in an 
analysis of different types of homicides, including political assassinations. The 
pm’pose here is to compare the political assassmation incidents to other types of 
homicide, thereby enabling an understanding of the relationship between subtypes. 
This will also clarify whether or not political assassination research should be 
informed by homicide.
Finally, tlie categories of concepts identified in the terrorism literature will be used in 
an analysis of terrorist incidents, again including political assassination as a subtype. 
As with tlie previously discussed homicide analysis, this will offer an understanding 
of relationships between terrorism and political assassination incidents, and confirm 
whether or not terrorism research should be used to inform political assassination 
research.
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3. Defining Assassinations: Political Assassinations as defined by the 
Political Assassination Literature
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 has outlined the ways in which political assassinations have been defined 
in the existing literature. The present chapter will use the literature’s definitions of 
political assassination to analyse a sample of incidents of political assassination, to 
establish how the existing definitions relate to potential instances, and to suggest 
different types of assassination.
This study will use definitions of political assassination to evaluate empirically how 
well the real-world incidents of assassination fit the existing definitions of 
assassination. There are no previous attempts to define assassination empirically, 
thus this will offer the first steps, with the intention of enhancing the understanding 
of what constitutes a political assassmation, and how they should best be studied.
3.2 METHOD
3,2.1 The Data
Incidents reported as political assassinations were identified via searches of the 
Mickolus series of books and the Nexis database. The Mickolus books (Mickolus, 
Sander & Muidock, 1989; Mickolus, 1993; Mickolus and Simmons, 1997; Mickolus 
and Simmons, 2002) comprise accounts of all transnational tenorist attacks, with the 
information drawn fiom worldwide news sources (see chapter 9 for more detail). 
However, smce incidents reported in this som*ce are already defined as terrorism and 
transnational it was considered important to broaden the sample. Nexis is an online 
database which offers access to UK broadsheet newspapers, which provided a further 
source of data. Victims of political assassinations were identified, in the year s 1990- 
2008 inclusive. Name-specific searches were then conducted to gather data on the set 
of political assassination cases. In total 400 cases were identified, occuning
42
internationally, and committed both by terrorist groups and others. The incidents 
identified aie not solely targeted at politicians, but at a range of figur es (see Table 
3.1).
Table 3.1
Profession o f Victim
Profession N = %
Politician 116 24
Member of Terrorist Group 46 9
Military 43 9
Business person 37 8
Jomnalist 35 7
Political Activist 27 6
Religious Leader 20 4
Academic/Historian 19 4
Government Official 18 4
Legal Professional 18 4
Related to a politician 15 3
Previously a politician 14 3
Print Industry worker 14 3
Community Leader 13 3
Leader/Prime Minister/President 12 3
Exile/Refugee 10 2
Foreign Diplomat 7 1
Writer 7 1
Civil Servant 4 <1
Charity Worker 3 <1
UN Negotiator 1 <1
Total 479 100
The figures in Table 3.1 sum to more than 400, as in some cases the victim was 
allocated to two or more categories. The profession of ‘politician’ was most common 
in this sample (24%), with terrorist group members (9%) and military individuals 
(9%) occupying the second and third most common professions. Business people.
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journalists and political activists were present with similar* frequency, being 8%, 7%, 
and 6% of the sample respectively. In fewer cases the victim of the political 
assassination was a religious leader (4%), or an academic (4%), or a government 
official (4%). Politicians’ relatives were targets in 3% of the cases sampled, and a 
similar number of cases targeted those who were politicians in the past (3%), who 
were in the print industry (e.g. editors, publishers, 3%), community leaders (3%), and 
current heads of state/comitr y leaders (3%). A further 2% of the sample were exiles 
or refugees, and foreign diplomats and writers each account for* 1% of the cases. 
Finally, each of civil servants, charity workers, and UN workers, account for less 
than 1% of the sample.
3.2.2 Content Analysis
In quantitative content analysis, the method used in this study, the descriptive text is 
reduced into numerical values by way of a coding scheme (Millward, 2006). In this 
study, newspaper, and other reports will be content analysed according to the 
definitions created by the researcher. However, as higlrlighted by Wilson (2000), it is 
important to note that not all features of attacks will be reported in the newspaper* 
articles fr om which the data ar e derived. Thus, the coding scheme has been created to 
code the presence of a variable, rather than the absence. This means that while 
something coded as present definitely did happen, items coded as absent ar e not 
necessarily absent, and it is possible that, actually, they did happen but were not 
reported.
As discussed in chapter* 2, there ar e a number* of concepts which cormnonly feature in 
definitions of political assassination:
• Legality
• Victim Identity
• Perpetrator Identity
• Motive
These were used to content analyse the data collected. The following definition of 
political assassination was used:
The intentional, premeditated [specific/unspecific] hilling o f a 
[public/private/both] figure by an offender who is a [repeat/first time]
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offender, [known/unknown] to the victim who has a [political/other] 
motivation.
This was di'awn from common aspects present in literatur e definitions of political 
assassinations (see chapter 2). The assumption is that all assassinations are 
intentional and premeditated (to a more or less degree). The specificity of the attack 
is par t of a number of definitions (e.g. Pape, 2002, and Pickard, 2001), who each 
state that assassinations are specific, rather than non-specific, thus a specific attack is 
more ‘typical’ of an assassination than a non-specific attack. The fact that public 
figur es are targets is common to the definitions, and is therefore also more ‘typical’ 
of an assassination. However, private individuals are incorporated in some 
definitions of political assassination, and so ar e also included in the sample. A repeat 
offender is considered to be more ‘typical’ of an assassination as it implies tliat the 
attack has been more ‘thought through’, and possibly represents par t of a campaign, 
rather than the spontaneous attack which may be perpetrated by a first-time offender. 
Definitions of political assassination tend to suggest that the perpetrator and victim 
of assassination are strangers (and this is more ‘typical’ of assassination), although 
this is not the case in all incidents. Finally, definitions suggest that assassinations 
tend to be driven by a political motive, although tliis is not always die case. The five 
aspects presented in square brackets provide variables which are used to content 
analyse the news reports, transforming them from qualitative information into 
nmnerical data. A higher number indicates that that featur e is considered to be more 
typical of an assassination:
1. The target was either specific (2) or imspecific (1), with specific attacks 
killing only the intended target, and unspecific attacks killing individuals 
other than the tar get, e.g. bystanders.
2. The target was either a public figure (3), had more than one target which was 
a combination of both public and private individuals (2), or was a private 
individual (1).
3. The offender was a first time offender (1) or a repeat offender (2).
4. The offender was either known (1) or unknown to the victim (2).
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5. The offender has either a non-political motive (1), or a political motive (2) 
(identified via their own statement, or conclusions drawn by law enforcement 
officials, and to include religious motivations as well).
The data on each of the 400 assassinations cases were content analysed using these 
five variables, in order to transform the qualitative news reports into quantitative data 
which can be further analysed. The (numbers) assigned to the variables in the list 
above indicate how cases are coded on each variable. For example, a case where the 
attack was specific would be coded ‘2’, while an unspecific attack would be coded as 
‘1’. Each case is coded this way on all variables, to create a data matrix, an example 
of which is shown in Figure 3.1. Thus, the killing of Lord Mountbatten (‘23222’) 
would be considered most typical of an assassination, and the killing of Mikel Uribe 
(‘21111’) is less typical. Of the 400 cases, 398 were included in this analysis, with 
two excluded due to missing data.
Case Specific/
Unspecific
Public/
Private
Victim
First time/ 
Repeat 
Offender
Known/
Unknown
Offender
Political/
Other
Motive
Lord Mormtbatten 2 3 2 2 2
Ian Gow 2 3 1 2 2
Rabbi Meir 
Kahane
2 3 1 1 1
Salvo Lima 2 3 1 1 1
Mikel Uribe 2 1 1 1 1
Figure 3.L Example of the Data Matrix coding
3.3 A DEFINITIONAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS
The results of this content analysis will be analysed using Par tial Order Scalogram 
Analysis (POSA). The intention of this is to analyse various political assassination 
incidents hr light of definitions of assassination. Tire results of this will show a) 
whether or not incidents commonly defined as political assassination meet tlie
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definition of political assassination, and b) demonstrate the imderlymg structur e in 
the definition of political assassination incidents.
POSA is a type of analysis designed to identify the underlying structmal properties 
of profiles of data (Dancer, 1990a), and in this case profiles of political assassination 
incidents, hr order for the use of a POSA to be appropriate, two conditions must be 
met. First, the variables used to create the profiles must have a common range, which 
is the case when the scores given to each incident on each variable have a “common 
direction” (Dancer, 1990b, p.482) (e.g. the score given to each behaviour* must run 
fiom high to low). Thus, a score of ‘2’ must represent ‘more’ of something than a 
score of ‘ r .  Second, the items must all measure a common construct, such as 
intelligence (Dancer, 1990b). If these two things can be established, it can be said 
that the variables have a common range, and therefore measure one common 
construct (Dancer, 1990a). Once this has been established, it can be said that there is 
a “rationale” (Dancer, 1990b, p.482) to look at the str*uctur*al relationships that are 
present among the incidents (Dancer, 1990b). In this analysis, the common constr uct 
is how ‘typical’ of assassination the case is, based on the definitions discussed 
previously. A low score (1) means low typicality, and a high score (2 or 3) means 
high typicality. All variables have two levels, except that of victim identity, which 
has thr*ee levels. The scores on the five variables are added to create a profile or 
measur e of how ‘ass^sinistic’ an incident is. Most ‘assassinistic’ would have a 
profile o f‘23222’ (sum = 11), while the least ‘assassinistic’ would have a profile of 
‘ 1111 r  (sum = 5). However, this quantitative variation is not all that POSA shows; 
it also shows qualitative variation (Wilson and Leith, 2001). For* example, an incident 
which has a sum of 7 may have a profile of ‘12121 ’ or* ‘ 11212’. Both are mid-way on 
the scale of typicality, but they are actually rather different types of assassination. 
Thus POSA (Shye, 1978,1985) was used to demonstrate how assassination incidents 
can vary qualitatively and quantitatively, across the 398 cases, according to the five 
variables.
In POSA incidents can share the same profile, and these profiles are represented by a 
‘point’ in a geometric space. The quantitative variation in the incidents is represented 
along the ‘joint axis’ of the POSA (i.e. that which r*uns northeast to southwest), while
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the qualitative variation is then represented along the ‘lateral axis’ (i.e. running fiom 
northwest to southeast) (Wilson and Leith, 2001) (see Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2. Axes of a POSA output
Figure 3.2a. Joint axis indicates quantitative variation
Figure 3.2b. Lateral axis indicates qualitative variation
In the cuiTent analysis, each variable is a quality of the definition of what makes a 
homicide a political assassination, according to the current definitions within the 
published literature. Each variable is scored such that a higher score is indicative of 
being more typically representative of an assassination, which forms tlie common 
range. In this way, POSA will be used to examine the relationships which exist 
between both the different variables used to describe the political assassination 
incidents, and the incidents themselves (Dancer, 1990b), and to explore a ‘scale’ of 
‘representativeness’ of assassination incidents. Figme 3.3 shows how the scale could
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run in theory, with the most ‘assassinistic’ cases in the top right, and the least 
‘assassinistic’ in the bottom left.
Most
Assassinistic:32222
Least
Assassinistic:
11111
Figure 3.3. Scaling Properties of POSA
POSA also provides item plots for each variable. It should be noted that although 
there aie 14 profiles in this analysis, there ai*e 15 points. This is because, as there are 
no cases with the ‘lowest’ profile (i.e. 11111), the analysis software inputs this 
automatically as a ‘dummy point’, which ‘anchors’ the analysis. The points are 
presented in the same conftguiation as on the main plot, and this allows the space to 
be pai'titioned according to the categories of each variable. A comparison of where 
the regions overlap enables understanding of the relationship between these variables 
and how they contribute to the underlying ‘typicality’ of an assassination.
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Figme 3.4 shows the type of victim killed in the political assassination. The incidents 
where only public figm'es were killed are in the darkest section at the top of the plot 
(n =173). In the middle of the plot are incidents where the victims were a 
combination of both public figures and private individuals (n = 58). At the bottom of 
the plot in the lightest section aie cases where only private individuals were killed (n 
= 167). Private individuals targeted in political assassination incidents are those such 
as journalists or business people, who were not widely known by the general public.
Figme 3.5 shows the relationship between the victim and the offender. The few cases 
where the victim was known to the offender fall to the left of the plot (n = 7), while 
the cases where there was no relationship between perpetrator and offender ar e at the 
right of the plot (n = 391),
Figme 3.6 shows these two variables combined onto one plot. The relationship 
between the victim and offender works on a different dimension to the type of 
victim, cutting vertically across the three victim types. The only cases where the 
victim and offender are known to each other are at the top of the plot, where a public 
frgme is tar geted. The killing of a private individual by a person known to them is 
unlikely to be reported as a political assassination, and therefore would not be 
sampled in this analysis. Public frgmes who are killed by people they know tend to 
be those killed by individuals working for or with them, i.e. conspirators who were 
placed close to the tar get with the intention of killing them. There were no cases 
where offenders known to the victim killed both public frgmes and private 
individuals, presumably because they had sufficient access to their target to only kill 
their target, or because their only targets were public flgmes.
Figme 3.7 shows the specificity of the attack, that is it shows which attacks were 
specific enough to only kill the intended victim (n = 303), and which were not 
specific, and resulted in the deaths of others (n = 95). The specific attacks fall in the 
thr ee grey bands across the whole plot, star ting at the very right, towards the middle, 
and towards the left.
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Public Figure + 
Private Individual
Private Individual
Figure 3.4. Identity of the victim
Victim & Offender 
are known to one 
another
Victim & Offender 
are not known to 
one another
Figure 3.5. Victim-Offender relationship
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V & O Known 
+ Public Victim
V & O Known / 
+ Public & / 
Private Victims // #
V & O Not 
#  Known + Public 
& Private Victims
. ,  „
V&O / •
Known + / •  V & O NotPrivate Known + Private
Victim  / Victim
•  /
Figure 3.6. Victim Identity combined with Victim-Offender relationship
SpecificSpecific SpecificNon-SpecificQ.Q.
Figure 3.7. Specificity of the attack
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Figme 3.8 shows the combination of Figure 3.7 with Figure 3.6. However, due to the 
natme of the partitions, it is best understood when presented schematically, as shown 
in Figure 3.9. The schematic version is used to simplify interpretation of the results. 
Together, these three variables divide the plot into 12 regions, six of wliich contain 
one or more points. At the top right of the plot, and thus as the most ‘assassinistic’, 
are cases where the target was a public figme, the victim and offender are not known 
to one another, and the attack was specific, only harming the taiget. Moving down 
this column, attacks against public figm'es may also be perpetrated by an unknown 
offender and non-specific, resulting in victims other than the target, or specific, but 
witli an offender known to the target. The second column, in the centre of Figme 3.9, 
shows incidents in which both public figmes and private individuals are the victims 
of an attack. In tliis sample, these individuals aie only attacked by pei'peti ators not 
Imown to them, in non-specific incidents, although this is perhaps obvious as there 
ai e two types of victim.
The third column, on the left of Figme 3.9, contains incidents where the victim of the 
attack was a private individual. There are two regions in this column containing 
incidents, first at the top, where the victim and offender are not known to each other 
and the attack is specific, and then further down, where again the victim and offender 
are not known to each other but the attack is non-specific.
Figme 3.10 shows the incidents in which the perpetrator had a liistory of offending 
previous to the political assassination (n = 13) overlaid onto Figme 3.9. These fall 
across the plot, present in fom* of the six populated regions. Assassins with an 
offending history target all victim types, killing public figmes, private individuals, 
and the two together. Repeat offenders perpetrate both specific and non-specific 
attacks, and may be known or unknown to the victim. Thus, repeat offenders appear 
to fall across most of the ‘types’ of assassination. However, in the majority of cases 
(n = 385) there is no evidence of previous offending behaviom.
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Figure 3.8. Victim Identity combined with Victim-Offender relationship and 
Specificity
Private
individual
Public Figure & 
Private Individual
Public
Figure
Specific +
V-0 Unknown
Non-Specific + 
V-O Unknown
Specific + 
V-O Known
Non-Specific + 
V-O Known
Figure 3.9. Schematic diagram of Victim Identity combined with Victim-Offender 
relationship and Specificity
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Private
Individual
Public Figure & 
Private Individual
Public
Figure
S .
•
H e
#
Specific +
V-O Unknown
e H . e e
Non-Specific + 
V-O Unknown
H e e
Specific + 
V-O Known
Non-Specific + V-O Known
Figure 3.10. Victim Identity + Victim-Offender relationship + Specificity with 
previous offending overlaid
Similarly, Figure 3.11 shows those incidents which were politically motivated 
overlaid onto Figure 3.10. Presence of political motivation was assessed on a case by 
case basis, and was coded as present in all instances where there was evidence of 
political motivation, e.g. a statement made by die perpetrator, or a belief by the 
police or criminal justice authorities of that country. Politically motivated individuals 
fall across the plot, in all six populated regions (n = 374). The non-politically 
motivated attacks however, fall in foui* regions (n = 24). They can be targeted at all 
victim types, and aie both specific, and non-specific, but are only carried by 
offenders who do not know their victim. In addition, there is some overlap between 
the political motivation of the attack, and the type of offender (repeat or first time 
offender). All of the incident types perpetrated by repeat offenders were also 
politically motivated.
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As Figure 3,11 shows, there are a six types of assassination which are theoretically 
possible, but are not populated by the cases in this sample, i.e. there are gaps. First, 
in the central column it is not possible for specific cases to be perpetrated against 
both public figures and private individuals: where there are two victims, the attack by 
definition is not specific. However, there are no cases in the region depicting public 
figure and private individual victim, which are non-specific, and where the victim 
and offender are known to one another.
Private
Individual Public Figure & Private Individual
Public
Figure®A.
A A
®A.
Specific +
V-0 Unknown
Non-Specific + 
V-0 Unknown
Specific + 
V-0 Known
Non-Specific + 
V-0 Known
Figure 3.11. Victim Identity + Victim-Offender relationship + Specificity with 
previous offending and political motivation overlaid
Second, in the right hand column there are no cases of attacks on public figures, 
where there were other victims, and the victim and offender were known to one 
another. It is likely that in instances where a public figure was attacked by a person 
known to them, they would be able to target them in locations with few witnesses or 
bystanders, wliich would be beneficial as it would reduce likelihood of capture or 
identification. Therefore there would be no other victims in such attacks.
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Third, attacks where private individuals were targeted by people known to them were 
also not present in this sample. Although it is possible that this would be a political 
assassination, particularly if the attack was politically motivated, this would be rare. 
Typically, the killing of a private individual by a person known to them would be 
considered a tr aditional homicide, as private individuals ar e less likely to cause 
political impact than public figures, particularly if the attack was not politically 
motivated.
As previously, in the top right corner are the most ‘assassinistic’ incidents, while in 
the bottom left are the least ‘assassinistic’ cases. Figure 3,12 shows the POSA output 
with tlie points labelled with names of assassination tar gets. Towards the top right of 
the plot is the political assassination of Ian Gow, a British MP killed by the IRA in 
1990. The attack was politically motivated, and carried out by offenders not known 
to Gow. He was obviously a public figure, and the attack was specific. Here, the 
perpetrator was classed as a first time offender as while the IRA had committed 
offences previously, there was no evidence that the specific individual responsible 
for the attack had offended previously. The attack on Rabbi Meir Kahane is in the 
same region of the plot, but is differentiated in that there is no evidence of political 
motive. However, it is classified as a political assassination as his death caused a 
political impact, in that following his death his ideas grew in influence in Israel.
The attack on Sergei Markidonov, a Russian MP killed in 1995, falls towards the 
middle/bottom of Figure 3.12. He was a public individual, killed by an individual 
known to him who was politically motivated. The attack was specific, and the 
assassin was a first time offender. Similarly, towards the other side of the plot is the 
attack on Ahmed Balousha, killed in a non-specific attack along with his two 
siblings. They were private individuals, the cliildren of a prominent politician, who 
were killed together by a politically motivated individual previously unknown to 
them. Finally, towards the middle of the POSA is the case of Cetm Emec, a Turkish 
journalist killed in 1990. There was no evidence that the attack was politically 
motivated, the perpetrator was a first time offender, and the attack was not specific, 
resulting in other victims.
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Thus, as Figure 3.12 shows, political assassination incidents come in a number of 
forms, creating a scale of different ‘types’ of assassination.
Private
Individual
Public Figure & 
Private Individual
Public Figure
AI..—....1 y ^ y a n  Gow
#Rabbi Meir Kahane
A
Ahmed Balousha ^A.Cetin Emec A
HaSergei Markidonov #
Specific +
V-O Unknown
Non-Specific + 
V-0 Unknown
Specific + 
V-0 Known
Non-Specific + 
V-0 Known
Figure 3.12. Schematic Plot of Assassination
3.4 SUMMARY
As discussed in section 3.1, there is much written in the literature about how political 
assassinations ar e defined, hr various fields such as academia, politics, and the law. 
These definitions tend to focus on a combination of three aspects of assassination, 
first who the victim is, second who the assassin is, and third, what the motive is for 
the attack. However, there is no definitive consensus on what political assassinations 
are. hr particular, the majority of the defiiritions are of little practical use, as they are 
largely abstr act, rather than designed for research.
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Therefore, this chapter was designed to evaluate emphically how well the literature 
definitions of political assassination fit real-life political assassinations. Using Partial 
Order Scalogram Analysis, individual assassination events were analysed, and scaled 
for how far' they meet the literatme’s definitions. It was found that even wherr 
looking solely at events termed as political assassinations, there is a lot of 
differentiatiorr between attacks, witlr attacks falling across the whole scale of 
‘assassination’. It is suggested that for the purposes of research, definitions of 
assassination should attempt to encompass the whole range of potential assassination 
events. Definitions should take into account possible variations in incidents, irr order 
that resear ch can be based on the whole universe of political assassination irrcidents, 
rather than being nar rowly focused on a small proportion of the available events.
Subsequerrt chapters will look at the ways in which political assassination irrcidents 
meet the definitions of homicide, and terrorism, exploring further how they should 
and could be defined.
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4. Defining Assassinations: Assassinations as defined by the 
Homicide Literature
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The pur pose of this chapter is to examine the links and similar ities between political 
assassinations and homicide, and whether political assassination shar es enough 
features with homicide to be considered in the same way, or whether assassination 
should instead be considered as a phenomena in its own right (see chapter 3) or in 
light of another phenomena (e.g. terrorism, see chapter 5). Currently, there is a great 
deal of literature discussing ways to define political assassinations, but there is little 
research which attempts to define political assassinations empirically. The literature 
shows that while some researchers are happy to use homicide as a way to define 
political assassinations, others draw attention to the differences between acts of 
homicide and acts of political assassmation.
The next step then, is to examine political assassinations empirically and homicides 
togedier. As discussed in chapter 2.3, definitions of homicide distinguish between 
types of homicide on the basis of concepts such as victim identity, and motivation. A 
set of political assassinations are used as a representative sample of the universe of 
political assassinations. In addition, a number of ‘traditional’ homicides ar e also 
used, to serve as an ‘anchor’ in the analysis, against which the political assassinations 
can be compared. In addition, some ‘questionable’ political assassinations are 
included, such as the case of John Lennon, in order to help tease out subtle 
distinctions between assassinations and homicides.
4.2 METHOD
4,2,1 The Data
A  sample of assassinations were drawn fr om the sample used m the previous chapter 
(see 3.2). These were selected to provide a range of assassinations, covering a variety
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of ‘types’ of assassination. In addition, a number of non-assassination homicides 
were selected to give variation to the analysis. These homicide cases were identified 
via the use of online news sources (e.g. news.bbc.co.uk), Mickolus books (Mickolus 
et al., 1989; Mickolus, 1993; Mickolus and Shnmons, 1997; Mickolus and Simmons, 
2002), and the resear chers own knowledge of cases. Cases were identified by the 
name of the victim, and data on each case were collected viaNexis and searches of 
the Mickolus series of books. Nexis is a database which allows for searches of UK 
broadsheet newspapers, including The Independent, The Independent on Simday,
The Observer, The Guardian, The Times, The Sunday Times, The Telegraph and The 
Sunday Telegr aph. Tire Mickolus series of books provide a comprehensive accoimt 
of transnational tenorism incidents, based also on newspaper coverage. The sample 
consisted of 57 homicide incidents, with 6 different types of homicide included (see 
Table 4.1).
Table 4.1
Types o f Homicide Incident
Type N =
Political Assassination 43
Known killing (e.g. infanticide) 6
Serial killing 4
Stranger killing 3
Mass killing 1
School shooting 1
The majority of cases included in the sample were assassinations (n = 43), as the 
purpose of the analysis is chiefly to understand what possible different types of 
assassination there ar e, while there were also six incidents in which the victim and 
offender were known to one another (e.g. infanticide), four serial killing incidents, 
tlir ee stranger killings, one mass murder and one school shooting.
4.2.2 Content Analysis
As in chapter 3, content analysis was used to transform the qualitative reports into 
quantitative data. As shown in chapter 2, literature definitions of homicide were
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content analysed to identify the concepts underlying definitions of homicide. This led 
to the identification of six concepts:
• Victim Identity/Relationship to Offender
• Number of victims
• Timing
• Geogiaphic Location
• Motivation
• Method
Of these six concepts, two were present in the definition of political assassination 
(motivation, and victim identity), but m order to understand the relationship between 
homicides in general and political assassinations all concepts are utilised, because, as 
mentioned in chapter 2.3, the other concepts may be important in future assassination 
research. Thus the following definition of homicide was created for the purpose of 
tills chapter, on the basis of these concepts:
The killing o f a [stranger/acquaintance/relative] which results in [more than 
one victim/one victim] in [serial attacks/non serial attacks] where the 
offender has [mental illness/no mental illness] and is motivated by 
[political/personal/instrumental] reasons.
Unlike the analysis in chapter 3, these concepts were not directional: there are no 
cases which are more or less typical of homicide, but instead all concepts simply 
describe different concepts found in sub-types of homicides. The first set of squai'e 
brackets broadly describe the victim-offender relationship, using tlnee levels to 
describe this: they are either shangers, with no relationship prior to the homicide, 
acquaintances, and so known to one another prior to the homicide, or relatives, and 
so are family members. The second square brackets describe the number of victims. 
There may be one victim of the homicide incident, or there may be more than one, 
depending on the type of killing (e.g. a spree killmg will have more than one victim, 
but a serial killing is likely to have one killing (per incident)). Serial attacks are 
largely believed to differentiate between serial killmgs and other types of homicide, 
and so it is interesting to see whether this concept is also important in differentiating 
between political assassination and homicides. The inclusion of mental illness is 
considered an important factor m some types of homicide (e.g. infanticide, a form of 
familicide) and therefore is included here. Finally, the motive is included, as either
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political (obviously a feature of political assassination definitions), instnnnental, or 
personal.
The five aspects identified in square brackets aie used as variables to content analyse 
the cases of homicide selected for this chapter:
1. The relationship between the victim and the offender could be quantified in 
one of three ways: they were related to one another (1), they were not related 
but were acquaintances (2), or they were strangers to one another (3).
2. There was just one victim (1) or there was more than one victim (2).
3. Where there was more than one victhn, these victims were killed in non-serial 
attacks (i.e. all at the same time) (1), or in a series of attacks (2).
4. The offender either does not suffer from any mental illness (1), or does suffer 
fr om some form of mental illness (2).
5. The offender’s motivation is political (1), personal (2), or instnnnental (i.e. 
they kill to achieve a particular goal) (3). Incidents were judged to have a 
political motivation if one of three criteria were met:
i. The assassin stated they were politically motivated, or a terrorist 
group claimed responsibility for the incident.
ii. A court case ruled that the incident was politically motivated.
iii. The secuiity seiwices or police reported evidence that the incident was 
politically motivated.
The data on each of the 57 homicide cases were content analysed using these five 
variables. The (numbers) assigned to the variables in the list above indicate how 
cases are coded on each variable. For example, a case where there was more than one 
victim would be coded ‘2’, while attacks with just one victim would be coded as ‘1’. 
Each case is coded this way on all vaiiables, to create a data matiix, an example of 
which is shown in Figuie 4.1. There was no missing data in this sample.
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Case Related (3)/ 
Acquaintance 
(2)/ Stranger 
(1)Relationship
One
Victim
(2y
Multiple
Victims
(1)
Serial 
Attacks 
(2)/Non­
serial 
Attacks 
(1)
Offender 
Mental 
Illness (2)/ 
No Mental 
Illness (1)
Political (2)/ 
Personal (1)/ 
Insti'umental 
(3) Motive
Lord
Mountbatten
1 1 1 1 2
John F. 
Kennedy
1 1 1 1 2
Sharon Tate 1 1 1 1 1
Ted Bundy’s 
victims
1 2 2 2 1
Columbine 2 1 1 1 1
Figure 4.1. Example of the Data Matrix coding
4.3 A MODEL OF ASSASSINATIONS BY HOMICIDE DEFINITIONS
In conti'ast to the analysis in chapter 3, the data in this chapter are analysed using 
another foim of multidimensional scaling, known as Multidimensional Scalogram 
Analysis (MSA). Like POSA, MSA offers a way in which to examine the 
relationship between both the cases across all variables, as well as looking at the 
relationships between variables. However, there is an important difference between 
POSA and MSA. In the analysis reported in section 3.3, the coding for each vaiiable 
contains a direction or a quantity. Thus a ‘2’ on a variable represented ‘more’ than a 
‘1’. The quantity (common range) shared by the variables was more typical of an 
assassination. In the cmTent analysis, the variables that distinguish between 
homicides do not contain a quantitative or directional quality, they simply define 
qualitatively different types of incident. MSA is used here because it allows the same 
examination of the stmctuie of the data without assuming directionality or requiring 
a common range.
MSA enables the researcher to identify the overlaps between the variables under 
analysis, and then relation to specific cases. Cases are analysed on the basis of the 
profiles created in the data matrix (see Fig. 4.1), i.e. the sequence of Is and 2s which
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describe the aspects of an attack via the presence or absence of a particular vaiiable. 
MSA plots points in a geometric space, in this case each point representing an attack. 
The closer together the points are, the more similar their profiles. If there are two or 
more attacks with the same profile, the points will be in the same place in the space, 
so one point can represent more than one case. The aim of the MSA is to plot the 
cases in such a way that the space can be divided into regions on the basis of the 
categories present for each variable (Wilson, 2000). If the solution is a good fit, it 
will be easy to draw a clear line between, for example, those attacks targeted at 
public individuals, and those targeted at private individuals. This should continue so 
that the plot can be subdivided into regions on the basis of all vaiiables.
MSA tries to find the best way to arrange the cases in the space, so that all categories 
of all variables can be represented by clear regions. It uses the Coefficient of 
Contiguity to measure the ‘goodness of fit’ of the plot. The closer to 1 the 
Coefficient of Contiguity is, the closer the plot is to a perfect representation. When 
the coefficient reaches 1, all variables fit into clear' regions in the space. However, a 
coefficient of 0.9 is typically accepted, provided there are not a large number of 
variables (Wilson, 2000).
The output of the MSA provides one plot with the final configuration of points, 
marked with the case numbers. It also provides individual plots for each variable. 
These have the same configuration of points, but instead of being marked by the case 
nmnbers, tliey are marked by the category code for each case of that variable (e.g. 2 
for Private and 1 for Public). Each plot is divided into regions according to the 
category codes, and overlapping areas are then identified on the main plot. The 
solution summarises the similarity of cases, and illustrates why those cases are 
similar'. From tliis plot, the researcher interprets the meaning of the regions 
identified, and the relationship the regions have to the cases (Wilson, 2000). There 
are no axes, as MSA works without any a priori coordinate system (Wilson, 2000). 
The important aspect of an MSA is the relationship between the cases, and how the 
researcher subsequently interprets that (Wilson, 2000).
65
In this section, the plots representing the variables will be presented initially, and 
then presented together to show their interaction. The coefficient of contiguity for 
this analysis is 0.918.
Figure 4.2 shows how the plot can be partitioned according to the relationship 
between the victim and the offender. Incidents falling in the bottom, darkest segment, 
are those where the victim and offender were related, i.e. they were family members 
(n = 3). The two lightest bands, which include seven points in total, represent the 
incidents where the victim and offender were strangers, i.e. did not know one another 
(n = 48). The mid-grey bands, at the top and middle of the plot, contain cases where 
the victim and offender were acquaintances, i.e. they knew one another, but were not 
related (n = 6).
•
•
Acquaintance
•
• Stranger
e# Acquaintance#
# Stranger
# •
# •
Figure 4.2. MSA plot of killings partitioned according to Victim-Offender 
relationship
Figure 4.3 demonstrates the number of victims in the incident. The shaded region on 
the left of the plot represents the 21 incidents in this sample where more than one
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person was killed in the attack. The unshaded area on the right represents the 36 
incidents where there was just one individual killed in the attack.
Figuie 4.4 shows whether or not the offender in the incidents was a serial offender, 
i.e. they committed more than one homicide, spread over a series of time periods.
The two points in the shaded region to the right of the plot represent those incidents 
were the offender was a serial offender (n = 4), while the remaining points in the 
unshaded region represent the incidents where the perpetrator was not a serial 
offender (n = 53).
Taking Figures 4,3 and 4.4 together, it can be seen that there are no incidents where a 
serial killer also killed multiple victims in one incident. The ‘serial’ variable refers to 
the fact that the perpetrator of the offence committed a series of attacks across 
different time periods, while the ‘multiple victims’ variable refers to the number of 
victims in a single episode, or time period. Thus it is theoretically possible for a 
serial offender to caiTy out attacks with multiple victims, but there are no such cases 
in this sample, as seen from Figmes 4.3 and 4.4, where these cases are present on 
opposite sides of the plot, with no overlap. Figure 4.5 shows these variables 
combined onto one plot, along with the relationship between the victim and offender. 
This creates a total of 15 combinations, each of wliich is labelled with the number of 
cases in each region. The most frequently occuning region contains cases where the 
offender is not a serial offender, where there is just one victim, and the victim and 
offender are stiangers to one another (n = 23). The next most frequently occuiring 
region contains cases where tliere is no serial offender, but there ar e multiple victims, 
and again the victim and offender ai e strangers to one another (n = 17). Not all 
regions contain cases: there are fbui' with no cases at all, although three of these are 
‘duplicated’ regions. Thus although it initially appeals that there are no serial killings 
between strangers (2"^  row, right column) these cases actually fall in the second such 
region (4**^ row, right column). The one region with no cases at all is in the bottom 
right of Figuie 4.5, where a serial offender would kill one person, who they are 
related to. So in this sample at least, offenders do not serial kill their relatives.
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Figure 4.3. MSA plot partitioned according to whether there was more than one 
victim per incident
SerialOffenderNon-serialoffender
Figure 4.4. Plot indicates whether or not the perpetrator was a serial offender
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Figure 4.5. Victim-Offender relationship + Specificity + Serial Offender
Figuie 4.5 can also be presented schematically, as in Figure 4.6. This removes the 
duplicated areas shown in Figure 4.5, resulting in a total of nine possible profiles (or 
regions), through the combination of the five variables. Variables can work along 
horizontal and vertical axes, with the variables describing the victim—offender 
relationship along the horizontal axis, while along the vertical axis are the var iables 
describing whether or not the offender was a serial offender, and the number of 
victims in the incident. Of these nine regions, eight contain cases (or points), 
representing the 57 homicide cases. As mentioned above, there are no cases where 
serial killers attack their relatives, and this is the only ‘gap’ in the sample. It is 
possible that this is an artefact of the sampling, and that with a larger sample there 
would be cases of serial killers targeting thek families. However, Figur e 4.6 also 
shows that there are no instances of serial killers also committing mass mur ders. It is 
less likely that this is an ar tefact of sampling: individuals committing mass murders 
ar e likely to be apprehended after their attacks, thus removing the potential for a 
series of attacks, and preventing them. However, there ar e some types of incident 
where it may be possible. For example, bomb attacks often kill multiple people, and
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Figure 4.6. Schematic MSA diagram
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it is possible for an individual to commit a series (campaign) of such attacks,
^vithout apprehension, as they are less likely to be at the scene of the crime (due to 
the possibility of using remote-detonation or timed bombs). Thus it is possible, but 
such attacks are more likely to be considered as teiTorism rather than homicide, and 
therefore are not present in this sample. Interestingly, in all cases where there were 
multiple victims the offender was a one-time offender, rather than a serial offender. It 
is possible that incidents where the offender committed multiple homicides also 
ended with the offender being apprehended by the authorities, or being killed 
themselves. For example, die Columbine school massacre falls in this region, and the 
perpeti ators of that incident did indeed commit suicide.
There aie still two further vaiiables to consider. Figure 4.7 shows whether or not the 
perpetrator of the homicide was suffering ffom mental illness. The shaded region on 
the right of the plot contains those incidents in wliich the offender was suffering ffom 
mental illness (n = 4), while the remainder of the points in the unshaded left region 
were not suffering ff om mental illness (n = 53). Careful comparison with the other 
plots shown in Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 reveals that in this sample, those considered 
to be mentally ill did not attack acquaintances. The profiles representing these cases 
aie circled in the schematic model in Figuie 4.8. It seems likely that if a large enough 
sample was taken, it would be possible to identify incidents in each of the nine 
regions that were conducted by someone suffering ff om mental illness, as well as 
someone who was not.
Finally, Figure 4.9 shows how the motivation for the attack partitions tlie plot. The 
region towai'ds the right of the plot, contains those cases where the offender was 
motivated by personal reasons (e.g. hati ed of a family member) (n = 14). The region 
in the top left contains cases where the motivation was political (n == 41), while the 
region in the bottom left contains cases where the offender had an instrumental 
motivation (i.e. killing their target for material gain) (n = 2). Figure 4.10 shows these 
cases overlaid onto Figuie 4.6, to show where the overlaps between motivations and 
other variables fall. Personally motivated attacks fall across all regions with cases, 
highlighted by a gieen circle. Personally motivated offenders kill strangers, 
acquaintances, and relatives, and can be serial offenders or non-serial offenders.
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Figure 4.7. MSA plot partitioned according to the presence of offender mental illness
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Figure 4.9. MSA plot showing the motivation for the attack
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Figure 4.10. Schematic MSA showing motivation of offender
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resulting in multiple victims, or single victims. In addition, all incidents where the 
offender was suffering from mental illness were personally motivated. The 
instrumentally motivated attacks ai'e highlighted by a blue circle, and occur in just 
two regions. These are only perpetrated against strangers and relatives, and not 
against acquaintances. Only non-serial offenders are instrumentally motivated, and 
they result in both multiple and single victims. They also show no sign of mental 
illness. Finally, politically motivated attacks are highlighted by a yellow circle.
These occur in fom regions of the MSA. Politically motivated attacks aie only 
caiiied out against strangers and acquaintances, and never against relatives. There aie 
no incidents where serial offenders are politically motivated, although they can incur 
both multiple and single victims. There are no instances where a politically 
motivated offender also suffered from mental illness in this sample.
On the basis of this, it is proposed that the motivation for homicides act as a third 
dimension, as shown in Figure 4.11. Figure 4.11 shows how this dimension works, 
cutting across all other variables.
In Figuie 4.11 the two dimensional plot is seen on the top ‘face’ of the box, again 
with the victim-offender relationship represented across the horizontal axis, and the 
number of victims and the offenders previous behaviom* across the vertical axis. In 
the third dimension are the thiee different motivations -  whether the attack was 
personal, instrumental, or political. The dai’k shaded region in the bottom right, 
where there aie no cases, cuts across all thiee dimensions. In order to study the other 
gaps in more detail, this third dimension can be split apart, as in Figuie 4.12. Figure 
4.12a shows the layer with the personally motivated incidents highlighted by a green 
squai'e. This shows that personally motivated attacks fall in all regions, with the only 
region with no personally motivated incidents being that where there are no attacks at 
all. Personally motivated offenders may be serial offenders, or non-serial offenders, 
they may have multiple victims or just one victim, and they may be a stranger to their 
victim, an acquaintance, or related to then victim. In addition, all incidents where the 
offender was suffering from mental illness were personally motivated, in this sample.
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Figure 4.11. Three dimensional plot showing motivations for attacks
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Figure 4.12b shows the layer of the plot where incidents aie driven by an 
insti'umental motive, this time highlighted by a blue square. There aie two ‘types’ of 
instrumental homicide in this analysis. Instrumental offenders are either strangers or 
relations of their victims, and within this sample are always non-serial offenders.
Finally, Figure 4.12c shows the third layer where incidents are driven by a political 
motivation, highlighted by a yellow square. These fall in a thhd pai t of the plot, 
towards the top left, with foui* different ‘types’ of politically motivated homicide in 
this sample. PoHtically motivated offences are, in this sample, committed by non­
serial offenders, where the victim-offender relationsliip is that of stranger or 
acquaintance. There are no instances in tliis sample of politically-motivated homicide 
where the victim and offender were related to one another. In addition, these types of 
homicides result in both one victim, or multiple victims.
However, these gaps may be a sampling ai'tefact. As discussed above, there is one 
region of the MSA which has no cases at all, and it is possible that this would be 
filled with a larger sample. The variation in motivations is also likely be an artefact 
of sampling. For example, instrumentally motivated homicides occur in just two 
regions. However, it is possible that with a larger sample they could be present in all 
regions: across attacks on acquaintances, and certainly in attacks perpetrated by 
serial offenders. Although it seems less likely that instrumentally motivated 
offenders would kill multiple victims in one attack, in an instance of, for example a 
bank robbery, it is possible. In addition, it is very likely that instiTimentally motivated 
offenders would kill a single relative. Thus it seems that with a larger sample, 
instrumentally motivated homicides would occur in all regions.
There are foui’ types of politically motivated homicides in this sample, and again it is 
possible tliat the ‘missing’ cases aie aitefacts of the sampling technique. Although 
politically motivated homicides seem to be rare against relatives, a person could, for 
example, kill their brother in order to assume the presidency. This could result in 
multiple victims if otliers are also killed, either at the same time or across more than 
one occasion. In addition, a politically motivated series of homicides is likely to take
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the form of a terrorist campaign, for example the Unabomber’s campaign killed two 
individuals on separate occasions.
Figuie 4.13 shows the MSA with the points labelled with the names of some of the 
homicide cases used in this analysis.
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Figure 4.13. Specific Homicide Cases
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In the top left region falls the Columbine school shooting, where the targets were 
acquaintances of the offenders, the offenders were not serial offenders, and they were 
personally motivated. The incident resulted in multiple victims. In the same region, 
but with a political rather than personal motivation the victims include the killing of 
Maitin Hyland, who was killed by the IRA. Moving down the plot, to attacks where
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the victim and offender were stiangers, but there were still multiple victims and a 
non-serial offender, include the deaths of Pierre Gemayel and Sharon Tate. Piene 
Gemayel was a Lebanese politician, shot to death, while Sharon Tate was an actress 
killed by Charles Manson and his accomplices. Thus here it is the motivation behind 
the otherwise similar* attacks which distinguish between them, with Gemayel’s 
killing being politically motivated, and Tate’s killing personally motivated. In the 
bottom region of this column are incidents where the victim and offender ar e related. 
John List killed his family for personal reasons, while the Menendez brothers killed 
then* parents in order to inherit their wealth (i.e. they had an instrumental motive).
In the next column, where the offender was again a non-serial offender, ar e attacks 
where there was just one victim. In the top region is the deatli of Ray Smallwoods 
who was killed in a politically motivated attack by the IRA. In the same region is the 
case of Nancy Spungen, killed by her boyfriend in a personally motivated attack. In 
both cases the victim and offender were acquaintances, but again the motivation 
distinguished between them. Moving down the column, in the central region, are 
attacks perpetrated by a stranger. Anna Lindh was a politician killed by a man 
working alone, while John Lennon was also killed by a man working alone. At tlie 
bottom of this column, still with a non-serial offender who kills just one victim, are 
cases where victim and offender are related. An example of this type of killing is that 
of Marvm Gaye, who was killed by his father, meaning that the victim and offender 
were related, and the attack was personally motivated.
The third column contains cases where the offender committed multiple offences, but 
only killed one person in each offence. In the top right region ar e the offences of 
Har old Shipman, a GP who killed Ins patients. His motivation was personal, rather 
than instr umental or political. In the mid-right region are cases where the serial 
offender killed one person at a time, but was a stranger to the victim. Representative 
cases in this region are the victims of Ted Bundy, who was personally motivated.
The final region, in the bottom right of the plot, contains no cases in this sample.
While Figure 4.13 gives examples of specific homicide cases. Figure 4.14 is the 
same analytical diagram, showing the location of the political assassinations in this
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analysis. Represented by a green highlight, they are clustered in the top left of the 
plot, in this sample occurring in just four of the nine possible regions. Although there 
is (obviously) some overlap between the political assassinations and the politically 
motivated attacks, not all assassinations were politically motivated (e.g. the killing of 
Anna Lindh) (these cases aie classified as political assassinations due to the fact that 
the target was a political figure, and thus the killing was likely to have some kind of 
political impact, e.g. an election). However, there were no instances where political 
assassinations were perpetrated by serial offenders in tliis sample. It is possible that 
terrorist groups (or specific individuals within or without a teiTorist group) may be 
responsible for a series of assassinations, for example the Greek group November 17 
perpetrated a number of assassinations. However, such cases were not present in this 
sample, as there was no evidence m the data that multiple attacks were committed by 
the same perpetiators.
In terms of compaiing political assassinations to homicide, fiom this analysis it is 
cleai* that while political assassinations appear to form a subset of homicides, it is 
also clear that there are similarities between assassmations, and homicides more 
generally. The main difference is in the motivation for the attack, and the fact that, 
within this sample, there are no assassinations where the victim and offender are 
related. However, there are cases where the victim and offender are acquaintances, or 
strangers, as with homicides. Another key difference is that there appeal* to be no 
serial offenders who commit political assassinations, whereas there are serial 
homicide offenders.
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Figure 4.14. Location of assassinations
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4.4 SUMMARY
This section has analysed valions types of homicide (including political 
assassinations) according to the concepts which underlie the definitions of these sub- 
types of homicide. There is a large body of resear ch regarding the behaviouial 
features of homicide, and the purpose of this chapter is to establish whether political 
assassinations should be considered as a sub-type of homicide in order that the 
existing homicide research can be drawn upon to inform political assassination 
research.
The use of MSA in this reseaich offers an opportunity to compare different types of 
homicide on a case by case basis, and also provides an understanding of the way in 
which the vaiiables relate to one another. This research suggests that political 
assassinations appear to be a subset of homicide overall, sharing features with other 
types of homicides, but typically being distinguished by the motivation for the attack. 
However, without a much larger sample it has not been possible to establish whether 
political assassinations are really differentiated from other homicides, except on the 
basis of motivation (i.e. political assassinations could theoretically occur in all 
regions of the MSA, so they are not that different from other homicide sub-types). 
Nevertheless, it has higlilighted tlie importance of conductmg more research into 
political assassination, considering the existence of serial attackers, and the role of 
terrorist groups in assassinations. In addition, it highlights the need to consider other 
concepts of homicide, such as the presence of multiple victims, issues regarding 
targeting, and the specificity of assassinations.
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5. Defining Assassinations: Terrorism and Political Assassinations as 
defined by the Terrorism Literature
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 provided a discussion of the ways in which terrorism has been defined, and 
worked towards establishing the concept categories which combine to form these 
definitions. This chapter is designed to test these definitions using different types of 
terrorism, including political assassinations, in order to establish whether political 
assassinations can or should be considered as a form of terrorist behavioui*.
Assassinations are undeniably used by terrorist groups, for example in tlie case of 
Marco Biagi, who was killed by the Red Brigades in Italy. Nevertheless, some 
researchers do argue that political assassinations should not be considered as a foim 
of teiTorism (e.g. Sclimid, 2003). This is on the basis that the victim(s) of political 
assassination are more specific and particular than the victim(s) targeted by 
terrorism, who tend to be more representative of a wider target. In addition, the 
intention of terrorism is to instil ‘teiTor’ m the general public, but it is argued that a 
political assassination is unable to have the same effect on the feelings of the public 
at lar ge. Therefore, from an academic or theoretical point of view, it has been ar gued 
that political assassinations should not be included in terrorism research.
This chapter is intended to provide an empirical analysis of whether political 
assassinations meet the definition of terrorism. Although there may be theoretical 
differences between political assassinations and terTorism, no research has looked at 
the actual differences as seen in incidents of both. In tliis chapter, definitions of 
terrorism will be drawn fiom the literatur e, and used to analyse incidents deemed as 
political assassination and terrorism. Conclusions will be drawn about whether 
terrorism research should be used to inform furfher research on political 
assassinations, based on how well assassination incidents meet the definition of 
terTorism.
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5.2 METHOD
5.2.1 The Data
A number of well-known ten orist incidents were identified, and searches were 
conducted in both the Mickolus books (Mickolus, Sander & Murdock, 1989; 
Mickolus, 1993; Mickolus and Simmons, 1997; Mickolus and Simmons, 2002) and 
the Nexis database to gather data on these incidents. Data on the terrorist incidents 
were collected fr om the Mickolus series of books, and newspaper reports on Nexis 
(The Observer, The Guardian, The Times, The Sunday Times, The Independent, The 
Independent on Sunday, The Telegraph and The Sunday Telegraph). The sample 
consists of 82 cases, including five assassinations. The most commonly occurring 
type of incident was bombings, with 17 in this sample (see Table 5.1). The least 
common types were aerial hijacks, exotic pollution, letter bombing, and shoot out 
with police, of which there were four each.
Table 5.1
Types o f Terrorism Incident
Incident Type N =
Bombing 17
Threat/Hoax 9
Conspnacy 8
Banicade-hostage 7
Non-aerial takeover 7
Sabotage 7
Assassination 5
Kidnapping 6
Aerial hijack 4
Exotic pollution 4
Letter bombing 4
Shoot out witli police 4
Total 82
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Of these 82 incidents, 60 were perpetrated by a terrorist group, and the remaining 22 
were tlie responsibility of individuals. These are included to assist in Teasing out’ 
distinctions between different types of incident classified as Terrorism’.
5.2,2 Content Analysis
Similarly to the method used in chapters 3 and 4, the data collected were content 
analysed, to create quantitative data fiom the qualitative news reports. As discussed 
in chapter 2, a content analysis of definitions of terrorism found that there ai e seven 
concepts which underlie these definitions:
Premeditation 
Motivation 
Target Identity 
Type of violence 
Peipetrator Identity 
Intention 
Legality
However, not all of the aspects identified in the literature are explicitly dealt with by 
these variables. Legality is not included, as all definitions of terrorism which address 
legality state that it is an illegal act, and fiulher that it is given that an act oftenorism 
is likely to break the law. The motivation for the attack is not included, as, similar to 
the legality of attack, there is a consensus that this would be political (including 
religious). Thus these two aspects would offer no differentiation between terrorist 
incidents. Premeditation and intention were also present in literature definitions, but 
not included here, as these are difficult to glean from the data available, and as 
Sclimid (1993) has argued, it is the act itself which is important to consider. Thus the 
definition used here draws on three concepts: the target, the violence used, and the 
perpetrator. These have been used to provide this definition of terrorism:
A [threat/act] targeted at individuals) who are [randomly 
selected/representative o f a larger target/specifically targeted] which results 
in [deaths/no deaths] and [financial losses/no financial losses], perpetrated 
by a [terrorist group/individual].
In this definition, the type of target is split across two variables. First, the literature 
suggests that both property and persons can be the targets of terrorist incidents, and
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this is quantified according to whether or not the terrorist attack directly caused 
financial losses. Second, the type of tar get of teiTorism can be divided into three 
categories, depending on whether the target is selected at random, whether they are 
selected because they are a representative of a larger target, or whether they are 
targeted specifically because of their identity. The identity of the perpetrator is 
considered simply as either a terrorist group, or an individual, both of which ar e cited 
as possible tenorists in the literature. Literature also suggests that terrorism may or 
may not incoiporate violence, and this is dealt with in the last two variables, which 
consider whether the incident is a thr eat or an actual attack, and whether the attack 
results in deaths or not.
From this definition then, a series of var iables can be established which are used to 
content analyse descriptive accounts of terrorist incidents;
1. The incident is either a threat (1) or an act (2).
2. The victim was either randomly selected (1), selected because they are 
representative of a larger target (2), or specifically targeted because of who 
they are (3).
3. The incident may (2) or may not (1 ) result in deaths.
4. The incident may (2) or may not (1) result in financial losses.
5. The perpetrator may be a terrorist group (2), or an individual (1).
For three variables, the data on terrorist incidents is coded according to the presence 
(2) or absence (1) of the variable. For example, cases where the incident resulted in 
financial losses would be coded as (2) on that variable. Where there were no 
financial losses the case would be coded as (1). The remaining two variables describe 
dichotomous choices, rather than the presence or absence of a particular* feature. An 
‘act’ is coded is a (2), while a threat is coded as a (1). Similarly, a specific tar'get is 
coded as a (3), while a representative target is a (2), and a randomly selected target is 
a (1). Each incident is coded on the five variables, creating a data matrix, which 
shows each incident’s particular profile according to the features of that attack (see 
Figure 5.1).
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Case Threat (1)/ 
Act (2)
Randomly Selected V 
(1)/ Representative V
(2y
Specific V (3)
Deaths
(2y
No deaths 
(1)
Financial 
losses (2)/
No financial 
losses (1)
Terrorist 
Group (2)/
Not Terrorist 
Group (1)
Aide More 2 3 2 1 2
Sarin Attacks 
(Japanese 
Underground)
2 1 2 1 2
Teny Waite 2 3 1 1 2
NFL bomb threat 1 1 1 1 1
Contaminated 
Mai s Bars
1 1 1 2 2
Figure 5.1, Example of the Data Matrix coding
5.3 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS AS DEFINED BY 
TERRORISM LITERATURE
As in chapter 4, Multi-Dimensional Scalogram Analysis (MSA) is used to analyse 
the data provided by the content analysis. Again, individual variables are presented 
first, followed by the combined plot.
Figure 5,2 shows whether incidents were acts or threats. The seven points shown in 
the unshaded region at the top right of the plot represent thr eats of violence (n =16) 
and the remaining points which are in the shaded region are acts of violence (n = 66). 
Threats are classed as incidents where nothing actirally happened, such as hoax calls 
claiming tliat a bomb has been planted, or claims to have contaminated an area with a 
radioactive substance when in actual fact the substance is harmless.
The 8 points which are in shaded region at the bottom left ofFigme 5.3 represent the 
cases where the terrorist incident resulted in deaths of individuals other than the 
perpetrators (n = 39). In the remaining 43 incidents, there were no bystander deaths.
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Act of violence
Figure 5.2. MSA plot partitioned based on whether the incident is an act or threat of 
violence
No loss of life
Loss of life
Figure 5.3. MSA plot partitioned dependent on whether there was loss o f life
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Figure 5.4 shows these two variables combined onto one plot, with the overlaps 
showing that there are acts of violence which result in deaths, and acts of violence 
which result in no deaths, and in all cases with tln eats of violence there ar e no 
deaths.
The shaded area towar ds the top left of Figur e 5.5 shows which incidents were 
designed to cause financial losses (n = 24). These are incidents such as the sabotage 
of Lufthansa offices in New York, where the intention was to cause damage and 
financial losses for the company. This also includes incidents of kidnap where the 
perpetr ator is motivated by the ransom that they expect to receive. In the unshaded 
areas towards the bottom and right are the remaining 58 cases where tliere were no 
financial losses, hr Figure 5.6 this plot is combined with Figure 5.4, to show the 
combination of the type of violence, the loss of life, and financial losses. This results 
in six regions, all of winch contain cases, witli the var iable showing financial losses 
cutting across the other two variables. Thus, an act of violence may result in both 
deaths and financial losses, deaths but no financial losses, no deaths and financial 
losses deaths, and no deaths and no financial losses. As before, thr eats do not result 
in deaths, but do result in financial losses, or no financial losses.
In Figure 5.7 the perpetrator of the incident is overlaid onto Figure 5.6. The 
perpetrator was classified as either an TndividuaF (in the yellow region) or a ‘Group’ 
(the non-yellow region). ‘Individual’ refers to incidents committed by lone 
individuals or groups of individuals, who are not affiliated to any terrorist group. 
Incidents classified as being committed by ‘Group’ are those where the perpetrator 
was a member of a terrorist gr oup. The incidents in the shaded region on the right are 
those which were committed by individuals (n = 22), while the incidents committed 
by groups are in the unshaded region on the left (n = 60). As the figur e shows, the 
incidents perpetrated by individuals fall in the opposite corner to the incidents 
resulting m financial losses, i.e. no cases perpetrated by individuals cause financial 
losses. Figure 5.8 shows this more clearly, with these four variables combined onto a 
schematic plot. There ar e nine regions, with incidents in each. The variables work on 
two different axes. Along the horizontal axis are the variables describing whether the
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Figure 5.4. Type of violence + Loss of life
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Figure 5.5. M SA plot partitioned according to presence o f  financial losses
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Figure 5.7. MSA plot partitioned according to the identity o f  the perpetrator
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incident was an act or a thieat and whether or not there were deaths, while the 
Group/Individual and Financial Losses variables work along the vertical axis. There 
ai e three important interactions shown in this plot. First, looking at the top of Figure 
5.8, financial losses are only incurred when the incident is canied out by a 
member(s) of a terrorist group, although not all incidents canied out by tenorist 
groups incur financial losses. Second, and perhaps obviously, deaths are only 
incurred as a result of acts, rather than thieats. Tliird, threats can incur financial 
losses, therefore it could be said that minimal action is needed to have an impact.
r
Act
+
Deaths
Act
+
No Deaths
_ _ X _ _
Threat
+
No Deaths
Financial
Losses
+
Group
No Financial 
Losses 
+
Group
No Financial 
V Lossesf +
Individual
Figure 5.5. Overall POSA
The fifth, and final vaiiable, describes the identity of the immediate victim of the 
attack. A specifically targeted victim is one who is selected for the attack, by name.
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for example Aldo Moro, who was kidnapped and assassinated by the Red Brigades, 
in Italy (n = 19). There are also incidents where the victims were targeted because 
they represent a larger organisation, such as a government or country (n = 15). An 
example of such an attack is the 9/11 attacks in New York. The World Trade Centre 
was targeted because it was seen as representative of the US. Finally, there are 
incidents in which victims are selected randomly (n -  48). These victims are not 
specifically targeted, nor are they representative of any organisation. They become 
involved in the incident solely because they happened to be at the scene at the time, 
such as in the case of ETA detonating bombs on public beaches. It is suggested that 
these represent a third dimension, as shown in Figure 5.9.
Financial Loss 
+ Group
No Financial Loss 
+ Group
No Financial Loss 
+ Individual
Threat
Deaths No DeathsNo Deaths
SPE SIFIC TARCiET
Figure 5.9. Three dimensional plot showing type o f  victim in terrorist incidents
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As with the analysis in chapter 4, this victim identity variable cuts across the other 
four variables. The two dimensional plot is shown on the ‘top’ of the box, again with 
the respective variables shown on the horizontal and vertical axes. In the third 
dimension are the different types of target, and these are shown split into individual 
‘layers’ in Figure 5.10.
Figure 5.10 shows the plot with the identity of the target overlaid. Figure 5.10a 
shows those incidents targeting a specific victim (highlighted with a green square), 
Figure 5.10b shows incidents targeted at representative victims (highlighted in 
purple), while Figure 5.10c shows the incidents targeted at randomly selected 
individuals (highlighted in blue).
Figur e 5.10a shows that there are five types of attacks in which the targets are 
specific individuals. These work across the horizontal axis, and are both threats and 
acts, and both result in deaths, and result in no deaths. However, although incidents 
targeted at specific individuals are committed by both groups and individuals, in no 
instances do they result in financial losses. It is likely that this is because the specific 
piupose of an incident targeted at a specific person is to kill/injirre that person, rather 
than to cause other kinds of harm. Incidents tar geted at specific individuals are most 
commonly acts which ar e perpetrated by groups, but that result in no deaths and no 
financial losses (n = 5) and threats made by individuals, which also result in no 
deaths and no financial losses (n = 5).
Figure 5.10b highlights those incidents which were targeted at individuals 
representative of a larger target. There are seven such types of terrorist incident. 
Similar to those incidents targeted at specific people, both threats and acts are aimed 
at representative targets, and these instances do sometimes result in the deaths of the 
tar gets. Similarly, attacks targeted at representative individuals may result in 
financial losses, and are perpetrated by botli individuals and groups. The two voids in 
Figure 5.10b are interesting. First, there are no instances where groups make threats 
against representative people, which do not result in deaths but do result in financial 
losses. Second, there are no instances where groups commit a terrorist act, which do 
not result in financial losses or deaths. Incidents aimed at a people who are
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representative of a wider target ar e likely to be intended to cause a lot of disruption: 
the purpose of them is to harm a broad target and so they need to have some impact 
to send the message to the broad tar get. An act with no deaths and no financial losses 
is ‘rmsuccessfUr, and it seems likely that terrorist groups would be more successful 
in their attacks, because of their experience and resour ces. The most common types 
of incident targeted at representative gr oups are acts perpetrated by gr oups, which 
result in deaths but no financial losses (n == 8). The other types of incident perpetr ated 
against representative targets all have the same frequency (n = 1), with the exception 
of acts, perpetrated by groups, resulting in deaths and financial losses (n = 2).
Finally, Figure 5.10c shows that incidents targeted at random individuals occur in all 
regions of the plot. Thus where random individuals are tar geted the perpetrator does 
not discriminate between the type of attack used. The most common type of incident 
targeted at random individuals involves an act perpetrated by a group, where there 
are no deaths but there are financial losses (n = 15). The least common type of attack 
targeted at random individuals is a threat, made by a group, involving no deaths, but 
resulting in financial losses (n = 1).
Looking at Figrue 5.10 as a whole, it shows that both individuals and groups target 
victims at all levels: both will aim attacks or threats at random victims, representative 
victims, and specific victims. In addition, financial losses can be incurred across all 
targets. The two remaining variables (Act/Threat, and Deaths/No Deaths) show that 
each is tar geted at all levels of victim, are perpetrated by both gr oups and 
individuals, and can result in financial losses. It is possible to see that incidents 
resulting in deaths are targeted at all levels of victim, are perpetrated by both groups 
and individuals, and in some cases do result in financial losses. Thr eats and acts can 
each result in financial losses, but in no case did a threat result in a death, which is 
perhaps common sense.
Figme 5.11 shows the MSA output with each point labelled with the name of a 
terrorist incident which was included m the analysis, in order to provide a more 
applied imderstanding of the incidents. The analysis shows that there are two types of
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assassination within this analysis, both falling in the bottom/centre left of the plot, 
shown in Figure 5.11 by a green highlight.
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Figure 5JL  Specific Assassination cases
For the purpose of this research, an assassination is defined as:
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+
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J
“A targeted attack with a specific victim. They need not he a politician, but 
their death must have some impact on the political scene, either because o f 
who they are, or the position they hold"
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The first point (in the bottom left region) represents assassinations in which an 
individual has targeted a specific victim  ^where tlie incident has resulted in no 
financial losses. This is exemplified by the assassination of John F. Kennedy, the US 
President killed by an individual. The second point (in the centre left region) 
represents incidents where an individual has been specifically targeted by a terrorist 
group, and again there were no financial losses. An example of such an assassination 
is the kidnap and killing of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, an Italian terrorist 
group. The assassination incidents in the sample are distinguished ftom other 
terrorist incidents by the type of tar get, being specific individuals rather than 
randomly selected or representative of a wider target, and the fact that none result in 
financial losses. Otherwise, they do appear- to be similar to other types of terrorism.
5.4 SUMMARY
As discussed, the research literature is somewhat divided on whether or not political 
assassinations should be considered as a form of terrorism. This study has used the 
literatiue’s definitions of terrorism to compare ‘traditional’ terTorism and political 
assassinations empirically.
Having content analysed the political assassination incidents according to the 
terrorism variables, it was foruid that there were two distinct types of political 
assassination. In terms of the definition used, all political assassination incidents 
were acts rather than thr eats, they all resulted in a loss of life, none of the incidents 
caused financial losses, and all were victims selected because of who they were. The 
only difference between political assassination incidents was whether they were 
committed by a terrorist group, or an individual. It is possible to suggest that the 
political assassination incidents present in this sample ar e able to be classified as 
terTorism, according to the literatme. All incidents met at least three of the ‘criteria’ 
of terrorism, as specified in the literature, while one incident met four of the five 
‘conditions’.
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This chapter, along with chapters 3 and 4, has examined political assassinations, 
using the literatuie to consider how well they meet existing definitions of political 
assassination, homicide, and terrorism, and by comparing real-life political 
assassinations incidents to each other, and to cases of homicide and teiTorism. The 
next step is to draw these findings together, to establish how future research should 
be informed.
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6. Defining Political Assassinations: Discussion
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The first part of this thesis has examined the ways in which political assassinations 
have been defined in the literature, and tested these against real-life assassination 
incidents to establish how well they account for the variation in attacks. In addition, 
definitions of homicide and terrorism were examined, to see if these could be used to 
inform research on political assassinations. Chapter 2 provided a discussion of the 
ways in which political assassinations have been defined in the literature on political 
assassinations, homicide, and teiTorism, while chapters 3, 4, and 5 subsequently 
endeavoured to provide fm*ther understanding of how well these definitions describe 
real-life political assassination incidents, via an analysis of these incidents. This 
chapter provides a discussion of the findmgs of Part 1 of the thesis, explaining how 
the findings can inform further research.
6.2 DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATION
As discussed in chapter 2, there is much written in the literature about the way in 
which acts of political assassination should be defined. Together these definitions 
provide four concepts by which assassinations can be defined: the victim identity, the 
offender identity, the motivation for the act, and the legality of the act. As chapter 2 
demonstrated, definitions of political assassinations fall in the overlaps between these 
categories. In chapter 3 these concepts were used to analyse real-life political 
assassination incidents, in order to establish how well the literature definitions do in 
fact describe real-life political assassinations. However, the concept of legality was 
omitted, as all incidents in this analysis could be considered illegal, and therefore the 
concept offers no differentiation between incidents. Thus the incidents of political 
assassination were analysed according to their specificity, the identity of the victim, 
the offending history of the perpetrator, the victim-offender relationship, and the 
motivation for the attack.
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Chapter 3 identified thirteen different types of political assassination, differentiated 
according to these concepts. This suggests that far fiom there being just one type of 
assassination, and therefore one type of definition which could encompass all cases, 
definitions need to be broader. None of the existing definitions of political 
assassination address all of these concepts. Instead, they each use one, two, or tliree 
of the concepts, creating rather narrow definitions, wliich are also of little practical 
use in differentiating political assassinations fiom non-political assassinations. For 
example, Ben-Yehuda (2005) merely defines political assassination as the illegal 
killing of a person against their will. However, this offers no way of distinguishing 
between political assassination and a more traditional homicide. Others aie 
somewhat restrictive, for example Khkham et al. (1970) ai-gue that only political 
individuals who are killed by a politically motivated offender can be political 
assassinations. However, the analysis in chapter 3 demonstrated that incidents 
commonly viewed and accepted as political assassinations are not covered by these 
definitions, therefore reinforcing the view that a broad definition should be used, 
wliich incorporates the elements identified in an analysis of literatuie definitions.
6.3 COMPARISON OF HOMICIDES AND POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS
At their most fundamental, political assassinations aie a form of illegal killing. 
Therefore it is important to understand the relationship between ‘ti'aditionaP 
homicide incidents (e.g. serial killings, school shootings) and political assassination 
incidents. Existing reseaich on political assassination tends to view them more as a 
form of stalking which can result in homicide, whereas it may be more useful to view 
political assassinations as a homicide which in some cases may be preceded by 
stalking. Thus chapter 4 compared homicide incidents (including political 
assassinations) using the distinguishing features of homicide definitions set out by 
the literature. Incidents were analysed on the basis of tlie victim-offender 
relationship, tlie number of victims in the incident, the type of offender (serial or not, 
mentally ill or not) and the motive behind the attack (personal, instrumental, or 
political). The results of the analysis found that, amongst this sample at least, 
incidents of political assassination show a number of similaiities with other types of
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homicide incidents. They appear to be mainly distinguishable by the motivation for 
the attack, with all the politically motivated homicides in the sample being political 
assassinations. Of couise there is an element of circular ity here. As discussed in 
chapter 3, and section 6.2 of this chapter, a key aspect of political assassinations is 
that they are politically motivated. However, not all political assassinations are 
politically motivated. Chapter 4 demonstrated that in a number of cases, the political 
assassinations were actually personally motivated (e.g. the killing of Anna Lindli). 
Thus although in some instances the motivation distinguishes assassinations fiom 
other homicides, this does not hold for all instances. Other aspects where political 
assassinations differ fiom traditional homicides include the type of offender, with no 
serial offenders committing political assassinations. It is possible that this is because 
the perpetrators of political assassinations are apprehended before they offend again. 
Equally it is possible that perpetr ators of political assassinations are only motivated 
by their desire to kill that particular individual and therefore do not feel the need to 
go on and offend again. Another difference between political assassinations and 
other homicides is the type of victim-offender relationship. Political assassinations 
appear- to rar ely be committed by an individual who is related to the victim. This is 
likely to be related to the motivation for the incident. All incidents where the victim 
and offender were related were driven by a personal or instr-umental motive. It is 
suggested that this is due to the nature of the relationsliip; perhaps it is unlikely that 
within close relationships politics would be the motivating factor to drive an 
individual to rnmder, over personal or even instr umental reasons.
Aside from these distinguishing featm’es, there are certainly similarities between 
homicides and political assassinations. Four- types of assassination were identified in 
this sample, and for each ‘type’ there was at least one case of ‘traditional’ homicide 
with the same profile, with the exception of the motive for the attack. That is, the 
cases of political assassination were the same on the Serial/Non-serial Offender, 
Mirltiple/Single Victim, and Victhn-Offender Relationship variables as homicide 
cases, but were differentiated fiom them by the Motive variable. Therefore this thesis 
suggests that political assassinations should be considered as a sub-type of homicide, 
at least for research piuposes. The existing resear ch and knowledge focused on 
homicides could be valuable in furtlrering the rmderstanding of political assassination
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incidents. In chapter 8 this will be discussed, with suggestions offered on particular 
aspects which could be drawn on to inform research.
6.4 COMPARISON OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS
In chapter 2, there was a discussion of how political assassinations may or may not 
be a form of tenorism. A key issue in this debate for many terrorism researchers (e.g. 
Schmid, 1992) is the differing target populations in terrorism and political 
assassinations: terrorism is usually targeted at the general public, with the intention 
of hai’ming or killing individuals who aie randomly selected, or representative of a 
larger body. Political assassinations however are seen as more ‘personal’ and tend to 
be targeted at specific, named individuals, rather than gioups. However, it is an 
indisputable fact that teiTorist groups do use political assassinations as a tactic, and 
so in that sense political assassinations should be considered as a form of terrorism.
Chapter 5 looked at the extent to which incidents of political assassination meet the 
literatui e’s common definition of terrorism. In terms of features of other incidents 
readily accepted as forms of terrorism, political assassination incidents were similai*. 
There was one key difference, supporting the arguments of Schmid (1992), and 
finding that the target group in political assassinations is restricted to specific 
individuals, whereas traditional terrorist targets three levels of victim: specific 
individuals, those representative of a wider target, and those who are randomly 
selected. Incidents of political assassinations also differ in terms of tlieir outcome. In 
no instances do they result in financial losses while other types of terrorism do. 
However, this is likely to be due to the intention of the perpetrators. The motivation 
for attacks which result in financial losses is likely to be very different to those which 
result in deaths. Thus as the sole purpose of a political assassination is to kill the 
target, the perpetrator is unlikely to also design an attack which would result in 
financial losses.
There were however similarities between political assassinations and other types of 
teiTorism. Chapter 5 also found that the offenders committing terrorist incidents were
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the same types as those committing political assassinations, with both individuals 
and groups committing both types of violence. Terrorist incidents and political 
assassinations can both result in deaths, although perhaps obviously there are no 
political assassinations where there are no deaths (as by definition a political 
assassination requires a death). Thus, while the literature may argue that political 
assassination incidents are not terrorism, and this research supports this on the basis 
of the victim identity, in other aspects the two incident types aie in fact similar. Thus 
it is suggested that in future research political assassinations should be considered as 
a type of terrorism, albeit vsdth an understanding of the differences which exist. Thus 
reseaich on teiTorism can be drawn upon to increase and inform understanding of the 
political assassination incidents.
6.5 CONCLUSION: WHAT ARE POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS?
The piu-pose of this section, and these thi ee research chapters, was to look in more 
detail at how political assassinations can and should be defined, in relation to both 
terrorism and homicide. Follovring Schmid’s (1992) statement that political 
assassinations should not be considered as a type of terrorism, analysis has shown 
that political assassinations share a number of features with some types of teiTorism. 
This, along vrith the fact that terrorist groups do use political assassinations as a 
tactic, leads this study to conclude that political assassinations can, in some 
instances, be considered a type of terrorism. Looking more closely at political 
assassinations, it is shown that they meet the definition of teiToiism on a number of 
factors, including similarities on offender type. However, the type of victim, which is 
deemed important by many, is different between political assassinations and more 
general types of terrorism. Thus, there may be some merit in using terrorism research 
to inform political assassination research, but it should be remembered that there aie 
still fundamental differences between the two types of violence.
In addition, political assassinations were compared to other types of homicide, 
following fi-om Kirkham et al.’s (1970) statement that they are another form of 
homicide. Similarities were found between the two types of killing, in particulai* that
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the types of victims targeted are similar, with public and private individuals being at 
risk of both homicide and political assassination. However, differences were evident 
in the offender, with political assassinations only being committed by strangers to the 
victim, but homicides being also committed by individuals known to the victim. The 
motivation also differs between homicides and political assassinations, with no 
politically-motivated homicides in this sample. The results of all the analysis 
suggests that rather than there being one single definition of political assassination, 
Üiere aie multiple types that require a more flexible definition.
The following chapters examine political assassinations in more detail, drawing on 
factors from the research arenas of both terrorism and homicide. Other aspects of 
political assassinations will be examined, with the intention of identifying aspects of 
assassinations which may improve understanding of political assassinations, and the 
different types of assassination that may exist.
PART TWO:
MODELLING POLITICAL 
ASSASSINATIONS
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7. Existing knowledge on political assassinations
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an ovemew of the reseai ch literatm e related to political 
assassinations. Research on this topic has been directed towai*d various areas 
including the assassin, the target of the attack, and the method used.
The research focused on the assassin tends to concentrate on profiling the assassin, 
identifying the common characteristics and presenting these as identifying factors. 
Others create typologies of assassins, grouping them according to their 
characteristics, and presenting these as different ‘types’ of assassins who behave in 
different ways. The intention of such research is to assist law enforcement agencies 
to identify potential assassins, and therefore to intercept them before they can 
commit an attack.
Finally, more recent research has diawn on the profiling and typology model of 
research, evaluating its practical use, and developing it fuither. (e.g. Fein and 
Vossekuil, 1998, and James, Mullen, Meloy, Pathé, Famham, Preston and Darnley, 
2007).
This chapter will discuss these ai eas of resear ch in more detail, providing an 
overview of the research cunently available. This chapter first divides the research 
into that conducted pre-1998, and post-1998, all of which is US-based. In 1998 Fein 
and Vossekuil published an influential report on US assassins, arguing that there was 
little or no evidence for previously accepted ‘facts’ about political assassination 
incidents. Subsequently, the focus of resear ch altered somewhat. The third section of 
this chapter looks at European-based research, which also has a different approach to 
political assassination research.
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7.2 PRE-1998 US RESEARCH
The majority of research in the area of political assassinations is focused on the 
perpetrators of the assassination, usually aimed at creating profiles or typologies of 
the offenders. The targets of these offenders are not always restricted to US 
Presidents, but sometimes also include politicians, and other related figmes such as 
judges. One of the earliest studies was by Rothstein (1964,1966), who examined 
case histories of prison inmates who had indicated an intention to attack the US 
President. From this work, Rothstein suggested the ‘Presidential Assassination 
Syndrome’, a collection of behaviours and beliefs which, Rothstein aigues, lead to 
individuals developing a desire to attack or thieaten the President. This took the foim 
of a continuum of behaviours and beliefs, along which both assassins and thi*eateners 
can be placed. Rothstein found that the individuals in his sample (n = 11) 
experienced difficult childhoods, with dominant mothers and weak fathers. Most 
joined the military at a young age, but had unhappy careers there. Rothstein’s sample 
also had difficulties in forming stable relationships, and trouble developing group 
identities. These findings were interpreted by Rothstein as being a manifestation of 
hostility towards the mother, subsequently redhected against symbols of authority, 
for example the government and the president. This redhected hostility then leads to 
threats, and in some cases even attacks.
Although not focused on assassins, Sebastiani and Foy (1965) considered the 
characteristics present in presidential thieateners. They used a sample of 48 
individuals, all of whom had tried to force theh way into the White House to gain 
access to the President, finding that they were paranoid, and self-destructive, and 
persistent in their attempts to meet with the President. Although seemingly 
supportive of the work of Kh'kham et al. (1970) and Rothstein (1964, 1966), the 
reliance on thieateners over assassins means that the findings are not really 
applicable to individuals who commit violence, rather than just threaten.
A major attempt to understand the identity of political assassins is the work of 
Kirkham et al. (1970). As part of a review of attacks aimed at political figures in the 
US, commissioned by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
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Violence, they identified the common chai'acteristics amongst then sample (n = 7). 
These were a combination of physical traits, and personality features, and they 
showed a number of similarities with the findings of Rothstein (1964, 1966). For 
example, all individuals in the sample were slender white males, with mhiimal social 
skills and difficult family relationships. All members of this sample, with one 
exception, were said to have been suffering from some form of mental illness. 
Kirkliam et al. (1970) argue that due to the presence of this mental illness the men in 
then sample did not commit their acts of political violence with the intention of 
achieving any gains, or to advance a rational plan. All had poor parental 
relationsliips, difficulties in fomiing friendships or romantic relationships, and had 
experienced difficulties in remaining in employment in the years leading up to their 
violent behavioms. In addition to these personality chai'acteristics, Kirkham et al. 
(1970) also found that, in their sample at least, the assassin tended to feel 
ambivalence towards their target, but did experience a general hostility towards the 
presidency itself. There is evidence that the assassins have focused on nanow, 
specific political issues, and feel no remorse for their actions, and instead feel that 
they have been guided by some higher power, and that this justifies their actions.
Graham and Gurr (1979) also identified common chaiacteristics found in individuals 
who had attacked (or attempted to attack) prominent individuals. Graham and Gurr 
examined assassins’ case histories. AMiough the sample size was unclear, the 
findings echo those of Rothstein (1964, 1966), and Kirkham et al. (1970), suggesting 
that assassins tend to come fi*om broken homes, aie loners who find it difficult to 
build meaningful relationships, and have poor employment histories. Graham and 
Gurr (1979) suggest that assassins want to be wanted, and would prefer to be 
“wanted” for a crime such as murder, than not be wanted at all.
Taking a broader approach, and looking at offenders in general rather than focusing 
just on the naiTow, small group of assassins/thieateners, Goldstein (1981) examined 
research on both violent and non-violent offenders. He found that research which had 
previously tried to establish differences between violent and nonviolent offenders 
has generally been unsuccessful. For example, Goldstein (1981) cites research by 
Holland, Beckett and Levi (1981), who demonstrated that such attempts to
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differentiate between groups tends to find eitlier very tiny differences, or no 
consistent differences at all. Goldstein (1981) suggests that these findings aie an 
acciuate reflection of the natuie of the relationship between criminality and 
personality, i.e. that there is none, or at least there is no clear link between the two. 
Instead Goldstein (1981) suggests that criminological research should view the 
individual solely in the context of their society, as this is where they draw ideas, 
beliefs and behavioural tendencies fiom. Goldstein suggests that the only patterns 
visible in studies of assassins is that they are socially isolated, with few family, 
fi'iends, or community ties, rather tlian there being a ‘type’ of person who will 
become an assassin, or their bemg any type of ‘syndiome’ of assassin.
Goldstein (1981) suggests that it is this social isolation wliich could be the key to 
violence (in the US). Those missing social contact have no way to learn about 
themselves and the world aiound them, and receive no feedback on the beliefs and 
values they hold. Therefore they have little way of knowing whether their opinions 
and beliefs are reasonable, or even widely held. He argues that the thought patterns 
of the socially isolated resemble those of autistic or scliizophi enic individuals, 
featuring rambling thoughts, confusion between fantasy and reality, disjointed 
speech, and highly affective components, such as violence or sexual elements. The 
isolation is not the source of the beliefs, but it compounds them. Those who have 
social contact with others have an awareness of when they are being unrealistic, but 
this is missing in socially isolated individuals. However, Goldstein (1981) does 
acknowledge that not all violence is committed by socially isolated individuals, and 
in fact groups may be formed by these socially isolated individuals. Such a group 
shares a set of core beliefs, isolating its members and ensming acceptance of views. 
This seems similai* to the way in which Ruby (2002) suggests that teiTorist gi'oups 
recruit their members, i.e. they attract individuals with shared beliefs, isolate them 
fi'om others outside of the group, thus ensuring the acceptance of more exti eme 
views (Ruby, 2002).
Political assassination research was advanced in the early 1980s, when the US Secret 
Service commissioned a study of presidential assassins, and other similarly 
dangerous individuals (Heyman, 1984). Although Heyman did not interview the
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assassins themselves, data were di'awn from publicly available sources, and Secret 
Service file data, in order to examine 21 paiticipants, 11 of whom had 
killed/wounded/assaulted presidents, five who had killed or wounded others of 
interest to the Secret Service (intentionally, or in an attempt to attack the President), 
and a further five individuals who were under investigation as they were considered 
potentially dangerous. Three such individuals were apprehended while engaged m 
potentially dangerous attacks on the President or Vice President.
Heyman (1984) categorised the sample into two main groups: the ‘Crazies’ and the 
‘Behaviomal Disorders’. Individuals in both shaie a set of behavioural and 
background characteristics, with all lacking anything offering a sense of achievement 
or fulfilment. Heyman (1984) argues that it is the resulting feelings of inadequacy, 
along with the lack of achievement, that leads Presidential assassins and attackers to 
become dangerous. In common with eaiiier research, Heyman found that, with the 
exception of two cases, the paiticipants had nothing personally against their tai gets. 
The tai'gets simply symbolised the finstrations the attackers experienced, or 
personified the system which they perceived to be oppressing them.
Looking more specifically at the ‘Crazies’ group, Heyman ai'gues that this can be 
subdivided fuither into the ‘marginal crazies’, and the ‘unsuccessful internalisers’. 
The division is laigely based on the individuals’ mental state. Marginals aie said to 
be confused, with their mental health being heavily reliant on others. They are 
capable of mental competence, but if their needs ai e ignored their mental wellbeing 
suffers. The group lack the support of family and friends, and are unable to acliieve 
success because of their mental health problems. Conversely, the unsuccessful 
internalisers aie mtroverted, socially insensitive, with poor social skills, and 
psychologically detached. Nevertheless, they aie still highly dependent on others. 
Unsuccessful internalisers hold an umealistic world view, are self-centred, isolated, 
friendless, and aie unable to maintain employment. This group want to be 
independent of others, but are unable to frilfil this desire as they actually need 
constant institutional cai e. Heyman (1984) suggests that all of the sample he placed 
in this category could be diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenics, although no fornial 
diagnoses were made.
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The second group identified by Heyman (1984) is that classed as ‘Behavioural 
Disorders’, which he also refers to as ‘unsuccessful externalisers’. This group 
understand the real world and have an accurate perception of it, but are unable to 
relate to it in a meaningful or effective way. They do not want to be isolated, but are 
unable to relate to others, or to form relationships. It is because of this understanding 
of the world that members of this group feel the need to acliieve something 
meanmgful to themself and others, and that will get them positive feedback fiom 
those they want to be close to. If this is unachievable, Heyman argues, the group will 
settle for a place in history, as a way to achieve recognition. It is tlieir desii e to make 
and maintain relationships, combined with their inability to do so, that drives them to 
extreme methods of gaining attention or achievement. The ‘unsuccessful 
externalisers’ reach out to others, but they stiuggle to adapt to the pressures they 
face, or the expectations of others, wliich must be met in order to gain the recognition 
they desire. If there is no such social reinforcement, they turn to learning skills or 
abilities in order to gain the desired respect. It is at this point that they differ fiom 
‘normal’ people. Despite their desne to succeed, the group aie chronically incapable 
of social or academic achievement. Their lack of social skills prevents the building of 
fiiendly relationships, and their low intelligence prevents impressive achievements. 
The cycling between social rejection and intellectual failuie leads to feelings of 
finstration, rejection and isolation.
In addition to Heyman’s Crazies and Behaviouial Disorders, he also suggests there 
may be a further group: the ‘Freedom Fighters’. These should be characterised as a 
prototypical psychopatli, but are not included in the 1984 project as there were just 
two paiticipants who fulfilled these criteria.
As mentioned previously, there aie similaiities between Heyman’s (1984) proposed 
categories of assassin, and those proposed by Kirkham et al. (1970), with all 
paiticipants experiencing the avoidance of other people (through choice or 
otherwise), resulting in their social isolation. None of the participants had positive 
relationships, instead they were chamcterised by fiiction, hostility and 
unpleasantness. Romantic relationships were difficult for the paiticipants, they were 
alienated fiom their families, and had little interest in joining mainstream, established
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social groups. Where these participants did show an interest in social gi'oups or 
activities, these were groups which were on the boundaries of society, and even still 
the assassins were raiely accepted. Instead, Heyman suggests that the assassins focus 
all of their energy on themselves. Heyman’s sample all had difficulty in school, both 
academically and behaviomally. Even where the individuals progressed to college, 
their personal weaknesses were their downfall, proving unable to deal with 
challenges or submit to the discipline required of them. A poor employment Instory 
was also identified. Habitual aggression was not in evidence, but the participants did 
appear to be unable to deal with their aggression when it surfaced, lacking the 
mechanisms required to deal with such negative emotions in a socially acceptable 
manner. Subsequently, Heyman argues, many turned their anger inwards in order to 
avoid confrontation with others. The assassins in this sample rely on others, with 
differences appearing between Externalisers and Internalisers. The Externalisers will 
try to communicate their needs, but are unable to due to their social inadequacies. 
Rather than gaining acceptance from others, they receive hostility. The Internalisers 
aie so lacking in communication and social skills that many will not even attempt to 
communicate their needs. Where there were communication attempts, messages were 
often coded in a way only the assassin would understand. Heyman (1984) argues that 
it is the combination of these factors, rather than any one in particular, that produces 
the angry, isolated would-be assassin. However, an issue with Heyman’s (1984) 
typology is, as with many others, he draws a number of conclusions from case file 
data, with no actual meeting with the assassin themselves. Thus he is drawing rather 
strong conclusions from what is essentially secondary data. Wilson (2003) highlights 
this as an issue in profiling in general, suggesting that where speculative profiles aie 
created, which aie based more on the author’s own experiences rather than on 
empirical data, the resultant profile is likely to suffer fiom any cognitive biases held 
by the author, rather than being objective (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).
Clarke (1990) went fuither than those before him, and created a full typology of 
assassins, rather than simply highlighting similar personality characteristics. This 
was a four pait classification, based on the case files of individuals who had attacked 
US Presidents (n = 16). Assassins were grouped as Type I -  IV, more specifically 
described as rational political extremists, mentally disturbed, emotionally disturbed.
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or truly insane. Clarke (1990) used seven broad categories to differentiate between 
the groups:
1. Emotional distortion (ranging from mild to severe)
2. Cognitive distortion (ranging from absent to severe)
3. Hallucinations (absent or present)
4. Delusions (absent or present)
5. Reality contact (between clear and poor)
6. Social relations (vaiied, disturbed or isolated)
7. Primary motive (political, personal (compensatory), personal (provocation), 
irrational)
These seven categories are then used in varying combinations to create the four 
‘types’ of assassin. The Type II and III individuals experience and “overwhelming 
and aggi'essive egocentric needs for acceptance, recognition, and status” (Clarke, 
1990, p.82). Prior to the violent behaviour, the people on whom the TII or Till are 
most dependent will have withdrawn fr om him, or denied his needs. This leads to 
feelings of inadequacy, leading to an inability to cope with disappointments. The 
individual has neither the resources nor the learned coping skills, to deal with the 
hurt, frustration and anger experienced. Clarke (1990) therefore argues that the 
individual will eventually become consumed by these negative feelings. In time, they 
will become suicidal, seeing no way out other than death. Further, they view this 
death as a way to gain revenge on those perceived to cause the unhappiness. The 
victims selected by TII and Till individuals have no link to them, serving as 
surrogate victims, because the attention the victim receives will be reflected onto 
them. They are compelled to express tlieir anger and resentment in a visible manner. 
The differences between the two groups relate laigely to the underlying feelings of 
the assassin. According to Clarke (1990) the TII assassin is guided by conscience, 
using this to rationalise and justify his suicidal actions, whereas the Till is at ‘rock 
bottom’, feeling alienated and estranged from wider society. However, this does not 
actually explain why they go on to attack the President, rather than any other person 
in authority.
Clai'ke (1990) draws comparisons between the displaced rage of a Till assassin, and 
mass mui’derers (mostly who select their targets at random), arguing that both acts
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will ensure notoriety, and offer the killer some kind of dominance or control over the 
situation. Both allow the killer to make a final, angry statement about the society 
which has excluded them. Indeed, some individuals who Clarke (1990) classifies as 
Till assassins would consider mass murder and suicide, before settling on political 
violence. He highlights similarities in characteristics of Till assassins and mass 
murders: they tend to be white males, who are socially isolated, with maiginal 
employment, who have recently experienced a frustrating event. Although neither 
group appeared to be psychotic, there was also little evidence of inhibition by the 
individual’s conscience, or own fear. It is because of their disillusionment, and lack 
of value they place on their own lives, that they ai e prepared to take others’ lives.
7.2.7 Weaknesses o f Pre-1998 US research
A difficulty with research which is based on a case-study methodology is that the 
researchers very rarely clearly define their rationale for then choice of methodology. 
A fundamental requirement when conducting both the design of and the data 
collection for case studies is that the researcher is guided by, and infoimed by, theory 
(Yin, 2003). The goal is to try and “develop preliminary concepts” (Yin, 2003, p.3) 
before beginning the case study, where these concepts are designed to serve two 
purposes. First, as with any empiiical research, the literature should be used to 
inform the reseaich, in order that the findings can offer a contribution to the field.
The second pmpose, which is more specific to case study methodologies, is to define 
the phenomenon under analysis, to identify the inclusion criteria to be used, and to 
identify the variables which are relevant to the area under examination (Yin, 2003). 
Without the guidance, the definition of the inclusion criteria, concept/phenomenon 
definition, selection of variables, etc. “may be extremely difficult and hamper the 
development of a rigorous case study” (Yin, p.3). As Ragin (1987, p.34) states:
“most investigators who use case-oriented strategies...are not self-consciously 
methodological, that is, they do not regard the case oriented strategies they use as 
formal methodologies”. Despite an increased focus on case-study methodology in 
recent years, researchers have still not devoted enough attention to improving the 
methodology, in terms of formal strategies and guidance, and those improvements 
that have come have not yet been ‘taken on board’ more widely (Kaai'bo and 
Beasley, 1999). This can be seen in the research papers presented in Table 7.1, where
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the inclusion criteria is vague, and includes both tlireateners and attempted assassins, 
and the vaiiables used to analyse the case file data aie not clearly stated. In addition, 
the age of these studies (all were published before 1991) suggests they were 
conducted prior to these developments. Thus the case studies of assassins have a 
flawed methodology. In addition to these flaws, as Salfati and Canter (1999) have 
highlighted in homicide research, offender accounts/reports (as likely found in case 
files) tend to be biased and possibly umeliable, and therefore not suitable for 
objective observations.
Table 7.1
Details o f Methodologies
Sample
size
Attackers
or
Threateners?
Method Control
Group
Kirkham, Levy & 
Grotty (1970)
7 Attackers -  
attempted and 
actual
Case histories No
Rothstein (1964,1966) 11/27 Threateners Case histories No
Sebastiani & Foy 
(1965)
48 Threateners Case histories No
Clarke (1990) 16 Attackers Case histories No
Graham & Gurr (1979) ? Attackers Case histories No
Goldstein (1981) ? Attackers & 
Thieateners
Case histories No
Freedman (1965) ? Attackers Case histories No
Heyman (1984) 21 11-
Presidential
Attackers
5 -  Attackers 
of others
5 -  Under 
investigation
Case histories No
Thus, case study methodologies are not without their weaknesses. Kaarbo and 
Beasley (1999) summarise these thus:
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“In both political science and psychology, there exists a stereotype o f the 
case study that includes an idiosyncratic, historically specific, and 
atheoretical character; a lack o f control; an inability to generate a sufficient 
number o f data points to test theory; and a highly suspect 'interpretive ' 
character that allows the analyst to draw favourable conclusions about 
hypotheses and to find support where no such support exists. Certainly, the 
ways in which case studies have been performed and used have frequently 
been rather divergent from the standards o f systematic inquiry currently 
widely accepted in both political science and psychology" (p. 3 71).
Even with these small samples, the research papers have drawn pailicipants from a 
mixture of populations: those who have thieatened prominent persons (in wiitmg, or 
in person), individuals who have attempted to attack prominent persons, and those 
who have successfully attacked prominent individuals. Much of the research treats 
these three types of individuals as a homogenous group, creating profiles or 
classifications of assassins on the basis of common personality traits, arguing that 
these can be used by security services to identify would-be attackers. However, more 
recent reseaich has shown that individuals who make threats do not typically go on 
to attack (Fein and Vossekuil, 1998), showing that inferences made on the basis of 
threateners’ characteristics should not be applied to attackers. It is also suggested that 
individuals who make attempts are different to those who complete assassinations -  
there is a reason why their attacks are incomplete, and these reasons should be 
identified before combining unsuccessful attacks with completed attacks. It is of 
coui'se possible that there aie no differences, and it is down to chance that some 
attacks aie unsuccessful, but until this is investigated further it seems prudent to 
focus just on completed attacks.
In addition to the weaknesses of a case study methodology, the literatuie on political 
assassinations is also weakened by the sampling technique used. As Table 7.1 shows, 
in addition to the common case-study methodology employed by these studies, they 
also have a low sample size in common, which reduces the generalisability of the 
findings.
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Because of the weaknesses inherent in case study methodology, despite the benefits 
of it, the inferences that can be drawn are limited, with the conclusions drawn 
considered to be an inadequate basis for scientific inferences because of the 
difficulties in establishing internal validity (Kazdin, 1981). This is not to say that 
case studies do not offer any benefits, and they can be appropriate when used, in 
single cases and particularly in clinical settings, e.g. in assessing change through 
ti'eatment (Kazdin, 1981). As Karbo and Beasley (1999) found, in the field of 
political psychology one of the most popular methodologies is the case study. 
However, this is typically carried out by political scientists, ratlier than 
psychologists. Looking specifically at publications in the journal Political 
Psychology, Karbo and Beasley (1999) found that psychologists are more likely to 
use alternative methodologies, including suiveys, experimental studies, or content- 
analysis based methods, with case studies being a raiity.
The studies listed in Table 7.1 are also weakened by their omission of a contiol 
group. None of the studies discussed used a control group, i.e. none compai ed their 
sample of threateners and/or attackers to a similar sample, either from a criminal 
population or the general non-criminal population. The purpose of using a control 
group in this situation is to provide comparison: the control gioup provides a baseline 
of the characteristics/personalities which are found in the general population, against 
which the specialised populations’ characteristics can be compaied. If there is no 
control group, there is no way for researchers to know if the personality of the 
assassin is unique to that gi'oup, or if this personality type/traits ai e also found in the 
general (non-assassin) population. In some cases it is cleai' that the chai acteristics 
said to be typical of an assassin do not discriminate between assassins and the 
general population. For example, Clarke (1990) cites assassins as being wliite males, 
while Heyman (1984) suggests that attackers and thieateners will experience social 
difficulties. In practical terms these highlighted characteristics are of little use: there 
aie many such individuals who do not go on to threaten or attack prominent public 
figuies. Other characteristics such as mental illness (Kh'kham et al., 1970), problems 
with women (Rothstein, 1964, 1966), and attention seeking (Freedman, 1965) may 
well provide a means to differentiate between assassins and non-assassins, but with
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no control group there is no way to tell. Thus the methodology used in these studies 
offers little in the way of practical contributions to the field.
However, the factors identified by this body of reseai ch as being common to political 
tlueateners and attackers aie also commonly found in the general population of 
offenders. Blackburn (1995) points out that official figures show offenders to be 
young and male. There is evidence that offenders tend to be of a lower social class 
(Braithwaite, 1981). Other evidence suggests that offenders can be differentiated 
fiom non offenders by their “personal status” (Blackburn, 1995, p.49), e.g. their level 
of educational achievement, and whether or not they have a stable job (Thomberry 
and Farnworth, 1982). There is a great deal of research looking at the IQ of 
offenders, with large number of offenders experiencing below average scores 
(Blackburn, 1995). A US study o f‘delinquents’ by Caplan and Siebert (1964) found 
tliat in almost 50% of cases the IQ was below 90. Other studies actually suggest that 
a higher IQ may serve as a protective factor against offending in individuals who 
have other risk factors (e.g. a criminal father (Kandel, Mednick, Kierkegaard- 
Sorensen, Hutchings, Knope, Rosenberg, and Schulsinger, 1988)), or childhood 
behavioural problems (White, Moffitt and Silva, 1989). In terms of education and 
learning, there is a range of evidence to suggest that, as a group, problems with 
learning are common (estimates range from 26% to 73%, Zimmerman, Rich, Keilitz 
and Broder, 1981). West (1982) found that “later failure at school and delinquency 
may be attributed primarily to deviant temperament” (Blackburn, 1995, p. 190), 
suggesting that the educational difficulties experienced by offenders in general (and 
assassins) may be related to aspects other than IQ. In terms of social skills and 
functioning, there is evidence that problems witli social skills are related to 
aggression. Kirchner, Kennedy and Dragmis (1979) found that offenders, when role- 
playing conflict situations, were more aggressive than non-offenders.
In addition, Wilson (2003) highlights a number of problems about this type of 
profiling. The profiles discussed here are comprised of a number of features, but 
none are likely to be of use to investigators or policy makers. Although the featur es 
may seem useful, as Wilson (2003) highlights, they merely provide a ‘baseline’ of 
featiues which are likely to be common amongst all offenders, rather than specific to
118
assassins, as shown in the previous paragraph. Thus the profiles offer no way to 
differentiate between offenders, or to identify likely assassins. Wilson (2003) also 
points out that personality and background characteristics identified in groups such 
as terrorists, are often found in individuals who do not become terrorists. Instead of 
focusing on the background characteristics, the suggestion is that it would be of more 
use to investigate why these particular' individuals chose violent action rather than 
another option. Wilson (2003) also identifies the difficulties in ‘backward profrling’. 
Unlike in police investigations, e.g. of rapists where the offender is an unknown 
individual, and the profile will assist in naiTOwing the list of suspects, with terrorist 
incidents, and likely with incidents of political assassination, the perpetrator is 
known. The main reason for creating these profiles is to enhance the understanding 
of potential perpetrators. However, it is unlikely that knowledge of likely background 
and demographic characteristics will be of use to investigators, whereas examining 
the techniques used by perpetrators is likely to be of much higher value.
7.2.2 Stf'engths o f Pre-1998 US research
Despite the detailed discussion of the weaknesses of this body of research, there are 
also strengths. This research provided the first step in imderstanding assassinations, 
providing a basis fiom which to create more research. In fact, the characteristics of 
assassins identified by these researchers can be compared to those of the general 
offending population, suggesting that the assassins are similar to other offenders. 
Thus this offers justification for using forensic psychology to understand political 
assassinations.
7.3 POST-1998 US RESEARCH
Following the attempts to create typologies of political assassins, in the US a 
different approach was sought. The typologies and profiles that had been created 
were not providing the information required to prevent attacks directed at prominent 
figures, and so the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP) was designed to take a 
different approach to previous reseaidi. Rather than the profiles or typologies of 
assassins produced by previous reseaich, the ECSP looked at specific incidents, and
119
examined the behaviours observable in those. In addition it went beyond the use of 
case study data, and also used sources such as investigative reports, interviews with 
the perpetrator, and medical records. It took a broad approach looking at the 
“thinking and behaviour of individuals who assassinated, attacked or approached to 
attack a prominent person of public status in the United States” 
(http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.shtmn. In total, the sample consisted of 83 
individuals who were responsible for 74 incidents of assassination/attack/neai-attack, 
between 1949 and 1995. Six of the incidents were perpetrated by gi'oups, which in 
total involved 16 individuals. In addition, one of the individuals in the sample was 
responsible for two of the incidents.
Fein and Vossekuil (1998) conducted the Exceptional Case Study Project, and report 
on the overall findings. Differences between their findings and those of previous 
research regarding the demogi aphic and personality characteristics of assassins and 
threateners are higlilighted, along with the ECSP’s approach of only examining the 
thoughts and behaviours of individuals who have acted in “lethal or near-lethal 
ways” (p. 177), i.e. they killed or attempted to kill tlieir target. In contrast to previous 
research, where the targets of assassination (attempts) were US Presidents, Fein and 
Vossekuil (1998) examined cases targeting ‘prominent persons’, including all 
persons protected by the Secret Service (the president, vice president, their families, 
previous presidents, presidential candidates, and visiting heads of state), cabinet 
secretaries, members of Congress, federal judges, governors, mayors of large cities, 
celebrities (famous film, television, radio and sports star s), and the presidents and 
chief executives of large corporate organisations. The project was afforded access to 
a lot of data relating to the perpetrators of attacks, threats and approaches, including 
Secret Service files, and law enforcement files. They suggest that their* findings 
debunk three key beliefs about assassinations.
First, Fein and Vossekuil (1998) suggest that there is no profile of ‘tlie assassin’. 
Despite the lar ge body of literatur e which has attempted to create a descriptive or 
demographic profile of perpetrators of assassinations, the individuals who commit 
these attacks do not fit into one, or even many, profiles. However, there are some 
similarities in the assassins’ backgrounds, including what Fein and Vossekuil (1998)
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call “common denominator behaviors and activities that potential attackers engage in 
before their attacks” (p. 182). In order to carry out an attack on a prominent person, 
the perpetrator must first select their target, choose their weapon, acquire that 
weapon, study the security suiTOunding their target, plan their attack, and make plans 
for escape (if desired). Although Fein and Vossekuil (1998) did not find that all of 
their sample committed all of these behaviours, most of the sample committed 
several of them, suggesting tiiat there is an element of planning in the attack.
The second myth is that assassins are mentally ill, or are ‘deranged’, and it is this that 
leads diem to violence against prominent figures. In actual fact, Fein and Vossekuil 
(1998) found that mental illness is rarely a feature of assassinations or assassination 
attempts. Rather than attacks on prominent persons being motivated by an 
individual’s mental illness, the motivation comes fiom the individual’s desire to 
achieve a goal or to solve a problem. Although those who “demonstrate unusual or 
inappropriate interests in, or make threats against” (Fein and Vossekuil, 1998, p. 183) 
public figures are often suffering fiom mental illness, those who actually turn to 
actions ar e not mentally ill. However, none of the sample were in perfect mental and 
emotional health, with near ly all experiencing some form of psychological problem. 
However, this was not the serious mental health issues suggested by previous 
researchers, and was not the primary motivator of the attack or approach. While Fein 
and Vossekuil (1998) did find that some attackers were mentally ill, in near ly all 
cases the attack was actually motivated by a desire to achieve a goal, for example to 
draw attention to a par ticular problem, rather than by mental illness. Even where 
mental illness was a factor in political assassinations, the symptoms of mental illness 
typically did not influence or hinder what Fein and Vossekuil termed “attack-related 
activities” (p. 183), for example the planning of the attack. Fein and Vossekuil 
compare this to the influence mental illness usually has on an individuals’ 
behaviours. Those with severe and untreated mental illness usually have unpaired 
problem-solving abilities, and a tendency to str uggle with organisational skills. In 
this sample of attackers and approachers, those with mental illness retained their 
organisational abilities, proving themselves capable of both planning and canying 
out an attack. Fein and Vossekuil (1998) highlight that the act of labelling an attacker 
(or threatener, or approacher) as mentally ill offers no practical assistance in the
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understanding of assassination behaviour. It neither explains, nor helps predict, 
assassins’ behaviours, and it offers little investigative assistance. Fein and Vossekuil 
(1998) summarise their findings relating to mental illness as follows:
• Many of the sample have had contact with a mental health professional.
• Of those in the sample who had contact with a mental health professional, 
few told them of their intention to attack or approach a public figm e..
• Nearly 50% show a history of delusions. However, it was in just a few cases 
that these led to the attack or approach behavioms.
• There were few members of the sample with “command hallucinations” (Fein 
and Vossekuil, 1998, p. 183).
• There was minimal history of substance abuse amongst the sample.
These findings regaiding the likely mental illness of assassins is echoed by research 
in the wider field of terrorism. Horgan (2005) discusses the way in wliich people try 
to make sense of terrorist incidents (and the perpetrators of such incidents) by 
deeming them as atypical, and making assumptions of mental illness and 
psychopathy. Attributing such features reassures people and assists their 
understanding of extreme acts of violence. The search for the ‘terrorist personality’, 
and within that the identification of terrorists as mentally ill, was a strong reseai ch 
idea throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, more recent research has shown that 
terrorists ai e not “mad”, and, in fact, terrorist gioups would be unlikely to accept a 
member with mental illness, for a number of reasons. Individuals with mental illness 
would be likely to draw attention to the group they join, and by their nature terrorist 
gioups prefer to avoid this. Those with severe mental illness are unlikely to be able 
to identify with other group members, and their behaviom* (which is likely to be 
chaotic, disorganised etc) is likely to make them unable to function satisfactorily 
(Horgan, 2005). Thus, the findings of Fein and Vossekuil (1998) regarding the 
mental illness of political assassins appears to reflect the findings relating to 
teiTorists.
The third and final myth debunked by Fein and Vossekuil’s (1998) project is that 
thi eateners of public figm es are the same people as attackers of public figures. As 
shown above, much research regaiding political assassination draws links and 
comparisons between threateners and attackers. Fein and Vossekuil (1998) point out
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that the two gi oups are often treated as if they are one and the same. In actual fact, 
Fein and Vossekuil (1998) claim, those who threaten most often, do not attack. The 
biggest thieat comes ftom those who do not make threats. Although some who aie a 
tlueat do make thieats, Fein and Vossekuil’s (1998) key findings relating to this 
myth are as follows. Of the 43 attackers, none had made a direct threat to their target, 
about then target, before the attack, suggesting that even where a potential target of 
assassination has received no thi eats, they may still be at risk of harm. In addition, it 
suggests that individuals who receive threats may not actually be at risk of haim. 
Together, these facts suggest that threats are actually of little predictive use in 
establishing whether or not an individual is likely to be taigeted by an assassin.
When looking at the combined sample of 83 attackers and near-attackers, less than 
10% had made a direct threat about their target, either to their target, or to a law 
enforcement agency. In practical terms, Fein and Vossekuil (1998) do not suggest 
that threats should be ignored by investigators. Prompt responses and reactions to 
threats have discouraged many thieateners ftom taking fuither action. However, Fein 
and Vossekuil’s findings suggest tliat investigators should focus their attention on 
“identifying, investigating, and assessing persons whose behaviours suggest that they 
might post threats of violence, but who do not communicate direct threats to their 
tar gets or to the authorities” (p. 184). They do not however, explain how these 
individuals, who have not communicated any threat to the authorities, should be 
identified, or if their existence would even be known about. Although few direct 
thr eats were made, two thirds of Fein and Vossekuil’s sample had either written or 
spoken in such a way that their plans to attack a public figure were clear. “Would-be 
assassins” (p. 184) were found to have told family, friends, and work colleagues of 
their plans, or to have written their thoughts and ideas in diaries or journals. Thus, 
although it is not necessarily threats that ‘give away’ the identity of would-be 
assassins, the assassins themselves identify themselves in other ways, hr this case 
then, it could be suggested that it would be useful if policy was to encourage these 
friends, family members, and acquaintances, to report any such activity, no matter 
how minor it appears.
In addition to presenting evidence regarding the myths around assassination, Fein 
and Vossekuil (1998) also offer a number of observations about assassins’
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behaviours. Again, they identify thr ee notable features of assassinations. First, an 
assassination (or attempted assassination) is the product of “a discernable and 
imderstandable process of thinking and behaviour ” (p. 184). Fein and Vossekuil 
(1998) assert that assassinations, and attempted assassinations, are pre-planned, 
rather than being spontaneous, impulsive acts of violence. The development and 
planning of the initial idea continues over periods of weeks, months, or even year s. 
They are prompted by things seen on television, or in newspapers, films and books. 
During the development of the assassination idea, would-be assassins gather 
information about assassination incidents, the lives of previous attackers, and the 
protection afforded to their chosen target. Thought is given to who the tar get should 
be, and the would-be assassin may switch their attentions from one to another. A 
great deal of thought will be devoted to the attack, and development of the plans, 
including thoughts on weaponry, location of the target, ways to gain proximity to the 
tar get, suitable clothing for the assassin, any necessary equipment, and whether they 
should prepar e some form of explanation (i.e. a letter), in case of their own death. 
Rehear sals may form a part of this planning. In some cases, this planning gives the 
assassin pirrpose and structure, or offers them an “ending point when they believe 
their emotional pain will cease” (p. 185). Despite the intense riunination and planning 
which goes into assassination attacks and attempts, many assassins are capable of 
maintaining and presenting a ‘normal’ persona to the rest of the world. However, in 
all cases in Fein and VossekuiTs (1998) study, the resulting attack or attempt is the 
end result of an “miderstandable process” (p. 185) of thinking, planning, and decision 
making preceding the actual attack.
The second important observation from Fein and Vossekuil (1998) is related to the 
motivations of these assassins. Few incidents in the U.S. were solely politically 
motivated, even where the targets were major political leaders. In fact, Fein and 
Vossekuil suggest that these attacks were utilised as a means of achieving a 
particular goal of the assassin. Eight main motives were identified. Fust, 
assassination as a means of acliieving “notoriety or fame” (p. 185) for the attackers. 
Second, assassination was used to draw attention to a problem or cause. Tliird, 
assassins used these attacks as a form of retaliation, or revenge against a “perceived 
wrong” (p. 185) or “perceived injmy” (p. 185). The fomth motivation identified by
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Fein and Vossekuil was to end the assassin’s own suffering, either because they 
simply want to be killed, or because they no longer want to be a part of society. The 
fifth motivation is to “save the countiy or the world; to fix world problems” (p. 186), 
and the sixth was to “develop a special relationship with the target” (p. 186). The 
penultimate motivation for assassination was the desire to make money, either by 
being paid to commit the attack, or because the assassination is an attempt to secure a 
ransom, although it is unclear* how the ransom would be achieved. Finally, the eighth 
motivation was to cause political change. Thus although political motives ar e 
present, they ar e by no means tire oveniding motivation for assassinations, and 
assassination attempts.
The third observation made by Fein and Vossekuil (1998) relates to the link between 
motive and target selection. For the assassins, their target is instrumental, serving a 
pmpose and acting as a means to an end. Unlike previous research (e.g. Kirkliarn et 
al., 1970) Fein and Vossekuil (1998) suggest that targets ar e selected on the basis of 
the assassin’s motivation, ratlier than because of any ill-feeling or negativity towards 
the tar get or office. For example, if the assassin is motivated by the desire for 
notoriety their feelings towards a particular individual or office holder is irrelevant. 
Similarly, one who attacks because they want to end their life is not likely to be 
concerned with their target’s political beliefs, but instead will select them as it is 
likely the attacker will themselves be attacked. In addition, many of the attackers in 
the sample presented by Fein and Vossekuil (1998) will consider a number of targets 
dming the plaiming stage. Those wanting notoriety will consider the targets which 
ar e most likely to get them attention, for example they may begin by considering 
governors and members of Congress, but actually decide on the president or vice 
president, as they calculate that such an attack would receive more attention. The 
attackers in this sample also took into account the opportunity afforded them, with 
final decisions on target being influenced by opportunities for attack, or the 
approacHability of the target.
Other research has examined political assassinations as a form of terrorism. Although 
they acknowledge that stalking/threatening/attacking public figures is lar gely a 
product of behaviours that do not meet the definition of terrorism, Biesterfeld and
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Meloy (2008) suggest that there is a terroristic subgroup of public figure 
stalkers/thi*eateners/attackers. They argue that the typology suggested by Clarke 
(1982), and others like it, have “consistently identified a small portion of stalkers, 
attackers, and assassins of public figures who are motivated to advance a political, 
social, or religious agenda” (p. 152), Although in the minority of those targeting 
public figures, such individuals do exist, and it is argued that they do tend to be both 
rational and capable of planning the attack. Despite the rationality displayed by these 
individuals, they do nevertheless have a rather extravagant view of what the outcome 
of their action will be, in compaiison to the more realistic, and more ordinary 
outcome. Biesterfeld and Meloy (2008) present the assassination of Anwar Sadat as a 
recent example of a terrorist assassination. The assassination “involved an organised 
group with committed members, but not an autonomous cell, dedicated to a 
radicalised philosophy (a politico-religious belief system) that had developed 
intelligence on their target and implemented a simple but effective attack plan”
(p. 154). The suggestion is that the success of political assassination is in large part 
down to the “tactical application” employed. That is, the way in which the 
perpetrator is able to observe then tai get, look at the situation in which they will be 
working, the way they plan their attack, and how to get close to the taiget. Although 
acknowledging that there is no single profile of a political assassination, Biesterfeld 
and Meloy (2008) suggest some common themes in terrorist assassins:
• Terrorist groups look for young people who can be easily influenced and 
manipulated, in order to perpetrate their violence.
• “Mid-level cell leaders” tend to be better educated, and fiom higher social 
classes (Meloy, 2004)
• In some cases of conversion prior to attacks (e.g. Eric Rudolph and Paul 
Hill), the perpetrators will have lost contact with their family prior to 
conversion, will have changed their behavioms, become more isolated and 
intolerant of others’ beliefs, and will become more paranoid and vigilant.
• Biesterfeld and Meloy (2008) argue that anyone who taigets a public figure 
for political or religious reasons are terrorists, whether tliey ai e part of an 
organised group, or whether they are working alone. The fact that ‘terrorists’ 
may not be organised groups can cause problems for the security services, 
who may only be alerted to the threat once the attack has occuned.
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• Public figuies have been the subject of attacks by autonomous cells, and 
Biesterfeld and Meloy (2008) believe that this trend will continue, 
particularly targeted at Western business executives who may become targets 
of Islamic gioups, because they symbolise the hated secularism, technology 
and fiee-market capitalism of the West.
• Terrorist organisations have been found to watch their potential targets, up to 
14 times over a period of 22 months (California Depaitment of Justice, 
Protection of Critical Infiastmcture Report, 2005).
• Biesterfeld and Meloy (2008) suggest that the target’s behaviour influences 
and moulds the perpetrators’ plan to attack them.
In addition to these general themes, Biesterfeld and Meloy (2008) have also 
identified six key research findings relating to terroristic political assassinations. 
First, among the many different motivations for assassinating a public figure is the 
desire to “intentionally kill a public fîguie to advance a particular political, religious, 
or social belief’ (p. 160), Second, while tlie attacks may be planned rationally, and 
will achieve the perpetrator’s aims (according to the perpetrator’s desires), the attack 
will rarely achieve the ‘grand’ aims: e.g. to change history, alter a country’s belief 
system, or to change world events. Third, and perhaps most obviously, the 
perpetrator of these attacks is either an individual working alone, or is part of a 
group. Often, where the perpetrator has ‘adopted’ a group which they identify with, 
the other group members are wary because of the individual’s weirdness, or 
“behavioural oddities or extremism” (p. 160). The fomth finding highlighted by 
Biesterfeld and Meloy (2008), in common with other political assassination research 
(e.g. Fein and Vossekuil, 1998), is that the perpetrators of these terroristic political 
assassinations tend to be instrumental rather than expressive. These attacks tend to 
involve weeks, months, or even years of planning, rather than being spontaneous, 
spm of the moment acts. The penultimate frnding argues that even where an assassin 
has a psychiatric diagnosis, their particular political or religious motivations should 
not be ignored. Biesterfeld and Meloy (2008) suggest that in actual fact delusions 
“may bring a resolve to the ideology that would not exist otherwise” (p. 160). Finally, 
away from group affiliations and particular motivations, the focus of the security 
services should be on gaining “knowledge of the research, preparation, and planning
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on the “pathway to violence” (Calhoun and Weston, 2003) before there is a breach 
and attack” (p. 160),
Other research, which has taken a broader approach, has looked at individuals who 
pose a risk to public figures (Calhoun and Weston, 2008). They suggest that there are 
two groups of individuals, each posing a different type of threat. First are what 
Calhoun and Weston refer to as ‘Hunters’. These make up a very small percentage of 
those who may pose a risk. They taiget public figures because they believe that by 
killing or injuiing their target, they will achieve their goal (no matter how irrational 
or unrealistic that may be). They use lethal violence to “avenge some personal 
injustice” (p. 105). Examples of Hunters are Mai*k Chapman, John Lennon’s killer, 
and John Hmckley Jr, who tried to kill President Ronald Reagan. Chapman’s 
motivation stemmed from liis belief that Lennon was a “phony” (p. 105), who did not 
deserve the fame that he had achieved. In the case of Hinckley, the motivation aiose 
from Ills desire to get the attention of Jodie Foster, and to build a link with her 
(Clai'ke, 1990). As a group. Hunters focus tlieir attentions on public figmes, as a way 
to escape their own ordinary lives. Calhoun and Weston (2008) suggest that there are 
a series of stages individuals go thiough to become Hunters:
1. They stai't to build animosity towaids their target
2. They decide that violence is the best, and perhaps only, way to relieve their 
grievance
3. They begin to research and plan the attack
4. Preparations are made for the attack
5. The tai'get’s security is infi'inged
6. The attack takes place (Calhoun and Weston, 2008, p. 105).
Calhoun and Weston state that the Hunter moves tlirough these stages in a linear 
fashion, but they can vacillate between the steps, moving back and forth between 
them on their way towaids the final, violent, act. The key featme of the proposed 
pathway is that the Hunter must go through all of the stages in order to frilfil their 
intended violence.
Howlers differ fr om Hmiters in that their pmpose is to induce fear, to distmb their 
target, or to get attention, rather than to commit violence. Rather than attacking their
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target. Howlers make (verbal or written) threats, which aie never followed through. 
Howlers often indulge in repeated communications, and their target may find them 
more of an irritant than a genuine threat. This group, Calhoun and Weston suggest, 
will not follow the Hunters’ pathway, but instead aie satisfied just with repeated and 
inappropriate contact. In nearly all cases the Howler has no personal connection with 
their tai get. They are simply looking for attention, or a reaction fiom their taiget. In 
fact, the ‘impersonal’ Howlers would rather keep their taiget at a distance, and use 
emails, letters, or telephone calls to do this. They have no need to get close to their 
taiget, because they only want to cause fear, or to get attention.
Looking at the two groups together, it is their behavioms which are fundamentally 
different. Calhoun and Weston (2008) suggest that it is these behavioms which 
provide the best indicators of whether or not an individual will become violent. 
Calhoun and Weston (2006) suggest that by looking at which of the two groups an 
individual falls into, it is possible to identify, assess, and manage individuals who 
may be thi eateners or attackers. Because of the increased risk posed by Hunters, 
compared to Howlers, research tends to focus on the former group. The Hunters’ 
focus on public figmes is both more costly and more disruptive than the thieat posed 
by Howlers. The reseaich that has been conducted on tliis group has tended to focus 
on “a small minority of problem individuals” (p. 107), suggesting that there may be 
difficulties in generalising research findings to a broader population. However, it 
does offer the advantage that this group of studies (known as the Exceptional Case 
Study) focuses solely on attackers, rather than creating a heterogeneous group of 
attackers, thieateners, and approachers.
Clearly there is a great deal of research on political assassins and threateners based in 
the US. However, assassination is an international phenomenon, and therefore it 
seems wise to look at research ftom other geographic locations.
7.3.1 Weaknesses o f Post-1998 US research
Despite the differences between the pre-1998 and post-1998 research, they do share a 
number of weaknesses. As in section 7.2.1, this research restricts its sample to US 
citizens attacked in the US, resulting in a rather naiTOw selection of cases. In
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addition, the research incorporates cases of assassination attacks, and assassination 
attempts. There is still no conù'ol group to provide a baseline with which to compaie 
the findings relating to the assassins. In terms of the outcomes of the research, some 
of the post-1998 reseaich is still focused on creating typologies of offenders, as in the 
case of the Hunters and Howlers identified by Calhoun and Weston (2006).
7.3.2 Strengths o f Post-1998 US research
However, the post-1998 research does offer some improvements on the earlier 
research. First, Fein and Vossekuil (1998) offer far more detail on die data sour ces 
used, using objective data drawn from law enforcement case files. The inclusion 
criteria also tend to be clearer than the pre-1998 research. In addition, they used a 
broader sample than earlier research, moving beyond just attacks on US presidents 
and politicians, to attacks on prominent public figures, including judges, families of 
politicians, and so on. The use of this broader sample reflects an understanding that 
political assassinations can and ar e tar geted at a wider range of people than just 
politicians. Fein and Vossekuil (1998) in particular' go fur-ther than creating just 
psychological profiles of the assassins, but examine the processes they go through in 
planning attacks, and the motivations beliind these attacks (rather than assuming that 
the assassin is motivated by mental illness).
Fein and Vossekuil (1998) drew on publicly available sources, such as newspapers, 
which were used in conjimction with other data sources. James et al. (2007) also used 
news soiu'ces to identify cases, and gather data for analysis. Wilson et al. (2010) used 
data from broadsheet newspapers, and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) in an 
analysis of ETA’s use of bombings and assassinations. Away fr om the field of 
political assassinations, similar methodologies have been used. For example Wilson 
(2000) used descriptive accounts of hostage-taking incidents to analyse both the 
behaviom s of the hostage-takers and otliers involved in the incidents, taken from 
both the Mickolus series of books, and supplemented by news sources (see below for 
more detail). Data drawn fr om such sources provides descriptive, easily accessible 
accounts of events, such as hostage-taking incidents or political assassinations, where 
it may otherwise be difficult to gather data.
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7.4 EUROPEAN RESEARCH
In Eur ope, resear ch on political assassinations takes a broader view of likely targets,
i.e. there is less focus on the head of state alone, and more focus on politicians in 
general, and the Royal Families. As Hoffinan (2009) says, “literally all empirical 
studies on stalking and unusual contact behaviours toward public figures outside of 
Europe were conducted in the USA” (p.294). This section will therefore discuss 
European based resear ch.
James et al. (2007) examined the role of mental illness in attacks on European 
politicians, between 1990 and 2004. With no previously published research on the 
attackers or killers of Europemr politicians, the intention of the research was to 
examine attacks on politicians committed by individuals rather than terrorists. A total 
of 24 cases were identified using the author’s contacts, and publicly available 
sources, with information collected from publicly available secondary sources, court 
records, and psychiatric assessments of the offenders (in 12 of the 24 cases, not 
conducted by the authors). Of the 24 attacks selected for the sample, James et al. 
(2007) found that in 13 cases there was evidence of mental disorder, with 8 cases of 
definite schizophrenia. In two cases a diagnosis of “paranoid disorders of uncertain 
aetiology” (p.339) was made, two cases were diagnosed as having a personality 
disorder (borderline or obsessive), and one was diagnosed as suffering from a 
depressive disorder. They also found evidence to suggest that in three of the 24 
cases, the attacker would have been happy to attack another politician “of similar 
status” (p.339) as their victim was selected by chance. In one further case, reports 
suggest that the attack was spontaneous and impulsive, with the “choice of 
victim...more or less accidental” (p.339). In terms of the motivations of the attacks, 
James et al. (2007) found that there were two cases where the motivation was 
unclear, nine where the motivation was political, and 13 where the motivation was 
personal. The political attacks were driven by an understandable, if extreme, belief 
system. Those pursuing a personal agenda were sometimes, although not always, 
delusional, in an obsessive and irrational sense, “a phenomenon referred to as 
fixation” (p.339). These personally motivated cases were more likely to result in 
either the target’s death, or serious injury. The pei-petrators were more likely to be
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loners, it is more likely that they are psychotic and/or delusional at the time of the 
attack, and more likely that they will have displayed warning behaviours prior to the 
attack. In conti ast to the work of the ECSP (see 7,2) there were no cases where the 
perpetr ator was in love with the target, or where they were motivated by a deshe to 
develop a personal relationship with the target. James et al. (2007) suggest that this 
may be because the US sample includes celebrities, while the European sample does 
not.
There are a number of other differences between the findings of James et al. (2007) 
and the findings of the ECSP. Wliile James et al. (2007) agiee with the ECSP finding 
that many attacks on public figures are preventable, they suggest different risk 
management str ategies to achieve this, arguing that cases should be split into two 
groups: the mentally disordered, and the politically motivated. The mentally 
disordered group is responsible for the majority of the fatal and serious wounding 
attacks, and tend to display warning behaviours. These ar e not subtle, nor are they 
likely to be missed so long as someone is aware of them, and paying attention to their 
existence. Conversely, the politically motivated cases give little, if any, war ning prior 
of an attack. In order to defend against these individuals, James et al. (2007) suggest 
that targets should employ personal protection, in particular during public events, 
where the perpetrator is provided with (and may take) an opportunity to mount an 
attack.
Also contrasting Fein and VossekuiTs (1998) assertion that mental illness is not an 
issue in attacks or attempts on US prominent figures, James, Mullen, Pathé, Meloy, 
Farnham, Preston and Darmley (2008) found that attackers of the British Royal 
Family ar e often mentally ill. Of the sample of 23 attacks, in 11 of these the 
perpetrator was experiencing delusions or hallucinations at the time of the incident, 
and a further four had a history of mental disorder, although there was no evidence of 
psychosis at the time of the attack. Despite this, they did find that seven of the 
attackers were motivated by political issues. A further four were driven by anger, 
using the attack as a way to express their anger and resentment towards the world, 
generally, and the royal family specifically. Three cases were classified as “frustrated 
petitioners” (p.64), and two cases were motivated by the individuals’ belief that they
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were heirs to the throne who were trying to make a claim to the throne. A further 
three were considered to have “bizarre” motivations (p.65), and in four" cases the 
motivation could not be categorised. In terms of prior warning behaviour s, ten of the 
23 had displayed these (for example tlu'ough threatening letters, “communications 
with demands linked to warnings” (p.64), or telling others of tlieir plans to attack a 
royal). In addition, nine of the 23 had also displayed prior stalking behaviours.
In addition, attackers of other public figur es are said to often be “delusionally 
driven” (p.522), for example the assassination of Spencer Perceval in 1812, and the 
attack on Edwar d Drummond, private secretary to the Prime Minister in 1843. 
Research by James et al. (2007,2008) shows that the main risk of harm to public 
figures comes from lone individuals, most of whom were mentally ill, and “driven by 
highly personal causes or quests for ‘justice’” (p.523). Also contrasting US findings, 
James et al. (2007, 2008) found tliat warning behaviours are very important. These 
take the form of tlneatening letters sent to politicians, deluded letters to prominent 
figures, frivolous law suits agamst governments, adverts in newspapers, posters, 
leaflets, and discussions with friends. Fixated individuals often engaged in these 
repeatedly over months, or even years.
In the UK, the Fixed Threat Assessment Centr e (FTAC) was established as a joint 
venture between the police and the National Health Service, created to manage and 
assess lone individuals with “intense pathological fixations” (James, Kenigan,
Forfar*, Farnham and Preston, 2010, p.521). While there aheady exist established 
systems to deal with terrorist and criminal threats, there are no such systems for- 
dealing with “disturbed members of the general public” (James et al. 2010, p.522). 
Based on this, James and colleagues were able to build on their previous work (2007, 
2008).
The purpose of the 2010 study is to examine characteristics of 100 individuals who 
are considered to pose a “moderate or high concern” (p.521). James et al. (2010) 
differentiate between risk and concern, with concern relating to the curTent context. 
For example, a high risk individual in a high security facility is of low concern.
Cases deemed to be of moderate concern are those in which the individual made
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thr eats to a public figure, or someone close to them, and who have exhibited unusual 
interest, and a willingness to or capability to travel. Those of high concern show 
“behaviours which indicated a likelihood of adverse consequences and a capacity and 
intent to cause such consequences” (p.256). The organisation of the perpetrator was 
considered, with organised individuals seeming “unremarkable in their general 
functioning and who are able to make plans and put them into effect” (p.528), with 
the resear ch showing that 40% of these fixated individuals could be considered 
organised. James et al. (2010) state that the mentally ill can be considered organised 
where their “structured delusional systems” (p.528) mean that they can look and 
function ‘normally’ on the surface. The most common types of behaviours preceding 
referral to the FTAC were “approaches to iconic sites or prominent individuals” 
(p.528), witli 66% of the sample displaying this. A further 19% were found to have 
“inappropriate communications” (p.528), and 15% made both inappropriate 
approaches, and inappropriate communications. The subject of the fixation in 37% of 
cases was a member of the Royal Family, in 27% of cases the subject was a specific 
politician, and in 4% of cases the individual was fixated on both a Royal Family 
member and a politician. A further 32% were fixated on a building, most often those 
occupied by individuals in power (e.g. Buckingham Palace, Palace of Westminster). 
Regarding the mental illness of the fixated person, the majority (61%) were 
diagnosed schizophrenic. Other diagnoses were personality disorders (narcissistic or 
paianoid), unspecified paranoid psychosis, delusional disorder, schizo-affective 
disorder, bipolar disorder, and depression. In total, 90% suffered fi'om some form of 
mental illness, 86% of which were psychotic, with James et al. (2010) calling this a 
“notably high proportion” (p.528).
In contrast to the US based work of Fein and Vossekuil (1998), James et al. (2010) 
suggest that the behaviour s of this fixated group are not easily predictable, do not 
have simple understandable motivations, and “do not fit easily into standard policing 
mechanisms for assessing and managing threat (Mullen, James, Meloy, Pathé, 
Farnham, Preston et al., 2009)” (p.522). They also argue that the existence of 
warning behaviour s provide “evidence of their fixations and of the threat which they 
went on to constitute” (p.523). James et al. (2010) go on to conclude that “the attacks
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were not predictable, but were potentially preventable, had a system been in place to 
assess warning behaviours” (p.523).
As has been shown, there is a lot of disagreement between political assassination 
research in the US and Europe. James (2010) provides a discussion of the differences 
in the findings of Eur opean resear ch and the ECSP. Although Fein and Vossekuil 
(1998,1999) suggest that mental illness is an unimportant feature of political 
assassinations, James (2010) points out that in actual fact, the presence of mental 
illness is far* higher in their sample than in the general population, and so should not 
be dismissed so easily. A psychiatric history was present in 61% of cases, 43% of 
cases had a history of delusional ideas, and 10% had a history of violent command 
hallucinations. In addition, Fein and Vossekuil report that threats are unimportant, 
but James (2010) point out that in 77% of the ECSP cases there was “a history of 
verbal or written communication about the target and that 63% had a history of 
indirect or conditional thr eats about or to the target” (p.243). Thus, James (2010) 
ar gues that while mental illness may not be the important aspect of political 
assassinations believed by older research, where the individual is driven by their 
mental illness, it is nevertlieless a feature that should not be ignored. In addition, they 
suggest that although it appears to be the accepted wisdom that threateners do not 
become attackers, with it even suggested that threats are ‘protective’, attackers do 
indeed communicate with their target prior to attacks, and again should not be 
discar ded as unimportant.
7.4.1 Weaknesses o f European research
Again, this research takes a different approach to that discussed previously (pre- and 
post-1998). However, with its focus on European targets, it is still restricted to one 
geographical region and one population. Nevertheless, it is an important step in 
extending research beyond the US. Similar to other* research the studies discussed 
here tend to include a mixed sample of completed and attempted assassinations, with 
the associated problems, and again there is no comparison to a control group. Finally, 
and also in common with US-based research, the European research presented here 
omits any consideration of the behaviours of the victim, and how they interact with 
the assassin’s actions.
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7.4.2 Strengths o f European research
However, there are a number of positives to this research. As mentioned above, it 
does broaden the research base by considering attacks outside of the US, and outside 
of US victims. Collectively, the European research studies a broader sample, 
including politicians and members of the royal family. Data sour ces are clearly 
explained, and include both case file data and publicly available resources. A variety 
of sour ces were used: “existing scholarly accounts” (p.60), court records, 
govermnent papers, “the archives of lunatic asylums” (p.60), newspapers, “published 
and unpublished letters of politicians and royal family members” (p.60), “various 
editions of State Trials and the Newgate Calendar ” (p.60). Thus, although they did 
not restrict themselves to case studies, there were elements included in the James et 
al. (2008) study, for example, they offered a classification of the assassins’ 
motivations, splitting them into six categories: 1) political, 2) “frustrated petitioners” 
(p.64), 3) “pretenders to the tlirone advancing their claims” (p.64), 4) “resentful, 
expressing their rage at the world in general and royalty in particular” (p.64), 5) “the 
bizane” (p.65), and 6) those whose motivations were unclassifrable. In addition, the 
paper looked at the presence of psychosis and psychiatric disorders in the assassins, 
based on records fr om the time. Thus more recent research has moved away fr om the 
case-study based profiles, instead utilising other sources of data. James et al. (2008) 
looked at attacks on the British Royal Family (1778-1994, n = 23), but went beyond 
just looking at case studies of the assassin. They also considered:
• “The target and the harm inflicted.
• Where and how the attacks occurred.
• The nature of prior warnings or stalking behavioms, if any.
• The attacker’s motivation
• The attacker’s psychiatric history and mental state at the time.
• The outcome for the attacker.” (p.60).
7.5 SUMMARY
This chapter has provided an overview of the reseaich available examining political 
assassinations. Eaiiy research in the US attempted to create profiles and typologies of
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the perpetrators of political assassins. These were not a gi eat success, with problems 
both in the methodology used and the practical applicability of the findings.
In 1998 the Exceptional Case Study Project findings were published, suggesting that 
previous research was inconect, and that actually there was no ‘profile’ of an 
assassin. In addition, they suggested that the presence of mental illness and prior 
thi eats should not be of huge concern.
However, in the past few years, research on Euiopean political assassination 
incidents has been published, based on incidents involving Emopean politicians and 
Royal Families. This research found a number of discrepancies between it and the 
findings of the ECSP, namely that mental illness is indeed a featuie, and that 
‘warning behaviours’ are important. However, they exclude ‘terrorist’ assassinations, 
which may effect this finding.
Thus there are conflicting findings from political assassination research.
Nevertheless there is some consensus in the newer research. First, projects should not 
be based on those who have stalked prominent individuals, but irrstead should dr aw 
information from actual attacks or attempted attacks. Second, there should be less 
focus on the internal motivations of the offender, and more on their observable 
behaviours. Finally, it appears that research has tended to focus on specific regions, 
and it may be useful to examine attacks worldwide, to gain larger samples and a 
broader range of attacks.
The next stage is to examine how psychology may underlie such research, and the 
ways in which psychology can contribute to an understanding of political 
assassination incidents.
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8. Theoretical Perspectives
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter considers how psychology can be used to inform research into political 
assassinations. As chapter 7 has shown, much of the research on political 
assassinations has dr awn on stalking research. However, although this may be valid 
in that stalkers do somethnes turn to murder, not all stalkers do. Rather than viewing 
political assassinations as a form of stalking which results in death, it may be more 
useful to view them as a form of homicide which in some cases has been preceded by 
stalking. As chapter 4 showed, political assassination events share similarities with 
homicide events. Therefore, the first section of this chapter will discuss possible 
contributions fi'om homicide research. The second section will look more broadly, 
with a consideration of how rational choice tlieory, reasoned action theory, and 
situational crime prevention theory may assist understanding of political 
assassination incidents. Finally, script theory will be discussed.
8.2 HOMICIDE RESEARCH
As shown in chapter 7, profiling of political assassination offenders and offences is 
widespread. Similar ly, in the field of homicide there is a large body of research 
looking at the profile of both homicide offenders and offences. Blackburn (1995) has 
suggested that the basis of a theory of crime could lie in the development of 
typologies which take into account the variations in offenders and their offending 
behaviour". Reminiscent of profiles and typologies of political assassination 
perpetrators, typologies of homicide offenders focus on their personality traits and 
characteristics, drawing on information both fi'om observable features of the crime, 
and assumptions made about Hie offenders’ inter-nal psychology. On the other hand, 
typologies of the offence focus on the behaviour s shown in the offence itself, 
drawing information fi'om the crime scene (Santilla, Junkkila and Sandnabba, 2005) 
rather than looking at the offender, and making assumptions about his or her internal
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characteristics. In order that such offender and offence typologies are of a good 
standard. Canter, Alison, Alison and Wentink (2004) argue that there are two key 
assumptions which must be met. First, the criteria used to define the different 
categories must “consistently co-occur” (p.301) and second, there should be minimal 
overlap of the criteria that differentiate between the two types.
A prominent and influential example of a typology of the homicide offender is the 
Organised/Disorganised dichotomy devised by the FBI. As the name suggests, this is 
designed to define offenders either as organised or disorganised (Ressler, Buigess, 
Douglas, Hartman and D’Agostino, 1986). Based on data gathered dming interviews 
with 36 serial homicide offenders, the classification scheme was designed to provide 
assistance to investigators, and has been used by police forces internationally (Canter 
et al., 2004). The behavioms evident at tlie crime scene (e.g. a weapon was found at 
tlie crime scene, or brought by the offender) are used to draw inferences about the 
offender, to provide law enforcement agencies with information about the personality 
characteristics of the offender. Offenders were assigned to one of tlie two categories 
on the basis of key personality and demographic characteristics. According to 
Ressler et al. (1986) in homicides committed by ‘organised’ offenders, there is 
evidence of careful planning of the offences, and of the offender displaying restraint 
in their crimes. Conversely, ‘disorganised’ offenders are enatic and impulsive in 
their offending, with little evidence of any planning behavioms (Canter et al., 2004). 
Later, a third category (the ‘mixed’ category) was added to the dichotomy, designed 
to account for offenders who do not easily fit into either of the initial two categories 
(Douglas, Burgess, Bm gess and Ressler, 1992). However, this addition of a third 
category undermines the validity of the classification: as Canter et al. (2004) state, 
good typologies should have minimal overlap between the categories, and the 
introduction of a third ‘mixed’ category suggests that the original two categories do 
not appropriately account for differences in offender behaviours. As Canter et al. 
(2004) highlight, if many homicide cases are classified as ‘mixed’, then the basic 
Organised/Disorganised dichotomy is unlikely to withstand “systematic scrutiny” 
(Canter et al., 2004, p.294). In addition. Canter et al. (2004) highlight that there is a 
lack of information regarding the underlying concepts and theories of the 
Organised/Disorganised model. As discussed in chapter 2, a crucial part of research
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and theory creation is a clear" explanation of the concepts which underlie the 
phenomenon under examination, and where this is missing the proposed model is 
unlikely to stand up to rigorous testing. Further, Salfati and Canter (1999) identify 
issues with the sampling technique used by Ressler, Burgess and Douglas (1988). 
Offenders volunteered to be interviewed about their crimes, and it is suggested that 
these individuals may represent the more extrovert offenders, therefore risking 
introducing bias into the findings, and limiting generalisations that could be drawn.
Others have created their own typologies of offenders. Dietz (1985) examined the 
(presumed) psychopatliology of serial homicide offenders, which the killing was 
believed to be based on. He distinguished between five types of homicide offenders: 
the psychopathic sexual sadists, the crime spree killers, the organised crime killers, 
the psychotics, and the custodial poisoners. Holmes and DeBurger (1988) created a 
classification of serial homicide offenders, consisting of six categories, based on 14 
featuies they identified as key to classifying serial homicide offenders. Canter et al. 
(2004) draw attention to an interesting featuie of tliis typology: that each category 
has exactly seven features. They aigue that the supposedly distinct categories laid out 
by Holmes and DeBurger (1988) have considerable overlap m the characteristics 
assigned to each group. On the basis of this. Canter et al. (2004) suggest that rather 
than presenting a new scale by which to categories homicide offenders. Holmes and 
DeBiu'ger merely presented the Organised/Disorganised dichotomy as a scale, 
assigning labels to various places along the scale. Subsequently, Canter et al. (2004) 
propose that Holmes and DeBurger’s typology could be reinterpreted as a continuum 
running fiom “disorganised and spontaneous to non-random and dispersed” (p.298). 
Another two gioup classification was suggested by Jenkins (1988) who defined the 
‘Predictable’ type offender and the ‘Respectable’ type offender. Assignment to each 
category was lai gely on the basis of the offenders’ prior violent criminal behaviom s, 
and whether or not they were habitual alcohol abusers. However, Canter et al. (2004) 
suggested that this classification merely drew attention to features of cases that 
Jenkins believed to be important, rather than identifying any actual differences 
between homicide cases.
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As mentioned previously, as well as the typologies of offender, it is also possible to 
create typologies of offences. For example. Canter and Heritage (1990) looked at 
offender behavioui" in stianger rape, finding that certain groupings of behaviours 
consistently co-occur. The behaviours observed in the crime scenes showed that 
there were five different ways in which the offender interacted with the victim. From 
these, they created a three-way model, placing the Victim as Object, Vehicle, and 
Person. This model demonstrated that m addition to there being a level of 
consistency in an individual’s behavioui' at crime scenes, it is also possible to 
coherently differentiate between patterns of crime scene behaviours, and then 
reliably associate these with offender characteristics. However, there are difficulties 
in typologies of offence, as well as those of offender. Salfati and Canter (1999) 
examined stianger murders, creating a classification of crime scenes, and then 
linking this to offender characteristics. However, they use police case files as a data 
source, which, as they acknowledge, were not collected with the intention of use in 
research and so may contain errors, and ‘noise’ (although this concept is not defined 
by the authors). In addition, although Salfati and Canter’s (1999) study is based on 
82 offences, it actually draws on just 30 crime scenes, which is similar* to the number 
of interviews Ressler et al. (1986) conducted for the Organised/Disorganised 
dichotomy, which was criticised by Salfati and Canter (1999) for its low sample size.
In addition, variables fall between the regions defined by Salfati and Canter (1999), 
and were then allocated to an ‘appropriate’ region by tlie researchers based on their 
interpretation of it. For example, the variable describing the presence of wounding of 
the face was close to the boundaries for all three regions. Salfati and Canter (1999) 
argue that because it occuried in 40% of cases in the sample it is of low importance 
in distinguishing between the thr ee themes, and suggest it may be relevant to all of 
them. Nevertheless, they allocate it to the ‘Expressive (Impulsive)’ region as it is 
ar gued to reflect findings of clinical work in the ar ea, with the face (perhaps 
unsurprisingly) representing the victim. Having established these themes on the basis 
of crime scene evidence, Salfati and Canter (1999) attempt to draw links between 
these and the offenders. There appear to be a discrepancy in this, as the ‘Instrumental 
(Opportunistic)’ crime scene shows sexual offending behaviours to have occurred, 
but the conesponding offender has no backgr ound of sexual offending. Conversely
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the ‘Expressive (Impulsive)’ offender does have a background of sexual offending 
even though these crimes are said to have no sexual content. In addition, the 
‘Instrumental (Cognitive)’ offender is said to be distinguished by a history of prison 
sentences, or being in the armed forces, which could be said of many offenders and 
non-offenders.
Beyond the offence-based research in homicide resear ch, offence-based research has 
also been successfully used in the field of terrorism resear ch. Wilson (2000) 
examined offence behaviours in hostage-taking incidents. Three types of hostage- 
taking incident were studied; aerial hijack, barricade siege, and kidnap. Each was 
analysed separately because of the differences on a number of important dimensions, 
with the focus on the behaviours of both the hostage takers and the others involved in 
the incidents (e.g. hostages). Wilson found that there ar e clear- patter*ns of behaviour 
in terrorist hostage taking, with structures involving interactions with large numbers 
of other people underlying the behaviour- of hostage-taking groups. Her analysis of 
aerial hijack does suggest that there are behaviours present in hostage-taking wliich 
reflect the level of organisation within the incident.
Thus there are a range of areas of psychology where typologies have been developed. 
Although typologies of offenders have proved to be flawed in some ways, typologies 
of offences may be more promising. Basing typologies on objective, obser-vable 
features of the offence itself appear s to be a more reliable way of categorising crime 
than trying to draw inferences on the internal workings of offenders from their 
behaviours.
8.3 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
hi addition to drawing on homicide research, the field of rational choice theory 
(RCT) also offers a way of understanding offender- behaviour. RCT comes fi om the 
perspective that, in the study of human behaviour-, all lirmian action is presumed to be 
rational, be it offence-related or not (Cornish, 1993), Thus, rather than crime being a 
random act, it comes about as a result of the relationship between an individual and
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their environment (Guerette, Stenius and McGloin, 2005), with offenders basing their 
decision to commit a particular’ crime on the combination of perceived costs and 
benefits of committing that crime in a pai-ticular place and time (Clai’ke and Cornish, 
1985, Cornish and Clarke, 1986). RCT argues that by studying the costs and benefits 
of committing crime, researchers are better able to understand criminal behaviour 
(DeHaan and Vos, 2003).
The decision by the offender to commit a crime is based on a cost-benefit analysis of 
the (potential) criminal act, and the non-criminal alternative (Blackburn, 1995). The 
benefits mvolved vary depending on the individual, but may be pecuniary (i.e. 
money or goods) or non-pecuniaiy (i.e. enjoyment, satisfaction) or a combination of 
the two (Blackburn, 1995). The costs involved mclude the resources requhed for the 
offence, the fact that the offender may not enjoy committing the offence, the fact that 
by choosing to act unlawfiilly the offender is closing off lawful avenues, and the 
consequences of being caught, both in material terms and social terms. The 
likelihood of, and likely severity of punishment, is also a key cost in the decision to 
offend. The overall calculation of these benefits and costs is influenced by mdividual 
differences, for example the offenders’ attitude to risk. As economists tend to assume 
that offenders who make decisions tend to avoid risk (Blackburn, 1995), they argue 
that in any situation where the costs outweigh the benefits, no criminal action will be 
taken (Blackbuin, 1995).
However, in practice the cost-benefit analysis is not quite so simple. The calculations 
may not appear rational or methodical to an outside observer, but according to the 
rational choice perspective even hnpulsive and violent crimes aie guided by rational 
decision making (Blackburn, 1995). Also, the rational decision making process is 
sometimes constrained by time, or limited by the information available, or the effort 
required fi’om the offender themselves. Carroll (1978) found that botli offenders and 
non-offenders evaluate opportunities for crime on just one dimension. The 
suggestion here is that some offenders will assess the feasibility of then’ (potential) 
offence but will not consider all possible costs and benefits, i.e. they may either 
ignore, or simply not consider, some of the costs and benefits of the offence. CaiToll
(1978) suggests that offenders’ process of decision making may well be sequential,
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meaning that decisions about different parts of the crime may be assessed at varying 
times throughout their criminal career. For example, Cairoll and Weaver (1986) 
looked at decision making in experienced shoplifters, finding that while they 
recognised many of tlie aspects involved m the opportunities for crime they were 
presented with, when it came to the point of actually making a decision, only a few 
aspects were assessed by the offenders. Interestingly, reseaich has shown that 
offenders tend to have cognitive deficits, and in particular experience difficulties 
with planning. Harper, Man, Taylor and Niven (2004) suggest that of offenders who 
are serving custodial sentences, up to 59% have tliinking and behaviour difficulties, 
and 50% of those semng community sentences experience such difficulties. This is 
born out by the fact that in the UK, offenders attend ‘offending behaviour programs’, 
including those known as Enhanced Thinking Skills and Think First, which is 
intended to develop better thinking skills in offenders, and teach them to think before 
they act (offend). Despite these difficulties, and although offenders may not consider 
all the possible costs and benefits to thek offending, it is ai’gued that all criminals, 
even violent or sexual offenders, will show a large amount of rationality (Rossmo, 
2000).
Where offenders do conduct a cost-benefit analysis, it is argued that there are 
individual differences in the weighting afforded to the various costs and benefits that 
the offender gives consideration to. Carroll (1978) found that the strongest influence 
in decision-making for both offenders and non-offenders was the potential for 
monetary gain, being twice as important as the threat of penalties. The context and 
situation the offender experiences are also strong influences on offender decision 
making, for example the influence of peers or (echoing CaiToll, 1978) their own 
material need (Guerette et al., 2005). Within the rational choice perspective, 
situational features such as the natui e of the crime scene, or characteristics of the 
victim, should be caiefully considered. This is especially the case when looking at 
the way situational features influence offender decision making. In this way it is 
possible to examine the vaiying person-situation interactions which lead to 
distinctive differences in offending. For example RCT suggests that individuals are 
more likely to offend when their target is “more accessible, vulnerable and 
attiactive” (Nagin and Paternoster, 1993, p.478). Supporting this, Birbeck and
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LaFree (1993) also suggest that accessibility, in terms of ease of access to the target 
(Scarr, 1973, Brantingham and Brantingham, 1975, Molumby, 1976) is an important 
factor in the decision to offend (see section 8.3 for more detail). They also suggest 
that a further key consideration is the likelihood that the offender will be seen or 
apprehended (Bennett and Wright, 1984, Walsh, 1986). Finally, echoing previous 
work, the expected reward from the crime is an important consideration (Hough, 
1987). Thus, in examining political assassinations it is impoitant to consider not only 
the offender, but also the accessibility and vulnerability of the tai-get of assassin, in 
terms of the location in which they ai e tai geted.
The deterrence hypothesis is a fiirtlier key aspect of the rational choice perspective. 
Detenence describes any act which is designed to make a criminal act harder, or to 
stop it altogether (Blackburn, 1995). In the context of criminal behaviour, deterrence 
is the process by which individuals do not commit certain criminal behavioms 
because of their fear of suffering some externally-located consequence, which is 
generally a negative consequence (Blackbmn, 1995). In real teims, when tlie 
expected or calculated costs of a deviant act aie greater than the benefits (which ai'e 
subjective rather than objective), the result is deterrence (Blackburn, 1995). More 
recent papers on the deterrence hypothesis view it as a vaiiable process, affecting 
individuals and their behaviour differently. It is suggested that the deterrence effect 
may be more effective in instiumental crimes, for example bmglaiy or tax evasion, 
as these aie more focused on material gains. Expressive crimes are considered to be 
more motivated by emotions, and so aie considered to be less influenced by 
deterrence (Blackbmn, 1995). However, research examining incarcerated offenders 
found only a small amomit of support for tlie detenence effect, with the suggestion 
that when looking at experienced offenders, the potential benefits do outweigh the 
potential cost (Bridges and Stone, 1986).
Enders and Sandler (2006) consider Rational Choice Theory in the context of 
terrorism. They argue that there are two essential components for rational behaviour: 
first, the ten’orist must have a cleai ly defined set of choices or options, which can be 
placed by the terrorist in order of preference. Second, the person must select the most 
preferred out of the choices, when given an option. However, it is unimportant why
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they prefer one option over another, and these can change over time. This rational 
choice perspective of terrorism ar gues that ten orists have limited resour ces, and they 
will use these in ways tliat will achieve the best outcomes and achieve the most for 
them. Enders and Sandler (2006) identify “basic commodities” (p. 115) (for example 
“media attention, political instability, popular support for their cause, and the 
creation of an atmosphere of fear and intimidation” (p.l 15)), which teiTorist gr oups 
‘consume’ in order to achieve a shared political goal. There are a number of different 
strategies that can be used to achieve these, both terrorist and non-terrorists, which 
may be violent or non-violent. Some groups, for example the IRA, have used both 
terrorist and non-teiTorist means (via their political arm, Simi Fein) (Enders and 
Sandler, 2006).
Others have examined the presence of planning in criminal behaviour. Amongst one 
sample of convicted bui glars, evidence of planning was found in 75% of cases 
(Repetto, 1974). In another study looking at incaicerated armed robbers, Petersilia, 
Greenwood and Lavin (1978), found evidence of detailed planning in 25% of cases. 
In 50% of cases some aspects of the crime were planned, wliile in the remaining 25% 
of cases there was no evidence of any planning at all. In a study of British armed 
robbers, 52% were found to have planned their attack (Walsh, 1986). While there is 
variation in the rates and level of plaiming in these studies, this can be explained by 
differences in aspects such as sampling, the different crimes, definitions of planning, 
and data collection methods. Nevertheless, this collection of studies does show 
evidence of planning in crime behaviours at different levels.
Rational choice theory has come under criticism, much of which comes from 
research into street crime. For example, Conklin (1972) found that the majority of 
robberies, including street robberies, are opportunistic rather than premeditated. 
Silbennan (1978) supported this, showing that individuals who commit street 
robberies aie “impulsive, chaotic youngsters who seldom prépaie their crimes and 
who aie not capable of advanced planning” (p.39). Shover & Honaker (1992) found 
that most street robbers, and some muggers, raiely complete a cost/benefit analysis, 
with the majority not actually having the skills to do so. More recently, DeHaan & 
Vos (2003) looked at sti eet robbery in terms of the rational choice perspective, and
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also included impulsivity, moral ambiguity and expressivity, to see if they would fit 
with the rational choice perspective. Their findings did not support the rational 
choice perspective, and they suggested that the “spontaneous and moral aspects of 
criminal behavioui*” cannot be understood if crime is viewed as a rational choice. 
Thus, although rational choice theory appear s to have a lot to offer, it may not be 
relevant to all crimes or all offenders. However, as previous reseaich into political 
assassinations has found evidence of planning (e.g. Fein and Vossekuil, 1998, see 
chapter 7), it is suggested that these crimes are, at least in part, pre-planned, and the 
result of rational decision making. Of course, political assassinations may be 
spontaneous and unplanned in some cases, but the existing evidence suggests that 
these are not the majority of cases, and as such it would seem that RCT may be a 
useful tool in furthering the understanding of political assassinations.
8.4 ROUTINE ACTIVITY THEORY
Related to Rational Choice Theory is Routine Activities Theory (RAT). RAT views 
crime in terms of the physical and temporal location of the people and property 
involved in crhne (Cohen and Felson, 1979, Felson, 1986). The term ‘routine 
activities’ refers to those activities tlirough which people satisfy their basic needs, for 
example grocery shopping, raising children, and leisure pursuits. These routine 
activities determine where people are, when, and what they ar e doing, therefore 
determining the location and vulnerability of “personal and property targets” 
(Blackburn, 1995, p. 104). RAT is designed to explain crimes where there is direct 
physical contact between offender and victim, and in RAT for such a crime to occur 
three tilings must come together. There must be a motivated offender, a suitable 
target, and the absence of a capable guardian (Sherman, Gar tin and Buerger, 1989). 
When these three aspects occur* at the same place, spatially and temporally, the 
likelihood of a direct-contact crime occuning is, according to RAT, gr eatly increased 
(Messner and Tar diffi 1985). The probability of these three aspects co-occuring is 
non-random, but instead is dependent on the “structur e of everyday interactions” 
(Messner and Tardiff, 1985, p.242) and also on the idea tliat legal and illegal 
activities are related to one another, and therefore dependent on one another.
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According to RAT, illegal acts ‘feed on’ legal acts. The target and guardian aspects 
of RAT are thought to be especially dependent on patterns of routine activities, and 
therefore are considered to be very influential on levels of crime. Cohen and Felson
(1979) found that changes in routine activities (reflected by things such as the 
number of working married women, people living alone, out of town travel, size and 
weight of consumer items) were significant predictors of changes in the patterns of 
both personal and property crime in the US.
Birbeck and LaFree (1993) examine two aspects of the opportunity theory aspect of 
RAT, suggesting that both the decisions made by offenders regarding the situation of 
the attack, and the behaviom s of the victim, should be considered in looking at 
crime. The first is called ‘situational selection’, and describes the way in which 
situations are assessed as being suitable for crime. The assessments may be fast or 
slow, and may occur before the decision is made to commit a crime (thus involving 
an assessment of just one situation), or after the decision to commit crime (thus 
involving the comparison of a number of possible situations in looking for the best 
one). An important aspect of situational selection is related to planning. As discussed 
previously (section 8.2), there is mixed evidence regarding the planning behaviours 
of offenders, with little consensus on whether they plan, and to what extent they plan. 
In addition, the actual concepts of planning and situational selection differ. 
Premeditation is an essential part of planning: planning implies premeditation. 
However, not all situation selection is premeditated. Also, situational selection is just 
one part of planning, as planning includes other concepts, such as organisation of 
multiple group members. Planning involves a series of steps which must be 
considered, whereas (as mentioned above) situational selection can be spontaneous 
and casual. Birbeck and LaFree (1993) cite research suggesting that situational 
selection is likely to be more thorough when the offender(s) aie older (Reppetto, 
1974), less thorough in impulsive offenders (Letkemami, 1973), and faster amongst 
experienced offenders (Carroll and Weaver, 1986).
The behaviours of the victim are considered as part o f‘theories of victimisation’, and 
these reflect the idea that the victim of crime contributes to their own victimisation, 
as seen in RAT. Victimisation comes about as a the function of an interaction
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between the potential victim, and the motivated offender, both of which are risk 
factors for crime. These echo aspects of RCT, finding that the most commonly 
discussed risk factors are the exposui e of the victim, in terms of the physical 
accessibility of the target to the offender; the guar dianship available, i.e. the 
protection afforded the potential target by either people (bodyguards) or objects 
(protection of a building); and the attractiveness of the target to the offender, in either 
a material sense or a symbolic sense (Cohen, Kluegel and Land, 1981). RAT argues 
that potential targets are more likely to become victims of crime when they are more 
attractive to motivated offenders, less well guarded, and more often exposed to 
motivated offenders. Thus in terms of political assassinations according to RAT 
individuals are more likely to be victimised when they represent something important 
to the offender, when they are not guarded (by an individual or by their physical 
location), and when they are more accessible (in a location to which the assassin can 
gain access).
8.5 SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION
Also related to Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activities Theory ar e Situational 
Crime Prevention (SCP) theories. These ar e a derivative of rational choice models 
and routine activity theories, and are influenced by the growing attention afforded to 
the victims of crimes (Young and Matthews, 1992). SCP theorists see “crime as the 
outcome of immediate choices and decisions, and which focus on the proximal rather 
than distal influences on crimes as specific events” (Blackbm*n,1995, p. 104). Taking 
into consideration the hifluences of both the environment and individual differences, 
SCP suggests that much crime should be viewed as a rational decision, with 
offenders being normal people who offend when their actions/behaviours are 
influenced by particular pressures when faced with specific opportunities and 
“situational inducements” (Hough, Clarke and Mayhew, 1980, p. 104). It is suggested 
that crime can be reduced by reducing the opportunities available to the offender to 
commit crime. It does this by “changing the relationship between the offender, the 
victim, and the environment (Nietzel and Himelein, 1986)” (Blackburn, 1995, 
p.398).
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SCP theories can be applied to real-life situations to prevent crime in a number of 
ways. The physical environment can be changed, or (potential) victims of crime can 
be encouraged to change their behaviour. In addition, “str engthening the social 
control of crime by the community” (Blackburn, 1993, p.398). SCP is initially based 
upon the concept of tar get har dening and surveillance (Brookman, 2005). Target 
har dening can be used to reduce opportunities for crime, and works by altering the 
balance of perceived costs and benefits of offending, for example by replacing 
aluminium coin boxes in pay phones with steel coin boxes, which ar e far* harder to 
break in to (Blackburn, 1993).
Target har dening has also been considered in the context of terrorism. Enders and 
Sandler (2006) suggest that target hardening works by “protect(ing) potential targets 
either by making attacks more costly for tenorists or by reducing their likelihood of 
success” (p. 120). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, plane liijackings (‘skyjackings’) 
became so prolific between the US and Cuba that metal detectors were installed 
across US airports in 1973 (Enders and Sandler, 2006). This stopped the large 
number of skyjackings for eight years, until strategies were identified to evade the 
metal detectors. In addition, when skyjackings became too difficult tenorists 
expanded tlieir portfolio, moving to kidnapping and banicade-siege incidents 
(Enders, Sandler, and Cauley, 1990).
Related to target hardening is the option to increase the use of surveillance. The 
design of new housing and offices has highlighted the possibility for opportunity 
reduction via looking at access opportunities and surveillance. Over time, SCP 
evolved to incorporate strategies relating to offenders and victims, as well as those 
relating to location (Brookman, 2005). Some aspects of SCP can be done by 
encomaging potential victims to take action, for example to get secmity for their 
home, or display warning notices of alarm systems on their houses (Blackbmii, 
1993).
Such concepts could be applied to the understanding of political assassinations. For 
example, targets of political assassination can be ‘hardened’ by employmg a 
bodyguard for protection, or installing extra security measures in their homes.
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offices, or cais. In this sense, the behaviours of political assassination targets really 
could affect the behaviours of their attackers.
It is suggested that “situational conshaints" (Blackburn, 1993, p. 104) may not work 
well on impulsive or “emotionally disordered” (Blackburn, 1993, p. 104) offenders.
In fact, situational crime prevention is considered to be paiticularly relevant to 
‘opportunistic’ crimes, for example shoplifting, tax evasion, or vandalism. In the case 
of vandalism, it occurs where there is minimal surveillance, for example in empty 
buildings, or on unsupervised buses (Sturman, 1980). There is some suggestion that 
perpeti ators of political assassinations ar e emotionally disordered, or experience 
mental illness. If this is the case, SCP theories may not be relevant. However, there is 
also evidence of planning amongst political assassins (Fein and Vossekuil, 1998), 
and therefore SCP theories are a relevant consideration of this project.
There ar e criticisms of situational crime prevention. First, tai get hardening can be 
expensive, with a lar ge amount of effort required to try and reduce offences, such as 
criminal damage or violence. However, this may be of limited value in reassuring 
concerned citizens regarding inner city crime (Trasler, 1986). Second, SCP efforts 
often have unclear*, ambiguous goals. They also are sometimes based on untested 
assumptions about offender decision making. Third, SCP efforts to make offending 
more difficult may result in displacement, which can be seen in the changes in 
time/place/method/for*m of offending (Trasler, 1986). For example as newer car s are 
better secured, theft of older cars was found to increase (Mayhew, Clarke and 
Hough, 1980). However, it is possible that displacement may occur most in “highly 
motivated ‘professional’ crimes, such as bank robbery” (Mayhew et. al., 1980), and 
least in opportunistic crimes. It should be possible to predict displacement “from 
rational choice analyses of criminal decision processes” (Blackburn, 1993, p.399). 
Reppetto (1976) developed the ‘displacement hypothesis’, which suggests that this 
displacement of offending may occur* because offenders change their usual crime 
location, timing, target, method, or even crime type if the usual option changes for 
the worse.
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Similarly, Enders and Sandler (2006) refer to the concept of ‘transference’, in which 
tar gets of terrorism are har dened, and so the tenorists tr ansfer their attentions 
elsewhere. Tliis follows directly from the idea of terrorists as rational (see section 
8.3), meaning that when one target is hardened, providing there are two types of 
violence/behaviour that “are logistically similar and yield similar* basic outcomes” 
(Enders and Sandler, 2006, p.l 15), hansference will occur towards the softer target, 
hi the last decade security at airports has been increased, and therefore terrorists 
look to target softer targets (referred to by Enders and Sandler as the ‘weak links’), 
which are less protected, for the Madr id train bombings in 2004, which killed 191 
people and resulted in more than 1200 injuries. Transference resulting fr om target 
hardening also affects the targets of teiTorism, as shown by the bombing of the 
Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004. An Al-Qaeda linked group targeted the 
embassy with a car bomb, because the Australian embassy was easier* to attack than 
the US embassy, wliich had heightened security (Enders and Sandler, 2006).
hi terms of political assassinations, it will be interesting to see whether the presence 
of a ‘hardened tar get’ (i.e. a target with a bodyguard) means fewer attacks, i.e. if 
there will be fewer* incidents where the target is protected by a bodyguard, than 
where they are not protected. However, as all targets of assassination in this sample 
are deceased, it is important to note that there may be many targets with bodyguards 
who were not killed, and therefore no firm conclusions can be drawn regarding this.
8.6 SCRIPT THEORY
Similarly to the rational choice perspective, script theory has been used to explain 
both non-offending and offending behaviour. Developed by Schank and Abelson 
(1977) it offers a way to explain how people process their understanding during 
events or in situations. Scripts are a type of schema, which guide individuals’ 
behaviour in everyday situations, in terms of their interactions with their 
environment and other people (Abelson, 1981). They provide individuals with an 
expectation of what will happen dur ing situations and events, enabling people to 
predict likely outcomes, therefore assistmg tliem in what is and is not appropriate
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behaviour in a given situation. Script theory has been applied in a number of fields to 
explain people’s behavioui*. For example, Donald and Canter (1992) looked at the 
behavioui* of those who were in the King’s Cross underground fire (in London,
1987). They found that even in life-threatening situations such as this, people tend to 
behave in predictable ways, based on what they think will happen. For example, in 
trying to leave the station, rather than take the nearest exit, people tended to take 
their usual route out, even if this was not the closest or fastest way out of the station. 
As Donald and Canter (1992) point out, although people have scripts to guide their 
behaviours in everyday life, a large number of people do not have scripts for new 
situations tliey encounter, in particular for emergencies where they may be in danger. 
Where people do have scripts, it is possible these are based on what they expect 
should happen, according to news reports they have read, or scenes on television or 
in films, rather than what actually does happen. Having studied a number of major 
fires. Canter found that people tend to behave according to the standard, accepted 
social roles and place lailes that are dictated by their situation at the time of the 
emergency (Canter, 1990).
Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) examined the patterns of behaviour in terrorist 
hostage-taking incidents, finding that the behaviours present in such incidents are in 
fact not random. Underlying psychological dimensions were revealed, which could 
be used to describe the different types of events. These included the method of 
control used, the type of interaction, the resources used and the (appai ent) motivation 
for the incident. By examining tlie way in which these underlying dimensions 
interact with one another, and the combination in which each occms, it is possible to 
define and describe hostage-taking incidents, with the potential for creating models 
which could predict outcomes.
Later, Wilson and Smith (1999) used the concept of script theory to explain terrorist 
hostage taking behaviour, in particular looking at what behavioms are predictable. 
They found that in general in hostage situations, adherence to the usual social roles 
and rules are expected of all groups involved, although they do offer examples of 
instances where the scripts broke down. However, rather than this being a negative 
issue, Wilson and Smith (1999) found that the breakdown of scripts can result in
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positive interactions between the gi*oups involved in hostage incidents. They explain 
tliis by suggesting that the individuals actually end up relying on their everyday 
scripts to guide tlieir interpersonal interactions, and that this suggests a certain level 
of (sometimes limited) predictability, even in unusual and shessful incidents. 
Similarly, Wilson (2000) found that “there are clear patterns of behaviour in terrorist 
hostage taking as in other forms of criminal activity such as rape (Canter and 
Heritage, 1990, Wilson, Canter and Jack, 1997) and arson (Canter and Fritzon, 
1998)” (p.420). Finding the behaviours to be highly structuied, Wilson (2000) 
suggested that this provides support for the rational decision making model of 
criminal behaviour.
Away from teiTorist situations, Gavin and Hockey (2010) looked at whether script 
theory could be used to explain criminal versatility, both in terms of their offending 
behaviour, and then* social behaviours. Finding support for the presence of script 
theory, Gavin and Hockey (2010) suggest that there is evidence that offenders 
possess a number of scripts for different offences, i.e. versatile offenders hold a 
range of scripts for offending which have been gathered tlnoughout their offending 
careers. They also found that scripts for criminal behaviours are learnt in the same 
way as scripts for non-criminal behaviours.
In the context of political assassinations, script theory suggests that assassins will 
follow usual patterns of behavioui* in plannhig and can ying out then* attack. Fein and 
Vossekuil (1998) found that the planning conducted by assassins is very similar in 
structuie and content to the planning that would be used in more everyday situations, 
for example in planning a trip. This is supported by the view of offenders and 
terrorists as rational (e.g. Enders and Sandler, 2006, Wilson, 2000), and suggests that 
the behavioms of assassins may be sh*uctm*ed and predictable. However, the findings 
of Donald and Canter (1992) suggest that when faced with unexpected situations 
individuals do not have scripts to follow, and so if an assassins plans do not go well, 
they may struggle to adapt, puttmg them more at risk of apprehension.
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8.7 SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a discussion of the ways in which forensic psychological 
theory can be used to better understand the phenomenon of political assassination. As 
discussed in chapter 4, political assassinations ar e indeed a fomi of homicide. 
Therefore, the literature on homicide has been discussed here, in particular the ways 
in which typologies and profiles have been used to explain homicide incidents. 
Although there aie difficulties in creating profiles of the homicide offender, it seems 
that creating a profile of the offence itself is more likely to have positive results. 
Therefore, it is likely that looking at the featui es of the assassination incident itself 
will be more fiuitfiil than trying to create profiles of the assassin.
In addition, rational choice theory, routine activities theory, and situational crime 
prevention theories, offer useful approaches to understanding the way in which 
decisions are made regarding offending behaviour, and the considerations made by 
offenders (e.g. how situational factors affect decision making). RCT has proved 
applicable to a range of offence types, and again it is possible that RCT could be 
used to inform the present assassination research. Such theories also offer insight into 
how target behaviours can affect offender behaviouis, and possible ways tai'gets can 
reduce their risk.
Script theoiy describes the way in which individuals act in given situations. With 
research in other areas finding script theory a useful way to understand behaviours of 
the offender and the target in situations such as hostage taking, this may also offer a 
way to understand the ways in which offenders and targets behave in political 
assassinations.
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9. Methodology
9.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will outline the methodological issues of the thesis. This research 
analyses political assassinations at two levels -  the assassin’s behaviour' and the 
victim’s behaviour', and how these interact to influence aspects of the assassination 
incidents. The chapter will examine the methodologies which have previously been 
used in political assassination research, and the methodological issues related to such 
research. The methodology to be used in this thesis will be presented and explained.
9.2 REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Chapters 7 and 8 provided an overview of both the previous resear ch related to 
political assassinations, and the underlying psychological research that is relevant to 
the area. The research into political assassinations can be loosely divided into thr ee 
gi'oups -  US based pre-1998, US based post-1998, and European. As chapter 7 
showed, the existing research has focused on the personality characteristics and 
behaviours displayed by perpetrators of political assassinations.
The pre-1998 US-based resear ch solely focused on creating typologies and profiles 
of political assassins, with the overall aim of understanding the type of person who 
assassinates, attempts to assassinate, or tlneatens, US presidents and other senior 
politicians. This is expanded in the post-1998 research to include prominent public 
figur es, such as judges, but there was still a focus on the psychological profile of the 
offender. The Emopean research examines attacks on both politicians, and the royal 
family, again with a focus on the characteristics and backgroimd of the offender. As 
shown in Part 1, political assassinations are not solely targeted at politicians, and 
therefore the research should reflect this. Following on from previous research, the 
current study will draw a sample fi om a range of professions according to a broad 
definition of political assassination, rather than focusing on one specific professional
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group. In addition, rather than trying to create a profile of ‘the assassin’, or drawing 
inferences about their mental wellbeing based on behaviours displayed during the 
attack, this project will look at obseiwahle behaviours to understand the incidents of 
assassination.
There aie also issues related to the sample used for the research. Previous research 
has, in some instances, used mixed samples combining both those who have 
threatened prominent figures and those who have attacked them. As research has 
shown threateners are unlikely to become attackers (Fein and Vossekuil, 1998), it is 
suggested that futui'e research concentrates just on actual attacks, rather than a 
combination. Previous research has also concentrated on individuals who have been 
apprehended, which automatically excludes a large number of attacks on prominent 
public figures. Thus research should be aware of this, and not limit itself in this way. 
The current research will only examine completed attacks, in order to study a 
homogenous group, and to avoid problems of generalisability.
Again, as discussed in chapter 7, the existing research is enthely focused on the 
assassin; botli their psychological workings, their personality characteristics, their 
background, and their behaviours immediately prior to the (attempted) assassmation. 
There is no attention afforded to the behavioui s and actions of the victim of the 
attack, and how this may interact with the behaviour of the assassin to create the 
incident. As chapter 8 discussed, theories of victimisation suggest that in actual fact, 
the behaviours of the tai'get are important in understanding crime. The accessibility, 
the guardianship, and the attractiveness of the target are all said to be key risk factors 
in victimisation. Thus, this project will examine the behaviours of tire target in 
addition to those of the assassin.
Relatedly, chapter 8 also discussed where the victims of crhne are most likely to be 
victimised. Reasoned Action Theory (RAT) argues that potential targets are more 
likely to be victimised when they are more attractive to motivated offenders, when 
they ar e less well guarded, and when they are easily accessible. To investigate how 
this relates to political assassination the present project will seek to identify the 
situational vulnerability of victims of political assassination, in terms of their
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location (accessibility), and preparedness for attack (guai'dianship). In previous 
research this has not been widely considered, and thus this is a new contribution to 
the research.
As discussed in chapter 5, there is a belief among some terrorism researchers that 
political assassinations are tar geted at, and kill, just one person. The number of 
victims other than the target has not been considered by any of the research discussed 
in chapter 7. The existing research only focuses on the immediate target of attacks. 
However, political assassinations do incur victims other than the target (both injured 
and killed), and this research will consider both tire number of casualties, and how 
this relates to other aspects of the attack, such as the identity of the perpetr ator, and 
the location of the attack.
Existing research does not address the methods used by assassins. This is an 
important feature of political assassinations, as it is possible that method (which 
includes both the weaponry and the behaviour of the assassin) var ies both in 
frequency and in nature. By understanding more about how potential targets are 
attacked, it may be possible to hnplement protective strategies. This would be 
exploratory resear ch, as there is no existing resear ch on this area.
Thus the aims of the study are as follows;
1. To examine the behaviours of the perpetrators of political assassinations;
2. To identify where victhns of assassination ar e at risk, in terms of their 
situational vulnerability;
3. To consider how widespread the casualties of assassinations ar e, in terms of 
how specific the attack is;
4. To look at the methods used by assassins to tar get their victims.
5. To understand how these aspects interact with one another, with a view to 
creating a multi-faceted model which furthers understanding of political 
assassinations.
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93 THE CURRENT METHODOLOGY
From the discussion of methodologies used in previous political assassination 
resear ch, it is clear that a key issue is that of the data sources to be used, with a 
related issue of accessibility. It is (obviously) impossible to collect data from the 
victims of political assassinations. Gaining access to assassins would also be very 
difficult, for various reasons: death of the assassin, imprisonment, the assassin being 
unidentified/unknown, and so on. In the absence of this direct contact, others have 
used case file data, but as discussed earlier, there are numerous flaws in the use of 
case studies in this ar ea. Nonetheless it is likely that data drawn fr om open source 
accounts will provide enough information on political assassinations on which 
analysis can be conducted.
The methodological approach taken in this research will follow a nomothetic 
approach, in that the focus will be on a large group of political assassination 
incidents, rather than an idiographic approach, which has been used before in case 
study methodologies which focus on one person. Data will be drawn from two 
sources: newspapers and a series of books offering accounts of terrorist incidents, 
and will then be content-analysed to provide numerically coded descriptions of a 
number of political assassination incidents.
The data on political assassination incidents will be drawn fr om two somces, UK 
broadsheet newspapers, via Nexis and the Mickolus series of books (e.g. Mickolus 
and Simmons, 1997,2002). Nexis offers a way to search newspaper articles. In this 
study, UK broadsheet newspapers were used (The Time, The Sunday Times, The 
Independent, The Independent on Sunday, The Guardian, The Observer, The 
Telegraph, The Simday Telegraph).
The use of multiple somces is known as ‘triangulation’, and offers a way to explore 
different facets of the same (often complex) event. Different sources offer different 
viewpoints of the same event, providing a greater level of information (Henwood and 
Pidgeon, 2006). For example, the Mickolus books only cover transnational terrorist 
attacks, meaning that they only report terrorist events which involve more than one
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country. For example an attack on an English person in France would be reported, 
whereas an attack on a French person in France would not be. Newspaper reports do 
not have this restriction. In addition, at the time of this data collection, the Mickolus 
books available only detailed events up to and including 2001, while newspaper 
reports are available up to the present day. Combining tire two data sources ensures 
the mclusion of more domestic incidents, and more recent incidents.
As discussed in chapters 7 and 8, such data sources have proved valuable in a 
number of other studies (e.g. Fein and Vossekuil, 1998, Wilson, 2000, Wilson et al., 
2010). The use of newspaper sources does have its weaknesses. It is possible that tlie 
UK newspapers used for data do not report all assassinations occurring worldwide. 
However, as Snitch (1982) states, it is an appropriate data collection technique on the 
basis that political assassinations tend to be major events which are therefore 
attended to by the media, paiticulaiiy when an assassination is successful. James, et 
al. (2008) used a similar method of data collection, drawing data from sources which 
were aheady in the public domain. Pape (2003) has also used Nexis to access the 
online world news media, for a study of suicide bombers. Wilson et al. (2010) used 
newspaper reports as a data source when looking at ETA’s bombing and political 
assassination campaigns, finding that they provided sufficient behavioural 
information to use in analysis. Although it is true that newspapers suffer bias, in that 
they are motivated to sell their product, the use of newspaper sources in previous 
studies such as those listed here suggests that tliis has not proved an actual issue in 
research. The information drawn fr om the newspapers is laigely related to 
behaviours in the incidents, and the reporting of these are unlikely to suffer bias, in 
that the location of the attack, or the identity of the victim is relatively objective. In 
addition, the use of numerous news sources (each of which is likely to have different 
agendas or bias) provides some level of protection against this bias. Finding 
consensus amongst different somces reinforces the validity. Where there is no 
consensus relating to aspects of the assassination incidents (e.g. one source reports 
that there were more than one assassin, while another reports that there were not) the 
variable is coded to the negative, i.e. that there is not more than one assassin. If there 
aie more than two reports in agreement, with one disputing the fact, the majority 
view is coded. This conservative strategy results in the best possible data set.
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The cases were selected primarily on the basis that they meet tliis definition of 
political assassination:
‘'Â political assassination is an attack targeted at a specific victim. The 
victim does not need to be a politician, but their death must have some 
political impact, either because o f who the victim is, or the position they hold. 
There are no constraints on who the attacker may be; an individual, a 
conspiracy o f individuals, or a terrorist group "
There are a multitude of definitions of political assassination in the literatm e, and 
these have been discussed in more detail in chapter 2. For the purpose of this 
research, the above definition was created which draws on various aspects of other 
definitions of political assassination. This is based on a thorough literatm e seaidi, 
and is intentionally broad in order to captme a wide range of incidents. It highlights 
the need for the attack to be taigeted at a particular person, but does not specify who 
that person must be in terms of their position or identity. The key aspect of the victim 
is that they must be a person who’s death will result in some kind of impact on the 
political scene they are a pai*t of. In this definition, the assassination can be carried 
out by anyone, with no limits on who can conduct an assassination. This definition is 
used to search for cases of political assassination, and is used to deteimine which 
cases should be included in this reseaich and which should not.
Cases were identified via a thorough sear ch of the Mickolus series, with each 
political assassination incident recorded. In addition to these cases, Nexis was used 
to identify further cases of political assassination, with a search term of “assass*”. 
This allowed the identification of a large nmnber of newspaper reports which 
included any word with “assass” as part of it (e.g. assassinate, assassination, 
assassinated). These were then examined, with suitable cases for inclusion identified, 
according to the definition cited previously. From the list of potential political 
assassination incidents, a further name-specific search was conducted on Nexis. 
Where there was sufficient data for inclusion (i.e. on the victim identity, the attack, 
and offender identity), and the attack occmi-ed between 1990 and 2008, the data was 
gathered for future content analysis.
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In total, 400 cases of political assassination were collected. This is obviously not the 
total number of political assassination incidents that occurred in the 18 years under 
examination, and in order to determhie an appropriate sample size, G*Power 3 was 
used to conduct an a priori power analysis. This computes a required sample size, on 
the basis of effect size, alpha value, and power value. Typically, this effect size 
would be drawn from a similar study. However, as discussed in chapter 7, there are 
no similar- studies to the present one. Therefore, a medium effect size of 0.3 was 
selected for use, along with an alpha value of 0.05, and a power of 0.8. On the basis 
of a Mann-Whitney test, G*Power 3 calculated a required sample size of 368. ^  
priori power analysis was also computed for the use of chi-square tests, finding that, 
with a maximum assumed tliree degrees of freedom, there would be a required 
sample size of 122. Thus 400 was taken as an appropriate sample size. This was 
supported by the finding that other research in related areas (e.g. homicide, terrorist 
behaviour) had similar-, or smaller, sample sizes. For example. Last and Fritzon 
(2005) looked at stranger and intrafamilial homicide, witli a sample size of 82. Salfati 
and Taylor (2006) used a sample size of 74 in a study on sexual homicide. Wilson 
(2000) examined behavioirrs in hostage taking situations with a total sample of 160, 
while Wilson, Scholes and Brocklehurst (2010) looked at ETA’s use of 
assassinations with a sample size of 275. Thus, the 400 used in the present resear ch 
exceeds all of these. In addition, as shown by the descriptive statistics presented in 
chapter-10, the sample of 400 political assassination cases provides a wide range of 
attacks across different countries, years and victim types. In addition, there are 
attacks in a range of locations, with a range of weapons, committed by various 
perpetrators.
Of course, this is not to say that the sample is perfect. In an ideal world data on all 
political assassinations would be included. In addition, it should be acknowledged 
that the inclusion criteria has weaknesses. As discussed in chapter 2, the definition of 
political assassination is not a simple concept. The inclusion criteria utilise a 
definition of political assassination that is as inclusive as possible, but the method of 
identifying cases does rely heavily on the way in which attacks ar e reported by the 
news media. The search terms used mean that the pool of attacks from which suitable 
cases can be drawn is already pre-defined as assassinations by the newspapers. This
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is not ideal, however, short of manually reading all available newspaper articles, it 
seems to be the most straightfor ward way of identifying cases. Of course, this creates 
a somewhat circular problem: this thesis is examining what happens in assassination 
attacks, by using cases already defined as ‘assassinations’. So we are defining 
assassinations usmg cases already defined as assassinations. However, tliis thesis is 
only providing the fir st steps in examining behaviours in political assassinations. 
There may be a whole universe of other incidents which ar e political assassinations, 
but which are not reported as such in the news media, and therefore are not included 
here. However, this researcher is very aware of the limitations of the data collection 
techniques, and so will not claim that findings can represent all political assassination 
attacks. As a first step however, the data collection tecliniques are considered 
sufficient.
9.4 EXISTING DATASETS
At present there are two key datasets relevant to this area: START’s Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), and the International Terrorism: Attributes of Ten'orist 
Events (ITERATE) dataset, along with tlie Mickolus series of books.
The GTD is a comprehensive database of tenorist-perpetrated incidents, both 
domestic, transnational, and international. It contains data on incidents which 
occurred between 1970 and 2010, and cun'ently includes more than 98000 cases. An 
open-soince dataset, the GTD’s information is dr awn fiom publicly available news 
articles and sources. At present it is the most comprehensive, non-classified, dataset 
of terrorist incidents in the world. The GTD has been widely used as the basis of a 
tenorism research, with numerous papers published based on its data. However, 
there are some problems with missing data. Wilson et al. (2010) found that although 
there was a comprehensive record of political assassinations they were only able to 
use a small proportion of the cases for their analysis. The GTD contains little 
behavioural information, and although there is space for an ‘incident summary’, in 
practice this gives little information and is normally a one-line description of the 
incident. Demographics are recorded, along with the success, or otherwise, of the
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attacks, and the type of the attack (e.g. hostage incident, assassination, armed 
assault). There is space for details of the target to be recorded, but this tends to be 
broad (e.g. tomist, infrastructure) rather than specifying the tar get by name. Often the 
outcome for the target is unclear*, with the total number of injuries/deaths recorded 
but no detail on whether the target is one of these. More information tends to be 
included regarding the perpetrator, including whether a responsibility claim was 
made, and how. In addition, some political assassination cases recorded in the GTD 
gave no way of identifying either the victim or the attack, and therefore it was not 
possible to find the necessary supplementary data from other sources (i.e. 
newspapers/Mickolus). The GTD acknowledges that there are problems with its 
recording and coding of assassination incidents in particular (Gary LaFree, personal 
correspondence). Thus other data sources were required to identify incidents, to 
provide more behaviouial information on the assassination incidents.
The ITERATE dataset differs from the GTD in that it only records instances of 
transnational terrorism which occurred between 1968 and 2004. Like the GTD, 
infoimation for ITERATE is drawn from publicly available news and media sources, 
but is smaller, containing more than 3000 cases. Associated with the ITERATE 
dataset are a series of books authored by Mickolus and colleagues (e.g. Mickolus and 
Simmons, 1997, 2002). The Mickolus series provides a comprehensive account of all 
terrorist incidents carried out worldwide, and are primarily based on newspaper 
reports. They offer an advantage in that they dr aw on information fr om newspapers 
worldwide, and have been proven as a valuable data source for a number of other 
studies.
Although both datasets discussed here have proved to be valuable research tools, the 
purpose of this study is to look more widely at assassinations rather than just 
examining terrorist-peipetiated incidents. In addition, as mentioned above, the GTD 
in particular suffers from missing data in a number of cases, and neither contain the 
necessary information regarding victim and offender behaviours (see Wilson et al., 
2010). Therefore, a new dataset will be created for this project, with the purpose of 
describing behaviours in political assassinations. The data collected will be coded 
according to a total of 118 variables. Guidance for variable selection was taken fr om
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previous research (e.g. James et al., 2008) and the aims of the project, resulting in 
political assassination incidents being coded on the three main aspects of attacks: 
first, the characteristics of the targets, second, features of the attack, and third, 
characteristics of the assassin(s) (see Appendix A). These variables were placed 
across three distinct temporal occasions: prior to the assassination, during the 
assassination, and after the assassination (see Figure 9.1). These variables will be 
discussed in more detail in section 9.6.
Pre-attack
During
attack
Post-attack
Target Characteristics
A ssassin  Characteristics
Target Characteristics
Attack Characteristics
A ssassin  Characteristics
A ssassin  Characteristics
Figure 9,1. Schematic outline of Coding Variables
Thus the dataset created for this project will provide a comprehensive account of 
behavioural aspects of political assassinations, with a range of victims and no 
restriction on the identity of the perpetrator.
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9.5 CONTENT ANALYSIS
Once the reports of political assassination incidents were collected, they were content 
analysed using a carefully constructed, rigorously designed coding scheme.
The purpose of the content analysis is to tr ansform the qualitative data collected from 
the newspapers and books into numerical data which can then be easily subjected to 
further analysis. It provides a way of reducing the data to a manageable level 
(Breakwell, 2006), with results in the form of a data matrix, which describes the 
presence or absence of a series of behavioirr s, in a numerical form (Breakwell, 2006). 
In this type of quantitative content analysis, the descriptive text is reduced into 
numerical values by way of a coding scheme (Millward, 2006), and this involves the 
issue of reliability of the categorisation. There is a risk that the categories specified 
may be ambiguous, or unclear, or open to bias. In order that the manual coding 
scheme used here can be classed as reliable, it must be sufficiently unambiguous that 
two independent raters will classify the data in exactly the same way, thus 
establishing inter-rater reliability. This involves a second rater coding the data 
according to the coding scheme. Any differences are identified and the inter-rater 
reliability is calculated on the basis of this. This reliability must be at least 0.7 
(Gregory, 2004). If inter-rater reliability is not established, the coding scheme runs 
the risk of being open to individual inteipretation, with the researcher imposing their 
own views onto the material (Wilson, 1995). In this study, approximately 20% of 
cases were selected at random fr om the overall sample, and passed to two other 
researchers along with the coding dictionary. Inter-rater reliability was calculated by 
comparing the coding of each researcher, and it was found that the coding matched in 
94% of the coded observations (cases x variables = total coded observations/data 
cells). That is, with 118 variables, and 80 cases, there were a total of 9440 data cells 
to be coded by the second researchers. The coding of the resear chers matched in 94% 
of these instances. Looking in more detail, these inconsistencies appeared in 98 of 
the 118 variables, showing that they were spread across a range of vaiiables. In 25 of 
these variables, there was just one instance (per variable) where the coding differed 
between resear chers, and in another 14 variables, there were only two instances (per 
variable) where the coding differed between resear chers. At the other end of the
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scale, there was one variable where, in 20 out of 80 cases, Üiere were discrepancies 
between the coding of the researchers. In another three variables, there were 
discrepancies in 16 cases, 14 cases, and 13 cases, and in two further variables there 
were discrepancies on these variables in the coding of 15 cases. Thus, it seems that 
some variables were more reliably coded than others. However, the overall figure of 
94% consistency is high enough to demonstrate good overall reliability, showing that 
both raters classified and understood the data in the same way. The inconsistencies 
were cai efully examined and some variables were recoded on the basis of the second 
researcher’s classifications, and the discrepancies in some variables’ coding 
demonstr ated that the definitions were not clear* enough. These definitions were 
altered to ensure consistency of coding.
The coding scheme is a detailed account of all variables imder examination, 
specifying the universe of possible responses to each variable. The majority of the 
variables used in this coding dictionary will use a present/absent dichotomy, and 
where the data is missing, the variable will be coded as absent. As highlighted by 
Wilson (2000), it is hnportant to note that not all features of attacks will be reported 
in the newspaper articles fiom which the data is derived, and because of the type of 
data used, “the absence of an action in the accormts could not be taken as a definite 
indication that a certain behaviour* had not occurred but simply that it was not 
reported as having occurred” (p.406). Thus, the coding scheme has been created to 
code the presence of a var iable, r ather than the absence. Tliis means that while 
something coded as present definitely did happen, items coded as absent are not 
necessarily absent, and it is possible that, actually, they did happen but were not 
reported. In instances where variables are not coded according to presence or 
absence, but rather* for two other dichotomous choices, a (1) or (2) was assigned to 
the appropriate variable category. Of course, there were some variables that were not 
dichotomous (i.e. they had more than two ‘options’), and these were assigned a 
numerical code. For example, when coding the region in which the attack took place 
there were 15 options, and so each region was assigned a code, ranging fiom ‘1’ up 
until ‘15’. Where the information was missing no code was assigned.
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9.6 CODING SCHEME
Target chaiacteristics both prior to the assassination, and din ing the assassination, 
were described (see Appendix B). These include basic demogi'aphics (name, age, 
gender), along with the profession of the victim. The experiences of the target prior 
to the attack were quantified dichotomously (present (2) or absent (1)), as receiving 
thieats prior to the attack, being stalked or followed prior to the attack, and any 
previous attempt(s) on their life. Aspects of the tai'get which were relevant during the 
attack were coded (again dichotomously). The behavioui' at the time of die attack 
included whether the target was at leisine or work, whether they were indoors or 
outdoors, in transit or stationary, and whether they were in a private, public or semi­
private location. This provides a simple description of what the target was doing at 
the time of the attack. Dichotomous coding was also used to record whether or not 
the tai'get had a bodyguard at the time of the attack, and whether they died instantly, 
or sui'vived for a period of time (but still died fi om the injui'ies sustained in the 
attack).
Assassin characteristics are relevant at all three time periods: prior to the attack, 
during the attack, and after the attack, as shown by Figure 9.1. The identity of the 
assassin is a difficult aspect to define, thus a simple classification system is used: the 
assassin is coded as either an individual working alone, as a teiTorist group, or as an 
unknown. In addition, dichotomous variables were included to show whether there 
was any (suspected) government involvement or (suspected) military or police 
involvement. The presence of an ‘insider’ was coded as either planning the attack, or 
assisting in conducting the attack. More specific aspects of the assassin were also 
included, such as the presence of mental illness, or a history of offending or violence. 
However, in many cases, such data was not reported, and therefore coded as absent 
(as discussed previously).
Assassin characteristics which could be obsei*ved at the time of the attack include 
their presence at tlie scene of the assassination, whether the assassin stayed at the 
scene after the attack or left, whether they ambushed their target, or broke in to a 
home or work location. The number of assassins present at the scene of the attack
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was recorded numerically, along with the gender. The terms Primary, Secondary and 
Tertiary assassin were used to allow a simple categorisation of the different roles 
taken by assassins. The presence of a Primary assassin indicates that an individual 
was present at the scene and responsible for the killing. A Secondary assassin was 
classed as a ‘support’ to the Primary assassin, an individual who did not do the 
killing itself, but acted as get away driver, look out, or similar-. The Tertiary assassin 
was any individual not present at the scene of the attack, who had responsibility tor 
planning or cariying out the attack. Again, these were coded dichotomously (present 
(2) or absent (1)), but tliere was an element of interaction between variables. A 
Secondary assassin could only be coded as present where a Primary assassin was also 
coded as present, as their pmpose is to assist the Primary. Other than this, any 
combination of the three roles could be present in the data.
The coding scheme was designed to accoimt for the outcomes for the assassin. This 
data was largely unavailable, but variables were provided to record whether the 
assassins were apprehended, when tliey were apprehended (at the scene or later), 
whether they were killed or committed suicide, if they confessed, were convicted, 
and whether they were sentenced to prison or death.
Finally, aspects of the attack were recorded, including a description of what 
happened in the incident. The presence or absence of other victims (bodyguard or 
civilian) will be recorded, along with the number of each. The weaponry used in the 
attack is recorded, both simply (i.e. the presence (2) or absence (1) of shooting/knife 
incident/manual/explosive device), and with more detail (e.g. explosive device could 
be a letter bomb, an incendiary device, a suicide bomb, and so on).
9.7 SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the methodologies used previously in 
political assassination research, those used in related research, and to identify the 
most suitable and appropriate methodology for this thesis. Previous political 
assassination research has typically been based on case study methologies, producing
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in-depth profiles of individual assassins, or typologies intended to char acterise 
different types of assassin. As discussed, there are a series of ‘gaps’ in the existing 
research, and the purpose of this project is to explore some of these gaps. Five aims 
ar e stated at the start of this chapter, related to understanding more about the 
perpetrators and victims of assassinations.
The present study utilises a methodology with information drawn from publicly 
available sources. Similar methodologies have proven successful in both political 
assassination research (Wilson et al., 2010), and other related research (Pape, 2002, 
Wilson, 2002). The triangulation of resources allows a broader understanding of the 
incidents, and improves the reliability of the information. A new dataset is created, 
which provides a comprehensive dataset of behaviour al aspects of political 
assassination.The qualitative data gathered is content analysed according to a 
rigorous and reliable coding scheme, which is designed to meet the aims of the 
project, and is informed by previous research. Data are gathered from publicly 
available newspaper sour ces, and the sample is drawn from international, completed, 
assassination attacks. Data is content analysed at three levels (assassin/victim/attack) 
over tliree time periods (pre-assassination/during assassination/post-assassination). 
The focus of the research is on objective aspects of the assassination, rather than on 
the internal aspects of the assassin.
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10. Sample Characteristics
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Tills chapter examines tlie chai acteristics of the sample of political assassinations. As 
discussed in chapter 9, a sample o f400 cases was drawn from the population of 
political assassinations, according to specific inclusion criteria. By looking at the 
characteristics of assassinations it is possible to increase understanding of such 
events, in terms of when and where they happen, who the victims of assassination 
ai e, and who the perpetiators of assassinations are.
10.2 PLACE AND TIME DEMOGRAPHICS
This section considers when and where the political assassinations in this sample 
occur. By looking at the number of assassinations over time it is possible to identify 
any patterns or cycles in the incidence of the attacks in this sample. The location of 
assassination attacks is important for two reasons. The existing reseaich focuses on 
attacks in two locations: on US figures in the US, and on European citizens in 
Europe. This project extends the focus, and looks at attacks in other countries as 
well.
Over the 18 year period in which incidents took place, the year with the highest 
number of assassinations is 1991 (n = 42,10.5%), while the yeai* with the lowest 
number of assassinations is 2004 with just 10 assassinations (2.5%) identified for this 
sample. Figui e 1 shows the fiequency of attacks each year since 1990. There are 
notable peaks in 1991 (n = 42), 1997 (n = 28), and 2007 (n = 34). The year with the 
fewest assassinations was 2004 (n = 10). The overall annual rate of attacks in this 
sample was 22.2, which is higher than that of both Fein and Vossekuil’s (1998) 
wliich found an average of 0.7 attacks per yeai*, and James et al.’s (2007) study 
which foimd an average rate of 1.6 attacks per year.
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Figure 10.1. Nmnber of assassinations over time
It is possible that there ai e cycles of political assassinations over the 18 years being 
studied here. The rate of political assassinations appeals to form a peak every 3 - 7  
years. Figme 10.1 shows that from the peak in 1991, a tiough appears in 1993, with 
another peak in 1997, followed by a trough in 2004, and back to a peak in 2007. 
However, this sample is just a small selection of the overall population, and the 
peaks and troughs may therefore simply mean that more cases were collected for that 
yeai*, rather than there being a change in the incidence of assassinations in that year. 
Figure 10.2 shows the number of assassination incidents recorded in the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) over the same time period. There aie similarities in that 
both data sets suggest high numbers of assassinations in the eai'ly 1990s, and then a 
general downward trend fiom the mid 1990s onwards.
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Figure 10.2. Assassinations over time as recorded by the GTD
The assassinations in this sample took place in a total of 85 different countries, with 
the most commonly occurring country being Northern Ireland (n = 58). A full list of 
these countries is presented in Appendix C. To simplify examination of the location 
of political assassinations, the countries in which incidents take place have been 
grouped into regions of the world, using the 13 areas defined by the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) centre’s Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD). Table 10.1 shows that the majority of incidents in this sample took place in 
Western Europe (n = 128, 32%), including countries such as N.Ireland, Germany and 
Spain. The next most common region is Middle East and North Africa, with 96 cases 
(24%), followed by Russia and the Newly Independent States with 53 cases (13.3%). 
The region with fewest political assassination incidents is Australasia and Oceania, 
where there was just one incident (0.25%), along with Central Asia and Southeast 
Asia, which each had 2 incidents (0.5% each). In 3 cases the region in which the 
incident took place was unclear. Interestingly, despite much of the existing research 
focusing on incidents in the USA, there were just six political assassinations in this 
sample which occurred in the USA (1.5%).
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Table 10.1
Region in which the attack took place
Region N =
Western Einope 128
Middle East & North Africa 96
Russia & Newly Independent States (NIS) 53
South Asia 40
Sub-Saharan Africa 31
South America 15
Eastern Europe 14
North America 6
East Asia 5
Central America & Caribbean 4
Unknown 3
Southeast Asia 2
Central Asia 2
Australasia & Oceania 1
Total 400
10.3 THE VICTIMS
This section will examine the demographics of the targeted victims of political 
assassination incidents. By examining just who is killed in assassinations, it may be 
possible to identify individuals who are at more risk of assassmation, and it will also 
highlight those non-political figuies who may not expect to be at risk of 
assassination.
The majority of political assassination victims were male (n = 376, 94%), while just 
24 (6%) of victims in this sample were female. Figure 10.3 shows the range of 
victims’ ages. These are seemingly normally distributed, as indicated by the bell 
cm ve. Victims most often fall into the age group 41-50 years, with 72 cases (18%). 
The next most conunon age range is 51-60, with 69 cases (17.3%). There aie fewest
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cases in the range 11-20, where there is just one case (0.3%). However, cases where 
the victim’s age is not specified are the most common, with 121 cases (30.3%).
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Figure 10.3. Age of Victim
As Figure 10.3 shows, the age of the victim appears to peak around middle age (in 
the 40s and 50s). It is possible that by this point the target has reached the peak of 
their fame or notoriety, and therefore are likely to be the target of a political assassin.
The profession of the victims in this sample were split into 21 categories, designed to 
cover all variations of professions which are present in this sample. These are shown 
in Table 10.2. Victims of political assassination were most often ‘political figures’ (n 
= 116, 29%). Members of terrorist groups were the next most common victim of 
political assassination (n = 46, 11.5%), followed by military personnel (n = 43, 
10.75%). The least commonly held profession in this sample is UN Negotiator, with 
just 1 such victim (0.25%). The sum of all frequencies adds up to more than 400 
(actually 479) and this is because some victims were eligible to be included in more
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than one category (e.g. a lawyer who was also an advisor to the government would 
be coded as both ‘Legal Professional’ and ‘Government Official’).
Table 10.2 
Profession o f Victim
Profession N =
Political Figure 116
Terrorist Group Member 46
Military Personnel 43
Business Professional 37
Journalist 35
Political Activist 27
Religious Leader 20
Academic/Historian 19
Government Official 18
Legal Professional 18
Related to a politician 15
Previous Politician 14
Printing Industry Personnel 14
Community Leader 13
National Leader 12
Exile/Refugee 10
Foreign Diplomat 7
Writer 7
Civil Servant 4
Charity worker 3
UN Negotiator 1
Total 479
The victim was protected by a bodyguard(s) in 74 cases (18.5%). Thus the majority 
of victims of political assassination were not politicians, and had no bodyguard at the 
time of the attack (n = 326, 81.5%).
176
Of the 400 cases of political assassination, the majority (n = 317, 79.25%) of the 
sample had no reported experience of receiving threats, being followed, of sm'viving 
previous attacks. Figure 10.4 shows the experiences of those who had received 
threats, or been followed, or survived previous attacks. In 35 cases the tai’get had 
been threatened (8.75%), in 24 cases the victim had survived a previous attempt 
(6%), and just four cases reported being followed (1%). In 14 cases (3.5%) the victim 
had been threatened and survived a previous attempt, and in a furüier three cases 
(0.75%) the victim had been threatened, and reported being followed. There were no 
incidents where the target reported being followed, and sui’ving an attempt on their 
life. There were just three cases (0.75%) where the victim had experienced all 
previous behaviours, receiving threats, being followed, and suiviving a previous 
attempt.
In addition to the target, it is possible that other individuals will be harmed in the 
assassination, as shown in Figure 10.5. In total, there were ‘other victims’ in 155 
attacks (38.75%), meaning that only the target was killed m more than half of the 
incidents in this sample (n = 245, 61.25%). These ‘other victims’, were divided into 
two categories: eiüier the bodyguard of the target, or not, in which case they are 
described as ‘civilians’. Tlie ‘civilians’ category can of course include people who 
were accompanying the victim, e.g. colleagues, assistants, family members.
In 113 cases (28.25%) there were civilian victims, but no bodyguards were harmed. 
There were far fewer cases where only the only other type of victim was a 
bodyguard, with just 8 such cases (2%). In 34 cases (8.5%) there were both civilian 
and bodyguard victims, in addition to the target.
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10.4 THE ASSASSINS
This section looks at the perpetiators of assassinations, in order to identify where the 
risk comes from. In existing research the perpetrators are largely individuals working 
alone, but this sample has intentionally widened the inclusion criteria. The 
perpetr ator is considered in terms of both their identity (e.g. terrorist gr oup, 
individual, government), and the types of assassins (e.g. presence at the scene, 
behind the scenes planners).
The variable Terrorist group’ is used to identify those incidents where a tenorist 
group actually claimed responsibility for the attack. Of the 400 cases sampled, 
responsibility was claimed in 102 (25.5%). In addition, there was one incident where 
November 17 were suspected, as the gun used was also used in a previous attack 
committed by them. In three of these cases although it was reported that 
responsibility was claimed by a group, the name of the group was not specified.
Of the terrorist attacks, they were claimed by a total of 42 groups. Table 10.3 shows 
these groups classified by cause, according the Memorial Institute for the Prevention 
of Terrorism’s (MIPT) Terrorist Organisation Profiles (TOPs), provided through 
START. A total of six causes aie represented here, and there is also a category for 
gi'oups which aie unclassified. It should be noted that there is considerable overlap 
between some categories, in paiticulai* the ‘Nationalist/Separatist’ and the 
‘Communist/Socialist’ categories. Thus, the number of cases listed in Table 10.3 is 
gieater than 102 as some cases aie represented twice. The ‘Nationalist/Separatist’ 
category contains 60 incidents, including those committed by the most prolific group 
in this sample, ETA (n = 17,17% of the total claimed by teiTorists), the Spanish 
Basque Separatist group. This is unsurprising, as it has been noted that assassinations 
are a favoured strategy of the group (Wilson, Scholes and Brocklehurst, 2010). There 
aie 33 cases in the ‘Communist/Socialist’ category, wliich includes the 14 cases 
(14% of all terrorist incidents) that were claimed by the IRA, the Irish separ atists. 
Again, this has been noted as a str ategy utilised by the IRA (Enders and Sandler, 
2006). There are 23 cases where it is not possible to classify the group within a ‘type’ 
of terrorist group, and this is because there is too little information on the group.
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There are eight cases which can be classified as ‘Religious’, and a fuither five which 
aie classified as ‘Leftist’. ‘Anti-Globalisation’ gi*oups account for three attacks, and 
one attack is the responsibility of a gi'oup classified as ‘Racist’. Interestingly, a total 
of 28 groups claimed just one attack each, showing that terrorist groups may use 
political assassinations as a ‘one-off, rather than as a regular tactic (a full list of the 
groups and their classifications is in Appendix D).
Table 10.3
Terrorist Groups who claimed responsibility for assassinations
Group Type N =
Nationalist/Separ-atist 60
Communist/Socialist 33
Unclassified 23
Religious 8
Leftist 5
Anti-Globalisation 3
Racist 1
Some groups claimed attacks under more than one name, for example the Ulster 
Defence Association (UDA) also claimed attacks under the name Ulster Freedom 
Fighters (UFF). In addition, the Red Hand Defenders, who claimed responsibility for 
2 assassinations, is a cover name used by loyalists in Northern Ireland when they 
were operating under a ceasefire. Thus it is possible that these attacks were claimed 
by another group already listed here. Fmlhermore, the group Direct Action Against 
Drugs (n = 6) appears to be a separate group from Northern Ireland, but this is often 
considered to be a cover name used by the Provisional IRA.
An individual was responsible for just 28 of the 400 political assassinations in this 
sample. Responsibility at an individual level was established in one of three ways; if 
there was evidence reported by the law enforcement agencies that an individual was 
responsible, if an individual claimed responsibility or confessed, or if an individual 
was convicted of committing the attack. An attack recorded as perpetrated by an 
‘individual’ may have involved more than one person, but these are not a recognised
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terrorist gi'oup and are simply one or more people working together on this occasion 
to achieve their goal.
In a further 52 (13%) of the 400 cases a government either claimed responsibility for 
the attack, or was suspected of being responsible for the attack. This was established 
in a number of ways: the weapon used may have been owned/come from a par ticular 
country’s supply, the cormtry may have stated that they were responsible for the 
incident, or tliere may be evidence reported that the country was responsible.
Table 10.4 shows that the 52 attacks in which a government is (suspected to be) 
responsible ar e perpetrated by 12 different governments. In these cases it is not 
necessarily the head of the government who has been involved in the attack, but 
could be a minister, the country’s secret service, or police or military. The 
government is considered to be involved because they have authority over such 
organisations. The cormtry responsible for most political assassinations is Israel (n = 
13), followed by the USA (n = 10). The USA is also thought to be responsible for a 
further attack, in collaboration with Britain.
Other than these 52, there are five further cases where it is suspected that a 
goverrrment was involved in an attack, but tliere is not sufficient proof. Russia and 
the FSB ar e suspected in two more cases. North Korea is suspected of being 
responsible for one attack, and one is suspected to be the responsibility of Syria. 
There is a further case where the perpetrator is not specified. A UN report into the 
incident suggested that Syria or Lebanon were responsible, but also suggested that 
the US could be involved, as an attempt to discredit Syria and their allies. This case 
in particular shows how difficult it can be to establish governmental responsibility 
for political assassinations.
There was also the option to record the presence of police or military involvement 
separately to the ‘Government Involvement’. The purpose of this was to identify 
specific cases where the police or military were involved, in more detail than simply 
recording that a Government had some involvement. Thus these two variables may 
show overlap. In seven cases there was police involvement in the assassination, for
I8i
Table 10.4
Governments suspected o f involvement
Government N =
Israel 13
USA 10
Iran 6
Iraq 6
Gaza/Hamas 4
Britain 4
Russia 2
Syria 2
Iran 1
Afghanistan 1
Cambodia 1
Colombia 1
USA/Britain 1
Total 52
example where the assassins themselves were police officers. In a further 27 cases 
there was military involvement, for example where soldiers were tasked with killing 
a tar get.
In 270 of the 400 cases, there was no claim of responsibility, or the perpetrator was 
not identified. Thus in the majority of cases (67.5%) the identity of the assassin has 
not been reported.
In some cases, the assassins were assisted by ‘insider cooperation’. This is taken to 
mean that the assassin either was, or had, some form of ‘inside’ cooperation: they 
were fed intelligence by someone close to tire target, or were assisted at the time of 
the attack, e.g. the target’s bodyguard was also working with the assassins, and 
permitted them entry to the location of the target. Additionally, it may have been the 
case that the assassin tliemselves was close to the target. They may have got close 
with the prior intention of assassinating the target, or they may have formulated the 
assassination plan after gaining the closeness. In 11 cases (2.75%) the assassins were
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assisted by a collaborator ‘on the inside’, while in 16 cases (4%) the assassin was an 
‘insider’. Thus in a total of 27 (6,75%) cases tliere was some element of ‘inside 
cooperation’.
The ‘type’ of assassin who carried out the attack was characterised as primary, 
secondary or tertiary. The phrase primary assassin describes an assassin who is 
present at the scene of the attack, and is responsible for the target’s death, e.g. they 
were present at the scene and pulled the trigger on the gun. A secondary assassin is a 
collaborator who is also present at tlie scene, but not directly responsible for the 
death, e.g. they are a get-away driver. A tertiary assassin is a collaborator who is not 
present at the scene of the attack at all, e.g. they built and planted a timed bomb, but 
left the scene in advance of the bomb detonating.
In the majority of cases a primary assassin was involved (n = 344, 86%). A 
secondary assassin was less common, present in just under a fifth of cases (n = 77, 
19.25%). A tertiary assassin was involved in approximately half of the cases (n = 
198, 49.5%).
In addition to looking at the types of assassins individually, it is helpful to look at the 
different combinations present in the sample. A primary assassin may work alone, or 
may be assisted by a secondary or tertiary assassin. A tertiary assassin may be the 
only type of assassin involved. However, as a secondary assassin is present as an 
‘assistant’ or collaborator to the primary assassin, it is not possible to have a 
secondary assassin without the presence of a primary.
Figure 10.6 shows the different combinations of assassins. The most frequent 
assassin type was still just die primary assassin, with neariy half of all incidents just 
involving a primary assassin (n = 172,43%). The next most common combination 
was that where both a primary and tertiary assassin are involved (n = 95, 23.75%), 
meaning that there was an assassin present at the scene responsible for killing the 
target, and another collaborator who was not at the scene. In 56 cases (14%) there 
was just a tertiary assassin, thus there is no assassin present at the scene. In a similar 
number of cases, 47 (11.75%), there was a combination of primary, secondary and
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tertiary assassin. This was relatively rare, perhaps because such a high level of 
manpower resoui'ces is either not necessary, or impractical. The most infrequently 
used combination was that of a primary and secondary assassin, with no tertiary 
assassin. In 30 cases (7.5%) this was the case.
Primary + 
Tertiary 
Assassin 
(n = 95)
Tertiary 
Assassin 
fn = 56)
Primary 
Assassin 
(n = 172)
Primary + 
Secondary 
+ Tertiary 
Assassin 
(n = 47)Primary + Secondary 
Assassin 
(n = 30)
Secondary 
+ Tertiary 
Assassin 
(n = 0)
Secondary 
Assassin 
(n = 0)
Figure 10.6. Type of Assassin
Where possible, the number of assassins present at the scene of the incident was 
recorded (see Table 10.5). In the majority of cases (n = 166, 41.5%) the number of 
assassins at the scene was unknown, either because it was not reported at all, or 
because it was reported but there was confusion, with different numbers reported in 
different sources, or just confusion as to how many assassins were at the scene. Of 
the remaining cases, 84 (21%) had two or tlnee assassins at the scene, 59 (14.75%) 
had one assassin at the scene of the attack, and in 35 cases (8.75%) there were four or 
more assassins present. In a further 56 cases (14%) there were no assassins at the 
scene of die attack (for example where a timed explosive device was used).
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Table 10.5
Number o f assassins at the scene
Number of assassins N =
0 56
1 59
2-3 84
4 35
Unknown 166
Total 400
In just 20 cases (5%) the assassin was both present at the scene and apprehended at 
the scene. In a further 314 cases (78.5%) the assassin was present at the scene but 
evaded capture. Wliere this was the case, in 67 instances the assassin was later 
apprehended. It is sometimes the case that assassinations can be fatal for the assassin 
as well as theii* tai'get, with the assassin being killed at the scene in 15 cases (3.75%), 
12 of which were suicide bombings (3%) and so self-inflicted. In a fuither six cases 
(1.5%) the assassin was killed after the incident.
Literatuie suggests that mental illness is commonly present in political assassins 
(Clarke, 1990), but in the sample here only three assassins were reported to have any 
form of mental illness (0.75%).
10.5 THE ATTACK
The final aspect of the sample to consider is the attack itself, in terms of the mode of 
death and the physical location in which the attack takes place. The pmpose of this is 
to identify the types of weapon utilised in political assassinations, and the locations 
in which assassinations occur.
Figure 10.7 shows how the political assassination victims were killed. These have 
been split simply into 7 categories which broadly describe the mode of death. The 
frequencies total more than 400 as in some cases more than one weapon was used.
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The most commonly used weapon was a gun, which featured in 286 cases (71.5%). 
The second most commonly used weapon was an explosive device, which was used 
in 80 cases (17.5%). In 12 cases the target was killed by a suicide bomber, which is 
considered as a sub-set of other explosive devices (3%).
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Figure 10.7. Method used to kill victim
In fewer cases a ‘manual’ method was used (n = 34, 8.5%). The manual classification 
incorporates any attack where the assassin did not use an automated weapon, so for 
example the victim was beaten to death, attacked with a blade, pushed from a height, 
smothered, etc. The only exception to this was poisonings, which obviously do not 
involve an automated weapon. However, attacks involving poisons do tend to have 
key differences in the administration of the attacks, for example there is no need for 
the assassin to be in close proximity to the target, as the poison can be planted in 
advance, whereas manual attacks require the presence of the assassin.
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Poisonings were used in a small number of cases, with just 4 incidents of poisonings 
occuiTing in this sample (1%). The methods used in assassinations will be considered 
in more detail in chapter 13.
When looking at the attack, the victim’s location was considered in teims of whether 
they were inside or outside at the time of the attack, and whether they were in a 
public, private or semi-private location. A public location is a place which is open to 
anyone, with no restriction on entry, e.g. a public park. A semi-private location is one 
which is open to the public, but requires permission to enter, e.g. a workplace where 
the public may enter with permission, or in a cai\ which is considered private, but 
travelling on a public road. The majority of incidents were targeted at individuals 
who were outside (n = 277, 69.25%), presumably because these are easier to gain 
access to. Less than half (n = 123, 30.75%) of targets were attacked when they were 
in an indoors location.
Table 10.6 shows the second aspect of location. In the majority of cases the target 
was attacked in a public location (n = 187, 46,75%), while private locations were 
least common (n = 82,20.5%). Victims were attacked in semi-private locations in 
around a third of cases (n = 133, 33.25%).
Table 10.6
Location o f attack
Location N =
Public 187
Semi-private 131
Private 82
Total 400
In over half of the 400 cases the victim was in transit at the time of the attack (n 
215, 53.75%). Victims are classified as ‘in transit’ in any case where they are 
tr avelling at the time of the attack, including driving, flying, walking etc. The 
location of the attacks is considered in more detail in chapter 11.
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10.6 SUMMARY
Having established the methodology to be used, a sample of 400 cases of political 
assassination were collected. There is considerable variance in the incidence of 
political assassinations over time, with most attacks in 1991, and fewest in 2004. 
Within this sample there was a downwards tendency in the frequency of attacks from 
1990, up until 2004, but since 2005 there appears to be an increasing tiend, with 
another peak in 2007. Attacks are spread across a total of 85 countries (see Appendix 
C), and once these are divided into regions, a total of 13 different regions. Western 
Europe has the highest incidence of assassinations, with over a quarter. Other regions 
in which assassinations often occurred include Middle East and North Afiica, and 
Russia and the Newly Independent States. Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and 
Austialasia and Oceania were relatively ‘safe’ areas, with incidents being relatively 
rare.
This chapter showed that, in this sample, the typical victim of political assassination 
is a male, aged between 41 and 50 years old. Perhaps rmsiuprisingly, the profession 
most commonly targeted in political assassinations is that o f‘politician’, which 
includes elected politicians, presidents, congressman, and so on. This is followed by 
individuals who ar e considered to be terrorists, and military professionals. Of the 
individuals in this sample, less than one quarter were protected by a bodyguar d at the 
time of the attack against them. This could be related to the relatively low level of 
‘previous behaviours’ experienced by the victims. Around one eighth had been 
threatened prior to the attack which killed them, one eighth had survived a previous 
attempt on their life, and even fewer had reported being followed before their death. 
These assassinations tend to show a reasonable level of specificity, with other 
victims being involved in less than half of the attacks in this sample. These ‘other’ 
victims tend to be civilians, rather than bodyguards, or a combination of both. There 
were very few cases where the only other victim was a/were bodyguard(s). 
Characteristics of the assassin ar e also considered. Ai'omid one quarter of the attacks 
in this sample were claimed by terrorist gr oups. A total of 42 groups were 
represented, ranging from established groups such as the IRA and ETA, to less well 
known groups such as the Strugglers for the Unity and Freedom of Levant. The
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groups claiming the most attacks are ETA and the IRA (just imder one fifth each), 
while a total of 28 groups just claimed one attack. This could be taken as evidence 
that terrorist groups do indeed use assassinations as a tactic, contr ary to Schmid 
(1992). Individuals also claimed or were attributed blame for political assassinations 
in this sample, but far fewer than terrorist gr oups, with fewer than a tenth being the 
responsibility of individuals. This may of course be an artefact of using the Mickolus 
books as a data source, wliich are solely accounts of attacks claimed by or attributed 
to terrorist groups. A similar number of attacks were considered to have involved 
police or military figures, either as the assassin themselves, or in planning the attack. 
Just over a teirth of this sample were considered to be ‘state-sponsored’ attacks, with 
12 different cormtries involved in assassinations. Despite these various 
claims/attr ibutions of responsibility, in a total of270 cases there was no claim of 
responsibility. However, this does not mean that there was no evidence to attribute 
these attacks to a govemment/group/individual, merely that no one actually claimed 
responsibility for the attack.
Other aspects of assassins were considered, beyond the identity of the perpetrator. In 
very few cases (less than a tenth) the assassin was assisted by ‘inside information’, 
i.e. they had someone close to the tar get feeding them intelligence, or they worked to 
get close themselves. The ‘type’ of assassin was also considered, and in the majority 
of cases tliere was only evidence for a primary assassin, that is the assassin was 
present at the scene of the crime, and worked without a collaborator away fi orn the 
scene. In ar ound a quarter of attacks this primary assassin did get assistance from a 
tertiary assassin who was not present at the scene. The remaining combinations of 
assassin type were less fiequent, and are made up of cases where there were just 
tertiary assassins, primary and secondary assassms working together, or a 
combination of primary, secondary and terfiary assassins.
The number of assassins at the scene of the attack was largely unrecorded, but 
typically there were 2-3 assassins at the scene (around one fifth). In a minority of 
cases there were more than four assassins at the scene, perhaps because of the 
difficulty in recruiting and managing a large group of people, both in the planning 
stages, and while carrying out the attack itself.
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The presence of mental illness in assassins was considered because the literature 
suggests it is a key aspect of political assassins. However, mental illness was found 
in less than one percent of cases in this sample, suggesting that it is uncommon. In a 
further contrast with previous research, where the sample consisted of mdividuals 
who had been apprehended, a minority of assassins in this sample were reportedly 
apprehended, either at the scene of the attack or later. This suggests that the sample 
under examination here is considerably different to those which are the basis of 
previous research.
A key aspect of the attack is the method used to kill the target. A gun was the most 
commonly used weapon, used in neariy three quarters of all the cases. An explosive 
device was the next most commonly used weapon, used in neariy one quarter of 
incidents. Other methods used were poisons, beatings, and rar ely, a plane crash. The 
location in which the tar get was attacked was also considered, in terms of whether 
they were inside or outside, and in a public or private location. The majority of 
incidents were against tar gets who were outside, as opposed to inside, and in public 
locations rather than private ones. Victims were stationery at the time of the attack in 
the majority of cases, with less tlian half of all attacks occuring while the victim was 
travelling.
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11. The Situational Vulnerability of Victims of Political 
Assassinations
11.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the situational vulnerability of victims of political 
assassinations. In this analysis, situational vulnerability is defined in terms of two 
parts: the accessibility of the victim at the time of the attack, and the preparedness of 
the victim for an attack, both prior to and at the time of the attack. It is important to 
examine the behaviours of the victim of assassination as there is evidence that these 
can influence and mould the perpetrators’ plans for the attack (Biesterfeld and 
Meloy, 2008, see chapter 7). The combination of these two aspects (accessibility and 
preparedness) are highlighted as important by James, Mullen, Meloy, Pathé,
Fai*nharn, Preston and Darnley (2007); they suggest that those who ar e considered at 
risk of assassination should consider employing protection, particularly during public 
events, as this is where their attackers will find, and may take advantage of, 
opportunities to mount attacks (see chapter 7).
Thus the accessibility aspect is comprised of the physical location of the victim at the 
time of the attack: whether they are inside or outside, whether they ar e in transit or 
stationary, and whether tliis location is a public or private place; and the time of the 
attack, in terms of whether they are attacked during their work or leisure time. The 
combinations of these aspects of political assassination attacks combine to form 
different situations in which victims may be targeted. By examining these it will be 
possible to identify the different types of situations in which the targets of political 
assassination are attacked. In addition, by looking at the frequencies with which 
these different types of attack occur, it is possible to identify those situations in 
which targets are likely to be attacked within the current sample.
The second aspect of this chapter is the victim’s '‘preparedness'’ for an attack. This is 
established by considermg whether the victim of the attack has been threatened, or 
sur vived a previous attempt on their life, and whether or not they are protected by a
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bodyguard at the time of the attack. It could be reasonably assumed that if the tar get 
has been thr eatened or attacked before they may have an increased awareness of the 
possibility of a (further) attack. Where a bodyguard is employed it can reasonably be 
assumed that the victim has an awar eness of their own risk of assassination (or 
violence more generally).
Underlying these concepts of accessibility and preparedness ar e those theories which 
were discussed in chapter 8. Routine activities theory (RAT) suggest that direct- 
contact crimes occur when targets and offenders come together in the same 
geographical and temporal location. For a crime to take place, RAT requhes that 
there is a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian. 
In the context of political assassinations, and this study, the absence of a suitable 
guardian is likely to be reflected in the absence of a bodyguard. Thus it would be 
expected that more incidents occur where there is no bodyguard than where there is a 
bodyguard. Away from guardians in the form of bodyguards, research has also 
suggested where there are large numbers of people, an area can seem more 
anonymous, and so people may reduce or completely neglect their guar dianship 
activities wliich they might perform in quieter areas (Roncek, 1981). Thus incidents 
in public areas (where it is likely there are more people than in private areas) may 
mean a reduction in guar dianship and therefore a gr eater chance of crime 
(assassination) than in less crowded areas. This is supported by the concept of 
bystander effects, which suggest that in situations where a person is in difficulty, 
others present who may be able to help are less likely to respond, and slower to do 
so, when there are other people in the locality, than when they are the only person in 
the area (Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz and Darley, 2002). An interesting concept is 
that of ‘confusion of responsibility’, which suggests that when there are others 
ar omrd, people tend not to help the victim as they do not wish to be (mistakenly) 
identified as the cause of the victim’s problem (Cacioppo, Petty and Losch, 1986). 
Particular ly in the case of political assassinations, where a serious crime is 
committed, it may be that bystanders do not want to be mistaken for the assassin, and 
so will be reluctant to become involved in any way. However, it is also possible that 
an attack in a busy ar ea is likely to have a higher number of witnesses, and therefore
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an increased chance of the offender being apprehended, either on the scene or at a 
later date.
Cohen and Felson (1979) state that a suitable tar get is one where there is value, 
visibility, low inertia and accessibility. Thus it is reasonable to expect that targets 
who ar e more visible ar e more likely to be targeted (e.g. those who are at pre­
publicised events such as political rallies, or who are distinctive in other ways). The 
presence of low inertia in the make up of a suitable tar get suggests that targets who 
are in transit are less likely to be targeted than those who ar e stationary. Accessibility 
is an important feature of suitable targets, with the more accessible targets (e.g. 
outdoors rather than indoors, or in a public rather than a private location) likely to be 
targeted more often than less accessible targets.
A key part of RAT is the concept of ‘hotspots’, defined by Sherman, Gartin and 
Buerger (1989) as “small places in which the occurrence of crime is so frequent that 
it is highly predictable, at least over a one year* period” (p.36). As the political 
assassinations in this sample are spread worldwide, it is unlikely that there are any 
particular geographical hotspots. However, it may be the case that with this type of 
incident there are more ‘generic’ hotspots, with attacks frequently occurring in the 
same type of location, if not the same geographical location.
In addition, the literatur e on re-victimisation (i.e. being the victim of a crime more 
than once) suggests that the majority of crimes are targeted at a minority of victims 
(Fari'ell and Pease, 1993). The British Crime Survey (1982) found that 71% of crime 
was reported by 14% of the population. Importantly, there are similar patterns of 
revictimisation across crimes. Farrell and Pease (1993) suggest that the lifestyle or 
occupation of the victim may leave them vulnerable to revictimisatron. It is likely to 
be the case, of course, therefore that victims of assassination are at risk due to their 
jobs. In terms of the timing of repeat victimisation, the research suggests that even 
across crimes, “the risk of revictimisation is greatest in the period immediately after 
victimisation” (Farrell and Pease, 1993, p.8). The implication of this is that 
preventative measures therefore should be put in place quickly after the initial 
victimisation, and even temporary protective measures (which aie in place during the
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subsequent high-risk period) may be helpful in reducing the likelihood of 
revictimisation. In terms of domestic violence, Farrell, Clarke and Pease (1993) 
found that where a victim made a call to the police, there is a 0.8 probability of a 
further call within one year. Thus it is possible that the presence of previous attempts 
may actually increase the likelihood of subsequent attacks, if only because it 
highlights them as a prominent target.
11.2 ACCESSIBILITY OF THE TARGET
11.2.1 The Data
Four variables are selected to go forward into the analysis. In relation to the 
accessibility of the target, the variables ‘outside/inside’, ‘public/private’, 
Teisure/work’, and ‘transit/stationary’ were selected as appropriate to describe the 
location and thus the accessibility of the target. In Table 11.1 the fr equency of each 
variable category is displayed.
Table 11.1
Presence/absence of Access variables
Present % Absent %
Outside 277 69.25 123 30.75
Inside 123 30.75 277 69.25
Public 185 46.25 215 53.75
Private 215 53.75 185 46.25
Leisure 246 61.5 154 38.5
Work 154 38.5 246 61.5
Transit 215 53.75 185 46.25
Stationary 185 46.25 215 53.75
As Table 11.1 shows, all of the 400 cases were used in the analysis of the 
accessibility of the target. In the majority of cases (69.25%) the target was outside 
rather than inside (30.75%). Slightly more incidents occurred in private locations 
(53.75%) than public locations (46.25%), and there were more incidents while the
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target was at leisure (61.5%) than at work (38.5%). Finally, maiginally more 
incidents occurred with a moving target (53.75%) than with a stationary target 
(46.25%).
11.2.2 Content Analysis
As in previous chapters, each case in the sample was coded by each of the four* 
variables. The Outside/Inside variable specifies whether the victim was inside (1) a 
building (e.g. at home, in an office) or outside (2) (e.g. in a garden, or a street) at the 
time of the attack. In this case, the attacks outdoor are considered to be more 
accessible than indoor attacks, simply because in general it is likely to be easier to 
get to the target outside, and they ar e therefore more vulnerable. The Public/Private 
variable refers to the nature of the location -  whether it is public (1), and therefore 
open to all (e.g. a restaurant, park, road), or private (2), and so not open to all (e.g. a 
private home, workplace). Again, this is a simple distinction: it is easier to gain 
access to a public location than a private one, leaving targets more vulnerable in 
public locations. The Leisure/Work variable indicates the time of the attack. Working 
(2) is not restricted to office work, but can also include behaviour s such as travelling 
as part of a job, or makhig public appearances. Victims who were not working were 
deemed to be ‘at leisure’ (1). Here, the distinction is not so simple, but as targets are 
often targeted due to their position, they are likely to be more vulnerable when in that 
role, i.e. when at work. However, it is possible that they would not have the 
protection of a bodyguar d when they are ‘off duty’ (unless they are very prominent) 
and so may be more vulnerable in tliis situation. The Transit/Stationary variable 
shows whether or not the victim was in transit at the time of the attack. Any victim 
reported to be moving, for example travelling in a car*, walking, flying, was coded as 
in Transit (2). Any victim not reported as in transit was coded as Stationary (1). In 
this var iable, a tar get is considered to be more vulnerable when they ar e travelling 
than when they are still, as in these cases they are likely to be outdoors than indoors, 
and so easier to target. In addition, it may be harder to prepare for an attack while 
travelling, than while standing still, simply because as the target is moving the risk is 
constantly changing.
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As there is some overlap between variables, some clarification is necessary. Where a 
target was in transit in a car*, they were generally considered to be outdoors, and in a 
public place. Although inside the car, tliey are not inside a building or structure 
which would offer them any significant protection, or which would require any effort 
to gain access. In addition, although the car itself is a private area, it is tr avelling in a 
public space and so is accessible to the general public.
The leisure/work variable describes the time in which the target was killed. This is 
not limited by set time periods, but refers to the activity the target was undertaking at 
the time of the attack, i.e. were they in work, or doing leisure pursuits. Where the 
target was attacked on their way to work, the attack was coded as during work time. 
If they were on their way home fi*om work, the time was classified as leisure.
The result of the coding is a data matrix, a sample of which is shown in Figm*e 11.1. 
This data matrix is then used as the basis for the next stage of analysis. Tliis section 
has demonstr ated that there is variation in the location of the victims of assassination, 
and therefore their accessibility and vulnerability to attack. The next step is to 
investigate the inter-relationships of these different var iables, which demands a 
multidimensional approach.
Case Outside (2) / 
Inside (1)
Private (2) / 
Public (1)
Work (2) / 
Leisure (1)
Transit (2) / 
Stationary (1)
Cetin Emec 2 2 1 2
Rajiv Gandlii 2 1 2 2
Yann Fiat 2 1 1 2
Ernest Lluch 1 2 1 1
Rafiq Hariri 2 1 2 2
Figure IL L  Example of the Data Matrix coding
11.2.3 Interactions between variables
A statistically significant association was found between whether the victim was in 
transit when they were killed, and whether they were in a private place, 'f- (i) =
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109.239, p <.001. This seems to represent that based on the odds ratio, when the 
victim was in transit they were .012 times more likely to also be in a private location. 
It is likely that this is an artefact of the coding, as in order to be in transit the target 
would typically be in a public location, rather than a private one.
Further statistically significant associations were found between whether the victim 
was inside or outside, and whether they were in transit (i) = 165.023, p <.001), 
and whether they were inside or outside, and whether they were in a private place (%^
(1) = 185.791, p <.001). The odds ratio suggests that when individuals were outside, 
they were 49.954 times more likely to be in transit than if they were inside, and that 
they were .014 times more likely to be in private than if they were inside. Again, this 
is likely to be an artefact of coding: individuals who were in transit in vehicles were 
coded as outside. In addition, private outdoor locations are likely to be rar er 
locations, as there are simply fewer private outdoor locations than private indoor 
locations.
Table 11.2
Chi-Squares o f Accessibility variables
Transit/
Stationary
Inside/
Outside
Work/
Leisure
Public/
Private
Transit/Stationary
Df
P
Inside/Outside 165.023 - - -
Df 1
P 0.000
Work/Leisure x^ 6.348 2.002 - -
Df 1 1
P 0.012 0.157
Public/Private fj- 109.239 185.791 17.788 -
Df 1 1 1
P 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bold text indicates significance at the .05 level.
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The relationship between time of death (i.e. during work or leisur e hours) and target 
behaviour* (i.e. if they were in transit or stationary) was also examined, finding a 
statistically significant association between the two variables, (i) = 6.348, p = .012. 
The odds ratio suggests that victims who were killed during leisure time were .591 
times more likely to be in transit when attacked. In addition, there was a statistically 
significant association between the time of death and whether the attack was in 
private, or not, (i) = 17.788, p <.001, with an odds ratio of 3.468 suggesting that 
attacks during leisure hour s are more likely to be in a private place than not.
11.2.4 The Results o f the Accessibility MSA
In this section the results of multidimensional analysis will be presented. The 
purpose of this is to examine the relationships between the different aspects of victim 
accessibility. As in chapter 3, tire data were analysed using Multidimensional 
Scalogram Analysis (MSA), one of a variety of analyses which are related to facet 
theory (Wilson, 2000). MSA analyses cases on the basis of their* ‘profile’, in this case 
the sequence of Is and 2s which describe the aspects of an attack via the coding on 
the four variables. In this analysis, the points in the plot represent one or more 
assassinations, and the plot is partitioned according to the categories of each variable. 
The coefficient of contiguity for this analysis is 0.95.
Figure 11.2 shows two of the item plots generated by the MSA for the var iables 
Outside/Inside, and Public/Private. Figure 11.2a shows that of the 15 profiles 
generated by tliis analysis, there were eight types of incident in wliich the victim was 
outside at the time of the attack (n = 277), indicated by the vertical shaded partition 
on the left. Similarly, as shown in Figure 11.2b, there are also eight profiles where 
the victim was in a public location at the time of the attack (n =185), although these 
partition the plot horizontally and fall towards the bottom.
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Figure 11.2. Item plots of the Accessibility MSA
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Figure 11.2a. Shaded area indicates 
profiles where the target was Outside
Figure 11.2b. Shaded area indicates 
profiles where the target was in a Public 
location
Figure 11.3 shows these two variables together, on one plot. This results in four 
regions. In the bottom left there are four points where incidents took place both 
outside, and in a public location, for example at a rally. In the bottom right region are 
a further four points representing incidents which occurred inside in a public 
location, for example at a restaurant. Towards the top left are four points which 
represent incidents which took place in an outside, private location, such as the 
garden of a private residence, while in the top right are three types of incident which 
occurred in an inside, private location, such as the victim’s home.
In addition to these two variables, the third variable showing whether the target was 
at work or leisure when attacked, can be overlaid. Figure 11.4 shows that this 
variable divides the plot again horizontally with the shaded regions indicating cases 
where the target was attacked during leisure time. This addition turns the plot from 
the four regions in Figure 11.3, to a total of 8 regions. Thus the four regions 
specifying where the attack took place are further subdivided according to whether 
the target was attacked during work or leisure time, with each region containing 
cases, meaning that it is possible for any combination of the three variables to occur.
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Outside + Private Inside + Private
Outside + Public
e
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Inside + Public
Figure 11.3. Combination of Outside/Inside variable, and Public/Private variable
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Figure 11.4. Shaded area indicates that the victim was attacked during leisure time
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Again, this plot can be further subdivided according to the fourth and final variable, 
showing whether the target was stationary or in transit at the time of the attack. As 
shown in Figure 11.5, there are four bands which indicate those incidents where the 
victim was in transit, with the remaining four bands containing cases where the target 
was stationary. As with the transformation in Figure 11.4, in Figure 11.5 each of the 
eight existing regions are further divided, creating a total of 16 regions, 15 of which 
contain cases. The one region where there are no cases is that where the target is 
inside, in a private location, attacked during work hours, and while in transit.
Outside + Private ^ Inside + Private ^
® Outside + Private Inside + Privatee# '
Outside + Private Inside + Private #
Outside + Private Inside + Private
mOutside + Public Inside + Public ^
eOutside + Public eInside + Public
Outside + Public ® Inside + Public ^
# Outside + Public 0  Inside + Public
Leisure + Stationary
Leisure + Transit
Work + Stationary
Work + T ransit 
Leisure + Stationary
Leisure + Transit
Work + Stationary 
Work + Transit
Figure 11.5. MSA partitioned depending on whether attack was Outside/Inside, 
Public/Private, Work/Leisure, and Transit/Stationary
This analysis can be simplified, with the schematic combination of the four item 
plots shown in Figure 11.3. The solution presented in this analysis is a three- 
dimensional one, therefore for ease the results are presented as two separate, two 
dimensional analyses.
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Figure 11.6 shows that theoretically there ai e 16 categories in this model of 
Accessibility in political assassinations. As mentioned above, however, one category 
has no cases in, so in reality there are only 15 categories represented in this sample. 
The missing region contains cases where the target was in an indoor, private location, 
during work hours, and while in transit. It is possible that there are attacks that would 
fit into this missing category, for instance walking through private work offices, but 
they are not present in the current sample.
Figure 11.6a shows that the most common situation in which individuals were 
attacked was when the victim was in transit, at leisur e, outside and in a public 
location (ri = 70), in the top right of Figure 11.6a, which is perhaps to be expected.
An example here is that of Claude Erignac, a Corsican politician, who was shot as he 
got out of Ills car near an entertainment complex. The other attacks which occuri ed 
outdoors while the tar get was in tr ansit showed similar frequencies to one another, 
with 51 attacks occurring while the victim was in transit, outdoors, and in a private 
work location (bottom right), such as the killing of Ismail Abu Shanab, a senior 
Hamas leader, who was killed in his car by a missile attack. Where the target was 
tr avelling outdoors, but was in a private leisure location there were 45 incidents (also 
bottom right), for example Walid Eido, a Lebanese politician killed while driving to 
a social club. Where the target was travelling outdoors, in a public work situation, 
there were 42 incidents (top right), for example the case of Luis Donaldo Colosio, a 
Mexican politician and presidential candidate, who was shot dead as he was walking 
dirr ing an outdoor political rally, which he attended in a work capacity.
On the left of Figure 11.6a are the less common types of incidents where the target 
was indoors and in transit at the time of the attack, although perhaps this is obvious 
because of the less open nature of such locations. Aside fr om the category which has 
no cases (bottom left; work, inside, private, transit), the least common type was 
where the victim was at leisine, inside and in a public location (n = 1, top left). In 
this region is the case of Francesco Foitugno, an Italian politician who was shot dead 
while at a polling station. Similarly, there were just two incidents where the victim 
was travelling indoors, in a public work location (also top left). Andiew Blake, a 
British businessman in Turkey, was killed in this situation, as he stepped into a lift at
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Figure 1L6. Accessibility of Victim
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a public workplace. There were only foui* incidents where the victim was travelling, 
indoors and in a private, leisme situation (bottom left), for example Gerald Bull, a 
businessman involved in arms trading with Iraq, who was also stepping into a lift 
when he was killed, but in his apartment building, i.e. a private leisure situation.
Figure 11.6b shows the other ‘slice’ of the three dimensional plot, with all incidents 
where the target was not travelling, i.e. where they were stationary. Again, there are 
eight distinct combinations, and in this dimension all of the regions contain cases. As 
there are fewer cases in total, it is to be expected that there are also fewer incidents in 
each region. This is found to be true; even the region with most cases (n = 65) has 
fewer cases than the corresponding most common region in Fig. 11.6a (n = 70). The 
most commonly occurring type of incident falls in the bottom left, where the targets 
aie stationary is where the target is in a private, indoor, leisure location (n = 65). An 
example of this type of attack is the case of Cecil McKnight, a former Ulster Defence 
Association commander turned Ulster Democratic Party politician, who was killed in 
his own home.
The next most common regions have similar ftequencies: there are 35 cases where 
the target is in a public, outdoors, leisure situation (top right), including the case of 
Paolo Borsellino, an Italian magistrate who was killed outside his mother’s house 
while visiting. The other regions occm' less ûequently, with 17 cases occurring 
where the target is in a public, outdoors location while working (top right) (e.g. the 
case of Lalitli Athulathmudali, a Sri Lankan politician, who was killed at a public 
political rally, while standing still talking to attendees), and 33 cases where the target 
is in a private, indoors location while working (bottom left) (e.g. Dmitry Kholodov, a 
journalist who was killed by a bomb in a briefcase, which he believed contained 
documents ftom a work source).
A further 14 cases are in a private, outdoors, leisure situation (bottom right), 
including the case of Ian Lyons, an alleged dmgs dealer killed by the IRA. He was 
sitting in a car with his giiifiiend when he was shot and killed. In 12 cases the target 
was in a public, indoors, leisure situation (top left), with the example of former hish 
National Liberation Army member Dessie McCleery, who was killed m a restamant.
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Finally, in six instances the taiget was in an indoors, public work location (also top 
left) (e.g. influential Jewish Rabbi, Meir Kahane, who was shot in a hotel while at a 
work event), and in thr ee cases the target was in an outdoors, private, work location 
(bottom right) (e.g. John McColgan, a driver who was killed hr his taxi cab, while 
working).
In addition to examining the different types of accessibility, the location of attacks by 
specific perpetrators can also be examined. Of the terrorist-perpetrated attacks in this 
sample, the two most prolific groups are ETA (n = 17) and the IRA (n = 14). Figme 
11.7 shows the regions in which these groups’ attacks fall, with ETA-perpetrated 
attacks indicated by blue shading, and the IRA attacks indicated by yellow shading. 
Wliere both groups act in a region, tire shading appears green. Figure 11.7 shows that 
there is much similarity in this sample between the regions used by these two groups 
to target victims of political assassination. If the time in which they attack 
(work/leisure) is disregar ded, then all ETA and IRA incidents occur in the same 
places. Both groups most commonly commit assassinations when the target is in 
transit, outside, and in a public location, with the main difference being in the time in 
which attacks occurx ETA tend to commit assassinations during the target’s leisure 
time, while the IRA attack dining the target’s work time. Interestingly, neither group 
commits attacks when the tar get is in transit and in an indoors or private location.
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Figure 11.7. Location of ETA and IRA assassinations
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11.3 ‘STEREOTYPICAL’ ASSASSINATIONS
The types of assassination which have been identified here show that victims of 
assassination are targeted in a range of locations and times. However, these are not 
necessarily the ‘stereotypical’ situations that people may think of when they think of 
political assassination. It could be hypothesised that the commonly held stereotype of 
an assassination would be the shooting of a political figuie at a public event.
A common finding in research in forensic psychology is that people over-estimate 
the occuiTence of certain fonns of a crime, for example, violent stranger rape 
(Wilson and Scholes, 2009), and it has been suggested that heuristics are responsible 
for the fact that these beliefs are still held, despite evidence to the contrary.
Heuristics are cognitive ‘rules of thumb’, developed through experience, and used in 
uncertain conditions, where there is minimal or missing information, or where the 
individual is under time constraints, in order to speed up decision making and 
understanding of a situation (Eyr e and Alison, 2010). However, systematic biases 
can arise from the use of these heuristics, which can lead to errors. ‘Belief 
persistence’ refers to the situation where individuals continue to hold incorrect 
beliefs, despite evidence to the contrary, because the heuristics are so str ongly held. 
‘Confirmation bias’ is similarly related to heuristics, and describes situations where 
any information which is not supportive of the hypothesis is discarded, rather than 
the hypothesis revised.
Various authors have discussed the way in which individuals construct ‘typical 
scenarios’ to imderstand complex situations, argiring that these tend to be based on 
media portrayals (Sime, 1990, Donald and Canter, 1992, Wilson and Smith, 1999). 
Thus, people’s understanding of political assassinations is likely to vary considerably 
from what actually happens, and their expectations of the situations where targets ar e 
most at risk may be subject to biased perceptions of fiequency.
Incidents of political assassination which ar e salient to most people are those such as 
the assassinations of public figures such as Benazir Bhutto, John F Ketmedy, Lord 
Mountbatten, and Martin Luther King. This, along with the heuristic beliefs
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discussed above, may lead to an expectancy that assassination takes certain forms, 
for example, that assassinations occur in public work situations (e.g. Benazir Bhutto), 
such as rallies, or walkabouts, and private leisure situations (e.g. Lord Mountbatten), 
such as while holidaying.
The ‘types’ of accessibility which have been identified here can be summarised as 
four' main types, as shown in Figirre 11.8. These encapsulate the broad styles of 
assassination incidents. As Figirre 11.8 shows, the public work situation such as the 
rally or walkabout accounts for only 16.75% of the deaths in this sample, while 
private work situations accormt for 21.75%, private leisure accounts for 32%, and 
public leisure 29.5%.
Private + Leisure Private + Workn = 128 n = 87
Public + Leisure Public + Workn = 118 n = 67
Figure 11.8. Situational categories of political assassination incidents
It was found that although there is no statistically significant association between the 
‘archetype’ of assassination and whether the target was a political figure or not {y^  (3 ) 
= 10.409, p = 0.015), there was a statistically significant association between the 
‘archetype’ of assassination, and whether the more target was, more specifically, a 
politician or not (%^ (s) = 16.895, p = 0.001).
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11.4 THE VICTIM’S PREPAREDNESS
11.4.1 The Data
The second aspect of the situational vulnerability of the target is that of the target’s 
prepar edness for an attack. In this analysis, the level of Victim Prepar edness is 
defined by tlrree variables, which describe whether or not the victim had been 
tlrr eatened prior to the attack (either by their eventual attacker, or by another person), 
whether they had smvived a previous attempt on their life (again, by their killer or by 
another person), and whether they were protected by a bodyguard, or not, at the time 
of the attack.
Table 11.3
Presence/absence o f Victim Preparedness variables
Present % Absent % Total
Threats 55 13.75 345 86.25 400 (100/%)
No threats 345 86.25 55 13.75 400 (100/%)
Attempts 41 10.25 359 89.75 400 (100/%)
No attempts 359 89.75 41 10.25 400 (100/%)
Protected 74 18.5 326 81.5 400 (100/%)
Not protected 326 81.5 74 18.5 400 (100/%)
Table 11.3 shows the presence and absence of these variables. Where the presence of 
a behaviour was not stated in the data soirr ces, it was tr eated as absent, and therefore 
these findings should be treated with some caution: it is possible that these 
behaviours were present with more fiequency than shown here, but were not reported 
and so not included in this analysis. Table 6 shows that all 400 cases were used in 
this analysis. In more cases, the victim of political assassination had received no 
threats prior to their death (86.25%), with just 13.75% of this victims in this sample 
receiving tlireats. A similar* figure had experienced no previous attempts on their life 
(89.75%), with a similar ly low number of victims surviving a previous assassination 
attempt (10.25%). Finally, in just 18.5% of cases the tar get was protected at the time 
of the attack, with the target being miprotected in 81.5% of cases in this sample.
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11.4.2 Content Analysis
As in the previous section, each case in the sample was coded according to the 
presence or absence of the three variables describing the victim’s preparedness for 
attack. These variables are considered to both raise the victim’s awareness of the 
likelihood of an attack, and also demonstrate a physical preparation for an attack.
The Previous Threats variable is coded as present (2) if the victim has received 
threats in the past, directed at themselves or their family. A threat is anything in 
which the victim is told that they (or their family/friends) will be harmed. These may 
be written or verbal, and need not come from the assassin. The Previous Attempts 
variable is coded as present (2) if the target has experienced previous unsuccessful 
assassination attempts. These must have been directed at the victim. Finally, the 
Protected variable is coded as present (2) if the victim was protected by a bodyguard 
at the time of the attack. The result of the coding is a data matrix, a sample of wliich 
is shown in Figure 11.9.
Case Threats (2)/ Attempts (2)/ Protected (2)/
No Threats (1) No Attempts (1) Not Protected (1)
Cetin Emec 1 1 1
Rajiv Gandlii 1 2 1
Yann Piat 2 1 1
Ernest Lluch 1 1 1
Rafiq Hariri 1 1 2
Figure 11.9. Example Data Matrix
As before, the data matrix is used as the basis for the next stage of analysis. The 
present section has shown that there is variation in the level of preparedness 
demonstr ated by victims of assassination, and the next stage is to investigate the 
relationships between these variables, which requires a multidimensional approach.
11.4.3 Interactions between variables
Table 11.4 shows the relationships between these variables. A number of chi-squares 
were conducted on a set of variables which were likely to contribute to the victim’s
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preparedness or expectation of an attack. A statistically significant association was 
found between the existence of previous threats against the tai get and whether there 
had been previous (unsuccessful) attempts on the taiget’s life, (i) === 29.585, p
<.001. This seems to represent that based on the odds ratio, the target was 5.984 
times more likely to have experienced previous attempts if there were previous 
threats, than if there were not.
Table 11.4
Chi-Squares o f Victim Preparedness variables
Protected/ 
Not Protected
Attempts/ 
No Attempts
Threats/ 
No Threats
Protected/Not Protected x^
Df
P
Previous Attempts/No Attempts
t
Df
P
7.417
1
0.006
Threats/No Threats x^ 0.04 29.585 -
Df 1 1
P 0.948 0.000
Bold text Indicates significance at the .05 level.
A further chi-square was conducted on the data, again finding a statistically 
significant association between the target surviving previous attempts on their life, 
and whether they were under protection at the time of the cuirent incident, X^ (i) ^ 
7.417, p = .006, An odds ratio of 2.584 was calculated, suggesting that the victim 
was more likely to have sur vived previous attempts if they were under protection at 
the time of the current attack, than if they were not under protection.
The chi-square conducted on the variables ‘threat’ and ‘protected’ foimd that there 
was no statistically significant association between the target receiving threats prior 
to the attack, and whether they were under protection at the time of the current 
incident, x^  (i) = .004, p = .948.
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11.4.4 The Results o f the Preparedness MSA
As with the data on the accessibility of the target, the variables here were used to run 
an MSA, to identify commonalities between variables, and examine the underlying 
structure of victim preparedness. Figures 11.10-11.12 show the item plots for the 
Victim’s Preparedness analysis. As with the Accessibility analysis, the shaded areas 
show the presence of the variable. This analysis has a coefficient of contiguity 
0.99997.
Previous Threats No Previous Threats
Figure 11.10. Shaded area indicates profiles where the target received Threats
Figure 11.10 shows the division between cases where the target received threats prior 
to the attack in the shaded region, and those cases where there were no threats 
reported in the unshaded region. The second variable, indicating whether or not the 
target was protected at the time of the attack, can be overlaid onto this, as in Figure 
11. 11.
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Threats Threats No No+ + Threats ThreatsNo Protection + +Protection NoProtection Protection
#
# e
e ee
Figure 11.11. Partition added to show presence of protection at the time of the attack.
As can be seen from Figure 11.11, the addition of the ‘protection’ variable divides 
the plot into four regions, rather than the previous two. In both of the original two 
regions, i.e. previous threats and no previous threats, there may or may not be the 
presence of a bodyguard, with cases in each of the four new regions.
Finally, Figure 11.12 shows the MSA plot with the third variable. This further 
divides the plot horizontally, creating eight regions. Those in the bottom section of 
the plot experienced no attempts on their life prior to their death, while the incidents 
in the top section survived a previous attempt prior to their death. These occur in just 
two of the four regions of the plot, at either side. On the left of the plot are incidents 
where the victim received threats, and survived previous attempts, but had no 
protection. On the right of the plot are incidents where the target had not received 
any threats, but had survived a previous attempt, and was protected. These three 
variables are shown together in Figure 11.13, presented as a schematic plot.
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Threats Threats No No+ + Threats ThreatsNo Protection + +Protection No ProtectionProtection
e —# # #
Previous attempts
No Previous attempts
Figure 11.12. Bottom partition shows incidents where the target survived previous 
attempts
Figure 11.13 shows that there are eight possible categories of victim preparedness, 
with all categories containing cases. Over half of the victims in this sample were 
unprepared for the attack, at least according to the variables used in this analysis, 
with no reported experience of previous attempts, no threats, and no bodyguard, 
shown in the bottom right comer of the plot (n = 267). An example of this type of 
where the target had a bodyguard, but no previous attempts or threats (n = 54), for 
example Luis Donaldo Colosio. Towards the bottom left, the plot shows that in 32 
cases the victim had been threatened, but had experienced no attempts on their life 
and had no bodyguard, as in the case of French politician, Yann Piat. At the top right 
are those victims who have survived attempts but were not threatened and had no 
bodyguard in 14 cases. An example of such a case is the Indian politician, Rajiv 
Gandhi, while the killing of Chris Hani, head of the South African Communist Party, 
is an example of similar attacks in which victims received threats, but no attempts 
and employed no bodyguard, shown in the top left with 13 cases. In 10 cases (top
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Bodyguard Bodyguard
n = 4 n = 10
n = 13 n = 14
No Bodyguard No Bodyguard
Bodyguard Bodyguard
n = 54n = 6
n = 267n = 32
No Bodyguard No Bodyguard
V Attempt
V No Attempt
J
Figure 11.13. Schematic plot of the Victim’s Preparedness
right) victims had sui*vived previous attempts, and had a bodyguard but had received 
no thieats, e.g. Giovanni Falcone, the head of the Italian Justice Ministry’s penal 
division. Categories with the least cases were those in wliich tlireats had been made, 
and a bodyguaid was employed although there were no incident is the killing of 
Francesco Fortugno, the Italian politician killed at a polling station. Also in the 
bottom right comer is the second most frequent type of attack, previous attempts (n = 
6, bottom left, e.g. Paolo Borsellino), and where threats and attempts had been made, 
and a bodyguard was employed (n = 4, top left, e.g. Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistani 
politician).
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11.5 SCALING SITUATIONAL VULNERABILITY
Having established that the situational vulnerability of political assassinations can be 
modelled, in terms of the accessibility of the victims of assassination, and their 
prepar edness for an attack, this model will now be explored in more detail. First, the 
accessibility will be examined by assigning quantitative values to the different types 
of accessibility present in political assassinations. Sixteen types were identified, 
using four' variables. The variable work or leisme gives an indication of the time of 
the attack, and the other three variables describe the location of the attacks according 
to whether they were inside or outside, in transit or stationary, and in a public or 
private location. It is the location of the attack that is taken forward in creating a 
scale of the accessibility of assassination. Each of the ‘types’ of accessibility 
identified in chapter 11 can be assigned a score which reflects the accessibility of the 
attack type. Incidents which are outdoors are considered to be in a more accessible 
location than those which are indoors, therefore outdoor attacks are scored as ‘2’ 
while indoor attacks are scored as ‘ 1’. Being in a public location is considered more 
accessible and as such is scored ‘2’, while attacks in private locations are scored as 
‘1’. Attacks where the target is stationary are considered more accessible and are 
scored ‘2’ while attacks where the target is in transit are scored ‘1’. The variable 
relating to whether the target was attacked during work or leisme time is not 
included in this scale, as it does not contribute to the overall accessibility score. 
There is no way to establish whetlier being attacked dming work or leisme time 
offers greater or lesser accessibility. The possible combinations of these var iables is 
shown in the Hasse diagram in Figme 11.14.
This shows the different levels of accessibility, ranging fi'om the least accessible at 
the bottom, represented by ‘ 111 ’, to the most accessible at the top, represented by 
‘222’. The total scores are also listed, created by adding the individual scores, and 
resulting in 3 and 6 respectively. Between these minimum and maxhnum scores are 
the remaining levels of accessibility. There are tlrree types of incident which are 
scored as fom* on the scale, and these aie each qualitatively different. Although they 
score the same, the way in wlrich they achieve tliat score differs. For example, the 
cases scored as ‘ 112’ were indoors (1), in a private location (1), and while stationary
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122 212
121112
222
221
= 3 (no variables)
= 4 (one variable)
= 5 (two variables)
= 6 (three variables)
Figure 11.14. Accessibility Scores
(2), whereas the ‘21T cases were outdoors (2), in a private location (1), and 
stationary (1). On the next level up, there aie another three types of assassination 
which score ‘5’ on accessibility. Again these aie quantitatively the same, but differ 
qualitatively. The cases scored as ‘122’ are indoors (1), in a public location (2), while 
stationary (2), while those scored as ‘221’ were outdoors (2), in public (2), and in 
tiansit (1). It would be reasonable to expect that the cases with the lowest 
accessibility scores would occur least frequently, while those with the highest 
accessibility scores occui' most frequently. Figuie 11.15 shows the frequencies with 
which these scores appear in the sample, showing that there are few cases with a 
score of ‘3’ (low accessibility), verifying this. However, the highest number of 
attacks do not occur in the most accessible location, but instead in one of the least 
accessible, where the score is ‘4’.
Figure 11.16 shows the average accessibility score per incident over the years. By 
looking at this it is possible to identify whether there is any change in the 
accessibility of the targets over time. It may be tliat tai'gets of assassination learn 
from others’, and avoid areas where they aie especially at risk of assassination. 
However, there does not appear to be any obvious changes in Accessibility over 
time, and there is no statistically significant change in the victim’s level of 
accessibility over time (rho = -.074, p = .141).
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Figure 11.16. Accessibility Scores Over Time
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The second aspect of situational vulnerability is the preparedness of the victhn for an 
attack. As with accessibility, the victim’s preparedness for attack was modelled in 
chapter 11, according to the existence of previous threats made to the tai get, previous 
attempts smvived by them, and whether or not they had a bodyguaid with them at the 
time of the attack. These combine to create eight different ‘types’ of preparedness, 
which can be assigned a score in a similar way to those categories present in the 
victim’s accessibility. Perhaps obviously, cases where there was a bodyguard were 
scored as ‘2’, while where there was no bodyguard a score of ‘ 1’ was given. If 
thi'eats had been received prior to the attack ‘2’ was given, while a ‘ 1’ was given 
with no tlireats, and in the same way if the victhn had survived a previous attempt the 
case was assigned ‘2’ and where there were no attempts they were assigned ‘1 ’. The 
Hasse diagram in Figure 11.17 shows how the variables describing Victim 
Prepaiedness can be combined to create total Preparedness scores.
211
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= 6 (three variables)
Figure 11.17. Victim Preparedness Scores
The more variables that are present for the victim, the higher on the scale they rate.
At the top of Figure 11.17 are cases where the victim had experienced Thieats (2), 
and Attempts (2), and had a Bodyguard (2), thus being considered the most prepared 
victim. These cases score six, and it is suggested that these individuals would be both 
aware of potential attacks, and they have made physical preparations for an attack. 
Lowest on the scale will be the victim who has not experienced Threats (1) or
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Attempts (1), and does not have a Bodyguard (1), resulting in a score of three. 
Moving up Figure 11.15, there are three types of cases which score four, which are 
qualitatively different to one another. As with the accessibility scale, cases assigned a 
score of four may be protected by a bodyguard (2), but have received no previous 
threats (1) or survived any attempts (1), or they may have no bodyguard (1), nor 
threats (1) but may have survived previous attempts (2). Again, incidents scoring five 
are qualitatively different to one another, depending on the combination of variables.
Figure 11.18 shows the frequency of these attacks. It would be expected that the 
majority of incidents involved an unprepared target, as they would be most 
vulnerable to attack, and this is verified by the data. As the preparedness of the 
victim rises (according to these three variables), the number of cases falls, with 
fewest victims scoring ‘6’ on the preparedness scale.
4  5
Victim Preparedness Score
Figure 11.18. Frequency o f  Victim Preparedness Scores
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Looking at the victim’s prepaiedness over time (Figure 11.19), there appeal’s to be an 
upwai’d ti’end, with a notable dip in 1999, and a peak in 2004. However, there was no 
statistically significant conelation between the year of attack, and the scores on the 
prepaiedness scale.
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Figure 11.19. Victim Prepaiedness Scores Over Time
Having established the scoring, these scores can be used to examine the relationship 
between these two aspects of situational vulnerability, by correlating the scores 
assigned to each case. A Spearman’s rho was calculated, which showed that there 
was no statistically significant correlation between the two scales (rho = -.058, p = 
.245). The fact that there is no statistically significant conelation suggests that there 
is no relationsliip between tlie two scales, and that the victim’s accessibility at the 
time of the attack is not linked to their preparedness for attack. Despite the fact that 
there is no statistically significant relationship between these two aspects, it is 
possible to look at the relationship in another way. The accessibility MSA plot
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presented in chapter 11 can be overlaid with the types of victim preparedness to 
understand the relationship better, as shown in Figure 11,20.
Figure 11.20 shows the accessibility MSA, with the Victim Prepaiedness scores 
overlaid, stai'ting from the highest scores (most prepared) at the top in purple, down 
to the lowest scores (least prepared) at the bottom in orange. Figure 11.19 shows that 
the least prepared victims aie targeted in all possible locations. Cases which score ‘4’ 
on the Victim Preparedness score (i.e. they had experienced one of the variables) 
occur in all regions bar the least accessible. Thus ill-prepared victhns can be taigeted 
in aieas which aie accessible, i.e. they aie not taigeted in the least accessible regions. 
Scores of ‘5’ on the Preparedness scale (i.e. the more prepared victims) also happen 
across the scale, and cases with a score of ‘6’ (i.e. the most prepaied victims) do not 
occur at either extr eme of accessibility. Prepaied victims are not attacked in the least 
accessible aieas, nor in the most accessible. It is possible that these individuals do 
not go to the most accessible aieas, because of theh previous experience, or that the 
bodyguai'ds they employ are particulai'ly effective.
These scales will be considered again in later chapter 12 and 13 in relation to other 
variables.
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11.6 SUMMARY
Features of political assassination incidents and the behaviour s of assassination 
victims have been analysed empirically, showing that there are at least two aspects of 
assassinations which have underlymg behavioural str uctur es; the accessibility of the 
victim at the tune of the attack, and the victim’s level of preparedness for the attack. 
The physical location of the victim at the time of the attack has two dimensions, 
reflecting two aspects of the accessibility of the assassination victim. The 
Outside/Inside dimension refers to the physical properties of the location, while the 
Public/Private dimension refers to the ownership of the location, in terms of whether 
it is open to everyone (public) or is open only to specific individuals (private). The 
Accessibility model also considers the behaviour' of the victim at the time of the 
attack: whether they were in transit or stationary, and whether they were at work, or 
at leisure. The interaction between each of these aspects creates a model of 
accessibility for the assassin. As discussed, these aspects combine to provide 16 
different categories of accessibility, each of which is used with differing frequency. 
By examining how common the different categories are, it is possible to suggest that 
the safest situation for targets of political assassinations appears to be where the 
victim is in transit, while at work, in an inside, private location, as there are no 
incidents in this sample where an individual is (successfully) targeted while in this 
situation. Conversely, the most risky situation for tar gets of political assassins, in 
terms of fr equency of assassinations, appears to be where the target is in transit, 
while at leisure in an outside, public location. By identifying the relative fr equencies 
it may be possible to identify where targets are most at risk, and use this infor-mation 
to assist potential targets.
If those types of attacks were to be examined along the accessibility scale proposed 
previously, the most commonly occurring level of accessibility would score 4 out of 
6, wlrile the category with fewest cases would score 3, the lowest possible on the 
accessibility scale. Thus the victims of political assassination are rarely targeted m 
the hardest-to-access situations, which could be considered to require more 
organisation. However, although it may be expected that assassins would act in the 
most accessible locations, they do not; in fact, this is tire second least common 
location in which attacks occur*.
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The second component of this Situational Vulnerability is the Victim’s Preparedness. 
There are two aspects to this; an awar eness of the possibility of an attack due to 
previous threats and/or attempts, and as a physical preparation in the form of a 
bodyguard. Of the categories possible, the most common was where the victim was 
completely unprepar ed for the attack, having experienced no threats, no previous 
attempts, and had not employed a bodyguard. It is possible, that the individuals who 
are targeted by assassins in this sample are not expecting an attack at all, and so have 
no reason to take any steps in prepar ation (i.e. they employ no bodyguard). However, 
it might also be the case that they are unable to employ a bodyguard, or they are 
targeted when the bodyguard is off duty. The second most common level of victim 
preparation is that where the target has experienced one of the tlrree variables; they 
have been threatened, survived a previous attempt, or employed a bodyguar-d. These 
tlrree Types’ of preparedness account for exactly a quarter of the sample. Even fewer 
targets had experienced two of the variables, and just one percent had experienced all 
three prior to their death. Such frrrdings support previous studies, for example 
research looking at attacks on European politicians found that all individuals who 
died had no bodyguards, suggesting that the absence increases risk of death (James, 
Mullen, Meloy, Pathé, Farnham, Prestorr & Darnley, 2007), although it does not 
prevent attack as two of the most serious woimdings in James et al. occuned when 
the victim was protected by a bodyguar'd. Additionally, Fein and Vossekuil (1998) 
reported that assassins rarely threaten their victims prior to attacking them.
Similar to the accessibility component, attacks where the target is most prepared are 
the rarest (n = 4), agahi suggesting that where the most organisation is required (on 
behalf of the perpetrator) the targets are least likely to be attacked. At the other end 
of the scale, where targets are least prepared, attacks are most frequent (n = 267) 
suggesting (perhaps obviously) that assassins prefer to attack where less organisation 
is requhed.
Considering these findings in relation to the literature, the current research provides 
mixed support for previous work. The finding that there are ‘high-fi*equency’ types 
of accessibility relates to the concept of ‘hotspots’ as discussed in Section 11.1
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(Sherman, Gartin and Buerger, 1989). It has been suggested that crime may occur in 
hotspots, i.e. small areas where crimes occm* with such frequency that they become 
predictable. Although this chapter does not look at geogiaphical locations, it may be 
possible that there is a ‘generic hotspot’ in the type of location in which victims of 
political assassination ar e targeted. In this sample, one such hotspot would be 
outdoor, public locations, while targets are at leisure and in tr ansit, with a high 
number of attacks occinring in this location. Thus it may be prudent for potential 
targets of assassination to be aware of the high likelihood of an attack when they ar e 
in this situation, and take appropriate steps as necessary. As well as looking at 
accessibility as an aspect of hotspots, it is also possible to consider how accessibility 
contributes to the idea of a ‘suitable target’. Cohen and Felson (1979) consider what 
makes a ‘suitable target’ for crime, finding that value, visibility, low inertia, and 
accessibility are key aspects. It is assumed that tar gets of political assassination are 
of value to the offender, as this is part of why they are targeted. Although the 
visibility of tai'gets is not directly considered in this research, the iner*tia and 
accessibility are. Cohen and Felson (1979) ar gue that individuals hr transit ar e less 
likely to be targeted than individuals who are stationary, but this is not boi'ne out by 
this sample, with more attacks tar geting individuals who are in transit than 
stationary. However, in this sample individuals who are walking are coded as 
‘transit’, and so the discrepancy may arise because of this. They also suggest that the 
more accessible the taiget (outside rather than inside, public rather than private) are 
more likely to be targeted more often. Attacks in this sample aie more often outside 
than inside, supporting Cohen and Felson. However, they are also more often in 
private than in public, not offering support for Cohen and Felson. Thus, there is 
mixed support for Cohen and Felson’s (1979) concept of the suitable victim.
Looking at the literatur e in relation to Victim Preparedness, Routine Activities 
Theory suggests that where there is an absence of a capable guardian (i.e. there is no 
bodyguard) more incidents should be expected, than where there is a capable 
guardian (i.e. there is a bodyguard). In this sample, less than one quar ter of the cases 
involved the presence of a bodyguar d, supporting the suggestion of RAT that attacks 
are more likely to take place where there is no guardian. However, it is important to 
note that tins sample is solely comprised of completed attacks, where the target was
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killed. It is possible that there are other attacks, where the target did not die due to 
the presence of a bodyguard. Thus this should be considered in future research. The 
literature also suggests that there may be links between Victim Preparedness and 
Accessibility. Although this chapter has not foimd a statistically significant 
relationsliip between the two aspects, overlaying VP scores onto the Accessibility 
MSA did suggest that there may some relationship between the two aspects. In 
addition, literatur e suggests that the idea of guar dianship is also linked to the location 
of the attack or accessibility of the target. It is possible that in crowded areas with 
lots of people, an ar ea can seem more anonymous, thus reducing the guar dian ship 
opportunities that individuals may perform in quieter locations (Roncek, 1981).
Thus, incidents in public ar eas (where there are likely to be more people than in 
private ar eas) may mean a reduction in guar dianship and therefore a greater chance 
of assassination, than in less crowded ar eas. Wliile this does not seem to be 
supported in this sample, with just under half of the attacks occurring in public, it is 
important to remember that tliis sample consists solely of completed attacks where 
the target is killed, and it is possible that there are even more attacks occuning in 
public locations, but which are not successfiil and so are not present in this sample.
The cmi’ent study has looked at two key aspects of political assassinations, the 
accessibility of the victim, and the preparedness of the victim. By basing the analysis 
on concrete, observable behaviours it goes some way to identifying the behavioural 
patterns and structures rmderlying assassination incidents. With further development 
and analysis of other aspects of political assassinations such as the assassins’ 
resources and plamiing, this could be useful to organisations such as the security 
services.
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12. The Specificity of Targeting in Political Assassinations
12.1 INTRODUCTION
As discussed in Chapter 8, specificity has been shown to be an important concept in 
terrorist behaviour' in assassinations (Wilson et al., 2010). hr an analysis of ETA’s 
tai'geting, Wilson et al. (2010) examine how accurate their assassinations are, and 
whether or not they will injure or kill more people than just their target. Wilson et al. 
(2010) found that ETA’s assassination attacks ranged from those with low specificity 
(witli individuals other than the intended tar get being killed or injured) to those with 
high specificity (with no or few individuals other than the intended target being 
killed or injured). In fact, with ETA, very few incidents had low specificity, with 
most actually having just one victim: the immediate target. This chapter will examine 
the level of specificity present in political assassination incidents in this broader 
sample. As in Wilson et al. (2010), ‘specificity’ refers to the accuracy of a political 
assassination incident, in ter'ms of the number of individuals who ar e injur ed or killed 
in the attack, other than the intended target. Examining this in terms of other 
variables, relating to both the assassin and the victim, enables identification of 
situations in which those other than the intended target ar e likely to be at risk, and 
those where there is minimal risk.
In addition, examining the specificity contributes to the overall understanding of the 
phenomenon of political assassinations. As discussed in Chapter 2, political 
assassinations are often discounted from the wider field of terrorism research due to 
the fact that they are typically tai geted at an individual, rather than a more 
representative target (e.g. Schmid, Jongman and Stohl, 1988), thus incurring fewer 
casualties and being less likely to induce personal feai'. However, if political 
assassination incidents are found to be non-specific, and result in victims other than 
the intended tar get, there is support for the argument that political assassinations 
should in fact be considered as one form of tenorism.
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This chapter will examine the specificity of assassination attacks, in terms of the 
number of ‘collateral victims’ in relation to the identity of the perpetrators of 
assassinations, the location and timing of assassinations, and the geogr aphical region 
in which assassinations take place. Together these will provide an understanding of 
the way hr which specificity varies according to the type of attack.
12.2 METHOD
12.2.1 The Data
As previously described (see Chapter 9), data on 400 political assassination incidents 
were collected. These data were content analysed on a series of variables. For the 
pur poses of this study, just 380 cases were included m the analysis. A total of 20 
cases were excluded as the presence and number of other victims was luiclear*, or 
unreporfed. In this sample of 380 cases, a total of 135 incidents (36%) resulted in 
victims other than the target, while in 245 cases (64%) there were no other victims. 
The term ‘collateral victims’ describes individuals other than the intended target who 
are either injured or killed in the attack. These collateral victims were coded broadly 
as either ‘Bodyguard Victims’(i.e. the other victim(s) was the target’s bodyguard and 
therefore responsible for their safety) and ‘Civilian Victims’(i.e. they were not 
responsible for the tar get’s safety, they were bystanders, either with no links to the 
target, or as part of the tar get’s family or entourage). Although it may have been 
beneficial to differentiate between ‘pure bystanders’ and those who could be 
considered part of the intended target’s entoirrage, the data did not offer sufficient 
information with which to make this distinction. Therefore the decision was taken to 
use these two broad categories.
Of the 135 cases (36%) with collateral victims, five incidents resulted in only 
bodyguard victims, with no civilian victims. There were 105 incidents (28%) were 
there were civilian victims but no bodyguard victims. A furlher 25 (7%) had both 
bodyguard victims and civilian victims. Thus, as shown m Table 12.1, the majority 
of cases had no other victims, followed by just civilian victims, and a combination of
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bodyguard and civilian victims. The least common type of ‘collateral’ victim was 
just bodyguard victims.
Table 12.1
Number o f cases with ‘Collateral Victims ’
Victim Type N = %
No other victims 245 64
Bodyguard victims 5 1
Civilian victims 105 28
Bodyguard and Civilian victims 25 7
Looking in more detail, it is possible to see that the number of collateral victims in 
the attack ranged from zero (n = 245, where the only victim was the intended target) 
to 141 (n = 1) (see Figure 12.1).
2 5 0 -
200-
«  1 5 0 -
Z  1 0 0 -
5 0 -
1 0 0 1 1 3 1 4 1
Total number of collateral victims
Figure 12.1. Number o f  cases with ‘collateral victims’
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In addition, looking at the average number of collateral victims in incidents over time 
suggests that there is an increase over time, with the highest number of collateral 
victims occurring in 2008, and the lowest number in 2002 (see Figure 12.2). 
However, the peaks in the plot can be explained to some extent by a few cases with 
very high numbers of collateral victims. For example, in 2008 one incident resulted 
in 113 collateral victims. In 2005, one incident resulted in 141 collateral victims, and 
in 2003 there was one case where there were 100 collateral victims. In 2000 one 
assassination incident resulted in 70 collateral victims. Thus the increase in collateral 
victims over time is skewed by these cases, all of which ar e the result of bombing 
attacks (the 2005 and 2000 attacks were car* bombs, wliile the 2008 and 2003 attacks 
were suicide bombings).
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Figure 12.2. Average Number of Collateral Victims per mcident, over time
These foui* cases are considered outliers (i.e. with very high numbers of collateral 
victims) and therefore they will not be included in this analysis. The first is the
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assassination of Jose Francisco Querol, a Supreme Comt judge in Spain, killed by a 
car bomb, when he was outdoors, travelling to work by car. No responsibility claim 
was made, but it was believed that ETA were responsible. The incident resulted in 70 
collateral victims. The second case is that of Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim, a Shia 
religious leader killed in an outdoors place during his work hours, in Iraq by a 
suicide bomb. This incident resulted in 100 collateral victims, and although no 
responsibility claim was made, Sunni extremists were suspected. The third case is the 
assassination of Jeyaraj Fernandopulle, where 113 collateral victims were killed or 
injured. He was the Sri Lankan roads minister, killed by a suicide bomb, while at an 
outdoor work event. Again, the attack was not claimed, although the Tamil Tigers 
were suspected. The final case excluded as an outlier resulted in 141 collateral 
victims. This was the assassination of Rafiq Haifii, the Lebanese politician and 
former Prime Minister. He was killed by a car bomb, again while travelling outdoors 
during his work time. Unlike the other outliers, a group calling themselves Jihad and 
Victory in Greater Syria claimed this attack.
The fact that these very non-specific incidents are the result of bomb attacks suggests 
that the type of weapon used is an ar ea that may benefit fiom further investigation 
(see Chapter 13). When the four outliers discussed above are removed, the graph of 
collateral victims over time changes, as in Figme 12.3. Here it is clear' that the 
maximum average number of collateral victims is lower, with a maximum of ar ound 
six per mcident, rather than the previous average of near ly 12 per incident. Tliere are 
also less exaggerated peaks and dips than in Figure 12.2.
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Figure 12.3. Average Number of Collateral Victims per incident, over time (n =
376).
12.2.2 Data Coding ~ The Assassin Variables
As this chapter will examine the relationships between collateral victims and other 
aspects of assassination, the variables under examination will be recapped in this 
section. As discussed in Chapter 10, there are three categories of peipeûator of 
political assassination: ‘Government’, ‘Terrorist’, and ‘Individual’. Table 12.2 shows 
the frequency with which these occur in tliis sample.
In 201 cases (53%) there was no claim of responsibility, from a tenorist group, a 
govermnent or an individual. Thus, in the majority of cases it is actually unknown 
who committed the attack. In 100 incidents (27%) a tenorist gioup was responsible 
for the attack. In 47 incidents (12%) evidence showed that a government was 
involved in the attack, and in just 28 cases (7%) an individual was found responsible 
for the assassination.
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Table 12.2
Frequency o f Perpetrator
Victim Type N = Percentage
No claim 201 53
Terrorist 100 27
Government 47 13
Individual 28 7
TOTAL 376 100
12.2.3 Data Coding— The Main Target
Again, Chapter 10 detailed the identity of targets of political assassination. For this 
analysis the targets are coded simply as ‘Political’ or ‘Not Political’, where the 
political category incoiporates politicians, tliose who were previously politicians or 
related to politicians, country leaders, government officials, diplomats and political 
activists. Table 12.3 shows that slightly more targets are non-political (56%) than are 
political (44%).
Table 12.3
Frequency of Victim Type
Victim Type N = Percentage
Political Victim 167 44
Non political 209 56
12.2.4 Data Coding- The Attack
As demonstrated in chapter 11, the data on the actual attacks were coded using eight 
variables describing the location. These are again used here, and therefore attacks are 
coded as Inside/Outside, Transit/Stationary, or Work/Leisure, as shown in Table
12.4. In this sample of 376 cases, political assassination incidents primarily occurred 
when the tar get as outside (68%) rather than inside (32%). Attacks are more common 
dining leisure time (63%) than work time (37%), and while the tar get is in transit 
(53%) rather than stationary (47%).
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Table 12.4
Frequency o f attackfeatures
Attack features N = Percentage
Inside 119 32
Outside 257 68
Work time 140 37
Leisure time 236 63
Transit 199 53
Stationary 177 47
This Specificity study utilises one further variable related to the attack; that of the 
region of the world in which the attack took place, using the categories defined by 
the GTD fwww.start.edu/GTDl (as in chapter 10).
Table 12.5 
Region o f attack
Region N = Percentage
Western Eur ope 124 32.9
Middle East and North 
Africa
89 23.7
Russia and Newly 
Independent States
51 13.6
South Asia 34 9
Sub-Saharan Africa 28 7.4
South America 15 4
Eastern Europe 13 3.5
North America 6 1.6
East Asia 5 1.3
Central America and 
Caribbean
4 1.1
Southeast Asia 2 0.5
Central Asia 2 0.5
Australasia and Oceania 1 0.3
Unknown 2 0.5
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As in chapter 10, Table 12.5 shows the region in which the incident took place. The 
majority of incidents in this sample occmred in Western Europe (32.9%). Middle 
East and North African areas accounted for a further 23.7% of attacks, while Russia 
and the Newly Independent States account for 13.6%. Attacks in Sub-Sahaian Africa 
provide 7,4% of the sample, and South American assassinations provide 4%. 
Similarly, 3.5% of the attacks occurred in Eastern Europe. Fewer attacks occurred in 
North America (1.6%), East Asia (1.3%), Central America and Caribbean (1.1%), 
Southeast Asia and Central Asia (each with 0.5%), and Australasia and Oceania 
(0.3%). In 0.5% of cases, the region was unclear or not reported.
12.3 RESULTS: SPECIFICITY AND ASSASSINATIONS
The number of victims in a political assassination attack can be represented visually, 
as Figur e 12.4 shows. The analysis in this chapter will focus on the centre of the plot, 
where numbers of collateral victims in cases range from zero, to 50. As the scale 
demonstrates, the inner circle indicates cases where there are zero collateral victims 
(n = 245), with the concentric circles representing higher numbers of collateral 
victims as the points move towar ds the outer circles. There is just one point in this 
inner-most circle, as there can only be 1 ‘level’ of collateral victims in this region: all 
are zero. The second band includes cases with between one and ten collateral victims 
(n =115), with the nine points representing the cases where there was one collateral 
victim, two collateral victims, three collateral victims, fom' collateral victims, five 
collateral victims, six collateral victims, seven collateral victims, eight collateral 
victims, and ten collateral victims. Individually, as with the analysis in Chapter 11, 
these points can each represent more than one case. For example, the point 
representing cases with one collateral victim represented 49 actual assassination 
incidents. The third band contains seven points representing cases with between 11 
and 20 collateral victims (n = 9), the fourth band contains four points which have 
between 21 and 30 collateral victims (n = 6), and the sixth and outermost band 
contains one point which has between 41 and 50 collateral victims (n = 1). There is 
one band which contains no points, the fiftli. This would contain cases which 
incurred 31-40 collateral victims, but in this sample there were no such cases.
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An important featine of Figure 12.4 is that the range of collateral victims in this 
sample of political assassination incidents is not very broad. The majority of 
incidents fall within the nanowest central ring, meaning that there are no collateral 
victims. Beyond this central region, near ly one third of the attacks fall in the second 
ring, representing the attacks which resulted in between one and ten collateral 
victims. In general then, political assassinations are reasonably specific, with most 
attacks resulting in ten or fewer collateral victims. Just over 4% of cases resulted in 
more than ten collateral victims.
Other variables can then be overlaid onto this plot, to examine relationships between 
them. For example, the collateral victims of an attack can be sub-divided into 
bodyguard victims, and civilian victims. This variable can be overlaid onto the plot, 
to show both how many victims Uiere are, and what type of victim these were.
12.3.1. Specificity and the Perpetrators o f Assassinations
The first set of results in this chapter focus on the identity of the assassin, and the 
relationship of this variable with other aspects of assassination incidents. The 
purpose of this section is to identify differences between the numbers of collateral 
victims caused by the different types of assassin. The assassin is considered as either 
a ten orist gr oup, a government, an individual, or another type of person/gr oup. The 
type of victim is also considered in relation to the type of perpetrator, along with the 
regions of the world in which the different types of perpetrator act.
12.3.1.1. Specificity x Assassin Identity
This first plot (Figur e 12.5) shows the level of specificity, depending on the type of 
perpetr ator. As discussed in chapter 2, a key factor in the ar gument against including 
political assassinations as a type of terrorism is the identity of the victim. Some argue 
that political assassinations only target and kill the one person, and therefore do not 
have the wider victimisation that is required for an act to be terrorism. However, 
some political assassinations do kill individuals other than the tar get, and so it is 
useful to examine these real life political assassination mcidents, and identify the 
number of victims caused by terrorist-perpetr ated assassinations.
238
lOo CO O) in
om oCO o
CO o
s2I<X
0es
1•o<N
.1
239
Figm*e 12.5 shows that the range of the number of collateral victims caused by a 
terrorist-perpetrated assassination was between 1 and 20. Terrorist-perpetiated 
attacks appear* to result in the fewest collateral victims. Government perpetrated 
attacks resulted in a maximum of 21-30 other victims, while attacks perpetrated 
by individuals, or unspecified others have a range up to 41-50. Thus terrorist 
perpetr ated assassinations do incur victims other than the target, although the 
number of victims seems lower than others. A Kruskal-Wallis test was used to 
examine the relationship between the type of perpetr ator and the number of 
collateral victims, finding that number of collateral victims was statistically 
significantly affected by perpetrator type (H(2 ) = 45.658, p<.001). Maim-Whitney 
tests were used to follow up this finding, with all effects reported at the p<.001 
level of significance. It appears that government-sponsored attacks resulted in 
statistically significantly more collateral victims than both terrorist assassinations 
{U= 997.5, r = -.530), and assassmations perpetrated by individuals or others {U 
= 2973, r = -.347). However, there was no statistically significant difference 
between the number of collateral victims in teiTorist assassinations or those 
perpetrated by individuals/others {U= 10645, r = -.081). It is of comse possible 
that this is because terrorist groups aie reluctant to claim incidents in which there 
aie a large number of collateral victims, due to their need or deshe to retain the 
public’s support for their cause. It is possible that the increased lethality of 
government attacks is due to the nature of the attacks, as government sponsored 
attacks are commonly canied out using weapons such as explosive devices, which 
can be less specific that other types of attacks such as shootings. This will be 
discussed further in chapter 13.
As in chapter 11, it is possible to look in more detail at the named terrorist groups 
groups who perpetiated attacks in this sample. There are two main gioups who 
use assassinations most fiequently: ETA, and the IRA. An analysis of just those 
attacks which were perpetrated by ETA (n = 16) shows that they resulted in an 
average of .37 collateral victims per incident, with a maximum of four collateral 
victims in ETA assassinations. A similai* mean was found in the number of 
collateral victims in attacks peipetiated by the IRA (n = 14), with an average of 
.36 collateral victims per incident, and a maximum of just 1 collateral victim.
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Thus these two terrorist groups, both of whom have been found to use political 
assassination as a tactic, result in relatively low levels of collateral victims. These 
two groups will be considered again in chapter 13, in an examination of the 
methods used in political assassinations.
12.3.1.2. Specificity X Assassin Identity X Victim Identity 
Figure 12.6 again shows the relationship between specificity and who the 
peipetrator was, but also looks at whether targets are political or not. As in Figme
12.5, as the points move fiu*ther away from the centre of the plot, the more 
collateral victims there were. Both political and non-political victims were 
tai'geted by all assassin types, with the majority of attacks clustered towards the 
centre of the plot. It should be noted that terrorist assassinations are targeted at 
both political and non-political individuals.
Those incidents with the highest numbers of collateral victims ar e those where 
political victims were tar geted, with the target of the one case where there were 
over 41 collateral victims being an Algerian politician. However, there are cases 
where attacks on non-political tar gets also resulted in lar ge numbers of collateral 
victims. It appears then, that the type of victim does not relate to the number of 
collateral victhns.
The next section looks at where and when assassination incidents occur.
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12.3.2 Specificity and Location o f Assassinations 
This section examines the relationship between the specificity of political 
assassination incidents, and the natm e of the location of the attack. The purpose of 
this is to identify where collateral victims aie likely to be incurred, in terms of the 
physical location (inside or outside, in transit or stationary, and at work or 
leisure). This is combined with the ‘type’ of collateral victim. For this section, the 
collateral victims ai e divided into the number of civilian victims (in the concentric 
rmgs on the plot, ranging fi om 0-50) and the number of bodyguard victims (in the 
segments, ranging fiom 0-10). This way it is possible to also see who is at risk in 
tliese locations. The figure used in this section is slightly different to that used in
12.3.1. Instead of bands representing the total number of collateral victims 
(civilian victims and bodyguaid victims), they represent die number of civilian 
victims, and are then further divided into ‘segments’ on the basis of the number of 
bodyguard victims. Thus the frequencies are also different to those shown in
12.3.1. CuiTently the literature only shows that political individuals are killed in 
assassinations. In reality political assassination incidents result in victims other 
than just the target, meaning tiiat other people are at indeed at risk in assassination 
incidents. Therefore the puipose of this section is to identify who these ‘other 
victims’ are. If they are bodyguards of the target, they are likely to already be 
awaie of the risk. If civilians (i.e. not the bodyguards, nor the tar get) these 
individuals are likely to be less aware of the risk.
12.3.2.1. Specificity X Inside/Outside Location x Bodyguard Victims
The first combination to be examined is the type of victim, and whether the target 
was inside or outside at the time of the attack. Figure 12.7 shows this represented 
visually. The majority of cases have no collateral victims at all (i.e. no civilian or 
bodyguar d victims, n = 245), represented in the inner-most band, in the first 
segment (labelled ‘Bodyguard Victims -  O’). There are fewer cases where there 
were no Bodyguard Victims but were civilian victims (in the same segment but 
outside of the innermost band, n = 103).
Where there are bodyguard victims, the majority of points on the plot indicate that 
these attacks take place outside rather than inside. Looking at the incidents where
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there were no bodyguaid victims, but were civilian victims, the cases in the outer 
rings, with 31-50 civilian victims actually take place inside, rather than outside. 
Thus it appear s that the type of victim var ies with the location of the attack. 
Interestingly, statistically significant associations were found between the 
presence of bodyguard victims, and whether the target was indoors or outdoors at 
the time of the attack (i) ^  11.025, p = 0.001). The odds ratios seem to suggest 
that an attack was less likely to incur bodyguard victims when the attack was 
inside than outside (OR = 0.072).
12.3.2.2. Specificity X Transit/Stationary Victim x Bodyguard Victims 
Figure 12.8 builds on the examination of the location of the assassination 
incidents, and how these relate to the specificity of the attack. In 177 of the 376 
incidents the target of the attack was stationary, rather than being in transit. It 
appears that in the incidents where there were no bodyguard victims, there are 
more attacks where the target is stationary, rather than in transit. In fact, there was 
a statistically significant association between whether the target was in transit or 
not, and the presence of bodyguard victims (x^  (i) = 16.053, p <0.001), with the 
odds ratio suggesting that the attack was 8.333 times more likely to incur 
bodyguard victims when the victim was in transit than when they were stationary. 
This is shown on the plot, with the segments where there are bodyguard victims 
having more points where victims are in transit rather than stationary.
12.3.2.3. Specificity X Work/Leisure x Bodyguard Victims
Figure 12.9 shows whether the target was attacked during work or leisure hours.
In general, incidents which took place dming the target's working hours (mean 
rank = 207.88) actually are more likely to result in statistically significantly more 
victims than attacks during leisure horns (mean rank = 177, C/= 13806.5, p = 
0.002, r = -.162). It appears that where there are no bodyguard victims attacks take 
place during both work and leisure hours. However, in this segment the incidents 
with more civilian victims (31-50) are during leistue hours rather than work 
horns.
245
This section has examined the specificity of assassination incidents depending on 
the location of the attack (inside/outside, public/private), the behaviour of the 
target at the time of the attack (tr ansit/stationar y), and the time of the attack 
(during work/leisme hours). The next section will consider the differences in 
assassinations depending on the geographical region in which they take place.
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12.3.3. Specificity and Geographical Location
This section examines the specificity of political assassination incidents in terms 
of their geogi'aphic location. As shown in chapter 8, a key aspect of routine 
activities theory (RAT) is the idea of hotspots. These are areas where crime 
frequently and repeatedly occurs, creating a concentration of offending in one 
paiticular* area. This section takes an exploratory look at this in relation to 
assassination, using the region in which the attack takes place to identify potential 
hotspots. Although the categorisation is broad, it may nevertheless highlight more 
at risk areas. This could highlight where potential targets are at heightened risk of 
attack, which would identify where more precautions such as security, vetting of 
people, or even avoiding certain regions altogether (where feasible), could or 
should be taken.
Figure 12.10 shows the specificity in assassinations according to the geographical 
location. In this section, the circles again represent both bodyguaid and civilian 
victims. The segments represent a different geographical region. The least specific 
attacks occur in the Middle East and North Africa, with between 41 and 50 
collateral victims in attacks in this region. Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe 
and South America also have less specific attacks, each with attacks resulting in 
between 21 to 30 collateral victims. The only region where there are no collateral 
victims is East Asia.
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12.3.3.1. Specificity x Assassin Identity x Geographical Location 
The next stage is to examine the geogmphical region in which the incidents of 
political assassination take place. This can be combined with the type of assassin, 
to establish whether there is any relationship between the identity of the 
perpetrator and the location in which they act. Figures 12.11-12.14 show the 
region in which attacks took place, combined with the number of collateral 
victims, and the perpetrator’s identity.
In four regions, (Central America and Caribbean, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, 
and Unknown) all of the attack peipetiators were classed as ‘other’, i.e. there were 
no known govermnent or tenorist perpetrators. In one fur ther region (Australasia 
and Oceania) an individual was the perpetr ator, although there was just one 
incident in this region. In all of the other regions the perpetr ators were a mix of 
terTorist, government, individuals and others.
The least specific attacks occur' in Middle East and North Afr ica. These were 
perpetrated by ‘individuals’, and resulted in between 41 and 50. The more specific 
attacks occur in all regions, and are the responsibility of all types of perpetrators: 
terrorists, governments, individuals and others.
Looking specifically at the regions in which terrorists have claimed assassination 
incidents, these are North America, South America, South Asia, Western Europe, 
Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Afr ica. Governments have been 
implicated in assassinations in eight regions, specifically North America, South 
America, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Western Europe, Middle East and North 
Afr ica, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Russia and the Newly Independent States. 
Finally, individuals have been active in North America, South America, East 
Asia, South Asia, Western Europe, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Russia and the Newly Independent States, and Australasia and Oceania, a 
total of 9 regions. Thus there appear to be no regions which ar e dominated by one 
type of perpetrator.
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However, there are a number of regions in which no cases ar e perpetrated by 
terrorists, governments, or individuals. In four regions (Central American and 
Caribbean, Centr al Asia, Eastern Europe, and Unknown) all attacks were the 
responsibility of ‘others’, i.e. no one claimed responsibility for these attacks, and 
there was no evidence of who conducted them.
12.3.3.2. Specificity X Geographical Location x Victim Identity
This analysis examines the way in which geographical location interacts with the
identity of the victim, i.e. whether the target of attack is a political figure, or not.
A total of 144 attacks were targeted at political figures. Figur e 12.15 shows that 
there are political victims in all regions in this analysis, showing that political 
figur es are targeted across the world. The political victims are also spread across 
the plot, showing that the specificity of the attack does not appear to be influenced 
by the political standing of the tar get victim. Attacks on both political and non­
political victims can result in collateral victims, across regions.
252
S
o « 
CO <
8
nCO <
« .{5(D V) 
LU <
(0  (0
(D (0
ro<(0 u
, ■ U)
0 ) B
0) ■O Sz c<D COofl Q .
(D<U■o■tf) c(/)3
t r
(/)E1>
2Io
Ü
ËE3
IDo CD 05II II II IIc c c c II
o o o o
2 T ( ? O
CO OJ
10
CN1 C
T- O
I
§I
<NI
253
ofl c
CO s s
c (U •c0) E (0O < O
(D (0
TO (0
TO (0
> s (A
$ 0) a0) ■O TOz c<D WoO Q .
.3 0)■o(A c(A3tr
(D Ü IOO
lOo (O O) lO
oin o CN o
CO o
§IN
NI
254
V) .2 CD <0 
LU <
O < O
CD CD
CD (D
CO$ 5 s0)z •DCCD §od CL.2 CD■oCO cCO3a:
CD O
inO CD a>
in
CNoin o oCO oeg o
CO o
I
IiCL
s
ë
I
Ni
255
o531® O  (0co <iîCO <
«  .55 co <fl 
UJ <
QÔ C
c g 3
s i s
*  CD 
(0ro ro
(D o
>» (0
$ <D a(D-O (0Z C0) cooô Q.
@ OT3CO C(A3
q :
ino CD O) lO
OlO o oco oCM O
co o
ICu
'T3i
iI
<N
I
256
toOJ to  
LU <
* 8 %
O <  Ü
(0 m
CO (0
> . to
$ tu atD •D (0
Z Ctu w
0Ô Q .
. 2 (U■ oto cto3
q :
(D o
to
iS<
LOo CO O)
olO o oCO oCN o
CO CM o
II
Q.JO C
O O ^  Z  O  03
I
o>
§I
<NI
257
12.4 SPECIFICITY IN RELATION TO SITUATIONAL VULNERABILITY
Having examined the specificity of attacks in relation to various other aspects, the 
previously modelled aspects (Accessibility and Victim Preparedness) can also be 
related to the specificity. Figure 12.16 shows the average number of victims 
incurred according to the scores on the Accessibility scale. The least accessible 
attacks (scored as ‘3’) incur the lowest average collateral victims per attack. The 
second least accessible attacks (scored as ‘4’) incur the highest average collateral 
victims per attack. Thus it would seem that in this sample the least accessible 
attacks are safest, in terms of the risk posed to individuals other than the target. 
However, the most dangerous types of assassination do still happen in low- 
accessibility areas, likely because more ‘forceful’ methods are required to ensure 
the target is reached in the attack.
3  4  5
Accessibility Score
NB: Based onn = 376
Figure 12.16. Average number of deaths according to Accessibility Score
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Supporting this, attacks where the taiget was at work and in a private location ar e 
shown to have statistically significantly more victims than attacks where the target 
was at leisure or in a public location (Table 12.6).
Table 12.6
Mann-Whitney Statistics
Variable Mean rank U P r
Work 207.88 13806.5 0.002 -.162
Leisure 177
Public 174.72 15167.5 0.009 -.136
Not Public 199.87
In addition, a Spearman’s rho was calculated, which showed that there was a 
positive statistically significant correlation between the Accessibility scale, and 
tlie number of collateral victims (rho = .155, p = .022). Thus as the accessibility of 
the attack increases, so too does the number of collateral victims (i.e. the 
Specificity reduces).
Figur e 12.17 shows the average number of collateral victims according to the 
scores on the Victim Preparedness.
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4  5
Victim Preparedness Score
NB: Based on n = 376
Figure 12.17. Average number of deaths according to Victim Preparedness Score
The fewest collateral victims are incurred where the Victim Preparedness was 
scored at ‘3’, i.e. victims were unprepared for attack, having experienced none of 
the three possible variables (threat or previous attempt or bodyguard presence). 
Interestingly the highest number of collateral victims is caused by attacks with the 
highest level of preparedness (score o f‘6’). It is possible that where the target has 
a bodyguard and has survived previous attempts, and has received threats, the 
perpetrator uses more destructive methods, e.g. explosives, to ensure that they 
achieve their aim of killing the target. However, attacks where the victim is scored 
‘4’ on victim preparedness (i.e. they have experienced one ‘preparedness’ 
variable) also incur a high number of collateral victims per incident.
Interestingly, Mann-Whitney tests show that attacks where the victim had 
received threats before their death (mean rank = 163.7) tend to result in fewer 
collateral deaths than attacks where there were no previous threats ((mean rank
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192.48) U— 7134.5, p = .037, r = -.108), while attacks where the victims had a 
bodyguard at the time of the attack result in more collateral victims (mean rank = 
261.62) than attacks where there was no bodyguard (mean rank = 174.62, U= 
5093, p <001, r = -.345). Again, a Spearman’s rho was calculated, finding a 
positive statistically significant correlation between the Victim Preparedness scale 
and the number of collateral victims (rho = .219, p <001), showing that the more 
‘prepared’ for an assassination a target is, the higher the number of collateral 
victims tends to be (i.e. the lower the specificity).
12.5 SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the level of specificity present in 
political assassination incidents. It was found that in general, political 
assassination incidents ar e specific, as they tend to have a low number of victims 
other than the target. However, there are nevertheless some interesting findings 
regar ding different aspects of assassination incidents.
Incidents perpetrated or supported by a Government tend to result in more 
casualties than non-Govermnent attacks. However, incidents which have been 
claimed by terrorist groups mainly have low numbers of collateral victims. It is 
possible that this finding is because terrorist groups are unlikely to claim non­
specific incidents, due to the potential negative publicity, but it may also be 
because terrorist groups are better able to plan specific attacks, thanks to the 
resources available to them. In fact, incidents which are backed by terrorist gr oups 
also tend to have low numbers of bodyguard victims (a maximum of one per 
incident). This offers support to the theory that terrorist perpetrators are able to 
plan attacks when the target is likely to be vulnerable, and without protection. 
Equally, they may be very good at targeting the individual they want to harm. In 
addition, incidents which have been claimed by an individual also have no 
bodyguard victims. This is likely to be because those working alone may which to 
tar get those who are easier to access, i.e. wMiout a bodyguard, or they may only 
wish to kill their tar get and actually intend not to harm others.
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In terms of how the victim’s behaviour and location affect specificity, it was 
found that incidents in which the taiget was m transit (i.e. moving) tend to have 
few cases of bodyguard victims. In addition, ambush attacks show a tendency to 
be specific (with a maximum of 20 collateral victims) but with a potentially high 
number of bodyguard victims. The overlap between these behavioui- types should 
be noted, as ambushes must take place when the victim is in transit. Thus these 
tiansit attacks are likely to be specific, and where there are high numbers of 
bodyguard victims, it is likely that those attacks involve an ambush.
In terms of the factors relating to non-specific attacks, i.e. those with high 
numbers of collateral victims, the less specific attacks tend to take place in public 
places, and in outdoor locations. Common sense suggests that it is in such 
locations that there would most likely be more people (compared to private or 
indoor locations where numbers may be limited), and therefore more potential for 
collateral victims, hi addition, there are more bodyguard victims in outdoor 
attacks than indoor attacks, suggesting that victims may feel safe enough to not 
require bodyguards when they are indoors. However, the fact these people are still 
targets suggest that bodyguards may be requhed at all times.
Political victims ar e the targets of the least specific attacks. As political 
individuals are likely to be higher profile than other potential targets, and 
potentially facing a higher risk of attack, it is possible that the low specificity 
reflects this. Rather than risk a targeted attack which may require close proximity 
to the target (e.g. a stabbing, beating etc), assassins may prefer to use a more 
‘hands off approach, such as a bombing, where the bomb can be planted in 
advance and detonated while the assassin is absent fiom the scene. In such cases it 
is plausible to assume that a bomb would harm more bystanders/bodyguards than 
say, a shooting or stabbing. In addition, regardless of the nature of the weapon 
used, the assassins may be so keen to be successfiil in their attack that they use a 
more ‘deadly’ approach, to ensure their success.
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The least specific attacks take place during the target’s work horns, rather than 
their leisure hours. It is likely that an individual’s work place would be easier to 
identify than their home address, particularly if they are a high profile individual. 
In addition, where the tar get is killed at a public event, such as a rally, it would be 
easy for the assassin to identify both their location, and the likely time that the 
target would be available.
Finally, there do appear to be some regional differences, hi terms of worldwide 
location. There are clear frequency differences across regions, with some having 
very few attacks and others having a lar ge number. Those regions with the least 
specific attacks were in Middle East and North Africa, Western Europe, and 
Unknown regions. It is possible therefore that these are the regions in which 
targets are most at risk, or that these ar e the regions in which the perpetrators are 
more concerned with killing the tar*get, regardless of how many others they injur e 
or kill in the process.
Here there may be some policy implication, in that when targets ar e in 
crowds/busy areas/at gatherings they could be warned to be vigilant for risks. Or, 
if the motivation is to reduce victim numbers, if a risk has already been identified 
it may be beneficial for the target to avoid crowds for a period.
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13. Methods used in Political Assassinations
13.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 12 showed that in reality, political assassinations do not affect just the main 
tar get, but actually often result in the death and injmy of bystanders and bodyguards. 
This chapter will build on the imderstanding of political assassinations by examining 
the methods by wliich the perpetrators commit these attacks. Wilson et al. (2010) 
examined the weapomy used in assassinations committed by the teri'orist group ETA, 
suggesting that the weapon used may work as a measur e of proximity between the 
tar get and the assassin, where for example, attacks can be highly proximal, such as a 
kidnapped victim shot in the head, through to ‘hands off attacks such as a remotely 
detonated explosive device.
This chapter considers the range of methods used in the present sample in order to 
better understand the way that assassinations ar e car ried out. There ar e different 
types of weapon available to assassins, e.g. bombing, guns, and manual attacks, and 
the choice of weapon both influences and is influenced by the assassins’ presence at 
the scene of the attack, i.e. whetlier or not they ar e present at the scene, and whether 
or not they employ an ambush. According to rational choice theory, the assassin 
weighs up both the costs and benefits of options available to them and then selects 
the most beneficial/the one most suited to their needs. This forms a key part of 
understanding behaviour in political assassinations, from the assassins’ perspective. 
By examining the methods used in political assassinations it is possible to identify 
the most likely type of thr eat facing prominent individuals, and prepar e better for 
that. It will also be possible to explore the relationships between weapons, situational 
vulnerabilities, and collateral victims.
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13.2 METHOD
13.2.1 The Data
As discussed in chapter 9, data on political assassinations were collected and coded 
according to a series of vaiiables, of wliich six are used in the following analyses, 
relating to the way in wliich the assassination was conducted in terms of weaponry 
and ‘modus operandi’. Of the 400 cases discussed in chapter 9, 395 were included in 
tills analysis. Cases of poisoning were excluded (n=4) due to the very low number of 
such cases, as well as one further case where the method used was not reported.
13.2.2 Data coding
The variables used in this analysis describe the weapon used in the attack, and the 
presence or absence of the assassin. The first variable, ‘ambush’, shows those cases 
in which an ambush was used, i.e. those cases in which the convoy in which the 
target was travelling was forcibly stopped by the assassin(s), in order to carry out the 
assassination. The second variable, ‘assassin present’, shows whether or not an 
assassin was present at the scene and at the time of the attack. In cases where there 
was more tlian one assassin (which is not coded here), this variable is coded as 
present providing at least one of tlie perpetiators was present at the time of the attack. 
The number of assassins is not included in this analysis, as although it offers a 
measui e of manpower, this chapter is not looking at manpower and resources. 
Instead, it is examining the level of contact between target and assassin, and how this 
interacts with weapon choice. Thus, it is the presence of an assassin which is 
important, as opposed to the number of those assassins.
Table 13.1 shows the fiequency of these variables in this sample. In the majority of 
cases the assassin was present at the scene at the time of the attack (86%), while an 
ambush was used in a minority of incidents (8%).
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Table 13.1
Presence o f the assassin
Behaviour N = %
Assassin Present 340 86
Assassin Not Present 55 14
Total 395 100
Behaviour N = %
Ambush used 31 8
No ambush used 364 92
Total 395 100
The remaining four variables describe the weapon used. Table 13.2 shows the ways 
in which taigets were killed. Of 395 cases, a weapon was used in 384 cases. The 
majority of victims were killed by gun (72%), and the second most commonly used 
weapon was an explosive device (20%), with 3% being suicide bombs. The tliird 
most popular method was a manual killing (e.g. beating, stabbing, 9%). The total 
number of cases here sums to more than 400, as in some cases more than one method 
was used to kill the victim.
Table 13.2
Weapon used in political assassinations
Weapon N — %
Gun 286 72
Explosive device 80 20
Suicide bomb 12 3
Manual 34 9
These four weapon types were coded for use in this analysis, as these account for the 
majority of tlie attacks. The variable ‘gun’ is self-explanatoiy: if coded as present 
then the taiget was killed by a gunshot. ‘Explosive device’ is also relatively clear, as 
it describes any form of explosive device, including, for example, car bombs, letter 
bombs, or suicide bombs. Suicide bombs are listed as a separate sub-type of
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explosive device because they are considered qualitatively different to other bomb 
types, requiring the assassin’s presence at the scene, and close contact with the 
target. In this sense they are a ‘special case’; by the nature of a suicide bomb the 
contact between victim and target must be higher than another type of bomb. Thus 
they are highlighted in this analysis. The final weapon variable is ‘manual’, which 
may be less clear. A manual attack is any in which an automated weapon is not used 
and the assassin is requhed to be present, thus any incident where the victim is 
beaten to death (with or without an implement), stabbed (or killed in some other way 
with a knife), hung, smothered, strangled, or pushed fiom a building. Again, these 
subtypes are not included in this analysis. Although there are large differences 
between, say, strangling a person and pushing them off a building, at their most basic 
both require minimal or no weaponry, but do require physical contact between 
assassin and victim. The puipose of tliis vaiiable is to reflect the complexity or 
otherwise of the ‘weapon’ or method used to cause the death of the taiget, rather than 
reflecting any underlying motivation. These weapon-related variables were selected 
as they describe the weapon used in the majority of incidents.
Each case was then content analysed, creating a data matiix (see Figure 13.1 for an 
example of the coding), which represents features of the attack numerically, with (2) 
representing the presence of tlie variable, and (1) representing the absence. This is 
then used as the basis for the analysis, where the inter-relationships between these six 
variables are considered.
Case
Assassin
Present Ambush Gun
Explosive
Device
Suicide
Bomb Manual
Alexander Memi 2 1 1 1 1 2
Veronica Guerin 2 1 2 1 1 1
lanGow 1 1 1 2 1 1
Diego Turbay 2 2 2 1 1 1
Taieq Ayoub 1 1 1 2 1 1
Figure 13.1. Example of the Data Matrix coding
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13.3 RESULTS: METHODS OF ASSASSINATION
As in chapters 11 and 12, Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis (MSA) was used to 
analyse the data. The data matrix was used (as in previous chapters) to examine the 
relationships between both the different variables, and the individual cases in the 
analysis. Again, points in the plots represent different ‘types’ of assassination, with 
the possibility that each point represents more than one case. The plot is partitioned 
according to the presence or absence of each variable, with a straightforward 
partition meaning that the solution is a better fit. The coefficient of contiguity for this 
MSA is 0.926.
Figure 13.2 presents the variables describing the assassins’ behaviour, showing 
whether they were present, and whether an ambush was used.
Figure 13.2. MSA plot of assassination mode partitioned according to the behaviour 
of the assassin
Assassin
Not
Present /  Assassin 
Present
• #
e
# e
• •  •  •
e
Ambush
Not Used
• #
# #
e Ambush
# /  Used
Figure 13.2a. Shaded area indicates 
profiles where the Assassin was Present
Figure 13.2b. Shaded area indicates 
profiles where an Ambush was used
Both plots are partitioned diagonally, with Figure 13.2a showing that in nine out of 
the ten profiles the assassin was present (n = 340). In just one of the profiles (n = 55)
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the assassin was not present at the time of the attack. It is perhaps surprising that 
assassin “removed” strategies are not more frequently used as they represent the 
‘safest’ strategy for the perpetrator. Figure 13.2b shows that the variable ‘ambush’ 
also partitions the plot diagonally, with three types of incident where an ambush is 
used (n = 31). Overlapping Figure 13.2a and 13.2b show that, unsurprisingly, all of 
the ambush cases are a subset of the ‘assassin present’ variable.
Figure 13.3 shows the type of weapon used in this sample of political assassinations. 
Figure 13.3. Weapon
No Gun 
Used
Gun Used
Figure 13.3a. Gun used
ManualX ManualTechniques \ TechniquesNot Used \ V Used
• \  •
\  •
• \  •  
•  \
•
#
•  X
Figure 13.3b. Manual Techniques used
Explosives 
Not Used
Explosives
Used
Figure 13.3c. Explosives used
Suicide Bomb 
Not Used
Suicide
Bomb
Used
Figure 13.3d. Suicide Bomb used
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Figure 13.3a shows those points where a gun was used to kill the target with six 
points in this aiea (n = 286). The plot can be partitioned diagonally moving upwards 
from left to right, with all cases involving guns falling towai ds the bottom of the plot. 
Compaiison with Figuie 13.2b shows that in all of the cases where the target was 
ambushed, the victim was killed by a gunshot.
Figure 13.3b illustrates the cases where assassins used manual techniques. The 
category of manual techniques is broad, including incidents where the target 
‘manually’ killed the victim without the use of automatic weapons, e.g. the victim 
was stabbed, hung, or beaten, with or without weapons. In this instance the plot is 
again partitioned diagonally, witii the three profiles in which a manual technique 
was used falling towards the right of the plot. These three points represent 34 
incidents.
Figure 13.3c shows those cases which involved the use of explosives. This includes 
all types of explosive devices, including remotely detonated bombs, suicide bombs, 
and timed bombs. The plot is partitioned in the same way as 13.3b, with all cases 
involving explosive devices towai ds the bottom left comer of the plot, with five 
points representing 80 cases. Finally, incidents of suicide bombing fall in the very 
bottom left corner of Figure 13.3d with two points representing 12 cases.
These six variables are now examined in relation to one another, in order to look at 
the way in which the different aspects of methods used to commit political 
assassinations relate to one another. As Figure 13.4 shows, the variables partitioning 
the plot in an upwards diagonal are whether or not an ambush was used, whether the 
assassin was present at the time of the attack, and whether a gun was used to kill the 
target. It is suggested that these vaiiables may be combined to form a ‘scale’ showing 
the level of contact, or proximity, between the victim and the assassin at the time of 
the attack. This scale ranges fr om attacks with a liigh level of proximity, where the 
assassin is present and ambushes the victim at the far right of the plot, to more ‘hands 
off attacks where the assassin is absent fr om the scene of the attack at the far left of
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the plot. In the middle of the plot are those incidents where the assassin is present, 
but there is no immediate contact between the assassin and the target.
Low level 
of
proximity
Assassin Not 
Present 
+ No Gun 
+No Ambushe
Assassin 
Present 
+ No Gun 
+No Ambush
Assassin 
Present 
+ Gun + 
No Ambush Assassin Present 
+ Gun 
+ Ambush
High level 
of
proximity
Figure 13.4. Proximity in Assassinations
Attacks where an ambush is used are considered more ‘contactfiil’ than attacks 
without ambush, simply because it implies direct contact between the target and the 
perpetrator, in the commissioning of the ambush. Attacks without an ambush, but 
where the assassin is at the scene, may have direct contact between the target and 
perpetrator, but may not. For example where the target is shot by an individual in the 
crowd, the perpetrator does not come into direct contact with their victim.
The variable ‘gun’ may not initially appear to directly relate to the level of contact 
between victim and assassin, but it does play a part. The central area of Figure 13.4, 
where the assassin is present but no ambush is used, is divided by the presence or 
absence of a gun. The area towards the bottom right shows the presence of a gun.
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suggesting a slightly higher level of contact, while the absence of a gun, more 
towards the top left, implies a slightly lower level of contact.
Figure 13,5 looks at the three remaining weaponry variables and shows how they 
relate to one another. When combined, they are considered to describe the 
complexity of the attack. The term complexity is used to refer to the complexity of 
the weapon used and ranges from explosive devices at the most complex end, to 
manual attacks at the least complex end. An explosive device is considered to be 
complex in terms of both the knowledge and materials required to make the weapon, 
while manual killings are simpler. ‘Manual’ describes relatively simple attacks which 
use either no weapon, or very simple weapons, such as blades, ropes or a tool to beat 
their target with. In no cases are these weapon types used together, and they fall at 
opposite ends of the plot showing that they are dissimilar in terms of the underlying 
concept of complexity. The area in the middle of the plot are cases where firearms 
are used, with no explosive devices or manual attacks.
Low
complexity
Manual
Explosive Device
Suicide BombHigh
complexity
Figure 13.5. Complexity in Assassinations
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These two concepts can be combined onto one plot, as shown schematically in 
Figme 13.6, with the proposed proximity and complexity scales mapped on. This 
shows all six vai iables together, with 16 regions, of which ten contain cases. There 
are no cases in tlie remaining six regions. Some of these regions contain no cases 
because they are impossible combinations (e.g. suicide bomb with no assassin 
present), or just because they are excessively forceful methods (e.g. suicide bomb, 
plus gun, plus ambush).
Suicide Bomb
Explosive
Device
Low
proximity
High
proximity
n?11
n = 1
n = 55
n = 12
1
Manual
n = 252
n = 29
n = 31
n f a
n = 1
High
complexity Lowcomplexity
Assassin Not 
Present 
+ No Gun 
+No Ambush
Assassin 
Present 
+ No Gun 
+No Ambush
Assassin 
Present 
+ Gun
+No Ambush
Assassin 
Present 
+ Gun 
+ Ambush
Figure 13.6. The Proximity and Complexity shown in Political Assassinations
The category which has the most cases falls towai ds the bottom right of the plot, 
where a gun is used and the assassin(s) is present (n = 252, 64%). Clearly, if a gun is 
to be used in an attack, the assassin must be present, but it should be noted that no 
ambush is used in these cases, and only the one weapon type is involved. It falls to
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the middle of the complexity scale, as a gun is considered reasonably easy to obtain 
(if you are intending to be an assassin), and is easy to use with little risk to oneself. It 
also falls midway on the proximity scale; while the assassin is present at the scene 
they may or may not be close to thek victim, it is possible that they aie some 
distance away. In such incidents it is assumed that the perceived costs of being close 
to the victim (e.g. captur e at the scene) are outweighed by the benefits of the 
closeness, and the relative simplicity of the weapon (e.g. ability to target the correct 
person, ease of obtaining and using a gun). Thus it is the most fi*equently used option 
in tliis sample of incidents.
The second most frequently used option, with far fewer cases, is that where an 
explosive device is used, and the assassin is not present at the time of the attack (n = 
55, 14%). In these cases the weapon is considered to be highly complex, and there is 
no contact between the assassin(s) and the target. This complies with the theory 
about decision making: the use of a complex weapon has benefits which outweigh 
the costs. An explosive device is considered a more complex weapon for a number of 
reasons. Fhst, they require at least some level of specialist knowledge and 
equipment, and it may be risky or difficult to get this. Second, it is possible that the 
assassin themselves may be injur ed when building the device, or when taking it to 
the target location. Third, it may not detonate at the conect time or it may not 
detonate at all, therefore there is a lower guarantee drat it will hit the desired target. 
Fourth, it may be discovered prior to the attack, and defused. However, these costs 
are thought to be outweighed by tire benefits of the assassin not needing to be at the 
scene of the attack, which reduces the likelihood of capture.
The third most commonly used method is that where the victim is killed manually, 
where the assasshi(s) is present (n = 31, 8%). Like in gun attacks, in manual attacks 
the assassin must be present. However, the decision making here is in weapon 
complexity, which is minimal, and even non-existant in some cases (e.g. strangling 
by hand, thr owing off a roof). Therefore these cases have tire benefit of a simple, 
easy to obtain weapon, counterbalanced by the cost of a potentially high-risk, high 
proximity encounter.
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All option used with slightly lower frequency is that where the assassin(s) is present, 
an ambush is used, and the weapon is a gun (n = 29,7%). As discussed above, a gun 
is a relatively simple weapon, falling mid way on the complexity scale. However, 
tliis is a relatively high proximity method, but it is possible that the high cost 
involved in high contact is chosen because of the higher likelihood that the 
assassin(s) will achieve their goal of killing the target. It is also possible that such a 
method is selected where it is hard to gain access to the taiget, and as such a higher 
risk, more forceful strategy, such as an ambush, is required.
There are also some interesting points to note in the least commonly used strategies. 
There is just 1 case (0.25%) where the assassin is present, an ambush is used, and the 
weapon of choice is both a gun and an explosive device. Also infrequently used is 
tliat method where the assassin is present, and both guns and explosive devices are 
used (n = 1, 0.25%). These attacks are discussed together as they are so similar, and 
so infrequent. They fall at the highest points on both complexity and proximity 
scales, and are seen as weapon intensive methods. The complexity of the weapon 
means a greater cost to the assassin, in terms of the materials and risks, as discussed 
above. The high level of contact also poses a high cost to the assassin(s). This 
combination of factors may be unexpected; the close contact involved in an ambush 
may suggest tliat guns would be sufficient weapomy to acliieve their goal, but 
perhaps the assassin felt it was necessary to be particularly thorough. However, this 
method is only used in two cases, and so clearly few assassins would consider that 
the benefits here (likelihood of success) outweigh the costs (risk of capture/danger to 
self posed by explosive devices etc).
Another rarely used method is that where the assassin is present, and uses an ambush 
and guns, as well as manual methods (n = 1, 0.25%). By taking a closer look at the 
data, it is possible to establish that in one of these cases the target was initially shot, 
and the assassin then held their tliroat to ensure that they had stopped breathing. The 
other incident where this method was used was in Gaza, where a Sheikh was stopped 
at a roadblock and beaten and shot. Thus in such cases the liigh level of contact is
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possibly necessitated by the assassins’ desiie to be thorough and ensur e the 
assassination is completed.
13.4 SCALING COMPLEXITY AND CONTACT IN ASSASSINATIONS
This chapter has shown that it is possible to model two aspects underlymg the 
method employed by the perpetrators of assassinations, describing the complexity of 
the attack, and the level of proximity between the target and victim. Having modelled 
these aspects, it is possible to examine the relationship between these two concepts. 
The complexity of attacks is reflected by the weapomy used. Manual attacks are 
considered the simplest form of attacks, and so are scored ‘1’, Attacks which involve 
guns are scored ‘2’, as they are somewhat more complex than manual attacks, but not 
as complex as explosive device attacks, which are scored as ‘3’ (Figure 13.7).
ExplosiveDevicesGunsManualattacks
HighcomplexityLowcomplexity
Figure 13.7. Complexity Scale
Figme 13.8 shows the fi'equency with which these types of attack occur in the 
sample. As may be expected, the most common weapon types used in these 
assassination incidents are guns. These are mid-way on the complexity scale, 
reflecting that assassins in this sample tend to avoid very simple methods (i.e. 
manual attacks) and very complex weapons. It is likely that very simple methods are 
avoided as they are likely to require more time, and more physical effort to ensme 
the target is killed (e.g. if beatmg a target to death it may take some time to ensme 
tliey are deceased), along with greater risks to the assassm. The more complex
276
weapons require more pre-planning and expertise, and therefore may be less 
preferred.
(A 2 0 0 -
Complexity Score
NB: Based on n = 395, due to exclusion of five cases on basis o f method
Figure 13.8. Frequency of Complexity Scores
In addition to examining the frequency with which the complexity scores occur in the 
data, it is possible to examine the average score over time, as in Figure 13.9. It 
appears, from Figure 13.9, that the average level of complexity in the weapons used 
in political assassinations is increasing. This is supported with the finding that the 
Complexity score is statistically significantly correlated with the year of attack 
(rho=.205, p <.001). It is possible that with the changes in technology over this time 
period, such as the development of the internet, more complex weapons are more 
accessible to perpetrators of assassinations.
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Figure 13.9. Complexity Scores Over Time
The other aspect of the Method of assassination is the level of proximity between the 
target and the perpetrator. As with the complexity scale, the proximity scale ranges 
from cases with a low level of contact, where the assassm is not present at the scene, 
and these cases are scored as a T ,  to incidents at the high end of the contact scale, 
where the assassin is present, an ambush is used and a gun is used, which are scored 
as a ‘4’. The middle options on this scale, where the assassin is present and no gun is 
used, or the assassin is present and a gun is used, are scored as ‘2’ and ‘3’ 
respectively. This is presented in Figure 13.10.
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Figure 13.10. Proximity Scale
Figure 13.11 shows the frequency with which each of these ‘types’ of proximity 
appear in the sample. Attacks are most frequently scored as ‘3’, where the assassin is 
present, a gun is used, but there is no ambush.
3 0 0 -
W 2 0 0 -
2  3
Proximity Score
NB: Based on n = 395, due to exclusion of five cases on basis o f method
Figure 13.11. Frequency o f  Proximity Scores
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This reflects the finding on the frequency of the Complexity scale, where the attacks 
using a gun are the most common. The least common attacks are those which score 
highest on the contact scale, which makes sense as these incidents ar e likely to put 
the target at highest risk of apprehension, or injury. Attacks with lower contact are 
also relatively infrequent, again because they risk being ineffective.
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NB: Based on n = 395, due to exclusion o f five cases on basis o f method
Figure 13.12. Proximity Scores Over Time
Figure 13.12 shows the average score on the Proximity scale over time. Reflecting 
the finding on the Complexity scale, it appears that the level of contact is actually 
falling over time. A Spearman’s rho shows that this is a statistically significant 
relationship (rho= -.225, p <.001), showing that as time goes on, the level of contact 
between victim and offender falls. This suggests that perpetrators of assassinations
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aie reducing the level of contact over time, perhaps as a protective measur e to avoid 
capture or injury.
By scoring each case on both scales, it is possible to look at the relationship between 
scales, and therefore how aspects of the attack interact with one another. Spearman’s 
rho found a negative statistically significant correlation (rho = -.450, p <.001), 
showing that the two scales are indeed linked. This correlation shows tliat as the 
score on one scale increases, the score on the other scale tends to decrease, thus as 
the level of contact between assassin and tar get rises, the complexity of the weapon 
used tends to fall. At the same time, as the complexity of the weapon utilised by the 
assassin increases, the proximity between the assassin and victim can be reduced.
It is suggested that this relationship between the contact and weapon complexity 
involved in assassinations reflects an rmderlying element of decision making. When 
a complex weapon is selected by the assassin, it allows them to increase the distance 
between themselves and their tar get. The complexity of the weapon is likely to 
increase the risk posed to the assassin prior to tire offence, e.g. in gatliering the 
materials required to make a bomb, and being able to plant the bomb prior to the 
attack, but also affords a certain level of distance between the assassin and victim, 
thereby reducing their risk at the time of the attack. Thus, more preparation and 
potential risk prior to the attack, in somcing and placing the weapon, is likely to lead 
to a lower level of risk at the time of the attack, as there is no risk of capture at the 
scene, and no need to be at the scene at the same time as the target. Conversely, a 
manual attack which is low in weapon complexity requires a higher level of contact, 
as at the very least the assassin must be present. For instance, an assassin cannot use 
very low complexity weapons (e.g stabbing and/or manual attack) when the assassin 
is absent from the scene. Using these simpler methods means that the assassin is 
required to be present at the scene, and it necessitates a higher level of contact 
between the actors. Therefore at the low complexity end of the scale it may be easier 
to get the weapon and therefore less risk is incuned prior to the attack, but as it 
necessitates a higher level of contact at the time of the attack, this creates more risk 
and difficulty. An assassin who is present at the attack has to consider how they will
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get access to the target, how they will disguise their identity to prevent future 
detection, and how they will escape the scene. Thus although the weapon is lower 
risk, in terms of the essentials needed to fall in this category, the risk of captur e at the 
scene is increased.
13.5 COMPLEXITY AND CONTACT IN RELATION TO SPECIFICITY AND 
SITUATIONAL VULNERABILITY
Previously, the specificity and situational vulnerability of assassination incidents 
were modelled (see chapters 11 and 12), and these were also related to one another 
(see chapter 12). This section explores the relationship between both these aspects, 
and the complexity and contact of political assassinations.
Figur e 13.13 shows the average number of collateral victims according to each score 
on the Complexity scale. The most complex attacks incur* the most collateral victims, 
which makes sense as these attacks use explosive devices, which are likely to result 
in more damage than, for example, a stabbing.
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Figure 13.13. Average number of collateral victims according to Complexity Score
Similarly, Figure 13.14 shows the average number of collateral victims at each point 
on the Proximity scale. The highest number of collateral victims result from low 
proximity crimes, which again makes sense: low proximity crimes tend to utilise 
explosive devices rather than other weapons. Interestingly, the lowest number of 
collateral victims is where the attack scores ‘3’ on the Proximity scale, with a slight 
rise at scores o f‘4’. It is possible that in the closest attacks require or enable the 
perpetrator to attack people with the target at the time of the attack, e.g. bodyguards, 
family, friends etc.
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Figure 13.14. Average number of collateral victims according to Proximity Score
Mann-Whitney tests show that attacks where the assassin used a gun (mean rank =
177.82) the attack tends to result in fewer collateral victims than attacks where there 
were no gun ((mean rank = 223.28), U = 11047.5, p <.001, r = -.217). Attacks where 
the attacker used manual means to kill their target (mean rank = 144.97) tends to 
result in fewer collateral victims than attacks where a manual attack was not used 
((mean rank = 194.97), U = 4334, p = .003, r = -.152). Explosive devices result in 
statistically significantly more collateral victims (mean rank = 262.19) than attacks 
with no explosive devices ((mean rank = 174.03), U = 5879.5, p <.001, r = -.366). 
Suicide bomb attacks also result in statistically significantly more collateral victims 
(mean rank = 358) than attacks with no suicide bomb ((mean rank = 186.44), U = 
162, p <.001, r = -.278).
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As was discussed in chapters 10 and 12, two prominent terrorist groups, ETA and the 
IRA, were the two most prolific groups committing political assassinations in this 
sample. Chapter 12 found that tenorist group assassinations aie more specific than 
government-sponsored assassinations, and in paiticulai* found that ETA and IRA 
assassinations were specific, killing on average less than one person per attack. A 
closer examination of the methods used by these groups shows that there is a lot of 
similarity m the way they conduct the killings. ETA uses three of the methods 
identified previously, tending to use strategies with higher proximity and with less 
complex weapons, that is they utilise firearms and aie present at the scene (n = 14). 
Lower proximity incidents were used in three cases, with explosive devices and the 
assassin either present or not (n = 3). The types of method utilised by the IRA aie 
similai', with the majority involving an assassin at the scene and a fiieaim (n = 11). 
The remaining tluee cases aie tliose involving firearms and an ambush (n = 1), and 
explosive devices, with the assassin present (n = 1), with no assassin present (n = 1). 
In these cases specific attacks in terms of low bystander casualties are caixied out 
with more specific weapon choices. These findings suggest that the where a target is 
at risk from one of these groups, the risk seems more likely to come fiom a gunman, 
rather than an explosive device. As such, it may seem prudent to take steps to 
ameliorate the risk from firearms attacks, rather than focusing resources on risks of 
bombings. However, these conclusions are tentative, as they are based on small 
samples, and only cases where the attack was completed. It is possible that explosive 
devices are used more commonly by these groups, but these cases aie not sampled 
here.
In teims of the assassin’s presence at the scene, and how that affects the number of 
collateral victims, where the assassin is present at the scene of the attack, there are 
fewer collateral victims (mean rank = 182.34) than where the assassin is not present 
((mean rank = 239.74), U = 6143, p <.001, r = -.214). Where an ambush is used there 
aie more collateral victims (mean rank = 239.48) than where there is no ambush 
((mean rank = 186.15), U = 3891, p = .002, r = -.156).
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In addition to correlating the aspects of Situational Vulnerability, and the Method 
used, it is possible to correlate the aspects of situational vulnerability with 
complexity and proximity to identify if there is a relationship between these aspects 
of political assassinations. The results are shown in Table 13.3.
Table 13.3
Correlations between Accessibility, Preparedness, Complexity, Proximity
Accessibility Victim
Preparedness
Complexity Proximity
Accessibility Correlation
coefficient
Sig.
1.000
Victim
Preparedness
Correlation
coefficient
Sig.
-.050
.322
1.000
Complexity Correlation
coefficient
Sig.
-.202
.000
.173
.001
1.000
Proximity Correlation
coefficient
.146 -.081 -.459 1.000
Sig. .004 .109 .000
Bold text indicates significance at the .05 level.
Spearman’s rho found a negative statistically significant correlation (rho = -.202, p < 
.001) between the Accessibility and Complexity scales. This correlation shows that 
as the accessibility of the victhn rises the complexity reduces, and vice versa. There 
is also a statistically significant correlation between Accessibility and Proximity 
scale, (rho = .146, p < .001), this time positive, meaning that as one scale goes up, so 
too does the other. More accessible victims result in a higher level of contact 
between victim and assassin. In addition, the Victim Preparedness scale and 
Complexity scale show a statistically significant conelation (rho = .173, p = .001). 
These findings suggest that there are indeed links between aspects of political 
assassinations.
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13.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has examined two aspects of the methods used in political 
assassinations, in terms of the weaponry used and the contact between the assassin 
and the target. The findings suggest that underlying political assassinations there ar e 
two scales, describing the level of weapon complexity, and the level of proximity 
between the assassin and the taiget. These two combine to create ten possible 
methods, with differences dependent on where one looks on the two scales.
The findings suggest that political assassins ar e indeed rational decision makers, who 
select their cour se of action via a series of rational decisions, reflected in the 
relationship between the complexity and proximity scales. In addition, it is possible 
to relate these scales to the findings of previous chapters. In terms of Specificity, the 
attacks scoring highest on the Complexity scale are found to result in more collateral 
victims than lower complexity attacks, while attacks lower on the Proximity scale 
result in more collateral victims. Relationships were also found between aspects of 
situational vulnerability and method. These, along with other findings, will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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14. Discussion
14.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis set out to flirther the understanding of political assassinations by 
analysing die behaviours of both the assassm and the victim. As the first study to 
look at assassinations in this way, the project set out to clarify who the victims of 
assassinations are, who the peipetmtors are, and where political assassination 
incidents take place. Political assassinations are a serious problem, with this study 
alone finding an average of 22.2 attacks per year (see chapter 10) even within a small 
subset of all assassinations worldwide. As some have begun to acknowledge, with 
the existing research focusing on profiling attackers of senior politicians in the US 
(e.g. Kirkham et al., 1970, Fein and Vossekuil, 1998) or politicians and royal family 
members in Eui'ope (e.g. James et al., 2007), there is a requirement for broader 
research. The search for the ‘assassin personality’ is likely to be fi'uitless, and it 
seems that mstead there ai e a number of factors hi the assassination which are more 
worthy of research. Thus, rather than trying to identify the elusive ‘assassin 
personality’ this project took a wider sample of assassinations, in terms of location, 
nationality of victim, and profession/identity of the victim. This sample included 
assassinations, which occurred worldwide, against a whole range of victim types 
(including, but not restricted to politicians, diplomats, academics, and terrorists), and 
committed by individuals, terrorists and governments. Data were gathered from 
publicly available somces, and content analysed to provide numerical data for further 
analysis. Inferential statistics, and multidimensional scaling techniques were used to 
model certain aspects of assassinations, i.e. the situational vulnerability of the tar get, 
the specificity of political assassinations (in terms of the other victims of attacks), 
and the method used to kill the target.
The project has a clearly defined rationale for the choice of methodology (Yin, 2003, 
as discussed in chapter 7). There is a clear set of inclusion criteria, defined in chapter 
9. This specified that incidents would be completed attacks, rather than a 
combination of completed, attempted or threatened assassinations. This decision is
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supported by Fein and Vossekuil (1998) who found that many attackers do not make 
threats, and many threateners do not commit assassinations. However, there were 
some incidents in which die victim had received tlireats prior to their death, and this 
offers an opportunity for future research.
This thesis makes a valuable theoretical contribution to the understanding of political 
assassinations. Three models have been developed, which describe the Situational 
Vulnerability of victims of assassination (with the underlying dimensions of then* 
Accessibility and Preparedness), the Specificity of political assassinations, and the 
Method of assassination (with the underlying dimensions of weapon Complexity and 
Proximity between target and offender). These models, and the dimensions which 
comprise them, provide the first steps hi developing the knowledge regarding 
political assassinations, and how the behaviours of victim and assassin combine to 
result in different styles of assassination attack. The current chapter discusses the 
findings fiom the analysis, in light of the existing research, and in relation to one 
another. The limitations of the reseaidi are discussed, and suggestions ai e made for 
further research. Finally, the practical implications of these findings ai e discussed.
14.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS IN LIGHT OF THE LITERATURE
This section discusses the findmgs of the reseai ch, in light of the aims set out in 
chapter 9, and the existhig research. Table 14.1 provides a summary of the key 
findings. As discussed in chapter 9, the first aim of the reseaidi was to understand 
more about the behaviours of the peipetrators of political assassinations, and so, 
echoing the work of Fein and Vossekuil (1998), the focus of this research was less on 
the backgr ound and personality characteristics of tlie assassin, and more on the 
behaviours during the assassination. By not profiling the assassins themselves, this 
research has avoided many of the problems inherent in such research, as discussed in 
chapter 7.
However, some background characteristics were examined, and an interesting 
contrast was found with the existing research (with the exception of that by Fein and
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Table 14.1 
Key Findings
Chapter Finding Detail
11 Model of 
Accessibility
Can be modelled, using four variables, showing 
tliat there are 15 different ‘types’ of accessibility 
in this dataset, out of a possible 16 types.
11 Model of Victim 
Preparedness
Can be modelled, using three variables, showing 
that there are eight ‘types’ of victim 
preparedness in this sample, meaning that all 
possible combinations were found.
11 Model of Situational 
Vulnerability
A combination of Accessibility and Victim 
Preparedness, although these scales are not 
statistically correlated.
12 Model of Specificity Government-sponsored attacks result in 
statistically significantly more collateral victims 
than those perpetrated by teiTorist groups.
All types of perpetrator target both political and 
non-political individuals, with no statistically 
significant difference in the type of victim.
12 Specificity & 
Accessibility
The most Accessible attacks aie least Specific, 
and the least Accessible attacks are most 
Specific.
12 Specificity & Victim 
Preparedness
Attacks with the highest score on the Victim 
Prepaiedness scale resulted in the highest 
number of collateral victims.
13 Method of Attack Comprised of Complexity (of weapomy) & 
Proximity (between taiget and assassin). Ten 
‘types’ of method were identified in this sample.
There is a negative statistically significant 
relationship between Complexity and Proximity. 
Proximity appear s to be falling over time. 
Complexity appears to be increasing over time.
13 Victim Preparedness 
& Complexity
There is a positive statistically significant 
relationship between Complexity and Victim 
Preparedness.
13 Accessibility & 
Complexity
There is a negative statistically significant 
relationship between Complexity and 
Accessibility.
13 Accessibility & 
Proximity
There is a statistically significant relationship 
between Proximity and Accessibility.
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Vossekuil, 1998). The cases in this sample show little evidence of mental illness, 
whereas much of the previous research (e.g. Kirkham et al, 1970, Clarke, 1990) 
ar gued that mental illness was a key feature of those responsible for committing 
assassinations. It is possible that this difference arises because such details were not 
reported, and therefore were not present in the data used as the basis of the research. 
However, it does seem that in cases where the mental illness of tlie perpetrator was a 
featur'e of the attack (e.g. the killing of Anna Lindh) it is reported. However, as Fein 
and Vossekuil (1998) suggest, where plaiming was involved in assassinations, it is 
unlikely that mental illness is a prominent feature of the assassinations. The 
ar gument that assassins who are suffering with mental illness are not capable of 
planning the attack is offered further support from Rational Choice Theory (Clarke 
and Cornish, 1985), which suggests that crime is based on the rational decision 
making of offenders, which is unlikely to be possible for seriously mentally ill 
individuals. The findings of this resear ch do suggest a level of planning, or structure, 
in incidents of political assassination.
As discussed in chapter 7, the existing research on political assassinations focuses on 
attacks which are perpetrated by individuals working alone or in small groups. There 
is little research available which looks at the types of assassmation conducted by 
terrorist groups, or governments. Thus, in addition to findings related to teiTorist 
assassinations, this study also incorporates government sponsored assassinations. 
This is a difficult area, and is fraught with issues regarding how to define 
government sponsored assassinations, and the politics of them. Research seems 
focused on the legal, theoretical and ethical aspects of government sponsored 
assassinations, rather than an examination of the behaviour s present in them as 
another type of political assassination. For example, Israel is known to use 
assassinations as a tactic, describing them as ‘targeted killings’, rather than 
assassinations (Katz, 2006).
Victim behaviour/previous research
The second aim of tlie project was to look at the situations in which targets are most 
often killed, and how their preparedness can be quantified. In order to further the 
understanding of political assassinations, it is important to look at the behaviours of
291
the victims of the attacks, as these are related to, and have an influence on, the 
perpetr ator’s behaviour. As Biesterfeld and Meloy (2008) found in their study of 
terrorist perpetrated political assassinations, the target’s behaviour both influences 
and moulds the perpetrators’ plans. Routine Activity Theory (Cohen and Felson, 
1979) also argues that the behaviour s of the target can influence choices made by the 
offender (e.g. Birbeck and LaFree, 1993).
Situational Vulnerability -  Accessibility
Chapter 11 showed tliat the victims’ accessibility at the time of the assassination 
could be modelled, using variables which describe whether the target was outside or 
inside, in a public or private location, and in transit or stationary at the time of the 
attack, along with whether the attack was duihig the victims’ work or leisure time. At 
a basic level, it was found that targets who were in transit were less likely to be in a 
private place than when they were stationary, although this was likely to be an 
artefact of coding, as when the target was travelling in a car*, so long as they were not 
on private land, they were also considered to be in a public location. Chapter 11 also 
showed that when the victim was outside at tlie time of the attack, they were more 
likely to be in tr ansit than if they were inside. Again, this is likely to be due to the 
fact that travel outdoors (e.g. driving home from work) is far more common than 
travel indoors (e.g. walking between rooms). When the target was outdoors, they 
were less likely to be in a private location than when they are indoors, again this is 
likely to be simply because outdoor public locations ar e more common than outdoor 
private locations. In terms of the timing of an attack, when the victim was killed 
during their leisur e time, they were less likely to be tr avelling than tliose who were 
attacked in work tune. Relatedly, attacks during leisure time were also more likely to 
be in a private place than attacks during work time. Together, these findings suggest 
that attacks in leisure time are less accessible overall.
In the multidimensional analysis of the Accessibility variables, it was found that 
there are 16 theoretical categories of accessibility, with 15 of these containing cases 
of assassination. The one remaining category (Inside/Private/Work/Transit) is 
possible, but less likely to occur*. Most commonly, the assassination incidents in this 
sample occur* in public, outdoor locations, while the target is in transit, and during
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their leisure hour s. Conversely, the least frequent attacks occur in public, indoor 
locations, while the tar get is m transit, during work hours. Thus it would appear that 
attacks more frequently occurred in more accessible locations, and were less 
common in the least accessible locations.
The findings of this thesis offer support to the rational choice theory belief that a 
more accessible victim is more vulnerable to attack, as the majority of the attacks in 
this sample are in the more accessible locations. However, there are also attacks in 
less accessible locations, so the assassins clearly do not restrict their attacks on the 
basis of accessibility, or to just the simplest options available. It is possible though 
that they are influenced by other aspects, for example the weapons available to them, 
which may offer them the resources to target difficult to access victims. Birbeck and 
LaFree (1993) look at the selection of the situation in which criminals act, with 
offenders whose crimes are premeditated assessing various locations. It seems fr om 
this thesis that the location of attack is an important aspect of assassination, being 
related to both the complexity of the weapon, and the level of proximity between the 
perpetr ator and the victim.
The effect of the accessibility of the target on perpetrator behaviour was also 
examined by Fein and Vossekuil (1998) who found that assassins were somewhat 
opportunistic, and took the accessibility of the target into accoimt. Again the findings 
in this thesis echo this, as the victims of this sample ar e most commonly attacked in 
the most accessible locations. Similarly, James et al.(2007) also found that 22/24 
cases were at public functions or public places, that is, in situations which were more 
accessible to perpetrators of assassinations.
Situational Vulnerability -  Preparedness
The victim’s preparedness for an assassination was quantified by three variables in 
this sample: the existence of thr eats prior to their death, whether or not the victim 
had survived previous attempts on their life, and whether they had a bodyguard with 
them at the time of the attack which killed them. These were selected as they were 
perceived to reflect both the previous experiences of the target (threat/attempt), and 
the level of protection they had employed (bodyguard). The presence of these
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variables in this sample was low (most cases had no experience of any of the three 
variables), suggesting that either the targets had little experience of prior 
thr eats/attempts and did not employ protection, or that this was not reported. In 
addition, it is possible that in some cases a bodyguard was employed in some, but not 
all situations, hr future research, it would be of interest to examine this in more 
detail: where targets of assassination have protection in some situations, it may be 
possible that they ar e targeted when tlie bodyguar d is off duty. However, this was not 
within the scope of this research.
Initial findings show that previous attempts were more likely if the target had also 
previously received thr eats, than if there were no threats, suggesting that the previous 
experiences were related. In addition, where the target had a bodyguar d, they were 
more likely to have sirrwived a previous attempt than if there was no bodyguard. Thus 
it is possible that targets do learn from their previous experiences, and where they 
have a bodyguard it may be influenced by their survival of a previous experience. 
However, there was no relationsliip found between the existence of previous threats, 
and the presence of a bodyguard, suggesting that threats may not influence target 
behaviour. This echoes the findings of Fein and Vossekuil (1998) who argued that 
those who thieatened did not actually attack their target, and so those receiving 
threats are not at risk. However, as these individuals are in this sample, they were 
killed in an assassination, and so tliis warrants further investigation, for example, in 
terms of whether the threats were fi om the same person that committed the attack, or 
from different peipeü'ators.
The multidimensional analysis of these variables showed that there are eight ‘types’ 
of victim preparedness, all of which are present in the cuixent sample. Most 
commonly though, the victim had none of the ‘previous experiences’, with no 
thr eats, no attempts, and no bodyguard. The fact that most had not received tlireats 
prior to their death supports Fein and Vossekuil’s (1998) finding that threateners do 
not tend to become attackers, and that attackers do not tend to make threats. There 
are few cases where the tar get had received thr eats, survived a previous attempt, and 
employed a bodyguard, with this type forming the least fiequently occmxing type of 
attack.
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Birbeck and LaFree (1993) consider the victims’ role in crime, in terms of the 
presence of a guardian. Targets are more attractive to offenders when they are less 
well guarded. Again, this is found in the analysis of victim preparedness, with most 
attacks happening when there is no bodyguard present. James et al. (2007) had 
similar findings, in looking at attacks on European politicians (1190-2004). They 
found that “the presence of personal protection officers did not prevent eight of the 
attacks, including two of the most serious woundings” (p.339). In fact, in all fatal 
cases in their sample, the victim was unprotected. In addition, in the cur rent sample, 
attacks more commonly occur outside than inside. Thus guardianship is important, in 
the form of both people and objects, with bodyguards and buildings providing an 
element of protection. The victimisation is also said to relate to what the target means 
to the perpetrator, symbolically or materially (Birbeck and LaFree, 1993). As others 
have discussed (e.g. Clarke, 1990) the target of assassination is selected because they 
represent a hated authority, or because of the office or position they represent (e.g. 
Kirkham, Levy and Grotty, 1970). Thus it appear s that evidence to support RAT is 
present in political assassinations.
The presence of thr eats was also included in the ‘preparedness’ analysis, as it is seen 
to provide a warning that assassination attempts may occur*. Fein and Vossekuil
(1998) find that it is rare for direct threats to be made to either the potential target of 
the attack or to law enforcement about the target. This thesis has found that the 
victim’s accessibility is not statistically significantly related to the preparedness. If 
threats are rarely made, then this makes sense, as they would have little relationship 
to other aspects of situational vulnerability. In addition Dietz, Matthews, Van Duyne, 
Martell, Parry, Stewart, Warren and Crowder (1991a) fbrmd no relationship between 
verbal threats and likelihood of approach (with celebrities). Dietz et al (1991a) felt 
that the finding that there is no relationship between verbal thr eats and approach was 
contrary to the assumptions made regarding the “harassing communications” (p.208) 
received by their sample, in terms of assessing whether the police should be notified, 
security increased, or* an investigation conducted. Thus they thoroughly tested this 
finding, using a variety of aspects of the threatening statements in their sample, but 
repeatedly found that there was no relationship between threats and approaches. 
While the presence of thr eats was minimal in the crurent sample (wliich may be a
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sampling problem) the findings of Dietz et al (1991a) do suggest that these threats 
may be coincidental, rather than related to the attack itself. In a study of 
communications to congress members, Dietz, Matthews, Martell, Stewart, Hrouda, 
and Warren (1991b) found that writers who included threats were statistically 
significantly less likely to approach the target, which was later supported by Fein and 
Vossekuil’s (1998) similar finding. Therefore it is not just the contact that is 
important, but also tlie content of the contact, hi fact, those who threaten may be less 
likely to attack, so perhaps the existence of previous thr eats in this study reflects the 
low fiequency of previous thr eats in completed attacks. This should be explored 
further (see 14.4). Similarly, Fein and Vosskuil (1998) argue that threats do not relate 
to subsequent attacks. It is likely, if the findings of research such as Dietz et al 
(1991a, 1991b) and Fein and Vossekuil (1998) are correct, that the cases where 
threats are made form another sample entirely, resulting in fewer deaths.
Situational Vulnerability
The findings relating to the Accessibility of victims of assassmation and the Victim 
Preparedness were also scaled in chapter 11, assigning each case a score dependent 
on their experience. This showed that the most common score on the Accessibility 
scale was not the highest (i.e. most accessible) as would be expected, but instead was 
the second lowest. This suggests that there must be another factor underlying the 
decision making in selecting where the targets should be attacked, for example the 
methods (and resources) available to the assassin. Conversely, as is expected, the 
least prepared victims are most commonly targeted, in this sample, and the most 
prepared victims are least fiequently targeted, in tliis sample. This may be an artefact 
of the coding, but it could also be that where attacks are targeted at the most prepared 
victims, they are unsuccessful, and therefore are not a part of this sample (i.e. the 
targets do not die). Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is no relationship between these two 
aspects of Situational Vulnerability, that is there is no relationship between the 
accessibility of the victim at the time of the assassination, and their prepar ation for 
the attack. However, it is possible to examine the locations in which the best 
prepared victims are targeted, with chapter 11 showing that the higher the Victhn 
Preparedness score, the fewer different location ‘types’ that attacks take place in. 
However, the highest prepared victims are not targeted in the most accessible
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locations, but instead fall mid-way on the Accessibility scale. It is possible that the 
prepared targets do not often go into the most accessible types of regions (although it 
is not possible to show that from this sample), or it is possible that where a taiget of 
assassination has sui vived previous attempts, in subsequent attacks assassins ‘up 
their game’, choosing to target less accessible locations, where taigets may have 
lower expectations of attack, or be less protected. Of course, it could also be the case 
that these tar gets, who are well prepared, ar e just very high profile or very high risk 
individuals, and so are likely to be tar geted repeatedly (although again, this was not 
quantified here).
Overall, the situational vulnerability analysis enabled identification of locations and 
times when targets of political assassination may be at risk. This is the first time that 
the accessibility of victims of assassination has been examined. In addition, the 
victhn’s preparedness for an attack, in terms of their previous experiences and the 
presence of a bodyguard, has never been examined in tliis manner, although the 
relationship between threats and attacks has been considered (e.g. Fein and 
Vossekuil, 1998, James et al., 2007). Chapter 11 showed that there are few cases 
where the victim of assassination had been thr eatened prior to their death, and few 
where they had actually survived a previous attempt on their life. However, as 
mentioned above, this may be related to the data source, where thr eats and attempts 
may not be known about by the general public (and so the news media), or may not 
be reported by the news media. This is an area that certainly warrants further 
research, particularly because of the conflict between the existing research, with no 
consensus on whether threats really are predictive of friture violent behaviour*. In . 
addition, further* research looking at the presence of threats, previous attempts, and 
the presence of bodyguards in both completed assassinations and attempted 
assassinations would be beneficial to further* the rmderstanding in this area of 
political assassinations.
Specificity -  Type o f Perpetrator'
In light of the discussion in Part 1 regar ding assassinations as a form of terrorism, it 
seemed important to consider the wider impact of political assassinations, in terms of 
victims other than the intended target. Much of the debate centr es around the identity
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of the victim/target of assassination. Schmid, Jonhman and Stohl (1988) have argued 
that as assassinations are aimed at a very specific individual, they are not terrorism, 
as terrorism is aimed at a wider audience than assassinations. However, in Jenkins’ 
(1975) famous statement that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of 
people dead” (in Pape, 2003, p.4) there is a suggestion that terrorists may find 
political assassinations a viable tactic, as they are thought to kill just one person.
Thus political assassination seems a good tactic to use, in order to draw attention to 
the cause without incurring a lot of victims. However, an examination of the data 
suggests that political assassinations often tend to result in many victims other than 
the immediate target. In the cunent sample, roughly one thud resulted in victims 
other than the immediate target, and this appears to be increasing over time. Wilson 
et al (2010) examined the specificity of the political assassinations conducted by 
terrorist gioup ETA, and found that very few attacks had low specificity, i.e. most 
had just one victim. Therefore the specificity of political assassinations was 
examined, in particular in relation to the type of perpetrator.
Specificity -  Perpetrator Identity
The specificity of each assassination incident was examined in relation to the type of 
peipetrator behind tlie attack. The perpetrator was classified as either a teiTorist 
group, a government, or an individual/other, as discussed in chapter 9. The results 
presented in chapter 12 show that govermnent-sponsored attacks result in statistically 
significantly more collateral victims than those perpetrated by tenorist groups, 
mdividuals, or others. This is obviously a finding to be treated with caution, due to 
the difficulty in establisliing government involvement in assassinations. However, it 
does suggest that although governments may find benefits in assassination, they may 
be less beneficial for those in the same area as their targets. This finding, regarding 
the low specificity of government-sponsored assassinations, may be surprising at 
first, but may be in large part due to the type of weaponry used. These attacks tend to 
use explosives, in the form of grenades, aimed drones, and rockets, which could all 
be considered rather destructive weapons (for further discussion of specificity in 
relation to weapon types see chapter 13), and tend to result in more collateral victims 
than other weapon types.
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The finding that terrorist-perpetrated assassinations do result in victims other than the 
immediate target shows no support for Schmid et aPs (1988) argument, often 
incurring the death or injury of up to 20 individuals other than the target. Thus 
terrorist-perpetiated incidents are more specific than other types of assassins, rather 
than causing large numbers of casualties. However, it is possible that attacks which 
had higher numbers of casualties were teiTorist-peipetrated, but were not claimed, as 
terrorists may be wary of associating tliemselves with very destmctive incidents, as 
this may result in a loss of sympathy for their cause. This relates to tlie importance of 
terrorists’ maintaining the support of their community (Wilson and Lemanski, 2010). 
In addition, Sclimid et al’s (1988) ‘wider audience’ refers to the amount of attention 
a violent act will draw for ‘the cause’. Interestingly, much assassmation research 
(e.g. Clarke, 1990) ai'gues that (individual) assassins want tlie attention, which is 
reflected fi*om the death of their target. Thus in both fields the attention given to the 
cause/the perpetrator is a key aspect of the incident. Although not studied here, 
assassination obviously draws attention, as all cases in this sample were reported in 
the media. The after effects of these cases is certainly worthy of further research (see 
14.4).
Specificity ~ Type o f Victim
As well as the type of perpehator, the type of victim was also considered in the 
analysis of specificity. Government-sponsored assassinations result in statistically 
significantly more collateral victims who are bodyguaids than attacks perpetiated by 
other types of assassin, while terrorist groups are statistically significantly less likely 
to result in bodyguaid victims than non-terrorist attacks. However, as discussed in 
chapter 12, it is possible tliat this is simply because the individuals targeted by 
governments are propoifionally more likely to have a bodyguard than the individuals 
targeted by terrorist groups. This is likely to be because those targeted by 
governments (e.g. terrorists) would employ protection, meaning that bodyguards 
would be present in order to be harmed. Also, this finding may reflect the type of 
tar get chosen by terrorists, as tliey were less likely to have a bodyguar d victim. Thus 
terrorist attacks do not appear to be more dangerous to the general public than nori- 
tenorist attacks. Alternatively, it may be that those with bodyguards simply do not 
get killed so often as those without bodyguaids, due to the increased level of
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protection afforded them. Terrorist groups may wish to target prominent figmes (i.e. 
those who are likely to have bodyguards) but do not due to the presence of a 
bodyguard.
In addition to the distinction between bodyguard victims and other victims, the type 
of victim was also divided into political, or non-political. The findings suggest that 
all types of perpetrator target both political and non-political individuals, and it 
appears that there is no statistically significant difference in the type of victim 
targeted by perpetrators. Thus it seems that it is the perpetrator that is more important 
regarding the specificity of assassinations, rather than the type of victhn. This seems 
intuitively conect, as it is the perpetr ator who selects the location of the attack 
(although this may well be influenced by the target), and the method of the attack.
Specificity and Geographical Region
The geographical region in which the attack took place was examined, in order to 
identify potential ‘hotspots’. The concept of ‘hotspots’ comes fiom Routine 
Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), and suggests that there are certain 
places in which crime fiequently occurs. In this sample, assassination incidents were 
spread across 13 regions, plus a category for attacks where the region was unknown. 
However, the region did not appear to differentiate between specificity of attacks, 
nor between the type of victim (in terms of whether the target was a political figur e 
or not).
Specificity — with Accessibility
The specificity of the attack was also examined according to the variables utilised in 
the analysis of accessibility (see chapter 11), in order to identify the locations and 
times in which collateral victims are more likely, and so where mdividuals other than 
the target are likely to be more at risk. It appears that the type of victims (in terms of 
bodyguard victims, and others) varies depending on whether the target of 
assassmation was inside or outside at the time of the attack. Attacks ar e less likely to 
incur' bodyguard victims when inside than when outside. It is possible that this is 
because tar gets of assassination tend not to employ a bodyguard when they are likely 
to be mside, as they ar e not considered at risk in this location. This relates to Birbeck
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and LaFree’s (1993) discussion of guardianship in crime more generally; where 
tar gets are indoors, it is possible that the building itself is considered to provide 
guardianship for the target, while outdoors a bodyguard is required as a guardian. In 
addition, when targets are in tr ansit, there are more likely to be bodyguar d victims 
than when the target is stationary. Agam, it is possible that this is where bodyguards 
ar e employed by targets of assassination, as they are perceived to be more at risk 
when travelling. Finally, during working hours assassination incidents result in 
statistically significantly more collateral victims than attacks which occur during 
leisure hour s. It is possible that this is because targets who are attacked while 
working tend to have more people ar ound them, and so more opportunity for the 
attack to incur collateral victims. Alternatively, it may be that in order for the taiget 
of assassination to be killed during working hours, more destructive methods are 
required. It is suggested that future research should look at who the collateral victhns 
are in more detail, in order to establish who is at risk from political assassinations 
(beyond the immediate target), and where they are.
In addition, it is possible to compare the Accessibility of attacks with the Specificity, 
using the Accessibility scale identified in chapter 11, and discussed above. This 
found that the most accessible attacks are least specific, i.e. they resulted in the 
highest number of collateral victims. This is likely to be a feature of the location, as 
accessible locations are more likely to be open to everyone, and therefore there is the 
potential for more people to be at the scene of the attack. The least accessible attacks 
are the most specific, i.e. they have the fewest collateral victims. Again, this is 
probably due to the nature of the location, as these aie private places, fewer people 
have the opportunity to access the location, and where tliey aie indoors they may also 
be smaller spaces, and therefore limit the potential victims in that way.
Specificity -  with Victim Preparedness
In the same way, the scores on the Victhn Prepaiedness scale were compared with 
the level of specificity in assassination incidents. The lowest average number of 
collateral victims was incuired when cases scored ‘5’ on the scale, which was highest 
but one, i.e. when victims were reasonably well prepared for an attack (experiencing 
two of the three preparedness variables), the attack was specific, resulting in few
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collateral victims. However, attacks with the highest score on the Victim 
Preparedness scale resulted in the liighest number of collateral victims. It is 
suggested that the peipetmtors of assassinations utilise the most destructive methods 
(bombs etc) to get tlirough the ‘prepaiedness’ or to ensure that the attack is 
completed, since the taiget has previously suivived attempts on their life.
Method o f attack
Having established that political assassinations do result in victims other than the 
immediate target, the next step in this research was to look at the way the attacks aie 
carried out. The method of assassination was modelled m chapter 13, finding two 
underlying concepts; the complexity of the attack, in terms of the weapon used, and 
the proximity between die tai get and the assassin. In this sample, it was found that in 
the majority of cases the perpetrator was present at the scene of the attack, but there 
were very few cases in which an ambush was used. In terms of the weapons used, 
firearms were the most commonly used, but explosive devices (including suicide 
bombs) and manual methods (e.g. strangulation, beating) were also used. A total of 
16 different types of method were identified in chapter 13, of which ten were present 
in the cuirent sample. In the most common type of attack in the sample, the assassin 
was present at the scene of the attack, and a gun was used to shoot the target.
The weapon used is ar gued to form a scale of Complexity, which reflects the 
complexity of the weapon used, ranging fi om the simplest manual methods, to the 
most complex explosive devices. The majority of the cases in this sample scored 
mid-way on the Complexity scale (i.e. the weapon used is a firearm), with the 
average level of Complexity shown in assassinations appearing to increase over time. 
In other research fields, the weapon used is suggested to reflect underlying aspects of 
the offender or the attack. For example, Fritzon and Binn (2005) suggest that the use 
of a manual weapon reflects tliat the perpetrator is “actmg out internal pressures, 
rather than targeting a specific victim fiom whom he stands to gain directly” (p.60). 
With political assassination research finding that the victim of assassination is 
incidental to the assassin, rather than being selected because of any direct 
relationship between them (Fein and Vossekuil, 1998), it is possible that the methods 
chosen also relate to motivation for perpetrators of assassinations. Manual attacks
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have been shown to require a closer level of proximity between perpetrator and 
victim, and it could be ar gued that these require a lower level of planning and 
therefore may be reflective of a more spontaneous or impulsive attack than those 
with more complex weapons, requiring more plarming. Thus manual attacks may 
reflect a more personal, less planned, attack. Similarly, in Salfati and Canter’s (1999) 
examination of expressive/insti'umental aggression, they discuss the perpetrator’s use 
of a manual weapon being due to “the power inherent in a weapon was not needed to 
incapacitate the victim” (p.401). This appears to be the case in assassinations, as the 
preparedness of the victim falls so too does the complexity of the weapon used, 
suggesting that the where the victim is less expectant and less guarded, a less 
complex weapon is required. Salfati (2003) develops the work of Salfati and Canter
(1999), suggesting that particular features of homicide are indicative of a more 
impulsive and emotional attack. For example the victim being found with multiple 
wounds to one area of the body, the victim being fbrmd face up and imcovered, and 
the victim not being moved after the attack ar e all suggested as representative of a 
“frenzied” (Salfati, 2003, p.503) attack, prompted by an argument of some kind, 
ratlier than an organised, planned attack. Interestingly, the government and terrorist 
attacks tend not to use manual weapons, suggesting that these may be the more 
planned and organised attacks, which also makes intuitive sense.
Pape (2003) also considered the methods used by offenders, in this case examining 
teiToiist groups’ use of suicide bombers. He suggests that suicide bombers ar e able to 
gain access to heavily guarded targets more easily because they do not need to 
escape after the attack. Suicide bombs are used in this sample, and it is possible that 
tliis is part of what differentiates them from the other types of explosive device. Pape 
(2003) suggests that the purpose of suicide terrorism is not just to hit the target, but it 
is much more about making the “opposing society” (p.346) think that they are 
vulnerable to future attacks. This relates back to terrorism definitions in that 
terrorism is designed to induce fear. Pape (2003) also argues that suicide terrorism 
largely tar gets civilians. Considering this in relation to political assassination, suicide 
terrorism does seem to be used specifically to hit targets, i.e. the politician/public 
figiue, and suicide bombers tend to get closer to their target in order to kill them. 
While Pape (2003) suggests that civilians are the main target of such attacks, when
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they are used in political assassinations it may offer dual benefits, that is the main 
target is killed, and bystanders are also wounded. Thus there may be a subset of 
suicide bombers who have a specific target, and are trying to ‘kill two birds with one 
stone’, harming these at the same time as the civilians. Enders and Sandler (2005) 
fbrmd that following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, although the number of terrorist 
incidents did not increase, “the composition of events” changed, “with terrorists 
relying on deadly bombings to a greater extent than ever before, and engaging in a 
very low proportion of complex hostage-taking missions” (p.260). Similar ly, the 
findings fiom this project suggest that there is in fact an increase in the complexity of 
weapons used in assassinations over time, although obviously this sample is not 
solely terrorist.
The existing research looks at individual perpetrators of political assassinations, and 
tends not to include group attacks (although Fein and Vossekuil, 1998, include six 
attacks where a group was responsible, rather than a single individual), terrorist 
perpetrated attacks, or government sponsored attacks. In one of the few studies 
which examine terrorist perpetrated assassinations, Biesterfeld and Meloy (2008) 
suggest that there may be a subgroup of assassinations which are terrorist 
perpetrated, and the findings presented in tliis thesis support this; approximately one 
quarter of the sample are claimed by terrorist groups. Aside fi om this research, in 
other fields there is much discussion about the use of assassinations by terrorist 
groups. For example, Enders and Sandler (2006) suggest that terrorist groups such as 
al-Qaeda may prefer acts such as bombings as they are found to be logistically 
simple, when compaied to assassinations, which are logistically more complicated. 
While at first this makes sense, it does not addi ess the issue of assassinations where a 
bomb is used, which are not mentioned by Enders and Sandler (2006). Chapter 13 
examined the method of assassination, aiguing that in fact a bombing is a complex 
method of attack, due to the natiu e of the weapon and the knowledge and materials 
needed to create a bomb. This obviously contradicts Enders and Sandler’s (2006) 
conclusion, but it is possible that although bombs are the most complex form of 
assassination, they aie also the least complex form of terrorism, as shown in Figure 
14.1.
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Figure 14.1. Suggested complexity of bombings
The least complex acts of assassination are far simpler than the most complex acts of 
terrorism, comprised as they are of manual killings with no, or very basic, weapons. 
Thus bombings ar e one of the most complex weapon types in terms of assassination. 
As Figur e 14,1 suggests, the bombings are where the two types of violence overlap. 
The range of acts which comprise terrorism can be far more complex than bombings 
(e.g. hostage taking incidents). However, it appears that the terrorist incidents in this 
sample tend to use the less complex weapomy, with ETA and the IRA more 
commonly using JSreaims than bomb attacks. These result in more specific attacks, 
with fewer collateral victims. This contr asts with the ar guments presented in the 
‘new terrorism’ literatur e (as discussed by Crenshaw, 2006), which argues that 
modern tenorists have little concern for civilian life and are happy to kill many 
individuals. Thus the use of assassinations by terrorist groups appears to be a 
complicated ar ea, particulaiiy when considered in relation to other types of terrorism, 
and the relevant outcomes.
The other aspect of the method of political assassinations considered in this thesis 
was the proximity between victim and attacker, with findings suggesting that this 
varied with the type of weapon used. The majority of attacks in this sample have 
reasonably high levels of contact, and similarly, James et al.(2007) found that in 20 
out of 24 cases of (attempted and completed) attacks on European politicians the 
perpetrator and target were in close proximity (within 2m). In terms of the Proximity 
scale, most cases in this sample score reasonably highly, with the level of Proxhnity 
in assassination mcidents appearing to fall over time. In addition, the Complexity of 
political assassinations has been found to increase over time. It is suggested that this 
increase in complexity may be because of the increasing availability of information, 
via the development of the internet and modern technology, and so more complex
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weapons can be used by the assassin. By increasing the complexity of the attack, the 
perpetrator can reduce then: proximity to the victim, thus reducing their risk of 
apprehension at the scene of the assassination (as they aie less likely to be at the 
scene). With the two scales proving to be negatively correlated, the implication is 
that there is some kind of ‘trade-off between the proximity and complexity, thus 
indicating that there is some element of rational decision making in assassinations, in 
that assassins appear to weigh up the costs and benefits of the various methods 
available to them.
Method & Specificity
As with the other aspects of political assassinations, the method was considered in 
relation to the specificity of the attack. Perhaps unsuiprisingly, the most complex 
attacks resulted in the most collateral victims, as the most complex weapons aie 
explosive devices. An explosive device has more potential for causing collateral 
damage than, for example, a manual attack where the target is strangled or stabbed. 
Attacks where guns aie used result in fewer collateral victims than non-gun attacks, 
and manual attacks result in fewer collateral victims than non-manual attacks. 
Conversely, attacks where explosive devices aie used (including suicide bombs) 
result in higher numbers of collateral victims than attacks where non-explosive 
devices are used.
In terms of Proximity and Specificity, the assassination incidents with the lowest 
proximity result in the most collateral victims, and the incidents with the highest 
proximity result in the fewest collateral victims. This is intuitive, with the attacks 
with most contact between assassin and victim incuiring the least victims, as there is 
both a lower likelihood of mistakes, and the weapons used tend to be less destructive 
(e.g. strangulation), whereas the less proximal attacks, by theii* nature, use explosive 
devices, which are more destructive. Looking more specifically at weapon types, 
Pape (2003) found that suicide bomb attacks aie typically more destructive than 
other types of tenorism. This is supported by these findings, with suicide bombs 
being in the most complex category of attacks. Fui ther to these findings, where the 
assassin is present, there aie fewer collateral victims compared to attacks when the
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assassin is not present, although this is likely to be related to the weapon choice, as 
described previously.
Finally, the scales of Complexity and Proximity were examined in relation to the 
Accessibility and Preparedness scales identified in chapter 11. A negative, 
statistically significant con elation was found between Accessibility and Complexity, 
suggesting that assassins may take aspects of the victims’ location into account, and 
therefore that aspects of the victim can influence the assassins’ decision making. 
Accessibility was also statistically significantly correlated to the Proximity scale, 
with more the accessible victims experiencing a higher level of proximity, and vice 
versa. This suggests that assassins compensate with more complex weapons when 
the tai'get is in a less accessible region. Lastly, Victim Preparedness and Complexity 
are statistically significantly correlated, with the more prepared targets being targeted 
with more complex weapons, presumably to ensure the death of the target, and 
because the less prepared victims require less complex attacks.
14.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
Despite the valuable contribution that this research makes to the understanding of 
incidents of political assassination, there are limitations to these findings. The use of 
newspaper ar ticles in Üiis study may be criticised for inaccuracy, or for providing 
biased accounts of events. In the case of political assassinations, it is not feasible to 
use direct data collection techniques, such as questionnaires or interviews, because 
the victim is dead, and the attacker is irmeachable either because they are dead, 
incar cerated, or unknown.
Witnesses and bystanders may seem like a positive option for collecting data on 
political assassinations, as they ar e present at the scene and witnessed exactly what 
happened. However, it has been demonstrated that eyewitness testimony can be 
umeliable (Semmler and Brewer, 2010), and this has been highlighted by the number 
of cases in the US (more than 200) where DNA evidence has exonerated those 
convicted of and incarcerated for serious crimes, on the basis of eyewitness
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testimony (Innocence Project, 2007). The research has found that there are many 
factors which influence the witnesses’ recollection of a crime, including physical 
aspects of the location, and aspects of the perpetrator. For example, the bigger the 
distance between the witness and the crime, the less likely the witness is to be able to 
identify the offender in a photo array, and the less detailed and accurate their 
description of the offender will be (Lindsay, Semmler, Weber, Brewer and Lindsay, 
2008). The exposur e time, during which the witness sees the offender, is an 
influential factor on tlie accur acy of memory (Memon, Hope and Bull, 2003, 
Valentine, Pickering and Darling, 2003).
In terms of features of the perpetrator, offenders with unusual looks are easier to 
identify, which although may seem beneficial, can lead to witness overconfidence, 
wlirch is not supported by the accur acy of their statement (Read, 1995). Witnesses 
are also more likely to remember offenders who act in an unusual manner, or who 
say imexpected things (Tuckey and Brewer, 2003). The ‘cross-race’ effect shows that 
when witnesses are trying to identify an offender from a different race, they are less 
likely to recognise the offender in a photo array, and when the actual offender is not 
present in the array, they are more likely to incorrectly identify and innocent person 
(Meissner and Brigham, 2001). Similar findings are also present across age 
differences, and gender differences (e.g. Wright and Sladden, 2003). Changes to the 
offenders hairstyle, or the addition or removal of glasses, can both significantly 
influence accirracy in witness recognition of faces (Patterson and Baddeley, 1977, 
Read, 1995), and the wearing of a hat to disguise a hairline can reduce the witnesses’ 
accur acy in identification of the perpetrator (Yarmey, 2010)
Whether or not the offender is carTying a weapon also influences their value as an 
eyewitness: when a person witnesses a crime committed by a person carrying a 
weapon, they are less likely to be able to identify the offender. It is suggested that 
this because the witnesses’ attention is drawn to the weapon, rather than the face of 
the offender (Loftus, Loftus and Messo, 1987). In political assassinations, weapons 
are extremely likely to be present (particularJy as the majority involve firearms), and 
so there is a big risk that the witnesses will be affected by this. Stress or anxiety 
experienced by the witness diuing the event is also shown to have an effect on
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memory, although not necessarily in the expected mamier. Stress can actually 
increase the accuracy of recall of ‘central details’ of the event, although it can also 
reduce the level of detail that is recalled about ‘peripheral details’ (Christianson, 
1992). As witnesses and bystanders in political assassinations are likely to have 
experienced some distress at being present dur ing such events, it seems that this 
especially may affect the value of their recall. However, in this area there are mixed 
results, highlighting the difficulty of not only conducting research in tliis area, but 
also the difficulty in understanding what it is that influences eyewitnesses.
Interactions with other witnesses can also influence witness reports, where they take 
place prior to police interviews. This is likely to be a problem within political 
assassinations, because in such high profile or dramatic events, witnesses are bound 
to discuss what they saw. In particular", the first witness report is likely to influence 
or even change the report of the second witness (Gabbert, Memon, and Allan, 2003). 
Loftus (1992) found that television reports and newspaper accounts can also cause 
witnesses to acquire new infor*mation about the event or the perpetrator during the 
retention interval. This is related to the ‘post-event misinformation effect’, which 
describes what happens when a witness is given new information or details after they 
have first given their account. It is found that this new information is incorporated 
into the witnesses’ memory, and they are likely to subsequently report this as 
something which they actually saw (Gerrie, Garry and Loftus, 2005). This proves 
problematic as the police tend to view corroboration between witness reports as an 
indication of reliability. If the first witness was incorrect, or the media reports were 
inaccurate, this may lead the investigation to follow the wi'ong avenue. In research, it 
would result in research being based on inaccurate data. More specifically, when 
witnesses speak to the police regarding events, one of the most important aspects is 
the description of the offender. One of the weaknesses of the cmTent data soui'ce is 
the lack of information regarding the offender. It may be thought that eyewitness 
accounts may offer a way to build on this, but research shows that witnesses tend not 
to given detailed accounts or description of the offender (Meissner, Sporer and 
Schooler, 2007).
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Cleaiiy then, eyewitness testimony has its drawbacks, and as in the cmient research 
it is often not possible to conduct direct research with such individuals. Police or 
security files containing information about the incident would be a preferred data 
source, but such sources are not available due to secmity concerns. Witliout tliese 
data sour ces, this study, like many others tur ned to the use of newspaper and other- 
credible reports. Broadsheets in particular ar e used as it is likely that they will give a 
more reliable and unbiased account of events. Tabloid newspapers tend to 
“sensationalise the stories”, and as Schaffer (1995) reports, tabloid newspaper reports 
ar e often unr eliable in terms of the news value of featmes. In addition, other research 
using newspaper articles as data has shown that there are highly structured patterns 
of behaviom", for example in the literature on hijacking (Wilson, 2000). As Wilson
(2000) points out, it is important when analysing data from newspaper articles that 
the absence of a particular featur e in a report should not be taken to mean that it did 
not happen. Rather, it could just mean that it was not reported. Thus, although 
newspaper reports are the best data source available for such research, they should be 
used with caution, and while considering that they ar e imlikely to contain all details 
of these events. Nevertheless, the success of numerous previous studies using 
newspaper reports, or data bases derived from newspaper reports, overcomes the 
potential shortcomings of the data, and the models developed can be tested by 
security/law enforcement personnel witli their own in house data to see whether tire 
principles stand (Wilson 2000).
A further potential limitation to the data somces used here is that they were limited to 
UK-based news sources, which are likely to show bias in the political assassination 
incidents they report, in terms of the location of incidents. The majority of attacks in 
this data set come from Western Europe. It is likely that, rather than Western Europe 
being a hotspot for assassinations, the sample shows some bias due to the data 
sour ces. Although nearly thr ee quarters of the sample is fr om other regions, it would 
certainly be beneficial to expand the data sources to include international news 
somces, thereby broadening the population fr om which cases are drawn. The use of 
internet resomces should also be considered, for example online news websites such 
as the BBC and CNN. These may provide a fuller pictme of the incident, and allow 
for more complete data analysis. In addition, it may be wise to review the coding
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scheme used: for example, any incident where the victim was moving was coded as 
‘in transit’. However, incidents in which the target is simply walking through their 
home, stepping into a lift in their apartment building, etc, is a rather different incident 
to that where the target is driving between locations, or walking down the street.
Thus this variable may benefit from a revision, although it should be noted that the 
coding scheme did achieve a good level of inter-rater reliability (see chapter 9).
Part of this research has highlighted the locations in which assassinations most 
commonly occur. However, there is no data on how many times likely targets are 
actually in these locations, i.e. although 10 people may die in location A, the 
significance of this finding varies depending on whether 20 people attend location A 
and do not die (a 50% chance of death), or 100 people attend location A and do not 
die (a 10% chance of death). Thus the addition of this information would enliance 
understanding of just how risky certain places are. In addition, as the research 
suggests that planning seems to happen, and that attacks are premeditated, it is 
possible that one aspect of this would be to observe and/or investigate the target prior 
to attack. Therefore likely targets (along with staff, fiiends, and family) should be 
advised to maintain a sense of alertness to people they do not recognise, or who seem 
out of place.
14.4 FUTURE RESEARCH
Although this thesis has produced a valuable insight into the nature of political 
assassinations, there is still much research to be done in this field. First, and perhaps 
most obviously, a comparison of attempted and completed assassinations should be 
carried out. Scholes and Wilson (2011) have begun to look at the methods used in 
terrorist-perpetrated assassinations, and whether these vary according to whether the 
assassination was completed, or was an attempt. This thesis has examined some 
aspects of completed assassinations, and the next stage is to see where the 
unsuccessfid assassinations occur". This would show, for example, whether there are 
situations or locations in which attacks ar e less likely to be completed. It would also 
be interesting to examine the identity of perpetrators of attempted assassinations, to
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see if, for example, terrorist groups (who are experienced in planning and carrying 
out acts of violence) have a better success rate than individual assassins. The identity 
of the targets of attempted assassinations is also of interest, that is whether the same 
types of target are subject to repeated attempts, and whether some are more likely to 
sui'vive attacks than others. Also, where a tar get is subject of repeated assassination 
attempts, it would be of use to determine whether these ar e repeated attempts by the 
same perpetrator, or single attempts by multiple perpetrators. In addition, where the 
repeated attempts are by the same perpetrator, is there any evidence of Teaming’ 
from failure, and improvement of str ategies. In other types of offending. Social 
Learning Theory (SLT) has been used to explain behaviour, arguing that individuals 
see certain behaviour s in others ar ound them, learn both the reactions to and 
consequences of these behaviour s, and then replicate (or avoid) these, in order to 
gain the same outcome (Bandura, 1969).
The examination and comparison of completed and unsuccessful attacks would also 
be beneficial to furtlrer understanding of how the victim’s preparedness for an attack 
influences the offender behaviour*. As chapter 11 discussed, the presence of previous 
threats, attempts, or the presence of a bodyguard was low in this sample, and it was 
found that the majority of attacks were against tar gets who had none of these 
featur es. In future research, both types of attack (completed and imsuccessful) should 
be examined, to identify whether the more prepared potential victims are simply not 
tar geted at all (explaining their non-appearance in the cun ent sample), or whether 
attacks targeted at more prepar ed individuals are simply imsuccessful, with the target 
surviving the attack. Tliis would offer more insight into the ways in which tlireats 
and previous attempts can be used to identify the likelihood of subsequent attacks.
Although the offender’s actual internal decision making process caimot be 
determined, it is possible to look at what they do and see whether that reflects any 
element of rationality. To a certain extent, it could be argued that, from the assassin’s 
perspective, all decisions made regarding the attack (at least in this sample) ar e 
‘good’, because all cases in this sample resulted in the death of the target. In 
attempted assassinations the decision making may not be so good, as, again from the 
assassin’s perspective, the decisions do not result in a positive outcome. In addition.
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if decisions aie made that do not have positive results, at least in the eaiiy stages of 
planning, it is possible that they aie never known about, as nothing ever comes of 
these bad decisions.
The issue of thi eats made to targets of assassination ai e also worthy of more 
research. Although Fein and Vossekuil (1998) found that threateners rarely attack, 
and attackers rarely thr eaten, some of the victims in this sample did receive threats 
prior to their death. Investigation of thr eats would take two forms. First, analysis of 
the threats themselves: the form they take (i.e. letter, telephone calls, emails), who 
they are from, and most importantly their content. Dietz et al (1991a, 1991b) have 
studied the communications made to celebrities and politicians by stalkers and 
approachers. For example, in celebrity cases, writers who approach their target write 
significantly more letters, although there is no relationship between the presence of 
verbal threats, and the likelihood of an approach being made (Dietz et al, 1991a). In a 
study of communications to members of the US Congress, Dietz et al (1991b) found 
a significant relationship between the presence of identifying information in the 
communication, and the likelihood of approach, although there was a difficulty in 
linking the writers of the anonymous letters received with the identity of the 
inappropriate approachers. In terms of tire type of communication, Dietz et al 
(1991b) found that where letter wr iters also telephoned members of Congr ess, they 
were significantly more likely to approach their target. Thus there is likely to be a lot 
of interest in the cornmimications towards victims of political assassinations. 
Unfortunately this resear ch is beyond the scope of this study, as access to the 
thr eatening materials would be required. The second aspect of studying tlireats 
relates to the identity of the thr eateners. In light of Fein and Vossekuil’s (1998) 
findings, it would be worthwhile to look in more detail at the threats received by 
members of this sample. There is little detail available about the thr eats, and it would 
be useful to know details such as whether the threateners were the same people as the 
attackers, and whether the threats related to the subsequent attack.
The motivations for assassinations have been considered by a number of researchers 
(e.g. Fein and Vossekuil, 1998), with the suggestion that some assassins are 
motivated by a desire for political change. This is echoed by Kirkham et al. (1970),
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who suggest that a criteria for classing an act as a political assassination is tliat it has 
a political impact. However, this political impact is not quantified in any way, and 
the resulting political change is not evaluated. Thus here is an area for development. 
The outcomes of assassination are unknown, for example, whether change does 
happen following an assassination, in what ways that change might occur, and 
whetlier tire assassin is satisfied with the changes. In particular, given that terrorist 
groups are driven by a desire to induce political changes, it would be of interest to 
determine whether terrorist peipetiated assassinations have different outcomes to 
non-terrorist assassinations. Where governments use assassinations, it tends to be as 
a method of inducing regime change, and thus understanding if this happens is 
valuable in establishing whether the motivations of the perpetiator ar e met by the act. 
Relatedly, the outcome for the assassin is of interest. Again, this was not addr essed in 
this thesis as the outcome for the assassin was rar ely reported, but using other 
sour ces (e.g. court records) it may be possible to see if the perpetrators were 
identified, apprehended, charged, convicted, and so on. In particular, it would be of 
interest to investigate whether the nature of the assassination incident affected the 
likelihood of the perpetrator being caught, with certain ‘types’ of assassination 
placing assassins at higher risk of apprehension.
Finally, the understanding of how and why victims of assassination ar e targeted 
should be examined in futiue research. Fein and Vossekuil (1998) suggest that 
targets are selected on the basis of what the target can offer the attacker (i.e. how 
much attention will be reflected onto the assassin because of the position of the 
victim), rather than because of any relationship (perceived or actual) between the 
victim and offender, or because of any personal reasons held by the assassin. 
Conversely, others suggest that the assassin is driven by a generalised hatred for 
authority, and that the tar get is selected on the basis that they are representative of 
the much-hated authority (e.g. Clarke, 1990). Again, research intending to 
understand the selection of victims of assassination would require access to the 
assassins themselves, which, as discussed previously, would be difficult to achieve.
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14.5 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
There are a number of practical implications that can be drawn from the findings of 
this thesis. Ffrst, looking at the accessibility of victims of assassination, it is clear that 
individuals are tar geted in a range of locations, both public and private, and indoors 
and outdoors. Although this does suggest that there are no ‘safe places’, it also 
highlights the need for potential targets to be vigilant in all areas, rather tlian 
assuming that they may be safer in certain places, and lessening safety precautions.
In particular*, the finding that victims are often targeted in private, indoor* locations 
suggests that precautions should be taken here, for example extra physical security or 
ensur ing that cars are checked for devices before using them. This relates to the 
finding that Accessibility is related to Complexity: the more accessible a victim is, 
the less complex the attack tends to be. Therefore, when a potential target is in less 
accessible places, it may be prudent to be alert to the likelihood of a bombing (e.g. a 
car bomb, or* a letter* bomb sent to a home or* work address). When in more accessible 
places (and this also relates to Proximity), it may be beneficial for potential tar gets to 
be aware of those around them, and to be vigilant of any individuals who they 
perceive to be acting unusually. In addition, this research has found that the more 
prepared a victim is for an attack (in ter*ms of threats, attempts, and presence of a 
bodyguard), the higher in complexity the weapon tends to be. Therefore, individuals 
who have received threats, who have sur*vived attempts in the past, or* who have a 
bodyguard (in any combination) may be more at risk from an explosive device than a 
manual attack. Therefore, relevant precautions should be taken. Equally, if they have 
not experienced any of these behaviours, they may be at more r*isk from manual 
attacks, and so should be cautious of individuals who approach them.
In addition, this research has shown that, in contrast to the focus of previous studies, 
the thr eat of assassination does not just come from individuals, but also comes fr om 
terTorists, groups of individuals, and governments. Thus assassinations should be 
incorporated in the consideration of terr orist tin eat. Although these incidents are 
seemingly different to ‘traditional’ terTorism, they are used as a tactic by terrorists. In 
addition, they are actually less dangerous (with fewer collateral victims, as discussed 
in chapter 13) than non-terrorist attacks. Where the thr eat does not come from
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terrorist groups then, authorities should be prepared that there may be additional 
casualties, and take precautions to avoid this. Of cour se, terrorist incidents do cause 
victims other than the tar get, but they tend to be fewer than assassinations committed 
by other types of perpetrator.
Examination of the perpetrators of political assassinations also found that 
governments do conduct such attacks, and that somewhat controversially, these 
appear* to result in more collateral victims than non-government assassinations. As 
discussed previously (14.4), assassinations tend to be used by governments in order 
to effect regime change, or* as a way to remove those perceived as ‘dangerous 
terrorists’. It is likely that, particularly in regime-change situations, a gover*nment 
employing these tactics would want to maintain the support of the local community. 
Given the apparent lack of success in the specificity of targeting measur es in the 
current (admittedly small) sample, it would seem wise for* governments to explore 
alternative methods before resorting to these types of assassination.
As discussed in chapters 12 and 13, it may be possible that the tactics used by 
individual terrorist gr oups could be identified. Looking specifically at the political 
assassinations committed by ETA and the IRA in this sample, it is possible to see 
tliat they tend to utilise shootings, with an assassin at the scene, rather* tlian attacks 
based on explosive devices. These types of attacks have been shown to be more 
specific than other types of attacks (in both weapon type, and compar ed to other* 
types of perpetrators). They also suggest that if the source of the threat is known, it 
may be possible to tailor the precautions taken on the basis of their known 
behaviours. For example, if it is known that ETA rar ely use bomb attacks, but 
frequently use firearms attacks, resources could be directed towards prevention of 
these kinds of attacks. Of course, this research is based on small sample sizes, and as 
such should be treated with caution; however, Wilson et al. (2010) have come to 
similar* conclusions. Leaving the issue of small sample sizes to one side, the models 
developed here can be taken and applied to studying any terrorist gr oup of interest, 
and their current strategies for* attack ‘mapped on’ to the models. This would allow 
analysts to compare different groups to one another* or to examine how a named 
group may be changing their* behaviour* over time.
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The type of attack used by terrorist groups may also relate to the identity of the 
tai'get. It is possible that assassinations are used by terrorist groups as a paiticular 
means of removing specific individuals. In this sample, and paiticulaiiy in the attacks 
claimed by the IRA, the targets are chosen for a specific reason. For example, 
because of a grievance, a disagreement, or because of action by the target which has 
annoyed the group. Thus the purpose of the attack was to kill that individual, or to 
send a message to a particular- gr oup, rather than to send a terror-laden message to 
the general public. Thus in some instances, assassinations may be used for very 
particular purposes, and this is something that may benefit from further research.
This research has also shown that assassinations are not always specific. Existing 
research looks at the immediate target of the attack, and neglects consideration of 
any other victims as a result of the attack. This project has shown that there are other 
people killed and injured in assassinations, both bodyguards and non-bodyguards. 
Hence assassinations pose a risk to a wider group than the immediate targets. This 
should be examined in more detail, as at present the category of ‘civilian victims’ 
does not differentiate between completely innocent bystanders, and others who were 
at the scene because of their link to the immediate target (e.g. family, support staff). 
This was not done in the present study due to data limitations, but it is wortli 
investigating, to establish whether innocent bystanders really are at risk. Regardless, 
authorities should be aware that attacks do result in other victims. Perhaps when it is 
believed that targets are under threat, they should avoid crowded locations. Although 
this may not necessarily remove the risk to them, it may reduce the risk of other 
deaths.
The analysis of weapons used in assassinations found that the majority of attacks 
utilise guns. It is possible that body armour may afford tar gets an extr a level of 
protection against such attacks, particularly when outdoors and so most at risk. Also, 
as the most common attack is shooting precautions could be taken, such as 
implementing metal detectors in locations the tar get attends, scanning the area for 
shooters, etc. Bombs are also widely used, although less common than guns. Checks 
for bombs can be relatively simple, for example (as mentioned above) checking 
under cars of tar gets, or checking parked cars. As some victims were killed by car
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bombs left on roadsides, it is worthwhile potential tar gets changing their routines (as 
often recommended by embassies, and other high risk employers) and taking a 
variety of routes between work and home. Suicide bombs ar e also used, and these 
tend to require close contact between tar get and assassin, so it may be wise 
(par ticularly for high profile individuals) to keep members of the public away from 
the tar get, for example setting up barriers during public events, and avoiding 
unnecessary contact.
14.6 CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has provided the first empirical study examining incidents of political 
assassinations, in terms of both the victim and the offender behaviorrr-. The thesis 
began by considering the ways in which ‘political assassination’ has been defined in 
the past, in the literatme specifically on political assassinations, the homicide 
literatm e, and the literature on ten orism. Analysis of real-life assassinations, 
homicides, and tenorist incidents higlilight the importance of drawing on the each of 
these ar eas in order to ftrrther the understanding of political assassinations.
Part 2 of this thesis required the creation of a new database, containing behaviour al 
information on political assassination incidents, and this provides a useful data 
source which can be built on and used in futme research. The first empirical analysis 
of the accessibility of victims of assassination was conducted, finding that 
assassinations occur in a wide range of different settings. In fact, the majority take 
place in private locations, ratlier than in public locations, and dming leisur e time 
rather than work time. This has highlighted the need for potential tar gets to be 
vigilant at all times, rather than assuming that they are afforded a level of protection 
by virtue of being indoors, or ‘off duty’. The previous experiences of the target were 
also considered, along with the presence (or otherwise) of a bodyguard. The research 
found that the majority of victims in this sample had received no previous thr eats, 
had not experienced previous attempts on their life, and tended not to have a 
bodyguard. It is suggested that more resear ch is undertaken in this area, in order to
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establish whether assassins target individuals who are not prepared at all, or whether 
they target everyone, with just those who are prepared for an attack who sui'vive.
Again, this thesis has provided the first analysis of the ‘collateral victims’ of political 
assassinations, i.e. the individuals who are killed or injured aside fiom the immediate 
tai'get. The analysis of the specificity of assassinations showed that, in this sample, 
assassinations do result in the death and injury of individuals other than the 
immediate target. In particular, government attacks result in more collateral victims 
than those conducted by terrorist gi'oups, and individuals/others.
Finally, the first analysis of the method used by political assassins has been 
conducted, in terms of their proximity to their victim and the complexity of their 
weapon. These two aspects have been modelled, finding Üiat they are statistically 
significantly related to one another, and suggesting that rational choice theories of 
crime can be applied to political assassins. Their use of highly complex weapons 
enables them to be absent fiom the scene (removing likelihood of apprehension at the 
scene), while the use of less complex weapons (reducing their risk of harm or 
apprehension prior to the attack) requhes their presence at the scene. In addition, 
different weapons have been shown to be related to the specificity of an attack, with 
explosive devices proving to result in the least specific attacks. In addition, tlie use of 
methods by the most prolific terrorist groups was examined, finding that they tend to 
use similar' methods, which tend to result in low numbers of collateral victims.
The models identified (Accessibility, Victim Preparedness, Complexity and 
Proximity) were compared, and it was found that these ar e related to one another. 
Accessibility is statistically significantly correlated to Complexity and Proximity, 
suggesting that the location of victim and time of the attack is related to the method 
selected by the assassin. Victim Preparedness is also statistically significantly 
conelated to the complexity, again suggesting that aspects of the assassination victim 
influence the behaviour of the assassin.
In conclusion, this thesis has shown that assassinations are shiictur ed events, 
seemingly organised and conducted by rational decision makers, who are influenced 
by their own aims, and using strategies tailored to the vulnerabilities of the target.
319
The reseai'ch has set out a number of models of assassin behaviour' that will form the 
basis for more systematic research in the future.
320
References
Abelson, R.P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. American 
Psychologist, 36, 715-729. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.36.7.715.
Arend, A., & Beck, R. (1994). Don't Tread on Us: International Law and Forcible 
State Response to Tenorism. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 12, 153-162.
Bandura, A. (1969). Principles o f Behavior Modification. New York, US: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston.
Bem, S., & de Jong, H.L. (2006). Theoretical issues in psychology: An Introduction 
(2nd edition). London, England: Sage.
Benjamin, D., & Simon, S. (2000, January 4). The New Face of Teixorism. The New 
York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com.
Benjamin, D., & Simon, S. (2002). The Age o f Sacred Terror. New York, US: 
Random House.
Bennett, T., & Wright, R. (1984). Constraints to burglary: The offender's perspective. 
In R.V.G. Claike and T. Hope (Eds.), Coping with Burglary (pp.181-200). Boston, 
US: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
Ben-Yehuda, N. (2005). TeiTor, Media, and Moral Boundaries. InternationalJournal 
o f Comparative Sociology, 46, 33-5. doi: 10.1177/0020715205054469.
Biesterfeld, J., & Meloy, J.R. (2008). The Public Figure Assassin as Tenorist. In J.R. 
Meloy, L. Sheridan, and J. Hoffinan (Eds.), Stalking, Threatening, and Attacking 
Public Figures (pp. 143-162). New York, US: Oxford University Press.
321
Birbeck, C., & LaFree, G. (1993). The situational analysis of crime and deviance. 
Annual Review o f Sociology, 19, 113-137. doi:
10.1146/annurev.so.l9.180193.000553.
Blackburn, R. (1995). The Psychology o f Criminal Conduct: Theory, Research and 
Practice. Chichester, England: Wiley.
Brantingham, P.J., & Brantingham, P.L. (1975). The Spatial patterning of burglary. 
Howard Journal o f Penology Crime Prevention, 14, 11-23. doi: 10.1111/j.l468- 
2311.1975.tb00297.x.
Braidiwaite, J. (1981). The myth of social class and criminology reconsidered. 
American Sociological Review, 46, 36-57.
Breakwell, G.M., & Rose, D. (2006). Theory, Method and Research Design. In G.M. 
Breakwell, S. Hammond, C. Fife-Schaw & J.A. Smith (Eds.), Research methods in 
psychology (3’^'^ ed.) (pp.2-23). London, England: Sage.
Breakwell, G.M. (2006). Interviewing Methods. In G.M. Breakwell, S. Hammond, C. 
Fife-Schaw & J.A. Smith (Eds.), Research methods in psychology (3^  ^ed.) (pp.232- 
253). London, England: Sage.
Bremer, P. (2001). A New Strategy for the New Face of Terrorism. The National 
Interest, 23-30.
Bridges, G.S., & Stone, J.A. (1986). Effects of criminal punisliment on perceived 
threat of punisliment: Towar d an understanding of specific deterrence. Journal o f 
Research in Crime and Delinquency, 23,207-239. doi:
10.1177/0022427886023003002.
Brookman, F. (2005). Understanding homicide. Chippenliam, England: Sage.
322
Brysbaert, M., & Rastle, K. (2009). Historical and Conceptual Issues in Psychology. 
Haiiow: Pearson.
Burgess, A.W., Hartman, C.R., Ressler, R.K., Douglas, J.E., & McCormack, A. 
(1986). Sexual homicide: A motivational model. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 
1, 251-272. doi: 10.1177/088626086001003001,
Calhoun, F., & Weston, S. (2003). Contemporary threat management. San Diego, 
US: Specialized Training Services.
Calhoun, F., & Weston, S. (2006). Protecting judicial officials: Implementing an 
effective threat management process. Bur eau of Justice Assistance Bulletin, 1-8. 
Washington, DC: US Depar tment of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of 
Justice Assistance.
Calhorm, F.S., & Weston, S.W. (2008). On Public Figure Howlers. In J.R. Meloy, L, 
Sheridan & J. Hoffman (Eds.), Stalking, Threatening, and Attacking Public Figures 
(pp. 105-122). New York, US: Oxford University Press.
California Department of Justice (2005). Protection o f Critical Infrastructure. San 
Diego, US: Specialized Training Services.
Canter, D. (1990). An overview of human behaviour in fires. In D. Canter (Ed.), 
Fires and Human Behaviour (2nd edition) (pp.205-234). London, England: David 
Fulton Publishers
Canter, D.V., Alison, L.J., Alison, E., & Wentink, N. (2004). The 
orgarrised/disorganised typology of serial murder: myth or model? Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law, 70,293-320. doi: 10.1037/1076-8971.10.3.293.
Canter, D., & Fritzon, K. (1998). Differentiating arsonists: A model of firesetting 
actions and characteristics. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 3, 73-96. doi: 
10.111 l/j.2044-8333.1998.tb00352.x.
323
Canter, D., & Heritage, R. (1990). A multivaiiate model of sexual offence behaviour': 
Developments in offender profiling. Part \. Journal o f Forensic Psychiatry, 7, 185- 
212. doi: 10.1080/09585189008408469.
Cari'oll, J.S. (1978), A psychological approach to deterrence: The evaluation of crime 
opporixxmXiQS. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1512-1520. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.36.12.1512.
Carroll, J.S., & Weaver, P.M. (1986). Shoplifters perceptions of crime oppor'tunities: 
A process-tracing study. In D.B. Cornish & R.V.G. Clar'ke (Eds.), The Reasoning 
Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending (pp. 19-37). New York: 
Springer-Verlag.
Caplan, N.S., & Siebert, L.A. (1964). Distribution of juvenile delinquent intelligence 
test scores overa thirty-forrr' year' period. Journal o f Clinical Psychology, 20, 242- 
247. doi: 10.1002/1097-4679(196404)20:2<242::AID-JCLP2270200213>3.0.CO;2- 
J.
Christianson, S. (1992). Emotional stress and eyewitness memory: a critical review. 
Psychological Bulletin, 112,284-309. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.112.2.284.
Clarke, J.W. (1982). American assassins. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Clar’ke, J.W. (1990). On Being Merely Angry: John Hinckley Jr. and other dangerous 
people. Oxford, England: Princeton University Press.
Clarke, R.V.G, & Cornish, D.B. (1985). Modelling offenders’ decisions: A 
framework for research and policy. In M. Tomy & N. Morris (Eds.), Crime and 
Justice: An Annual Review o f Research: Vol. 6 (pp. 147-185). Cliicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
324
Cohen, L.E., Kluegel, J.R., & Land, K.C. (1981). Social inequality and predatory 
criminal victimization: An exposition and test of a formal theory. American 
Sociological Review, 46, 505-524.
Cohen, L.E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine 
activity approach. American Sociological Review, 44, 588-608.
Conklin, J. (1972). Robbery and the Criminal Justice System. Philadelphia: 
Lippincott.
Cornish, D.B. (1993). Theories of action in criminology: Learning theory and 
rational choice approaches. In R.V. Clarke & M. Felson (Eds.), Routine activity and 
rational choice (pp. 351-382). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Cornish, D.B., & Claike, R.V. (1986). The reasoning criminal: Rational choice 
perspectives on offending. New York: Springer.
Crenshaw, M. (2006). Have Motivations for Terrorism Changed? In J. Victoroff 
(Ed.) Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis o f Terrorism 
(pp. 51-57). Amsterdam: IDS Press.
Crotty, W.J. (1971). Assassinations and their inteipretation in the American context. 
In W.J. Crotty (Ed.), Assassinations and the political order (pp.3-53). New York: 
Harper and Row.
The Crown Prosecution Service (2011). Homicide: Murder and Manslaughter. 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/homicide_murder_and_manslaughter/ 
[Accessed: July 2011].
Dancer, S.L. (1990a). Introduction to Facet Theoiy and its Applications. Applied 
Psychology: An International Review, 39(4), 365-377. doi: 10.111 l/j.1464- 
0597.1990.tb01061.x
325
Dancer, S.L. (1990b). Suicide Prediction and the Partial Order Scalograin Analysis 
of Psychological Adjustment. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 39 (4), 
479-497. doi: 10.1111/j.l464-0597.1990.tb01067.x
DeGroot, A.D. (1966). Perception and memory versus thought: Some Old Ideas and 
Recent Findings. In B. Kleinmimtz (Ed.), Problem Solving: Research, Method, and 
Theory (pp. 19-50). New York: Wiley.
De Haan, W., & J.M.C Vos (2003). A Ciying Shame: The Over-Rationalized 
Conception of Man in the Rational Choice Perspective. Theoretical Criminology, 7 
(1), 29-54. doi: 10.1177/1362480603007001199
Dietz, P. (1985). Sex offender profiling by the FBI: A preliminary conceptual model. 
In M.H. Ben-Aron, S.J. Hucker & C.D. Webster (Eds.), Clinical Criminology 
(pp.207-219). Toronto: Clarke Institute of Psychiatry.
Dietz, P.E., Matthews, D.B., Van Duyne, C., Martell, D.A., Parry, C.D.H., Stewart, 
T., WarTen, J., & Crowder, J.D. (1991a). Threatening and Otherwise Inappropriate 
Letters to Hollywood Celebrities. Journal o f Forensic Sciences, 36, 185-209. doi: 
10.1520/JFS13019J
Dietz, P.E., Matthews, D.B., Martell, D.A., Stewart, T., Hrouda, D.R., & Warren, J. 
(1991b). Tlireatening and Otherwise Inappropriate Letters to Members of the US 
CongL'ess. Journal o f Forensic Sciences, 36 ,1445-1468. doi: 10.1520/JFS13165J
Donald, I.J., & Canter, D. (1992). Intentionality and fatality in during the King’s 
Cross undergroimd fire. European Journal o f Social Psychology, 22, 203-218. doi: 
10.1002/ejsp.2420220302
Douglas, J.E., Burgess, A.W., Burgess, A.G., & Ressler, R.K. (1992). Crime 
classification manual: A standard system for investigating and classifying violent 
crime. New York: Simon and Schuster.
326
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2006). The Political Economy o f Terrorism. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Enders, W., Sandler, T., & Cauley, J. (1990). UN Conventions, Technology, and 
Retaliation in the Fight against Terrorism: An Econometric Evaluation. Terrorism 
and Political Violence, 2 (1), 83-105. doi: 10.1080/09546559008427052
Eyre, M., & Alison, L. (2010). Investigative Decision Making. In J.M. Brown and 
E.A. Campbell (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook o f Forensic Psychology (pp.73-80). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eysenck, M. (1998). Psychology: An Integrated Approach. New York: Addison 
Wesley Longman, Inc.
Counterten'orism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit (2000). Terrorism in the 
United States 1999. Washmgton, DC: US Department of Justice, FBI Publication 
#0308.
Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B. (1998). Preventing Attacks on Public Officials & Public 
Figmes: A Secret Service Perspective. In J. Reid Meloy (Ed.), The Psychology o f 
Stalking: Clinical and Forensic Perspectives (pp. 176-194). San Diego: Academic 
Press.
Fein, R.A. & Vossekuil, B. (1999). Assassination in the United States: An 
Operational Study of Recent Assassins, Attackers, and Near-Lethal Approachers. 
Journal o f Forensic Sciences. 44 (2), 321-333.
Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G. (1995). Threat assessment: An approach to 
prevent targeted violence. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of 
Justice Progr ams, National Institirte of Justice, Publication NCJ 155000.
327
Felson, M. (1986), Linking criminal choices, routine activities, informal control, and 
criminal outcomes. In D.B. Cornish & R.V.G. Clarke (Eds.), The Reasoning 
Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending (pp.l 19-128). New York: 
Springer-Veiiag.
Field, J., & Pearson, A. (2010). Caring to death: The murder of patients by nurses. 
InternationalJournal o f Nursing Practice, 16, 301-309. doi: 10.1111/j.1440- 
172X.2010.01845.X
Freedman, L.Z. (1965). Assassination: Psychopathology and social pathology. 
Postgraduate Medicine, 37, 650-658.
Gabbert, F., Memon, A. and Allan, K. (2003). Memory conformity: can eyewitnesses 
influence each other’ s memories for an event? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 
533-543. doi: 10.1002/acp.885
Gavin, H., & Hockey, D. (2010). Criminal Careers and Cognitive Scripts: An 
Investigation into Criminal Versatility. The Qualitative Report, 15, 389-410.
Gerrie, M.P., Garry, M., & Loftus, E.F. (2005). False memories. In N.Brewer & K.D. 
Williams (Eds.), Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective (pp.222-253). New 
York: Guilford Press.
Goldstein, J.H. (1981). On Political Assassinations and Heinous Crimes. Aggressive 
Behavior, 7, 268-270.
Graham, H.D., & Gurr, T.R. (1979). Violence in America: historical and 
comparative perspectives, a report submitted to the National Commission on the 
Causes and Prevention o f Violence. London: Bantam.
Gregory, R. J. (2004). Psychological Testing: History, Principles & Applications. 
USA: Allyn & Bacon.
328
Guerette, R.T., V. Stenius, & J. McGloin (2005). Understanding Offense 
Specialization and Versatility: A Re-application of the Rational Choice 
Perspective. Journal o f Criminal Justice, 33, 77-87. doi:
10.1016/j .jcrimjus.2004.10.005
Harper, G., Man, L., Taylor, S., & Niven, S. (2005). Factors associated with 
offending. In G.Haiper and C.Cliitty (Eds.), The impact o f corrections on re­
offending: a review of'what works' (pp.ll-29). London: HMSO.
Havens, M.C., Leiden, C., & Schmitt, K.M. (1970). The Politics o f Assassination. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc.
Henwood, K., & Pidgeon, N. (2006). Grounded Theory. In G.M. Breakwell, S. 
Hammond, C. Fife-Schaw, & J.A. Smith (Eds.), Research methods in psychology (3"^  ^
ed.) (p.342-365). London: Sage
Heskin, K. (1984). The Psychology of Terrorism in Northern h eland. In Y. 
Alexander & A. O'Day (Eds.), Terrorism in Ireland (pp.88-106). London: Croom 
Helm.
Heyman, M.N. (1984). A Study of Presidential Assassins. Behavioural Sciences and 
the Law, 2, 131-150.
Hoffman, J. (2009). Public Figures and Stalking in the European Context. European 
Journal on Criminal Policy Research, 15,293-305. doi: 10.1007/s10610-009-9104-0
Hoffinan, B., & Claridge, D. (1998). The Rand-St. Andrews Chronology of 
International Terrorism and Noteworthy Domestic Incidents 1996. Terrorism and 
Political Violence. 10,2,135-180. doi: 10.1080/09546559808427461
Holmes, R.M., & De Burger, J. (1988). Serial murder: Studies in crime, law and 
justice. Vol. 2. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
329
Holmes, R.M., & Holmes, S.T. (1988). Serial Murder, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Horgaii, J. (2005). What Is Terrorism? In J. Horgan (Ed.), The Psychology o f 
Terrorism (pp. 1-22). London: Routledge.
Hough, M., Clarke, R.V.G., & Mayhew, P. (1980). Introduction. In R.V.G. Clarke & 
P. Mayhew (Ed.s), Designing Out Crime (pp. I -5). London: HMSO.
Hough, M. (1987). Offenders’ choice of target: Findings hom victim surveys. 
Journal o f Quantitative Criminology, 5, 355-369.
Infanticide Act (1938) c.36 (Regnal. I and 2).
Innocence Project (2007). Imiocence Project, www.innocencenroiect.ors [accessed 
August 2011]
James, D.V. (2010). Protecting the prominent? A research journey with Paul Mullen. 
Criminal Behavior and Mental Health, 20,242-250. doi: I0.I002/cbm.769
James, D.V., Kerrigan, T.R., Forfar, R., Farnham, F.R., & Preston, L.F. (2010). The 
Fixated Tlneat Assessment Centre: preventing harm and facilitating care. Journal o f 
Forensic Psychiahy and Psychology, 2 f  521-536. doi:
I0.I080/I478994100359698I
James, D.V., Mullen, P.E., Meloy, J.R., Pathé, M.T., Famham, F.R., Preston, L., & 
Dainley, B. (2007). The role of mental disorder in attacks on European politicians 
1990-2004, ActaPsychiatrica Scandinavica, 116, 334-344. doi: I0.IIII/j.I600- 
0447.2007.01077.x
James, D.V., Mullen, P.E., Pathé, M.T., Meloy, J.R., Farnham, F.R., Preston, L. & 
Dainley, B. (2008). Attacks on the British Royal Family: The Role of Psychotic 
Illness. Journal of the American Academy o f Psychiatry and Law, 36 (I), 59-67.
330
Jenkins, P. (1988). Serial murder in England, 1940-1985. Journal o f Criminal 
Justice, 16,1-15.
Johnson, B.M. (1992). Executive Order 12,333: The Permissibility of an American 
Assassination of a Foreign Leader. Cornell International Law Journal, 25, 401-402.
Kaaibo, J., & Beasley, R.K. (1999). A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case 
Study Method in Political Psychology. Political Psychology, 20, 369-391. doi: 
10.1111/0162-895X.00149
Kandel, E., Mednick, S.A., Kierkegaard-Sorensen, L., Hutchings, B., Knope J., 
Rosenberg, R., & Schulsinger, F. (1988). IQ as a protective factor for subjects at liigh 
risk for antisocial behaviour. Journal o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56, 
224-226. doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.56.2.224
Kasher, A. & Yadlin, A. (2005). Assassination and Preventative Killing. SAIS 
Review, XXV, 41-57. doi: 10.1353/sais.2005.0011
Katz, Y. (2006, June 23). Defense: Pinpointing the problem. Jerusalem Post. 
Retrieved from http://www.jpost.com.
Kazdin, A. (1981). Drawing Valid Inferences From Case Studies. Journal o f 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 49 (2), 183-192. doi: 10.1037/0022- 
006X.49.2.183
Khatchadourian, H. (1974). Is Political Assassination Ever Morally Justified? In H. 
Zellner (Ed.), Assassination (pp.41-56). Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing 
Company,
Kirchner, E., Kennedy, R., & Draguns, J. (1979). Assertion and aggression in adult 
offenders. Behavior Therapy, 10, 452-471.
331
Kirkham, J.F., Levy, S.G., & Grotty, WJ. (1970). Assassination and political 
violence: a report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of 
Violence. London: Bantam.
Laquem*, W. (1999). The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms o f Mass 
Destruction. New York: Oxford University Press.
Last, S.K.& Fritzon, K. (2005). Investigating the Natur e of Expressiveness in 
Stranger, Acquaintance and Intrafamilial Homicides. Journal o f Investigative 
Psychology and Offender Profiling, 2,179-193. doi: 10.1002/jip.36.
Law Commission (1996). Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter. 
Report No. 237. London: HMSO.
Leahey, T.H. (2001). A History o f Modern Psychology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall.
Leary, M.R., Kowalski, R.M., Smith, L., & Phillips, S. (2003). Teasing, rejection and 
violence: Case studies of the school shootings. Aggressive Behavior, 29,202-214. 
doi: 10.1002/ab.l0061
Lesser, I.O., Hoffman, B., Arquilla, J., Ronfeldt, D., & Zanini, M. (1999).
Countering the New Terrorism. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation.
Letkemann, P. (1973). Crime as Work. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Lindsay, R.C.L., Semmler, C., Weber, N., Brewer, N., & Lindsay M.R. (2008). How 
Variations m Distance Affect Eyewitness Reports and Identification Accuracy. Law 
and Human Behavior, 32, 526-535. doi: 10.1007/sl 0979-008-9128-x
Loftus, E.F. (1992). When a lie becomes memory’s trntli: memory distortion after 
exposure to misinformation. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 1 ,121- 
123. doi: 10.111 l/1467-8721.epl0769035
332
Loftus, E.F. and Loftus, G.R., & Messo, J. (1987). Some facts about ‘weapon focus’. 
Law and Human Behavior, 11, 55-62.
Mayhew, P., Claike, R.V.G, & Hough, J.M. (1980). Steering column locks and car 
theft. In R.V.G. Clarke & P. Mayhew (Eds.), Designing Out Crime (pp. 19-30). 
London: HMSO.
Meissner, C.A., & Brigham, J.C. (2001). Thirty year s of investigating the own-race 
bias in memory for faces: a rneta-analytic review. Psychology, Public Policy, and 
Law, 7, 3-35. doi: 10.1037/1076-8971.7.1.
Meissner, C.A., Sporer, S.L., & Schooler, J.W. (2007). Person descriptions as 
eyewitness evidence. In R.C.L. Lindsay, D.F. Ross, J.D. Read & M.P. Toglia (Eds.), 
Handbook o f Eyewitness Psychology, vol. 2: Memory for People (pp. 1-34). Mahwali, 
NJ: Erlbaurn.
Meloy, J.R. (2004). Indirect personality assessment of the violent true believer. 
Journal o f Personality Assessment, 82, 138-146. doi: 10.1207/sl5327752jpa8202_2
Memon, A., Hope, L., & Bull, R. (2003). Exposme duration: effects on eyewitness 
accuracy and confidence. British Journal o f Psychology, 94, 339-354. doi: 
10.1348/000712603767876262
Messner, S.F., & Tardiff, K. (1985). The social ecology of urban homicide: An 
application of the routine activities approach. Criminology, 23 (2), 241-267.
Mickolus, E.F. (1993). Terrorism 1988-1991: A chronology o f events and a 
selectively annotated bibliography. London: Greenwood Press.
Mickolus, E.F., Sandler, T., & Murdock, J.M. (1989). International Terrorism in the 
1980's: A chronology o f events. Volumes 1 & 2. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
333
Mickolus, E.F., & Simmons, S.L. (1997). Terrorism, 1992-1995: A Chronology of 
Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography (2 Vols). London: Greenwood 
Press
Mickolus, E.F., & Simmons, S.L. (2002). Terrorism, 1996-2001: A Chronology (2 
Vols). London: Greenwood Press.
Millwai'd, L.J. (2006). Focus Groups. In G.M. Breakwell, S. Hammond, C. Fife- 
Schaw & J.A. Smith (Eds.), Research methods in psychology (3"^  ^ed.) (pp.274-299). 
London, England: Sage.
Molumby, T. (1976). Patterns of crime in a university housing project. American 
Behavioural Sciences. 20, 247-259.
Morgan, M.J. (2004). Waging War on TeiTor: The Origins of New Terrorism. 
Parameters, 34 {V), 29-43.
Nagin, D.S., & Paternoster, R. (1993). Enduring individual differences and rational 
choice theories of crime. Law and Society Review, 27, 467-496.
O'Brien, K.A. (1998). The Use of Assassination as a Tool of State Policy: South 
Africa's Counter-Revolutionary Strategy 1979-1992 (Part I). Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 10, 86-105. doi: 10.1080/09546559808427458
Office of Combating Terrorism (1982). Patterns o f International Terrorism. 
Washington, DC: US Department of State.
Pape, M.S. (2002). Can We Put the Leaders of the 'Axis of Evil' in the Crosshairs? 
Parameters, 32, 62-71.
Pape, R.A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political 
Science Review, 97(3), 343-361. doi: 10.1017.S000305540300073X
334
Patterson, K.E., & Baddelely, A.D. (1977). When face recognition fails. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 3 ,406-417. doi: 
10.1037/0278-7393.3.4.406
Petersilia, J., Greenwood, P.W., & Lavin, M. (1978). Criminal Careers o f Habitual 
Felons. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.
Pickard, D.B. (2001). Legalizing Assassination: Terrorism, The Central Intelligence 
Agency and International Law. Georgia Journal o f International and Comparative 
Law, 30(1), 1-35.
Prevention of Teri'orism (Temporary Provisions) Act (1974)
Ragin, C.C. (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. Berkley: University of California Press.
Read, J.D. (1995). The availability heuristic in person identification: the sometimes 
misleading consequences of enhanced contextual information. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 9, 91-121. doi: 10.1002/acp.2350090202
Repetto, T.A. (1974). Residential Crime. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Repetto, T. A. (1976). Crime prevention and the displacement phenomenon. Crime 
and Delinquency, 22 ,168-169. doi: 10.1177/001112877602200204
Ressler, R.K., Burgess, A.W., & Douglas, J.E. (1988). Sexual homicide: Patterns 
and motives. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books
Ressler, R.K., Burgess, A.W., Douglas, J.E., Hartman, C.R., & D'Agostino, R.B. 
(1986). Sexual killers and their victims: Identifying patterns through crime scene 
analysis. Journal o f Interpersonal Violence, 1, 288-308. doi:
10.1177/088626086001003003
335
Rossmo, D.K. (2000). Geographic profiling. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Rothstein, D.A. (1964). Presidential Assassination Syndrome. Archives o f General 
Psychiatry, 11, 245-254.
Rothstein, D.A. (1966). Presidential Assassination Syndrome II: Application to Lee 
Harvey Oswald. Archives o f General Psychiatry, 15, 260-266.
Ruby, C.L. (2002). Are Terrorists Mentally Deranged? Analyses o f Social Issues and 
Public Policy, 2 ,15-26. doi: 10.1111/j.l530-2415.2002.00022.x
Salfati, C.G. (2003). Offender Interaction With Victims In Homicide: A 
Multidimensional Analysis of Frequencies in Crime Scene Behaviors. Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence, 18, 49-512. doi: 10.1177/0886260503251069
Salfati, C.G., & Canter, D.V. (1999). Differentiating Stranger Murders: Profiling 
Offender Characteristics from Behavioral Styles. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 
17, 391-406. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-0798(199907/09)17:3<391::AID- 
BSL352>3.0.CO;2-Z
Salfati, C.G. & Taylor, P. (2006). Differentiating sexual violence: A comparison of 
sexual homicide and rape. Psychology, Crime and Law, 12 (2), 107-125. doi:
10.1080/10683160500036871
Santilla, P., Junkkila, J., & Sandnabba, N.K. (2005). Behaviomal Linking of Stranger 
Rapes. Journal o f Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 2, 87-103. doi: 
10.1002/jip.26
Scarr, H. (1973). Patterns in Burglaiy. Waslrington, DC: US Department of Justice.
336
Sclimid, A.P, (1992). The Response Problem as a Definition Problem. In A.P. 
Schmid, & R.P. Crelinsten (Eds,), Terrorism and Political Violence: Special Issue on 
Western Responses to Terrorism. Volume 4, No. 4, Winter 1992. London: Frank 
Cass.
Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. 
Hillsdale, N.J.: Eiibaum.
Schmid, A.P., & Crelinsten, R.P. (1992). Terrorism and Political Violence: Special 
Issue on Western Responses to Terrorism. Volume 4, No. 4, Winter 1992. London: 
Frank Cass.
Schmid, A.P., & Jongman, A.T. (1988). Political Terrorism: A New Guide To 
Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature (2nd Ed). The 
Netherlands: Noim Holland Publishing Company.
Sclmiid, A.P., Jongman, A.J., & Stohl, M. (1988). Political terrorism: a new guide to 
actors, authors, concepts, databases, theories, and literature. New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books.
Scholes, A., & Wilson, M. (2008). Defining political assassinations: How are they 
different fiom other homicides? European Association o f Psychology and Law, 
Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Sebastiani, J.A., & Foy, J.L. (1965). Psychotic visitors to the White House. American 
Journal o f Psychiatry, 122, 679-686.
Semmler, C., & Brewer, N. (2010). Eyewitness memory. In J.M. Brown and E.A. 
Campbell (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook o f Forensic Psychology (pp.49-57). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sherman, L.W., Gartin, P.R., & Buerger, M.E. (1989). Hot Spots of Predatory 
Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place. Criminology, 21, 27-55.
337
Siine, J. (1990). The Concept of Panic, hi D. Canter (Ed.), Fires and Human 
Behaviour (2"^  ed) (pp.63-81). London: David Fulton.
Shover, N., & D. Honaker (1992). The Socially Bounded Decision Making of 
Persistent Property Offenders. The Howard Journal, 31 (4), 276-293.
Shye, S. (1978) (Ed). Theory construct and data analysis in the behavioral sciences. 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Shye, S. (1985). Multiple Scaling. New York, NY: North Holland Press.
Silberman, C. (1978). Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice. New York: Random 
House.
Snitch, T.H. (1982). Terrorism and Political Assassinations: A Transnational 
Assessment, 1968-80. Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social 
Science, 463, 54-68.
Sturman, A. (1980). Damage on buses: The effects of supervision. In R.V.G. Clarke 
& P. Mayhew (eds). Designing Out Crime (pp.31-38). London: HMSO.
The Hague (1907). Convention IV respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land 
and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs o f War and Land. 18 
October 1907.
Thombeny, T.P., & Famworth, M. (1982). Social correlates of criminal 
involvement: Further evidence on tlie relationship between social status and criminal 
behavior. American Sociological Review, 47, 505-518.
Trasler, G.B. (1986). Situational crime contiol and rational choice: A critique. In K. 
Heal & G. Laycock (Eds.), Situational Crime Prevention: From Theory into Practice 
(pp. 17-42). London: HMSO.
338
Tuckey, M.R., & Brewer, N. (2003). The influence of schemas, stimulus ambiguity, 
and interview schedule on eyewitness memory over time. Journal o f Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 9, 101-118. doi: 10.1037/1076-898X.9.2.101
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: a heuristic forjudging frequency 
and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5 ,207-232.
US Department of Defense (1988). Terrorist Group Profiles. Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office.
United States Code (2000a). Title 22 - Foreign Relations and Intercourse.
United States Code (2000b). Title 18 - Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
US Department of Homeland Secmity,
http://www.dlis.gov/xlibrary/assets/lu'_5005__enr.pdf [accessed August 26th 2011] 
One Hundr ed Seventh Congr ess of the United States of America, Homeland Secmity 
Act of 2002, January 23,2002, o. HR 5005-7.
Valentine, T., Pickering, A., & Darling, S. (2003). Characteristics of eyewitness 
identification that predict the outcome of real lineups. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
17, 969-993. doi: 10.1002/acp.939
Walsh, D. (1986). Victim selection procedures among economic criminals: The 
rational choice perspective. In D.B. Cornish & R.V. Clarke (Eds.), The Reasoning 
Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives o f Offending (pp.39-52). New York: 
Springer-Verlag.
West, D.J. (1982). Delinquency: Its Roots, Careers and Prospects. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
339
Wilson, M.A. (1995), Stmctining Qualitative Data: Multidimensional scalogiam 
analysis. In G.M. Breakwell, S. Hammond & C. Fife-Schaw (Eds.), Research 
Methods in Psychology (pp.259-273). London: Sage.
Wilson, M.A. (2000). Toward a Model of Terrorist Behavior in Hostage-Taking 
Incidents. The Journal o f Conflict Resolution, 44, p.403-424.
Wilson, M. (2003). The Psychology of Hostage Taking. In A.Silke (Ed.), Terrorists, 
Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences 
(pp.55-76). Chichester: Wiley.
Wilson, M.A., Canter, D., & Jack, K. (1997). The psychology o f rape investigation: 
A study in police decision making. Final report. Swindon, UK: ESRC.
Wilson, M.A., Canter, D., & Smith, A. (1995). Modelling terrorist behaviour. Final 
report. Alexandria, VA: US Ai*my Research Institute.
Wilson, M.A., & Leith, S., (2001) Acquaintances, Lovers and Friends: Rape within 
Relationships. Journal o f Applied Social Psychology, 31,1709-1726. doi: 
10.1111/j.l559-1816.2001.tb02747.x
Wilson, M.A., & Lemanski, L. (2010). Forensic Psychology and terrorism. In J.R. 
Adler & J.M. Gray (Eds.) Forensic Psychology (pp.245-262). New York: Willan 
Publishing.
Wilson, M.A., Scholes, A., & Brocklehurst, E. (2010). A Behavioural Analysis of 
Terrorist Action: The Assassination and Bombing Campaigns of ETA between 1980 
and 2007. British Journal o f Criminology, 50, 690-707. doi: 10.1093/bj c/azq023
Wilson, M.A., & Smith, A. (1999) Roles and mles in terrorist hostage taking. In D. 
Canter and L. Alison (Eds.), The social psychology o f crime: Groups, teams and 
networks (pp. 127-151). Ashgate: Aldershot.
340
White, J.L., Moffitt, T.E., & Silva, P. A. (1989). A prospective replication of the 
protective effects of IQ in subjects at high risk for juvenile delinquency. Journal o f 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 57, 719-724. doi; 10.1037/0022-006X.57.6.719
Wright, D.B., & Sladden, B. (2003). An own gender bias and the importance of hair 
in facQ VQCOgmtion. Acta Psychologica, 114, 101-114. doi:10.1016/S0001- 
6918(03)00052-0
Yarmey, D. (2010). Eyewitness testimony. In J.M. Brown & E.A. Campbell (Eds.), 
The Cambridge Handbook o f Forensic Psychology (pp. 177-186). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Yin, R.K. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods (3rd edn). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Young, J., & Matthews, R. (1992). Questioning left realism. In R. Matthews and J. 
Young (Eds.), Issues in Realist Criminology (pp. 1-18). London: Sage.
Zengel, P. (1991). Assassination and tlie law of armed conflict. Militaiy Law Review, 
134, 123-165.
Zimmemian, J., Rich, W.D., Keilitz, I., & Broder, P.K. (1981). Some observations 
on the link between learning disabilities and juvenile delinquency. Journal o f 
Criminal Justice, 9, 1-17.
341
APPENDIX A
342
Table 1
List o f variables
Variable Used?
Case number No
Victim Name No
Age No
AgeRange No
Country No
Region No
Date No
Year No
Source No
VictimGender No
Previous Threats Yes
Previous Attempts Yes
Victim Followed No
Previous Behaviour No
Victim Profession: Political Figure Yes
Victim Profession: Previously Politician Yes
Victim Profession: National Leader Yes
Victim Profession: Related Politician Yes
Victim Profession: Government Official Yes
Victim Profession: Military Personnel Yes
Victim Profession: Foreign Diplomat Yes
Victim Profession: UN Worker Yes
Victim Profession: Civil Servant Yes
Victim Profession: Activist Yes
Victim Profession: Community Leader Yes
Victim Profession: Religious Leader Yes
Victim Profession: Charity Worker Yes
Victim Profession: Legal Professional Yes
Victhn Profession: Business Professional Yes
Victim Profession: Jomnalist Yes
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Victim Profession: Printing Industry Personnel Yes
Victim Profession: Writer Yes
Victim Profession: Academic Yes
Victim Profession: Exile/Refugee Yes
Victim Profession: Terrorist Yes
Bodyguard Yes
Victim Died Immediately No
Other Victims (general) Yes
Other Victims: Civilian Yes
Number Civilian Victims Yes
Other Victims: Bodyguard Yes
Number Bodyguar d Victims Yes
Total Number of Victims Yes
Describe Death (string) No
Weapon Used No
Gim Yes
Shot More Than Once No
Blade No
Stabbed More Than Once No
Hands Used No
Beaten No
Manual Attack (no weapon) Yes
Explosive Device Yes
Suicide Bomber Yes
Plane Crash No
Poison Yes
Weapon Left at Scene No
Assassin Present at Scene Yes
Ass^sin Left Scene No
How Assassin Left No
Assassin Stayed at Scene No
Ambush Yes
Inside/Outside Yes
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Work/Leisme Yes
Transit/Stationaiy Yes
Private Location Yes
Semi-Private Location No
Public Location Yes
Break In -  Home No
Break In -  Work No
Number of Assassins No
Primary Assassin No
Secondary Assassin No
Tertiary Assassin No
Male Assassin No
Female Assassin No
Police Assassin No
Group Responsibility Yes
Which Group Yes
Individual Responsibility Yes
Both Responsibility (Gr oup & Individual) Yes
No Responsibility Claim Yes
Suspect Responsibility No
Terrorist Group Member No
Group Name No
Government Involvement Yes
Which Government Yes
Police Involvement No
Military Involvement No
Consphacy No
Motive Contract No
Inside Cooperation: Assassin No
Inside Cooperation: Collaborator No
Assassin History: Violence No
Assassin History: Offending No
Assassin: Mental Illness No
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Assassin: Known to Authorities No
Assassin: Apprehended at Scene No
Assassin: Present at Scene & Left No
Assassin: Later Apprehended No
Assassin: Killed at Scene No
Assassin: Stopped at Scene No
Assassin: Killed at Later Date No
Assassin: Confessed No
Assassin: Retracted Confession No
Assassin: Convicted No
Assassin: Sentenced to Prison No
Assassin: Death Sentence No
Assassin: Suicide No
Assassin: Never Identified No
Conspirator: Apprehended No
Conspirator: Confessed No
Conspirator: Convicted No
Conspirator: Sentenced to Prison No
Consphator: Released from Prison No
Conspirator: Never Identified No
Reward Offered No
Who Offered Reward No
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CODING DICTIONARY
Part One -  Assassinations as Assassinations
Speciflc/Unspecific 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attack was specific, and code 1 if the attack was not 
specific. Specific attacks kill only the intended target, and unspecific attacks kill 
individuals other than the target (e.g. bystanders).
VictimTvpe 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 3 if the target of the attack was a public figm e. Code 2 if the tar get 
were both public and private figures. Code 1 if the tar get was a private figur e, with 
no public figures killed/injured.
OffenderTvne 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the offender was a repeat offender, and code 1 if the offender 
was a first time offender. If the perpetrator was a group, only code 2 if it is clear that 
the individual was the same each time.
VGRelationshit)
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim and offender were known to one another prior to the 
attack. Code 1 if there was no prior knowledge.
Motive
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the target has a political motive (identified via their own 
statement, or conclusion diawn by law enforcement officials, and to include religious 
motivations as well). Code 1 if there is a non-political motive.
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In this case, political should be taken to refer to a desire to implement some kind of 
change in government policy/society/the way the country is mn. It should include 
any attempt to change the government/ruling body itself, or the social/religious 
policy of a countiy.
Part One -Assassinations as Homicide
VORelationsliip 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 3 if the victim and offender were strangers to one another, and had 
no prior relationship. Code 2 if the victim and offender were acquaintances, but were 
not related to one another. Code 1 if the victim and offender were related to one 
another.
NumberVictims 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if there was more than one victim in the pailicular incident. Code 
1 if there was just one victim in the incident.
SerialAttacks 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attack was part of a series, committed by the same 
offender(s), over separate time periods. Code 1 if the attack was not part of a series.
Mentallllness 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the offender was suffering fi om any form of mental illness. 
Code 1 if there is no evidence that the offender had no mental illness.
Motivation 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 3 if the offender(s) was motivated by an instrumental need (i.e. 
they kill to achieve a particular goal). Code 2 if the offender was personally
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motivated. Code 1 if the offender was politically motivated (identified via the 
offender’s statement of their own motive, a claim from a terrorist group, a court case 
ruling a political motive, or security services/police reporting evidence a political 
motive).
In tliis case, political should be taken to refer to a desire to implement some kind of 
change in government policy/society/the way the country is lun. It should include 
any attempt to change the govermnent/ruling body itself, or the social/religious 
policy of a countiy.
Part One — Assassinations as Terrorism
Threat/Act 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if tlie incident was an act of violence. Code 1 if the incident is a 
thr eat of violence.
TargetTvne 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 3 if the tar get(s) of the attack was targeted specifically because of 
who tliey are. Code 2 if the tar get(s) of the attack was selected because they are 
representative of a larger target. Code 1 if the target(s) of the attack was selected at 
random.
Deaths
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the incident resulted in deaths. Code 1 if the incident did not 
result in any deaths.
FinancialLosses 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the incident resulted in financial losses. Codel if the incident 
did not result in any financial losses.
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TerroristGroup 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the perpetrator of the incident was a member ofiworking on 
behalf of terrorist group. Code 1 if the perpetrator was not a member of/working on 
behalf of a teiTorist group.
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Part Two -  Features o f Victim & Demographics 
Case
Type: Numeric
Definition: Number to serve as identifier for each case.
NameVictim 
Type: Strmg
Definition: Enter the name of the victim, along with any aliases. 
Age
Type: Numeric
Definition: Enter the age of the victim when they died.
AgeRange 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Select the group which the age of the victhn falls into.
Country 
Type: String
Definition: Enter the country in which the attack took place.
Date
Type: String
Definition: Enter the date on which the attack took place.
Region
Type: Numeric
Definition: Select the region in which the attack took place
1 North America
Canada, Mexico, United States
2 Central America & Caribbean
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Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Hondmas, Jamaica, Martinique, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Puerto Rico, St Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Virgin 
Islands (U.S.)
3 South America
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, 
French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuala
4 East Asia
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan
5 Southeast Asia
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam
6 South Asia
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka
7 Central Asia
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
8 Western Emope
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Corsica, Denmark, East Germany (GDR), 
Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Great Britain, Greece Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Isle of Man, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany (FRG)
9 Eastern Euiope
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia-Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
10 Middle East & North Africa
Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Ir an, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, 
Tunisia, Tirrkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Western 
Sahara, Yemen
11 Sub-Saharan Africa
353
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Bur undi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rhodesia, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
12 Russia & the Newly Independent States (NIS)
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, 
Soviet Union, Ukraine
13 Austr alasia & Oceania
Australia, Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa (Western Samoa), Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna.
Date
Type: String
Definition: Enter the date of the attack in the format DD/MM/YYYY.
Year
Type: Numeric
Definition: Enter the year in which the attack took place in the format YYYY. 
Source
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 1 if the source of information was newspapers only, code 2 if the 
source of information was only the Mickolus books, and code 3 if information came 
from both sources.
VictimGender 
Type: Nrrmeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was male, and 1 if the victim was female.
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PreviousThieatsGeneral 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim previously reported receiving thi eats directed at 
themselves or their fiiends and family. Thieats are anything in which the victim is 
told they (or their fiiends/family) will be haiined. Threats can be written or verbal. 
Code 1 if there is no evidence of any tlireats being reported.
PreviousAttempts 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if previous attempts on the victim’s life have been reported. Code 
1 if been no previous attempts have been reported.
VictimFollowed 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if there is evidence/it is reported that the victim was followed or 
watched by anyone prior to the attack. This may have been reported by the victim or 
someone else. Code 2 also if the individual/gi oup responsible reports following or 
watching the victim. Code 1 if tliere are no reports/no evidence that the victim was 
followed.
PrevBhvr 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if any of the previous 3 variables ar e coded 2 (i.e. if the victim 
was previously thieatened, suivived a previous attempt, or was followed). Code 1 if 
none of these behavioui s are present.
PoliticianVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim is cuiTently a politician. Also code 2 if the victim is 
the leader of the country, such as Prime Minister or President. Code 1 if the victim 
was not a politician at the time of their death.
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PreviousPoliticianVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim has served as a politician in the past. Code 1 if they 
have never worked as a politician.
LeaderVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim is the leader of a country, e.g. Prune Minister, 
President. This should include military rulers, dictators etc. Code 1 if they are not the 
leader of a country.
RelatedPolitician 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was related to a politician, alive or dead. Those who 
have married into the family are to be included in this category. Code 1 if there are 
no familial ties reported.
GovernmentOfficialVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim worked for the Government, other than as a 
politician. This includes those who worked in the intelligence services, advisers to 
the government, and other civilians working for the government. Code 1 if the victim 
was a member of the police or military, or if they were part of the criminal justice 
system (judge, prosecutor etc) of the country.
MilitarvVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim is a member of the military or police. This is to 
include officers of the military and police. Code 1 if tire victim is reported to be a 
member of the intelligence services, or if they are not a member of the 
military/police.
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ForeignPiplomatVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was a foreign diplomat or ambassador. Code 1 if the 
victim was not a foreign diplomat or ambassador.
UNVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if it is reported that the victim worked for the UN at any time. 
Code 1 if the victim has not worked for the UN.
CivilSeivantVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was a civil servant. Code 1 if they were not a civil 
servant.
Activist Victim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was a political activist/campaigner. This should 
include those individuals who campaign for a political cause, or who are reported as 
activists. This should include victims who were actively working on such campaigns. 
Also include those who fund activists/campaign groups. Code 1 if there is no 
evidence that the victim was involved in political activism or campaigning.
CommunitvV ictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was a leader of a particular community, such as an 
etlinic group, or of a particular tribe, etc. Does not include religious officials, 
members of political parties, or activists. Code 1 if there is no evidence that the 
victim was a leader of such a community.
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ReligiousVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was a religious official of one of the five major 
religions -  Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism or Sikhism, male or female. 
This is to include officials at all levels, including nuns, priests, vicars, Imams, etc. 
Code 1 if they were an official of another religion, or if they were only a member of 
the church, and were not an official of the church. Code 1 if the victim was not a 
Religious official.
CharitvVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition; Code 2 if the victim worked for a charity, or as an aid worker, in any 
capacity. Also code 2 if the victim was a doctor. Code 1 if the victim did not work 
for a charity, or was not a doctor.
LegalVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was a legal professional, such as a lawyer, 
prosecutor, judge. Code 2 if the victim was reported to work in the legal profession 
in the past. Code 1 if the victim has never been involved in the legal professions.
BusinessmanVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim worked in business, either their own or someone 
else’s. Code 1 if the victim was not a businessman.
JomnalistVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was a jommalist. Also code 2 if the victim is a 
photographer working for/with the press, or for/with a jomnalist. Code 1 if not.
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PrintVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim worked on, was editor of, publisher of, or owner of a 
newspaper. Also code 2 if the victim was an editor/publisher of books. Code 1 if the 
victim was not an editor or publisher.
WriterVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was a wiiter. This category includes script writers, 
poets, and novelists. Code 1 if they were a jour nalist, and code that within the 
JournalistVictim category. Code 1 if the victim was not a writer.
Academic Victim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim is a teacher/lecturer/academic. Code 2 also if the 
victim was a historian. Code 1 if tliey were not.
Exile Victim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim is an exile/refugee fiorn another country’s 
government. Code 1 if the victim is not in exile.
TerroristVictim 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim is reported to be a terrorist, or a member of a terrorist 
organisation. Code 1 if the victim is not a teiTorist.
Protected 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was protected by bodyguar ds at the time of the 
attack, even if the bodyguards were involved in the attack. Code 1 if there is no 
evidence that bodyguards were present.
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Diedlmmediatelv 
Type: Numeric
Defînition: Code 2 if it is reported that the victim died immediately, or if not reported 
were it is obvious that they could not have survived the attack. Tins should include 
situations were they were bombed or shot repeatedly. Code 1 if the victim was alive 
after the attack, for example to be taken to hospital.
OtherVictimCivilian 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if others (who were not the intended victim’s bodyguar ds) were 
killed or injured in tlie attack. Code 1 if there were no other victims of the attack.
NumberCivilian 
Type: Numeric
Definition: State how many civilians were killed/injrjred in the attack. If there are 
different nmnbers reported, record the highest. If not otherwise specified, code all 
victims as civilians.
OtherVictimBodvsuard 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the intended victim’s bodyguards were also killed or injured in 
the attack. Code 1 if there were no bodyguar ds injm ed in the attack.
NumberBG 
Type: Numeric
Definition: State how many bodyguards were killed/injmed in the attack. If there are 
different numbers reported, record the highest. If not otherwise specified, code all 
victims as civilians.
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Part Two — Weaponry
DescribeDeath 
Type: Stiing
Definition: Briefly describe the death.
WeaponUsed 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if any weapon was used. Code 1 if there was no weapon used. 
Gun
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was shot. Code 1 if the victim was not shot.
ShotMoreThanOnce 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was shot more than once. Code 1 if the victim was 
not shot more than once.
Blade
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed with a blade. This includes the use of 
scalpels, knives, swords, and any other blades. Code 1 if the victim was not killed 
with a blade.
StabbedMoreThanOnce 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was stabbed more than once. Code 1 if the victim 
was not stabbed more than once.
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Hands
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if hands were used to kill the individual. Code 1 if the victim was 
not killed with hands.
Beaten
Type; Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was beaten to death, either with a weapon or by 
hand. Code 1 if the victim was not beaten.
ExnlosiveDevice 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if a bomb/rocket/missile/pilotless drone was used to kill the 
victim. Code 1 if there was no explosive device, or if the bomb used was a suicide 
bomb.
SuicideBomber 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if a suicide bomber killed the victim. Code 1 if the victim was not 
killed by a suicide bomber.
PlaneCrash 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed in a plane crash. Code 1 if the victim was 
not killed in a plane crash.
Suicide Bomb 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a suicide bomber. Code 1 if the victim 
was not killed by a suicide bomber.
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Incendiary Bomb 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by an incendiary bomb, i.e. a firebomb, 
Molotov cocktail. Code 1 if no kind of incendiary bomb was used.
Letter Bomb 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a bomb delivered in a letter or parcel. 
Code 1 if no letter/parcel bomb was used.
Suitcase bomb 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a bomb left/placed in a suitcase or 
briefcase. Code 1 if there was no suitcase/briefcase bomb.
Car bomb 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a bomb in a cai\ This includes bombs 
left in and under cars, regardless of how they ai e detonated (e.g. wired into the cai' 
itself or detonated remotely/on a timer etc). Code 1 if no car bomb was used.
Landmine 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a landmine. Code 1 if the victim was 
not killed by a landmine.
Rocket attack 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed in a rocket attack. This includes rockets 
fired fi'om planes/helicopters/fi om the ground. Code 1 if the victim was not killed in 
a rocket attack.
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Unknown missile 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed in a missile attack where it is not known 
how it was fired. Code 1 if no missile was used, or if the type of missile is known.
Manned missile 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victhn was killed by a manned missile. By this it means that 
the victim was killed by a missile fired by a person fiom a helicopter or plane.
Unmanned missile 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by an unmanned missile. By this it means 
that the victim was killed by a missile fired remotely, i.e. using an 
unmanned/pilotless drone, or fired remotely fiom the giound.
Timed Bomb 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a bomb detonated with a timer. This 
may overlap with other categories such as cai' bomb, where a bomb was placed in a 
car and detonated by a timer. Code 1 if the victim was not killed by a timed bomb.
Remote bomb 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a remotely detonated bomb. This can 
overlap with other categories of bomb, such as car bomb, where a bomb was placed 
in a cai* and then remotely detonated. A remotely detonated bomb is placed in the 
desired location prior to the attack and then detonated by remote conti'ol at the 
required time of the explosion. It is not the same as a timed bomb or missile. Code 1 
if no remotely detonated bomb was used.
364
Roadside bomb 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a bomb left at the side of the 
road/pavement. Code 1 if they were not killed by a bomb left at the roadside.
Unknown bomb 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a bomb but the type is unknown. There 
should be no overlap between this variable and other ‘bomb’ vaiiables. Code 1 if the 
victim was killed by a known bomb, or not killed by a bomb.
Other bomb 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a specific type of bomb wliich is not 
listed separately here. Code 1 if the type of bomb is already specified, unknown, or 
the victim was not killed by a bomb.
Grenade 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by a grenade regai dless of whether it was 
thrown or left at the scene. Code 1 if there were no grenades involved in the attack.
Shot
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was shot to death. Code 1 if there was no shooting. 
Knife
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was stabbed with a knife (any kind of knife). Code 1 
if the victim was stabbed with an unknown tool/sword/axe/other blade.
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Sword
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed with a sword, thiough stabbing, beheading 
etc. Code 1 if the victim was not killed with a sword.
Throat cut 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim had their throat cut. Code 1 if their throat was not 
cut.
Axe
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed with an axe. This may be through cutting 
or beating. Code 1 if no axe was involved in the attack.
Other blade 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by stabbing/blade injmies, but the blade is 
not a knife, sword, or axe. Code 1 if this is not the case, or if the blade is unknown.
Unknown blade 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by stabbing/blade injuries but the type of 
blade used is unknown. Code 1 if the victim was not killed by stabbing or if the blade 
used is coded above.
Radioactive poison 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed with radioactive poison. Code 1 if 
radioactive poison was not used.
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Chemical poison 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed with a chemical poison. Code 1 if they 
were not killed with a chemical poison.
Biological poison 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed with a biological poison. Code 1 if they 
were not killed with a biological poison.
Unknown poison 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was killed by poisoning but the type of poison used 
is unknown. Code 1 if the victim was not poisoned or if the type of poison used is 
known.
Other poison 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was poisoned and the poison was not radioactive, 
chemical or biological. Code 1 if the victim was not poisoned or if the type of poison 
used is already coded.
Beaten hands 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was beaten to death and the killer used their hands, 
rather than an object/weapon. Code 1 if the victim was not beaten, or was beaten 
with another object.
Strangled 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was sti angled. Sti angling may involve a weapon or 
may be done with bare hands. Code 1 if the victim was not strangled.
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Thrown 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was thrown to their death, e.g. fiom a balcony. Code 
1 if the victim was not thrown.
Smothered 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was smothered. This is different to strangulation or 
hanging, and involves suffocation of the victim. Code 1 if the victim was not 
smothered/suffocated.
Beaten blunt 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was beaten to death using some kind of blunt 
instrument, i.e. anything other than their hands. Code 1 if the victim was not beaten 
to death, or was beaten with hands or it was unknown.
Beaten unknown 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if you know the victim was beaten to death but there is no 
information on whether they were beaten by hand or with an object/weapon. Code 1 
if they were not beaten, or if they were beaten by hand/object.
Hung
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was hung. Tliis is a sepai ate vaiiable to strangulation 
or smothering. Code 1 if the victim was not hung.
Plane crash 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim died in a plane crash. This does not include where a 
bomb killed the victim and subsequently caused the plane to crash. It should only be
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coded as 2 where the plane crashed and it was that that caused the death. Code 1 if 
the victim did not die in a plane crash.
Car crash 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim died in a car crash. Code 1 if the victim did not die in 
a car crash, or if a car or roadside bomb was the weapon of death.
Run over 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was run over by a car or other vehicle. Code 1 if the 
victim was not run over.
Drowning 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was drowned. Code 1 if the victim was not drowned.
Number Weapons 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Enter the number of type of weapons used.
WeanonLeft 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the weapon was left at the scene after the crime had taken 
place. Code 1 if the weapon was not foimd at the scene of the crime.
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Part Two — Features o f the Attack
AssassinPresent 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker was present at the scene of the attack. Code 1 if the 
attacker was not present.
AssassinLeft 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if there is evidence that the killer left the scene once the attack 
had taken place. Code 1 if there is evidence the killer stayed at the scene. Code 1 if 
the killer was apprehended or arrested at the scene, so did not leave for this reason.
HowLeft 
Type: String
Definition: Enter how the attacker left the scene, such as on foot, by cai- etc.
AssassinStaved 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if there is evidence that the killer stayed at the scene of the attack. 
This is to include killers who stay at the scene if they are apprehended or arrested. 
Code 1 if there is evidence that the attacker did not stay at the scene. ,
Ambushed 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was stopped using an ambush. This is to include 
being stopped by a roadblock, being forced to stop by a large group of people, or 
being stopped by a person/people who were previously hidden. Code 1 if the victim 
was not ambushed.
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InsideOutside 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 1 if the victim was inside a building when they were attacked. Code 
2 if the victim was outside.
WorkLeisure 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 1 if the victim was working when they were killed. Code 2 if they 
were not working, and therefore were at leisme.
Transit
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was in transit when they were attacked. Code 1 if 
they were not.
Private
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was in a private location at the time of the attack. 
This is to include private homes/buildings, and private planes. Code 1 if they were 
not.
SemiPrivate 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the victim was in a semi-private location at the time of the 
attack. This is to include if they were m a cai* in a public place, or, if they were in a 
building, if they had to be permitted access to the victim. Code 1 if they were not.
Public
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if tlie victim was in a public location at the time of the attack.
This is to include public spaces both inside and outside. Code 1 if the victim was not 
in a public location at the time of the attack.
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BreakhiHome 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killers broke in to the victim’s house. This should be coded 
2 if the killers used force to enter, or snuck in without the knowledge of those in the 
house. Code 1 if the killers were peimitted entry to the building.
BreaklnWork 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killers broke in to the victim’s building of work. This 
should be coded 2 if the killers used force to enter, or snuck in without the 
knowledge of those in the building. Code 1 if the killers were permitted entiy to the 
building.
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Part Two — Features o f assassin/group
NumberAssassins 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 1 if there was just one attacker at the scene. Code 2 if there were 2- 
3 attackers. Code 3 if there were 4 or more attackers at the scene. If the specific 
number of attackers is unknown, code 4.
PrimaivAssassin 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker was at the scene of the crime. This refers to a 
person at the scene who killed the victim. If there was no attacker at the scene of the 
crime, code as 1.
Secondai’VAssassin 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if there was a collaborator at the scene of the crime. This refers to 
an individual who did not commit the killing, but who was at the scene of the crime. 
Code I if there was no collaborator at the scene.
T ertiarvAssassin 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if there was a collaborator/planner who was not at the scene of the 
crime. Code 1 if there were no collaborators who were not at the scene.
MaleAssassin 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker(s) were male. Code 1 if the attacker(s) were not 
male. Code 3 if the sex of the attacker is unknown.
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FemaleAssassiii 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if tlie attacker(s) were female. Code 1 if the attacker(s) were not 
female. Code 3 if the sex of the attacker is unknown.
PoliceAssassin 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker(s) was (were) a member of the police or military at 
the time of the attack. Code 1 if there is no evidence that the killer was a member of 
these organisations at the time of the attack.
GrounResnonsibilitv 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if a terrorist group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Code 
1 if no group has claimed responsibility.
WhichGroup 
Type: String
Definition: State the tenorist gioup which has claimed responsibility.
IndividualResponsibilitv 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if an individual is responsible for the attack. Code 1 if no 
individual has been found responsible for the attack.
BothResnonsibilitv 
Type: String
Definition: Code 2 if both an individual and a terrorist group were responsible for the 
attack. Code 1 if neither, or just one or the other were responsible.
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NeitherResponsibilitv 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if no one has claimed responsibility for the attack (individual, 
govt, or terrorist gioup). Code 1 if an individual or group has claimed responsibility, 
or if an individual has confessed to the attack.
SuspectedResponsibilitv 
Type: String
Definition: Enter the name of Üie gioup or individual who is reported to be suspected 
of killing the victim, but they have not admitted responsibility for the attack.
Membership 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killer was a member of a terrorist group. Code 1 if the killer 
was not a member of a terrorist gioup.
GroupName 
Type: String
Definition: Give the name of the ten orist group the attacker was a member of.
Governmentlnvolvement 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if a government was involved in plamiing or carrying out the 
attack. The government may be any government, not necessaiily that of the country 
in which the attack took place. The involvement is likely to be along the lines of a 
“death squad”, or an order by the military/ministers/politicians to kill. Police 
involvement is coded elsewhere. Code 1 if there is no evidence that a country’s 
government/ruler was involved in the planning or commission of the attack.
WhichGovernment 
Type: Stiing
Definition: State the government winch was involved in the attack.
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Policelnvolvement 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the police were involved in planning the attack. The police as 
attacker should be coded in PoliceAssassin. Code 1 if there is no evidence that the 
police were involved in the planning of the attack.
Militaivlnvolvement 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the military were involved in planning the attack. Code 1 if 
there is no evidence that the militaiy were involved in the planning of the attack.
Conspiracv 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if there is evidence that the decision to kill the victim and/or the 
planning was made by a gioup, which is not a terrorist group. Code 1 if there was no 
evidence of a group making this decision. Also code 1 if there is evidence that a 
teiTorist gioup decided the victim should be killed/plamied the attack.
MotiveContract 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the actual killer was paid to kill the victim. The killer should be 
motivated solely by the money, and not because he/she is part of a tenorist group. 
Code 1 if there is no evidence that the killer was paid to kill.
InsideCoonerationAssassin 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killer was working covertly with the victim. This should 
include any attacker who worked for or with the victim, who intended to kill them. 
Code 1 if tlie killer was unknown to the victim, and did not work with him/her.
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InsideCooperationCollaborator 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if one (or more) of the collaborators (not killers) was working 
covertly with the victim. This should include any attacker who worked for or with 
the victim, who intended to plan to kill them. Code 1 if the killer was unknown to the 
victim, and did not work witli liim/her.
HistorvViolence 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if it is reported that the killer has a history of violent behaviom*, 
which can include self-reported violence or a histoiy of violent offending. Code 1 if 
there is no evidence of previous violence.
HistorvOffending 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if it is reported tliat the killer has a history of offending, of any 
kind of offence. Code 1 if tliere is no evidence of an offending history.
MI
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker has ever been diagnosed with a mental illness, 
either before, duiing or after the attack. Code 1 if there is no evidence to show that 
the killer had ever experienced mental illness.
Known
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if there is evidence that the killer was already known to 
intelligence seivices at the time of the attacker. Code 1 if there is no evidence that the 
intelligence services had been aware of the killer prior to the attack.
377
Part Two -  Result
ApprehendedScene 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker was apprehended at the scene of crime. This can 
include them being aii ested by police, or apprehended by a member of the public. 
Code 1 if they were not apprehended/arrested at the scene.
AssassinPresentLeft 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker was present at the scene, and left (i.e. was not 
caught). Code 1 if the attacker was present and did not leave, or if the attacker was 
not present.
LaterApprehended 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker was not apprehended at the scene of the attack, but 
was apprehended at a later date. Code 1 if the attacker was not apprehended at all, or 
was apprehended at the scene of the crime.
AssassinKilledScene 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker was killed at the scene of the attack. This is to 
include killing by police/militaiy/bystanders/protection officers/their collaborators. 
Code 1 if the killer was not killed at the scene of the crime.
StoppedScene 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the perpetrator was stopped at the scene of the attack. Code 1 if 
the peipetrator was not stopped at the scene (including because they were not at the 
scene).
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AssassiiiKilledAfter 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killer was killed at any time after the attack. Code 1 if the 
killer is still alive, or if this information is missing.
Confessed 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killer made a confession to the killing. Code 1 if no 
confession was ever made.
RehactedConfession 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killer confessed to the killing, but later withdrew the 
confession, at any stage for any reason. Code 1 if there was no confession, or if the 
killer never withdrew the confession.
AssassinConvicted 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killer was convicted for killing the victim. Code 1 if there 
was no conviction.
AssassinPrison 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killer was sentenced to prison after their conviction for the 
murder. Code 1 if they were not.
DeathSentence 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker was sentenced to deatli. Code 1 if they were not.
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AssassinSuicide 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the attacker committed suicide, any time after the attack. Code 
1 if they did not.
AssassinNeverldentified 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killer was never identified. Code 1 if the killer was 
identified.
ConspiratorApprehended 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the consph ator was apprehended. This should be coded as 2 if 
this was at the scene of the crime, or if not. Code as 2 even if not all of the 
conspirators were arrested. Consphators should be considered as any individual who 
was involved in deciding to kill the victim, or in planning to kill the victim. This 
includes those who were at the scene of the killing, but who did not actually 
physically attack the victim. Code 1 if there were no such conspirators (i.e. the killer 
worked alone) or if the conspirator(s) were never caught.
ConspiratorConfessed 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the conspirator confessed to being involved in the decision to 
kill, or the planning of the killing. This should be coded as 2 if an individual person 
confesses. If a group confesses and takes responsibility, tins should be coded imder 
“GroupResponsibility”.
ConspiratorConvicted 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the consphator was convicted for deciding to or planning to kill 
tlie victim. Code 1 if there was no conviction.
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ConspiratorPrison 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the killer was sentenced to prison after their conviction for the 
mm der. Code 1 if they were not,
ConspiratorReleased 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the conspirator was released ftom prison, either on appeal, or 
because they were given amnesty. Code 1 if they have been released because they 
have served their sentence.
ConspiratorNeverldentified 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if the conspirator(s) was (were) never identified. Code 1 if the 
conspirator(s) was (were) identified.
Rewai'dOffered 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Code 2 if a reward was offered to help find the killers and/or 
conspirators. Code 1 if there is no evidence of any reward.
RewardWho 
Type: Numeric
Definition: Specify who offered the rewaid, and the sum.
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APPENDIX C
382
Country N=
Afghanistan 11
Algeria 4
Armenia 8
Austialia 1
Azerbaijan 3
Belgium 3
Bosnia-Hercegovina 1
Brazil 3
Bulgaiia 1
Burkina Faso 1
Cambodia 1
Caucasas, Ingushetia 1
Checlmya 2
Chile 2
Colombia 5
Corsica 2
DR Congo 4
Ecuador 1
Egypt 2
Eire 3
England 5
Ethiopia 2
France 9
Gaza 12
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Georgia 1
Germany 5
Greece 4
Guatemala 1
Haiti 1
Holland 1
Hong Kong 1
India 3
Iran 1
Iraq 29
Israel 2
Italy 4
Japan 3
Jordan 3
Kashmir 1
Kazakhstan 2
Kenya 3
Lebanon 16
Malta 1
Mexico 2
Mozambique 1
Norüiem Ireland 58
Nepal 1
Nicaragua 1
Niger 1
Nigeria 5
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Pakistan 11
Palestine 4
Panama 1
Paraguay 1
Pern 2
Philippines 1
Poland 1
Qatai* 1
Russia 37
Rwanda 2
Senegal 1
Serbia 10
Sicily 4
Slovakia (Slovak Republic) 1
Somalia 2
South Africa 7
South Korea 1
Spain 25
Sri Lanka 13
Sweden 1
Switzerland 2
Syiia 4
The Netherlands 1
Tunisia 3
Turkey 11
Uganda 1
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Ukraine 1
USA 4
Venezuala 1
West Bank 3
Yemen 1
Zambia 1
Not specified 3
Total 400
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APPENDIX D
387
COMMUNIST/SOCIALIST
• Red Brigades for the Construction of the Communist 
Combatants/Construction of a Fighting Communist Party 
Breakaway faction of the Irish People’s Liberation Organisation (aka INLA) 
ETA
INLA (Msh National Liberation Aimy)
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front & Lautaio Youth Movement 
Populai* Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
Red Army Faction 
Shining Path 
November 17
NATIONALIST/SEPARATIST
Breakaway faction of the Irish People’s Liberation Organisation (aka INLA) 
Abu Nidal/Kach movement/Kahana Hay movement 
ETA
INLA (Irish National Liberation Army)
IRA
Loyalist Volunteer Force
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)/Tamil Tigers 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
Red Hand Defenders
Ulster Defence Association (UDA)AJlster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Maityi’s of the al-Aqsa Intifada 
November 17
Unspecified Militant Sepaiatist Group
ANTI-GLOBALISATION
• November 17
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RACIST
• Abu Nidal/Kach movement/Kahana Hay movement 
RELIGIOUS
• Abu Nidal/Kach movement/Kahana Hay movement
• Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (the “Islamic Group”) (aka al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya 
(GIA))
• A1 Qaeda
• Islamic Action
• Taliban
• Islamic militants, likely Islamic Liberation Organisation
LEFTIST
• Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left)
• Dev Sol & Turkish People’s Liberation Party Front
UNCLASSIFIED
Al-Awja (Palestinian org.) (appeal's in Mickolus)
Committee for the Release of Moshood Abiola 
Al-Jama’ah of International Justice (appears in Mickolus)
Direct Action Against Drugs (allegedly a fr ont for the PIRA)
First Panthic Committee 
Islamic Revenge 
Jihad & Victory in Greater Syria 
Loyalist Defence & Retaliation Group 
(N.Ireland) Loyalists 
Mafia/Cosa Nostra
Mexican Front Against Government Corruption (appears in Mickolus) 
People’s Aimy (killed in Senegal)
Stragglers for the Unity and Freedom of Levant 
Youth of the Armed Struggle 
Unspecified group
